Very often, victims or purported victims of domestic violence hear about the concept of the cycle of domestic violence. Also, it is not uncommon for victims of domestic violence not to report acts of domestic violence once or many times for many reasons. Often, victims of domestic violence are nervous when they testify – they are confronting their abuser after all and moreover, most people are not professional witnesses.
But can a judge at a domestic violence Final Restraining Order hearing (trial) simply justify the nervousness and failure to report prior acts based on battered woman syndrome?
That was the issue that arose in the unreported (non-precedential) Appellate Division decision released on January 27, 2025 in the case of Y.H. v. Y.P. The Appellate Division held that such a finding, unsupported by expert testimony was improper and vacated the Final Restraining Order, returning the matter to the trial court for a new hearing.
The facts of the are sexually graphic but need not be recounted here. Suffice it to say that at issue was credibility over whether or not certain sexual activities between the parties was consensual or sexual assault, as alleged by the plaintiff.
One of the major issues on appeal was as follows:
… In deciding whether to grant the FRO, the trial court found plaintiff to be “a more credible witness” addressing her demeanor, which was “nervous,” but finding “the basis [of] that
nervousness . . . can be found in the classic case of State v. Kelly which talks about the battered woman syndrome.” The trial court then discussed Sacharow v. Sacharow, 177 N.J. 62 (2003), and explained although “[p]eople [who] suffer from battered woman syndrome do [not] readily report things immediately. . . . the plaintiff testified at great length how she attempted to report the incident.”
Also, at issue was whether the trial court made sufficient findings of fact related both to the claim of sexual assault and whether there was a need for the FRO as required to be made under the second prong of the Silver case. The Appellate Division found that the factfinding was lacking in each instance. That happens all of the time but for the purposes of this blog, the reference to battered woman’s syndrome is more interesting.
As to that issue, the Appellate Division held:
Additionally, the trial court did not explain why it found plaintiff “could not get out of [defendant’s] control,” and cited the battered women’s syndrome. The battered woman’s syndrome was not raised by plaintiff or defendant, nor was there any expert testimony offered at trial with respect to it. The New Jersey Supreme Court has held “that ‘the battered[]woman’s syndrome is an appropriate subject for expert testimony; that the experts’ conclusions . . . are sufficiently reliable under New Jersey’s standards for scientific testimony.'” State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 491 (2006) (quoting Kelly, 97 N.J. at 187). Here, the trial court erred in relying upon the battered woman’s syndrome to make credibility determinations and findings without any testimony regarding same, and without the introduction of expert testimony pursuant to the New Jersey Rules of Evidence. See N.J.R.E. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”). A finding that a victim is suffering from battered women’s
syndrome is not necessary in order for a restraining order to issue; domestic violence and battered women’s syndrome are not synonymous. It is axiomatic that not every victim of domestic violence suffers from battered women’s syndrome. (Emphasis added).
As to battered woman’s syndrome, particularly in light of the brevity of the parties’ relationship, the Appellate Division noted:
The trial court also erred in relying upon the battered woman’s syndrome in reaching its conclusions because the “[s]yndrome is recognized as ‘a collection of common behavioral and psychological characteristics exhibited in women who repeatedly are physically and emotionally abused over a prolonged length of time by the dominant male figure in their lives.’” State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 149 (2011) (quoting State v. B.H., 183 N.J. 171, 182 (2005)). Here, plaintiff was in a relationship with defendant from May 9 through May 24 and the trial court failed to address how it found plaintiff was suffering from battered women’s syndrome for a “prolonged length of time.” Nor did the trial court make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the reasons why the court reached the conclusion that “one or more factors of coercive control are more or less relevant than others.” Plaintiff did not testify she was under defendant’s control during their brief relationship. (Emphasis added)
Thus, the takeaway is that while battered woman’s syndrome is serious when it occurs, it cannot be used out of thin air (and seemingly incorrectly in this case), to justify finding a party more credible and entering an FRO. Quite frankly, it seems like an unforced error in this case because the judge could have simply found plaintiff to be more credible and then conformed the findings to the statutory definition of sexual assault without muddying the waters unnecessarily with references/findings regarding battered woman’s syndrome. Ultimately, that may be the result if the new judge who hears the matter on remand similarly believes that plaintiff is more credible than defendant.
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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Department of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys. Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Morristown, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973) 994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.