The topic of coercive control is one that rightfully has gotten a lot of attention in the last few years. It is coming up more and more as part of custody cases.

Moreover, in January of 2024, New Jersey’s Domestic Violence statute was amended to include coercive control – not as a predicate act of domestic violence (though prior proposed versions of amendments to the statute included it as such), but rather, among the statutory factors courts must consider when determining whether to issue a Final Restraining Order (FRO). Specifically, courts are now required to analyze it in the secondary “Silver” analysis, once domestic violence has been proven, to determine if there is a need for the protections of an FRO.

On February 10, 2026, Judge Berdote Byrne of the Appellate Division issued its first reported (precedential) opinion addressing coercive control since the statute was amended in 2024 in the case of S.M.T. v. S.A.

This is an interesting case both because the trial judge found that plaintiff proved simply assault but found that the physical assault was “marital contretemps” and not domestic violence. Worse yet, the trial court found that the existing divorce matter was the forum appropriate to protect the plaintiff from future harm.

It is also interesting because the Appellate Division reversed not only on a misapplication of the law, but also, overturned credibility findings based upon the evidence in the record. That rarely happens!

In reversing, the Appellate Division concluded that plaintiff required the protections of an FRO holding:

…We disagree and conclude S.M.T. demonstrated the need for an FRO because she proved simple assault, sexual assault, and coercive control, and established the likelihood of a risk of
continued domestic violence. A pending dissolution matter is not the appropriate forum to address future risk of domestic violence, unless the parties have mutually agreed to civil restraints… (Emphasis added).

In this case, the parties had been sleeping in separate bedrooms for 6 months when the defendant came into plaintiff’s room, got into her bed and refused to leave after she asked him to. Defendant hit plaintiff in the face with a hard pillow used for neck problems causing her a lot of pain in her face and neck. As a result, plaintiff obtained a TRO. In her complaint, she alleged a prior assault with injuries. Plaintiff then amended her TRO multiple times to include more prior acts.

At the hearing, she testified as to coercive control including not allowing her to take the children to Egypt to visit her father who was ill with cancer (he took them to Saudi Arabia instead); trying to stop her from traveling to see her sister when her sister had cancer; placing hidden cameras in the marital residence; controlling access to the home by changing lock codes; opening her packages; cutting off her phone line; restricting access to Wi-Fi; and restricting the children’s access to the plaintiff by taking away their electronics.

She also testified about forced sexual intercourse, forcing her to do what was on “sex cards”, as well as other unwanted sexual acts that plaintiff claimed were sexual assault.

The trial court found that the act of smashing plaintiff in the face with a pillow was simple assault but that the other allegations of physical abuse, sexual abuse and coercive control were simply “marital contretemps” that did not warrant an FRO. Note that the trial court never made any actual factual findings regarding the allegations of these things.

In first addressing the simple assault issue and how the trial judge’s finding that plaintiff did not need an FRO did not square with the law, the Appellate Division held:

When the predicate act involves physical force and violence, “the risk of harm is so great that the inquiry [regarding the secondary analysis of Silver] can be perfunctory.” J.D., 207 N.J. at 488. In these cases, “the decision to issue an FRO ‘is most often . . . self-evident.'” A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J. Super. 402, 417 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Silver, 387 N.J. at 127)….

Given that this has been the law for about 10 years, it remains shocking how often assault cases get reversed because a trial judge disregarded this finding of law.

As to the sexual assault allegation, the Appellate Division reiterated that the statute provides that, “”[a]n actor is guilty of sexual assault if the actor commits an act of sexual penetration with another person . . . using coercion or without the victim’s affirmative and freely given permission, but the victim does not sustain severe personal injury.” Here, the Appellate Division concluded that the trial court failed to make specific findings as to the allegations of non-consensual sex or whether a sexual assault had occurred.

The court also seem constrained to reiterate what most people should know, that is, that sexual assault my occur between two people who are married. This case had a cultural element to it where the plaintiff testified that the husband would use religious obligations and the wife’s duty to obey, as justification for forcing her to engage un unwanted sexual conduct.

The trial court’s finding is even more troubling because the trial judge found that defendant felt that he had a right to control plaintiff. In fact, the Appellate Division noted:

“It’s clear from the contentions that it’s somehow recognized by [S.M.T.] that [S.A.] feels he
has a right to exert certain authority over her, and again, the [c]ourt doesn’t pretend to understand the actual tenets of the faith or culture in that regard.” Tenets of faith and culture are not relevant as to whether acts of physical or sexual assault occurred. (Emphasis added)

As to the issue of coercive control, Judge Berdotte Byrne noted:

Effective January 8, 2024, the PDVA was amended to include coercive control among the statutory factors courts must consider when determining whether to issue an FRO. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(7). Coercive control is not among the predicate acts enumerated in the PDVA; rather, it is analyzed pursuant to the secondary analysis of Silver once a predicate act of domestic violence has been proven.

Our courts have long recognized controlling behavior as a dangerous form of domestic violence that threatens the safety of those subjected to it. See Cesare, 154 N.J. at 397 (describing domestic violence “as a ‘pattern of abusive and controlling behavior injurious to its victims'” (emphasis added) (quoting Peranio v. Peranio, 280 N.J. Super. 47, 52 (App. Div. 1995))). In New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. I.H.C., we noted the testimony of an expert in domestic violence, who described coercive control as a:

malevolent course of conduct directed toward a social partner in order to dominate that partner using strategies of physical abuse, isolation from support systems, intimidation involving threats, degradation involving emotional abuse, confinement [and] can also
include surveillance, and restrictions on the ability to move freely and act independently and make autonomous decisions. [415 N.J. Super. 551, 564 (App. Div. 2010).]

The Legislature’s recent amendment of the PDVA to include coercive control of a secondary analysis factor in determining whether an FRO should issue reflects a renewed intent to prevent this type of domestic violence….

The Court then went on to include the entirety of the statutory definition of coercive control and then held that the trial court failed to make findings regarding the allegations of coercive control. The Appellate Division, looking at the evidence, held that plaintiff:

… detailed S.A.’s acts of coercive control in limiting her travel, controlling the family’s finances and her access to money, surveillance by various electronic means, and depriving her
of sleep using lights, television noise, and spilling water on her. This testimony supports a finding that S.A.’s acts of coercive control required issuance of an FRO.

The takeaways of this case are twofold. First, if the court finds assault, a final restraining order should issue in most cases. Second, if there has been coercive control, it should be presented by the plaintiff and the court has to make fact findings about it. In many cases where the predicate act is borderline, it may be the difference to whether the court finds the need for an FRO. On the other hand, because coercive control was not made a predicate act when the statute was amended, the evidence of coercive control, in and of itself, should not be the basis of an FRO when the predicate act was not proven and/or it was actually “marital contretemps.”

In any event, it is good that there is now precedential guidance regarding the issue.

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Department of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys. Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Morristown, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973) 994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.