Modification

Subscribe to Modification

As avid readers of this blog know, New Jersey’s recently amended alimony statute has been the inspiration for many blogs posts as cases interpreting same are coming down the pike. Under the amended statute, a party may seek to terminate or modify his or her spousal support obligation based upon an actual or “prospective” retirement. While this was seemingly good news for those seeking to retire, the question many practitioners had was what does “prospective” actually mean?

In the case of Mueller v. Mueller, Judge Lawrence Jones provides some insight as to this very question. The facts in Mueller are simple. The parties were married for twenty (20) years, divorcing in 2006. Under the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement, the obligor was to pay $300.00 per week in permanent alimony and their agreement did not expressly address retirement or its relationship to the alimony obligation.

The obligor filed a post-judgment motion, under New Jersey’s amended alimony law, seeking a determination that his alimony would end in five (5) years. At the time of the hearing, the obligor was 57 years old. In five years, he would be 62 and entitled to receive his full employment-related pension benefit. The obligor asserted that if his alimony does not end at that time, that he will be unable to retirement at that age.

Judge Jones provides a thorough analysis of the obligor’s claim, specifically discussing the distinction of a pre-September 2014 agreement modification/termination analysis (where the burden is on the obligor to demonstrate why alimony should terminate) vs. a post-September agreement modification/termination analysis (where there is a rebuttable presumption of termination with the burden on the recipient).

He also notes that the amended statute covers the situation where an obligor wishes to retire earlier than “full retirement age” as defined by the receipt of full social security benefits”, which in this particular case would be 66 years and 8 months for the obligor. The rationale behind this provision is to avoid the proverbial “Catch-22” financial situation.

Specifically, if an obligor is considering the possibility of retirement in the near future, he or she logically benefits from knowing in advance, before making the decision to actually leave the workforce, whether the existing alimony obligation will or will not change following retirement. Otherwise, if the obligor first retires and unilaterally terminates his or her primary significant stream of income before knowing whether the alimony obligation will end or change, then the obligor may find him/herself in a precarious financial position following such voluntary departure from employment if the court does not terminate or significantly reduce the existing alimony obligation.

When applying the new law to the facts of the Mueller case, Judge Jones held:
• The spirit of the statute inherently contemplates that the prospective retirement will take effect within reasonable proximity to the application itself, rather than several years in advance.
o Thus, in this specific case, the request for an order prospectively terminating alimony five (5) years in advance does not lend itself to the Court being able to reasonably analyze and consider all relevant information. The Court warns about how an application too far in advance of prospective retirement could in essence be nothing more than an attempt to summarily change the terms of an alimony settlement agreement.

• An order for prospective termination or modification of alimony based upon reaching a certain retirement age inherently contemplates that the obligor not only reaches retirement age, but actually retires at that point. If the obligor reaches the age, but does not actually retire, the “retirement age” provisions do not trigger until such time as the obligor actually retires or submits an application regarding a prospective retirement in the future.

o Here, the obligor did not provide a specific plan but merely stated a desire to potentially retire in five (5) years, without anything more. While this case does not create a bright-line for when such applications should be brought, Judge Jones notes that a prospective retirement application brought, 12-18 months before prospective retirement, may be more appropriate.

The takeaway from this case is that while the amended alimony statute permits a degree of reasonable prospective adjudication by the court for a prospective rather than actual retirement, an attempt to engage in the necessary statutory analysis several years in advance of such retirement would likely be replete with long-term guesswork. Any such effort would essentially ignore the practical reality that the parties’ economic situations, health and other relevant factors may radically change over such a lengthy period of time, before an actual retirement ever takes place. If you are paying alimony and are within 12-18 months of retirement, you should think about consulting with an experienced professional to discuss your options regarding the termination or modification of your alimony obligation.

Signed into law on January 19, 2016, New Jersey’s emancipation law is set to take effect on February 1, 2017 and will apply to all child support orders issued prior to or after its effective date.

37774117 - definition of word emancipation in dictionary

One of the highlights of the new law is that it will dramatically impact when and how child support orders will terminate. Specifically, it provides that unless otherwise indicated in a court order or judgment, the obligation to pay child support shall terminate without order on the date a child marries, dies or enters into military service.

Child support will also terminate automatically when a child reaches 19 years of age unless (a) another age for such termination is specified in a court order, which shall not extend beyond the date the child reaches 23 years of age; (b) a written request seeking the continuation of child support is submitted to the court by a custodial parent prior to the child reaching the age of 19; or (c) the child receiving support is in an out of home placement through the Division of child Protection and Permanency in the Department of Children and Families.

Just ahead of the effective date of the statute, Judge Jones issued an opinion on the effect of one child’s emancipation in Harrington v. Harrington. In Harrington, the parties divorced in 2012. The parties have three children, all of whom were unemancipated at the time of the divorce. As such, the parties’ settlement agreement provided that the father would pay the mother the sum of $240 per week in child support for all three children. In what would become a decisive fact in the case for Judge Jones, he noted that the child support was unallocated, rather than broken down or allocated into specific dollar amounts for each child – either on a one-third per child basis or otherwise.

Following the divorce, the father paid child support as agreed without requesting an modifications, even when their oldest child began college. In September, 2014 the parties mutually agreed to emancipate their two oldest children. Two orders were entered confirming the emancipation, but the amount of child support that the father paid remained the same. Further, neither party submitted or exchanged updated financial information or filed any motion.
In June, 2015, the last remaining unemancipated child graduated high school and decided not to proceed to college. The father continued to pay $240 per week in child support nonetheless, without any objection by either party.

In February, 2016, a year-and-a-half after the first two children were emancipated, the father filed a motion for the retroactive allocation of child support to $80 per child, and downward modification of one-third per emancipated child, effective September, 2104. He also sought to emancipate the youngest child and terminate his obligation. The mother consented to the emancipation of the youngest child, but opposed the retroactive modification that the father sought.
With regard to the issue of retroactive emancipation, the Court initially grappled with which law to apply in this situation: should it apply the anti-retroactivity statute which prohibits the retroactive modification of unallocated child support, or does the case law with regard to retroactive emancipation apply?

In reaching its decision, the Court devised a set of equitable factors that should be examined:

1) How much time has passed between the date of one child’s emancipation and the filing date of the obligor’s present motion for retroactive modification of unallocated child support for the remaining unemancipated child or children?

2) What are the specific reasons for any delay by the obligor in filing a motion to review support based upon emancipation?

3) Did the non-custodial parent continue to pay the same level of child support to the obligee, either by agreement or acquiescence, and of his or her own decision and free will, even after he/she could have filed a motion for emancipation at a prior point in time?

4) Did the custodial parent or child engage in any fraud or misrepresentation that caused the obligor’s delay in filing a motion for emancipation and support modification motion?

5) If the non-custodial parent alleges that the custodial parent failed to communicate facts that would have led to emancipation and modification of support at an earlier date, could the non-custodial parent have nonetheless otherwise easily obtained such information with a reasonable degree of parental diligence and inquiry?

6) If the obligor’s child support obligation was unallocated between multiple unemancipated children of the parties, will a proposed retroactive modification of child support over a lengthy period of time be unduly cumbersome and complicated, so as to call into question the accuracy and reliability of the process and result?

7) Did the custodial parent previously refrain from seeking to enforce or validly increase other financial obligations of the non-custodial parent, such as college contribution for any remaining unemancipated child, because during such time period, the non-custodial parent continued to maintain the same level of unallocated child support without seeking a decrease or other modification?

8) Is the non-custodial parent seeking only a credit against unpaid arrears, or rather an actual return of child support already paid to, and used by, the custodial parent toward the financial expenses of the child living in the custodial parent’s home?

9) If the non-custodial parent seeks an actual return of money previously paid to the custodial parent, what is the estimated dollar amount of child support that the non- custodial parent seeks to receive back from the custodial parent, and will such amount likely cause an inequitable financial hardship to the custodial parent who previously received such funds in good faith?

10) Are there any other factors the court deems relevant to the analysis?

In applying the above factors to the present case, the Court considered the following factors: nearly a year and a half passed between the effective date of the emancipation for the older two children and the filing of the father’s motion; there was no reason provided to explain the delay in filing; during that period, the father continued to pay the same level of child support to the mother; there was no evidence submitted that the mother or the children engaged in any type of fraud; the mother and children communicated facts that would have led to a modification of support; and, a retroactive modification of support to 2014 may be unduly complicated given the fact that no financial information was submitted for the period of time in question – 2014-2016.

The Court noted that a hearing should to be scheduled to examine these factors and weigh the comparative equities to determine whether to exercise its discretion and retroactively modify unallocated child support prior to the motion filing date, based upon a prior emancipation of one or more children. However, the Court was somber in its knowledge that this would not be an easy task – i.e. to recreate what child support *might* have looked like over a two year period of time.
____________________________________________________________________________________
Eliana Baer, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP Eliana T. Baer is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Eliana practices in Fox Rothschild’s Princeton, New Jersey office and focuses her state-wide practice on representing clients on issues relating to divorce, equitable distribution, support, custody, adoption, domestic violence, premarital agreements and Appellate Practice. You can reach Eliana at (609) 895-3344, or etbaer@foxrothschild.com.

I’m not usually one to place a lot of stock in celebrity gossip, but I couldn’t help but take notice of the fact that it has been rumored that Amber Heard’s monthly income is $10,000, yet she spends $44,000 a month on shopping, dining out and vacations. Her ask for spousal support: $50,000 per month, based upon the parties’ marital lifestyle.

45351836 - champagne bottle in ice bucket and two full glasses realistic vector illustration
45351836 – champagne bottle in ice bucket and two full glasses realistic vector illustration

Amber Heard may not be only one spending beyond her means. This phenomenon applies to us common folk as well.

Particularly during the economic downturn, we have seen many cases where parties have splurged during times of plenty and then failed to scale back when the economic downturn hit. As a result, the parties are living on credit or perhaps not paying their bills. It, in effect, creates an artificial lifestyle which neither party really has the ability to maintain.

This puts the Court in a tough spot. On the one hand, the Supreme Court explained in Crews, “the standard of living experienced during the marriage . . . serves as the touchstone for the initial alimony award.” On the other hand, what happens when the marital standard of living is based on nothing more than irresponsible spending?

An unpublished case was just recently decided by the Appellate Division that touched on this issue. Although the crux of the case really focused on the reversal of a judge’s suspension of alimony as a discovery sanction, what peaked my interest was how the judge dealt with what he classified as an “artificial lifestyle,” marked by the parties’ “irresponsible spending and outlandish behavior, whether going on expensive vacations to South America and Europe, or purchasing fancy cars” when awarding alimony.

In Ponzetto v. Barbetti, decided on June 28, 2016, the parties had a nineteen year marriage which ended in a contentious divorce when the parties were in their mid-forties. The parties did not have any children and the only issues in the case were equitable distribution and alimony, both of which were hotly litigated during the course of a lengthy trial.

The husband had started a sound system business when he was a teenager, for which the wife kept the books. At one point, the business was so lucrative, that it generated revenue of $500,000 per year. These were the times of plenty.

Unfortunately, the business suffered during the economic downturn. The parties’ lifestyle, however, did not. They continued to spend lavishly. By the time of the divorce, they had two Ferraris, a Harley Davidson, Pontiac Fiero and two hummers.

While typically a judge would look at the parties’ spending during the last several years of the marriage to determine lifestyle, in this case, the trial judge found that it would not be appropriate to do so in this situation, where the lifestyle was not based on income or need.

As a result, the judge declined to use “the parties’ irresponsible spending from 2006 through 2008 in determining marital lifestyle” and instead determined to “kindly” utilize the marital lifestyle from 1990 through 2006, which the judge determined to be $14,500 per month. Ultimately, the wife was awarded $400 per week in alimony.

This is just one example of how a judge has dealt with this increasingly common situation. However, judges are frequently placed in these precarious situations, where the parties have exceeded a reasonable lifestyle based upon their income as compared to their expenses. In the case of Ponzetto v. Barbetti, the judge crafted a remedy that was equitable given the specific circumstances of the case.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Eliana Baer, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLPEliana T. Baer is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Eliana practices in Fox Rothschild’s Princeton, New Jersey office and focuses her state-wide practice on representing clients on issues relating to divorce, equitable distribution, support, custody, adoption, domestic violence, premarital agreements and Appellate Practice. You can reach Eliana at (609) 895-3344, or etbaer@foxrothschild.com.

It’s a tale as old as time. Divorced parents bash each other in hopes of garnering favor with their child during a divorce or custody dispute. At some point the child, becomes so exposed to the bashing, blame and ill-will from one parent toward another that the child becomes disenchanted with the other parent; the relationship begins to break down, sometimes, irreparably.

25487205 - unhappy family and child custody battle concept sketched on sticky note paper
25487205 – unhappy family and child custody battle concept sketched on sticky note paper

This strategy is known as parental alienation, and is being increasingly tossed around in Court battles – sometimes by a truly harmful parent who has exploited their child for a litigation win or as some sort of perverse retribution, and sometimes, it is levied against a parent legitimately attempting to protect their child from abuse or neglect.

However, in cases of true alienation, it is clear that it is injurious to all involved. University of Texas psychologist Richard Warshak, author of Divorce Poison: Protecting the Parent-Child Bond from a Vindictive Ex explains that it’s typically the emotionally healthier parent that is rejected, whereas the alienating parent thinks it acceptable to use the child as a form of punishment for the other parent. Warshak characterized it as a form of abuse toward both parent and child.

Still, as Eric Solotoff blogged in late 2012, the American Psychiatric Association board of trustees will still not go so far as to characterize Parental Alienation Syndrome as a mental illness in the DSM 5 (released in May 2013).

Yet, given the grave effects of parental alienation on both parent and child, it is no surprise that Courts are taking aggressive steps to try to restore the parent-child bond. Experts advise that alienation requires an order from a Court to allow a manipulated child time to bond with the alienated parent.

Sometimes, this will mean reunification therapy for the child and alienated parent, perhaps beginning once a week, and then gradually increasing. The therapist may ultimately place the child and parent in a “real-life” situation, like having the therapy occur in a diner, or at the park. Eventually, the parent may have parenting time alone with the child for an increasing amount of time as the relationship progresses.

For more extreme cases of alienation, where the child is completely past the point of even being open to conventional reunification therapy, the Court may order an intensive, immersion therapy program such as Stable Paths, which is described on its website as an “intensive therapeutic reunification intervention for families impacted by separation resulting from high-conflict divorce, parental alienation, and familial abduction.”

There, the families essentially move on to a tranquil campus, and immerse themselves in therapeutic activities together, such as horseback riding, cooking, sports and games. The goal is to create new memories and re-establish existing bonds and attachments in hopes of repairing the relationship. Each family leaves with a treatment plan for reunification.

The most extreme cases, however, may warrant a complete overhaul to the custody arrangement. Judges may award primary custody of the child to the alienated parent in an effort to extract the child from a toxic situation and reestablish the bond with the other parent.

In 2012, in Milne v. Goldenberg, the Appellate Division reaffirmed the necessity of trial court judges to consider removing a child from the custody of the uncooperative parent and/or imposing temporary or permanent modification of custody. The decision reinforced the holding of New Jersey courts that interference with an ex-spouse’s parenting rights is so inimical to the welfare of the child that judges should transfer custody when the non-compliance puts parent/child relationships at risk:

[T]he necessity for at least minimal parental cooperation in a joint custody arrangement presents a thorny problem of judicial enforcement in a case such as the present one, wherein despite the trial court’s determination that joint custody is in the best interests of the child, one parent (here, the mother) nevertheless contends that cooperation is impossible and refuses to abide by the decree…However, when the actions of such a parent deprive the child of the kind of relationship with the other parent that is deemed to be in the child’s best interests, removing the child from the custody of the uncooperative parent may well be appropriate as a remedy of last resort.

The Milne court reinforces that the Rules of Court provide for a change of custody as a remedy for recalcitrant parents. R. 5:3-7(a)(6) explains that remedies for violations of custody and parenting time Orders include “temporary or permanent modification of the custodial arrangement provided such relief is in the best interest of the children.”

Turning custody on its head, although seemingly an effective remedy, may prove difficult to swallow for some judges. Even if the Court finds alienation has occurred, it may prove almost impossible to override the child’s wishes, who, by the time the Court is involved, may be a preteen absolutely refusing to have any relationship with the alienated parent.

Accordingly to Psychology Today, House Divided: Hate Thy Father, by Mark Teich, it will take a “sophisticated judge to realize what psychologists might see as obvious: Deep down, the child has never really stopped loving the other parent. He or she has just been brainwashed like a prisoner of war or a cult victim, programmed to accept destructive beliefs until critical thinking can be restored.”

The same sophistication is required when a judge is asked to identify whether a parent accused of alienation is merely attempting to protect his or her child from actual abuse by the other parent. Parental alienation seems to have taken on “buzz word” status in recent years, being used even in cases where there may be a legitimate concern for the child’s safety and wellbeing.

As it stands right now, alienation can be repaired, but it requires judges to:

(1) Differentiate real alienation from legitimate concerns about abuse or neglect;
(2) Order parents to intensive therapy programs and ensure that resulting treatment plans are complied with; and
(3) Overlook the supposed desires of an alienated child to see that he or she has never stopped loving their parent, but has just been brainwashed to accept untrue and very destructive beliefs.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Eliana Baer, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLPEliana T. Baer is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Eliana practices in Fox Rothschild’s Princeton, New Jersey office and focuses her state-wide practice on representing clients on issues relating to divorce, equitable distribution, support, custody, adoption, domestic violence, premarital agreements and Appellate Practice. You can reach Eliana at (609) 895-3344, or etbaer@foxrothschild.com.

With summer just beginning, many people have visions of swimming pools, beaches and family vacations. Others in New Jersey have visions of Sallie Mae, tuition bills and book fees.

After four years of what has become obligatory college contribution pursuant to the mandates of Newburgh v. Arrigo, many parents in the state are then faced with the daunting possibility of an additional 3-4 (maybe more?) years of opening their wallets and contribute toward the cost of graduate school; sometimes for their 24, 25, 26 or 27 year old children who are not yet considered emancipated pursuant to our current laws. Many times, child support also continues during that period.

45567922 - graduate figure made out of falling sand from dollar sign flowing through hourglass

Indeed, New Jersey courts have recognized that completion of undergraduate education is not the determinative factor for either declaring emancipation or terminating child support. Many times, the determination as to whether child support would continue, and along with it the parents’ obligation to contribute toward the cost of the child’s education, focused largely on the whether the child, is “beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtains an independent status of his or her own”.

New Jersey is in fact one of the few states in the country that still requires divorced parents to pay for their children’s college educations. Even fewer require contribution toward graduate school. However, New Jersey remained an outlier in that regard.

For example, in the 1979 case of Ross v. Ross, the Chancery Division declared that the parties’ daughter could not be considered emancipated as she was attending law school after obtaining her undergraduate degree.

As recently as 2010 in Mulcahey v. Melici, the Appellate Division upheld a trial court’s determination that a 23 year old child was not emancipation and was entitled to contribution toward her education costs as well as continued child support. Eric Solotoff previously blogged about this case in his post entitled: I Don’t Have to Pay for My Kid’s Graduate School, Do I?

The New Jersey Emancipation Statute, signed into law on January 19, 2016, is set to take effect on February 1, 2017, and may change the way courts view graduate school contribution.

Whereas previously emancipation was a fact specific inquiry focusing on the level of independence of the child, now, child support “shall not extend beyond the date the child reaches 23 years of age.”

Does this mean that the possible obligation to contribute toward a child’s graduate school education is a thing of the past? If emancipation must occur by the age of 23, and the obligation to contribute hinges on the question of whether the child is emancipated, how could a parent be required to contribute to graduate school?

Another interesting question will be whether an agreement to pay for graduate school at the time of the divorce, pre-statute will be enforced.
Recall also the New Jersey Rutgers University professor who was ordered to pay more than $112,000 for his daughter to attend Cornell Law School in 2014 because he had agreed to contribute in his divorce settlement agreement, but failed to place any cap on tuition.

The enforcement of agreements to contribute toward college is extensively addressed in Robert Epstein’s – Appellate Division Addresses Enforceability of Settlement Agreement as to College in New Published Decision – but it will be interesting to see if the same principles are applied when it comes to graduate school.

We will keep you posted as the case law is decided.
_____________________________________________________________________________

Eliana Baer, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP Eliana T. Baer is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Eliana practices in Fox Rothschild’s Princeton, New Jersey office and focuses her state-wide practice on representing clients on issues relating to divorce, equitable distribution, support, custody, adoption, domestic violence, premarital agreements and Appellate Practice. You can reach Eliana at (609) 895-3344, or

Too often in family law practice, the discovery process by which one litigant is supposed to procure information from the other litigant becomes a frustrating and costly game where the non-compliant party hopes that the other party will simply give up rather than continue the chase down the rabbit hole of information.  Long-term readers of this blog may, in fact, remember Eric Solotoff’s post about the Discovery Dance, where parties can, in fact, “dance if they want to and leave their friends behind”.  Information is deliberately withheld, or incomplete, or ignored, etc.   As opposed to standard civil litigation, however, it often seems that a non-compliant litigant does not pay the price for such misconduct.  While perhaps this simply goes along with family law’s often mis-characterized “Wild West” reputation, what is one party who simply can’t get information from the other party to do when discovery motions are commonly frowned upon as a waste of the court’s limited resources?

Hide and seek

This is especially true in cases where one party seeks to modify an alimony or child support obligation.  Trying to get the full financial picture, especially from the party seeking the modification, is often the most difficult challenge of litigating such a matter.  It often becomes even more difficult in cases where either party is remarried and the new spouse has assets, income and the like that the remarried litigant does everything he or she can to shield from the court’s consideration.  This becomes a problem when one party is, perhaps, providing the new spouse with money to hold in a separate account, or the house is solely in the new spouse’s name, and the like.  In other words, the financial picture can be manipulated a dozen different ways and roadblocks structured so that the court never has all of the relevant facts and circumstances upon which to render a determination.

In Null v. Null, a recently unpublished (not precedential) decision from the Appellate Division, an ex-husband’s application seeking a termination of his alimony obligation was dismissed – with prejudice – because of his repeated refusals to comply with discovery requests and related court orders.  Here is a brief recitation of the relevant facts:

  • After a lengthy post-judgment procedural history wherein the payor sought to terminate his alimony obligation, the court – in November 2010 – found that he had made an initial showing of “changed circumstances” sufficient to warrant a plenary hearing on his motion to reduce alimony.  Notably, payee claimed that payor had entirely stopped making alimony payments at that point.
  • The judge directed that payor produce certain forms of discovery including, but not limited to, his current wife’s most recent three pay stubs.  Payor objected, moving to bar discovery of his new wife’s assets.  The motion was denied because payor was claiming to be employed by a business owned by new wife, and payee claimed that payor had placed businesses and assets he owned in new wife’s name.
  • Payor subsequently moved again to block discovery of his new wife’s financial information and was denied.  Payor was ordered to pay counsel fees – the first of many consequences to the payor for his misconduct.  New wife was also ordered to sit for her deposition.
  • At her deposition, new wife failed to produce tax returns or pay stubs as previously ordered.  She also failed to produce documents relating to the dry cleaning business payee claimed was owned by her.
  • With scheduled trial dates having come and gone, and payor still having failed to comply with discovery, the trial court denied payor’s motion to depose payee and compel her to undergo an employability evaluation.  In so doing, the judge noted that payor took no issue with violating discovery orders, and “unreasonably delayed” payee’s ability to effectuate litigation.  Counsel fees were again awarded for payee.
  • In October 2013 – three years after the initial changed circumstances burden was fulfilled – a third trial judge entered an order rescheduling the plenary hearing, and appointing an expert to examine businesses allegedly owned by new wife and operated by payor.  Payee was permitted to depose new wife as to whether payor maintained an equitable ownership of the businesses registered to new wife.  Payee was again awarded counsel fees for a third time.  Payor sought reconsideration and a stay of the October 2013 orders.
  • On April 3, 2014, the trial judge dismissed payor’s motions to modify alimony – with prejudice – pursuant to Rule 4:23-2(b) based on payor’s “failure to cooperate with the court’s expert, his failure to file complete Case Information Statements, and his extensive history of failure to timely respond to [payee’s] discovery requests and comply with court orders.”  Payor was also ordered to resume alimony payments at $6,000 per month, and to pay $201,000 in alimony arrears from November 2010 (when the hearing was first scheduled) through March 2014.

While noting that dismissing an action “with prejudice” (a final determination on the merits of the case that precludes further litigation of the matter) because of a party’s failure to comply with discovery is a drastic sanction “generally not to be invoked except in those cases in which the order for discovery goes to the very foundation of the cause of action, or where the refusal to comply is deliberate and contumacious,” the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision to do so in this case.

In so doing, the Court analyzed the differences between Rules 4:23-2 and 4:23-5 of the New Jersey Court Rules because payor argued that the trial court engaged in an abuse of discretion under 4:23-5 by failing to first dismiss the case “without prejudice” (a dismissal without a decision on the merits that leaves the parties able to litigate the matter in a subsequent action) and then only dismissing “with prejudice” if he failed to thereafter comply.  Disagreeing with payor, the Appellate Court found that while 4:23-5 does, in fact, require the initial without prejudice dismissal, 4:23-2 does not.

Here, payor even acknowledged that he had not been compliant with all discovery demands made, and his position that he and his new wife had provided timely and relevant information was unsupported by the record.  After more than five years of continuous litigation, there was still no clear picture of payor’s earnings, and the trial court found that his “willful and deliberate violations of court orders across a period of more than five years justified dismissal.”  Five years of delay.  At least ten court orders directing payor to provide payee with discovery to which she was entitled.  Still no end in sight.

The Appellate Division concluded, in light of such facts:

  • “[T]he trial court reasonably concluded that it was unfair to plaintiff to be interminably delayed in resolving the alimony dispute.”
  • “Because the judge’s decision was prompted by defendant’s blatant and continuous defiance of several court orders, we perceive no abuse of discretion in her decision to dismiss defendant’s claim with prejudice.”

While there will always be litigants who believe that the discovery rules and obligations are not worth more than the paper on which they are written with the belief that playing games will provide the optimal result, the trial court’s implementation of available sanctions shows that, at least in some cases, there is a price to pay for such non-compliance.

_______________________________________________________

Robert A. EpsteinRobert Epstein is a partner in Fox Rothschild LLP’s Family Law Practice Group and practices throughout New Jersey.  He can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.

Connect with Robert: Twitter_64 Linkedin

*image courtesy of Stuart Miles.

As regular readers of this blog may know, cohabitation has been a hot topic of discussion in recent months with several new cases addressing the subject within and beyond the context of the amended alimony law.  With new case law to consume, one question remains constant – how does a payor spouse fulfill his or her initial burden of proving cohabitation so as to justify a period of discovery and a future hearing as to how and whether alimony should be modified (or suspended, or terminated, etc.).

threes company

In Robitzski v. Robitzki, another recently issued cohabitation decision from the Appellate Division, the Court affirmed the lower court’s findings that the ex-husband/payor spouse failed to present sufficient evidence of a prima facie claim of cohabitation.  Here are the facts that you need to know:

  • The parties were divorced in 2004.  The property settlement agreement required that the ex-husband pay the ex-wife $2,500 in monthly permanent alimony.
  • The agreement also provided that alimony “shall be modified or terminated pursuant to New Jersey statutes and case law” in the event it was proven that the ex-wife was cohabiting with another.  The PSA did not define cohabitation, nor did it specify whether applicable “New Jersey statutes and case law” to be analyzed in such a claim would be those existing at the time of the divorce or those existing if and when the ex-husband filed a motion to address the issue.
  • From the time of the divorce through the subject motion practice, the ex-wife admittedly maintained a lengthy relationship with a significant other.
  • The ex-husband filed his motion after the alimony law was amended in late 2014.  He claimed that the parties were cohabiting under the amended law.
  • The ex-wife cross-moved for a declaration that the 2014 amendments did not apply to the alimony obligation at issue.
  • In support of his motion, wherein the ex-husband claimed the ex-wife and significant other were interdependent upon each other, he claimed that they held themselves out as the “equivalent” of spouses, and provided various items posted publicly on Facebook by the significant other containing photos and commentary of various family and social activities that the significant other engaged in with the ex-wife and her children.  The children referred to the significant other as “Pap Thom.”
  • In opposing the motion, the ex-wife certified that the significant other only spent approximately 100 nights out of the year overnight with her, and they maintained separate finances and assets.  She provided copies of bank statements and bills for 2013 and most of 2014 showing the ex-wife paid her bills from her bank account balances, and that there were no deposits from any unaccounted for sources.
  • The trial judge denied the ex-husband’s motion, finding that he failed to provide proof of financial interdependency, and the court did not consider the Facebook postings (which the judge deemed inadmissible hearsay and substantially unauthenticated).  The judge also denied application of the amended law to the present matter.
  • Notably, however, limited discovery was granted ordering the significant other to provide a certification addressing his independent living arrangements – including the length of his lease or whether he owns the home, whether he and the ex-wife are co-owners or co-tenants, and whether he lives alone and how he pays for his current living arrangements.  The judge also ordered the ex-wife to provide an accounting of her household expenses, including how such expenses were paid for in 2012.

In addressing whether the amended law or pre-amended law applied, the court declined to resolve the issue for multiple reasons including that the settlement agreement language was ambiguous as to what law should apply.  In language that practitioners thirst for, even if an unreported (not precedential) decision, the Court notably provided:

          We recognize that the new statute eliminates the modification of alimony as a remedial alternative to termination or suspension upon a finding of cohabitation.

This language will surely provide some degree of guidance, although it is not likely the end of what we will hear about whether modification can still occur.

Ultimately, the court held that whether the new or old law applied, the ex-husband still failed to fulfill his initial burden.  The reasoning was as follows:

  • The ex-wife attested to spending essentially a weekend of overnights each week with the significant other – “far less than the majority of days of the year.”  In so doing, the court noted:

          Although we do not treat the frequency of overnights as a dispositive “litmus test” for cohabitation, (and are mindful that subsection (n) of the new statute, if it applied, expressly disallows such per se reasoning) their infrequency here is certainly a significant consideration that bolsters the trial court’s conclusion that a prima facie case has not been presented.

  • The Court acknowledged that the Facebook postings reflected that “he and the ex-wife take part with one another in a variety of social and family activities, go on vacations together, and attend graduation ceremonies, family gatherings and other such events together.”  The Court noted, however, the postings – even had they been considered by the trial court – were not enough.
  • The Court, added, however, “Even so, the present record lacks any evidence that the couple’s finances are intertwined or that the ex-wife is financially dependent upon the significant other.”  No proof of joint bank accounts or other joint asset holdings or liabilities.  No proof of shared living expenses.  No proof of any enforceable promise of support.  Little proof of shared household chores with “the exception of occasional snow removal”.  Notable, however, is the level of potential difficulty in the ex-husband establishing financial inter-dependency on his initial motion without discovery beyond the limited documents provided by the ex-wife.
  • Concluding its opinion, the Court commented that the ex-husband could make a future application with supplemental proofs that the couple resides together more frequently, or that their lives and finances are “actually more intertwined than what the present record suggest[ed].

Robitzski presents an interesting dilemma for practitioners and litigants looking to fulfill the initial burden of proof associated with a cohabitation claim.  How much is enough?  What is enough?  Every judge will look at the case differently.  Each case has its own set of facts where one component may weigh more heavily than another.  Only time will tell if a valid claim has been raised.

_______________________________________________________

Robert A. EpsteinRobert Epstein is a partner in Fox Rothschild LLP’s Family Law Practice Group and practices throughout New Jersey.  He can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.

Connect with Robert: Twitter_64 Linkedin

*image courtesy of Google free images.

The amended alimony law that went into effect in late 2014 raised many questions as to the meaning of its terms and how such terms will be applied, especially as to how a payor’s retirement impacts upon an existing alimony obligation.  As we have previously discussed, the law provides that a payor former spouse may even file an application to terminate or modify alimony based on a future, prospective retirement, at which point a court may establish under what conditions same should occur.  So doing allows the payor and payee to plan accordingly by providing an indication as to whether and how alimony will end/change.

Golfer

This was the topic addressed in Mueller v. Mueller, a new unpublished (not precedential) decision from the Honorable Lawrence Jones in the Ocean County Family Part.  Judge Jones held as follows:

  1. While the amended alimony law does not set a specific minimum or maximum time period for obtaining an advance ruling on a prospective retirement and its effect upon an existing support obligation, Judge Jones concluded that the statute contemplates that the prospective retirement will take effect “within reasonable proximity” to the application itself, rather than several years in advance.  Notably, the judge referenced “approximately twelve to eighteen months” as an appropriate proximity.  Otherwise, the application is more akin to a motion to modify a permanent alimony obligation to one of limited duration without a basis under Rule 4:50-1 or the requisite change in circumstances.
  2. As a result, the payor’s application to terminate alimony based on a prospective retirement date to occur five years later was not considered within a reasonable proximity because “reasonably current information” relative to the time period of the proposed retirement itself could not be considered.
  3. An order for prospective termination or modification of alimony based upon reaching a certain retirement age “inherently contemplates” that the obligor reaches a specific age and actually retires at that point.  A specifically detailed proposed plan for an actual retirement must be provided, as opposed to a “non-specific, general desire to someday retire.”  The specifics may include, but are not limited to, a particular retirement date, and details of the payor’s plan for economic self-support following retirement.

Here are the facts that you need to know:

  • The parties were married in 1986 and divorced in 2006.
  • The settlement agreement provided that husband would pay wife $300 per week in permanent alimony.
  • The agreement contained no provision expressly addressing retirement and/or its relationship to husband’s permanent alimony obligation.
  • Husband filed a motion under the amended alimony statute to terminate his alimony in five years from the date of his application, asserting that he was 57 years old and planed to retire in five years (at which time he was entitled to retire and receive his full employment-related pension benefit).

Analyzing the relevant facts, the court found the husband failed to provide a specific plan to retire in the near future, and that he was nowhere near even an early retirement age.  Rather, he testified about a “general wish to potentially retire and terminate alimony at age 62 . . . .”  Filing so far in advance was found to preclude the court from engaging in a practical analysis of the parties’ economic circumstances that would exist at the time of the termination/change, the parties’ health and other relevant factors that could dramatically change before the retirement ever occurred.  As a result, the husband’s application was denied without prejudice based on his request to retire five years later.

Decisions addressing the provisions of the amended alimony law continue to emerge, and Judge Jones’ decision makes practical and logical sense when considering the retirement provisions and a payor’s ability to seek a termination/modification in light of a future, anticipated retirement date.  The decision will help both litigants and practitioners in framing future applications and oppositions for such relief

_______________________________________________________

Robert A. EpsteinRobert Epstein is a partner in Fox Rothschild LLP’s Family Law Practice Group and practices throughout New Jersey.  He can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.

Connect with Robert: Twitter_64 Linkedin

*image courtesy of Google free images.

The impact of cohabitation on alimony is often one of the most difficult clauses to negotiate in a marital settlement agreement.  The payor always wants the agreement to read that alimony shall terminate upon cohabitation, while the recipient, if they are allowed to agree to anything, might agree to allow the payor to seek to modify alimony “in accordance with the law”.  Generally, “the law” would be an economic benefits test – i.e. is the alimony recipient receiving an economic benefit by virtue of the cohabitation and/or is she providing one to her cohabitant.

That said, at least since 1999, when the Konzelman case came was decided by the Supreme Court, that agreements to terminate alimony based upon cohabitation are enforceable if cohabitation is proven and the “the cohabitation provision of the marital settlement agreement [sic] was voluntary, knowing and consensual.”

17790572_s

But what happens in a case with a clear cohabitation clause requiring termination, where the cohabitation ends, perhaps because of the litigation, or simply because the relationship ran its course?  Should the alimony recipient be entitled to start receiving alimony again?  Today, the Supreme Court answered that question in the negative in the case of Quinn v. Quinn.  Put another way, the law is now clear that if you have a termination clause and you cohabit, alimony is over, even if the cohabitation ends.

In Quinn, the parties divorced in 2006 after a 23 year marriage.  Per their Property Settlement Agreement (PSA), the wife was to receive permanent alimony of approximately $68,000 per year plus Cost of Living Increases.  The PSA stated that “alimony shall terminate upon the Wife’s death, the Husband’s death, the Wife’s remarriage, or the Wife’s cohabitation, per case or statutory law, whichever event shall first occur.”  The wife started cohabiting in January 2008.  The cohabitation included all of the usual indicia of cohabitation – including the fact that the cohabitant maintained his own home – apparently for appearances only.  PRACTICE NOTE:   Finally a case that seemingly looks past the fiction of a separate residence that the cohabitant has access to but really doesn’t live at.

About a month after the motion to terminate alimony was filed, the cohabitation allegedly ended.  Though cohabitation was found to occur, the trial court’s decision deviated from the PSA.  Specifically,

Having determined that Cathleen and Warholak had cohabited, the trial court invoked its equitable powers and suspended alimony for the period of cohabitation — from January 2008 until April 2010 — but declined to terminate alimony permanently. The trial court based its decision on the great difference in incomes between Cathleen and David, concluding that Cathleen was “entirely dependent on her alimony for her support.”

 

However, because the court found her not credible in her testimony, that she had litigated in bad faith, and that she had falsely denied cohabitation, the payor was awarded $145,536.74 in legal fees.  Both parties appealed but the Appellate Division affirmed.  Both parties sought Certification from the Supreme Court but only the payer’s Petition was granted on the issue of “whether the trial court properly invoked its equitable power to modify the clear and unequivocal terms of a PSA entered knowingly and voluntarily by both parties.”

The Supreme Court reversed deciding:

In sum, we reiterate today that an agreement to terminate alimony upon cohabitation entered by fully informed parties, represented by independent counsel, and without any evidence of overreaching, fraud, or coercion is enforceable. It is irrelevant that the cohabitation ceased during trial when that relationship had existed for a considerable period of time. Under those circumstances, when a judge finds that the spouse receiving alimony has cohabited, the obligor spouse is entitled to full enforcement of the parties’ agreement. When a court alters an agreement in the absence of a compelling reason, the court eviscerates the certitude the parties thought they had secured, and in the long run undermines this Court’s preference for settlement of all, including marital, disputes. Here, there were no compelling reasons to depart from the clear, unambiguous, and mutually understood terms of the PSA. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.

In noting that Courts have greater discretion in interpreting marital agreements, the Supreme Court reiterated that, “An agreement that resolves a matrimonial dispute is no less a contract than an agreement to resolve a business dispute.”  Of course, the court failed to correlate this statement with the famous quote from the landmark Lepis case that “contract principles has no place in the law of domestic relations” but I digress.

The Supreme Court was clear to point out that this case was decided based upon the law in effect at the time of the Agreement, not the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute.  It bears repeating that under the new statute, alimony may be suspended or terminated if there is cohabitation.

In equating this to remarriage, the Supreme Court noted:

Furthermore, Cathleen continued to cohabit with Warholak after David filed the motion to terminate alimony and still cohabited with him when the trial commenced. This record presents a situation no different from a remarriage that terminates by death or divorce. In light of the parties’ agreement that alimony would terminate upon cohabitation, the circumstances here do not call for a different result.

The Supreme Court rejected the notion that this type of provision allows a payor to control the alimony recipient, holding:

Finally, we reject the suggestion that enforcement of this cohabitation agreement permits a former spouse to control the post-marital conduct of the other spouse. Such a contention misconstrues the purpose of identifying cohabitation as an alimony-termination event and also misconstrues this record. When parties to a matrimonial settlement agreement have agreed to permit termination of alimony on remarriage or cohabitation, they have recognized that each are equivalent events. In each situation the couple has formed an enduring and committed relationship. In each situation, the couple has combined forces to mutually comfort and assist the other. The only distinction between remarriage and cohabitation is a license and the recitation of vows in the presence of others. When the facts support no conclusion other than that the relationship has all the hallmarks of a marriage, the lack of official recognition offers no principled basis to treat cohabitation differently from remarriage as an alimony-terminating event.

We do not today suggest that a romantic relationship between an alimony recipient and another, characterized by regular meetings, participation in mutually appreciated activities, and some overnight stays in the home of one or the other, rises to the level of cohabitation. We agree that this level of control over a former spouse would be unwarranted and might violate the no-obligation clause found in many divorce agreements.  However, the romantic relationship described above is not the long-term relationship presented in this voluminous record.

Finally, this case is unusual in that Justice Albin filed a strong dissent (which will be the subject of a separate post on this blog), about the harsh result on the recipient here.  The majority responded:

Our dissenting colleagues highlight the financial consequences of this decision to Cathleen. To be sure, those consequences are serious. Yet the record demonstrates that she knew that cohabitation would risk the loss of her primary source of income and, recognizing the consequences, she proceeded to cohabit with Warholak. She, not the Court or her former husband, exacerbated her financial situation by quitting her job and fashioning a defense that was found baseless by the trial court.  (Emphasis added)

In rejecting the dissent’s feeling that an economic benefit test should always be applied, the majority noted:

We also cannot subscribe to the view advanced by our dissenting colleagues that applying the Gayet economic reliance or dependence rule is somehow less intrusive in the personal life of the former spouse. There are few exercises more intrusive than the need to identify every expenditure and the source of the funds for each expenditure. Such an inquiry reveals a vast amount of personal information about the daily life of the former spouse that is of no concern to the obligor spouse. Moreover, sixteen years ago in Konzelman, this Court declined to import the Gayet economic dependence or reliance rule when the parties have agreed in a marital settlement agreement that cohabitation is an alimony-termination event. We discern no basis to depart from that determination. (Emphasis added)

In the past, and maybe even currently, far too many cases settled with vague language requiring termination in accordance with the law – without setting forth which law.  Quinn evidences that that was a dangerous practice for the recipient.

_________________________________________________________

Eric SolotoffEric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Roseland and Morristown, New Jersey offices though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com. Connect with Eric: Twitter_64 Linkedin

Photo credit:  Copyright: <a href=’http://www.123rf.com/profile_myvector’>myvector / 123RF Stock Photo</a>

In many custody disputes, a primary area of concern is one parent’s ability to relocate with the children after the divorce is over.  Relocation requests have been characterized as often resulting in “heart-wrenching” decisions.  As we have previously discussed on this blog, the legal standard to be applied to a parent’s interstate removal application differs if the parent is the primary caretaker as compared to an equal/”shared” physical and legal custodian with the other parent.  The two standards are briefly explained below:

US

Equal/”Shared” custodial parents:  If the parents “truly share both physical and legal custody,” then the moving parent must prove that the best interests of the children would be better served by residential custody being primarily vested with the relocating parent.

One primary custodial parent:  On the other hand, if one parent is the primary caretaker, that parent’s request to relocate with the children is governed by the two-prong Baures test – specifically, the moving party has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there is a good faith reason for the move; and (2) the move will not be inimical to the children’s interests.  The Baures test is analyzed in the context of twelve (12) factors set forth in that case, and is more favorable to the primary custodian seeking relocation.  In fact, it is this favorable standard that often sees non-custodial parents claiming “de facto” equal custodial status in response to a primary custodian’s relocation motion so as to convince the trial judge to utilize the best interests standard.  As an aside, there exists pending legislation that would alter this favorable legal standard.

What happens, then, if there exists a so-called non-relocation agreement and a primary custodian seeks to relocate interstate?  The Appellate Division was faced with that issue in the newly published (precedential) decision of Taormina Bisbing v. Bisbing.  Here are the facts that you need to know:

  • The parties were married in 2005 and the children were born in 2006.  Both parties were highly-paid professional employees, with wife earning more than husband.
  • In early 2013, husband investigated job opportunities in Colorado and California.  The parties separated in August, 2013 and, in November, wife began a long distance relationship with a Utah resident who had children from a prior marriage.  The Utah resident owned a business in Idaho and had business interests requiring him to frequently travel to California and Louisiana.
  • On March 8, 2014, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement wherein they agreed to joint legal custody, and that wife would have primary residential custody under the condition that she would not relocate outside of New Jersey.  The MSA also provided that dad would have “broad, reasonable and liberal timesharing” of the children – Father’s Day, his birthday, every other weekend and on one weeknight during the weeks when he did not have parenting time, every other Thanksgiving, Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, New Year’s Eve, New Year’s Day, and school breaks.  Each parent was entitled to attend all sporting events and activities regardless of which parent was scheduled to have parenting time.
  • As to relocation, the agreement provided:

The parties agree that each shall inform the other with respect to any change of residence concerning himself or herself or the said   minor Children for the period of time wherein any provision contained in this Agreement remains unfulfilled. The parties represent that they both will make every effort to remain in close proximity, within a fifteen (15) minute drive from the other. Neither party shall permanently relocate with the Children from the State of New Jersey without the prior written consent of the other. Neither parent shall relocate intrastate further than 20 miles from the other party. In the event either party relocates more than 20 miles from the other party, the parties agree to return to mediation to review the custody arrangement. In the event a job would necessitate a move, the parties agree to discuss this together and neither will make a unilateral decision. Neither party shall travel with the minor Children outside of the United States without the prior written consent of the other party.

The parties hereby acknowledge that the Children’s quality of life and style of life are provided equally by Husband and Wife.

The parties hereby acknowledge a direct causal connection between the frequency and duration of the Children’s contact with both parties and the quality of the relationship of the Children and each party.

The parties hereby acknowledge that any proposed move that relocates the Children any further away from either party may have a detrimental impact upon the frequency and duration of the contact between the Children and the non-moving party.

  • On April 16, 2014, a final judgment was entered that incorporated the terms of the settlement agreement.  Husband represented that, after the divorce, he was very involved in the children’s lives, coached their teams, took them to activities, and attended school events.
  • One month after the divorce, wife sent an email to husband telling him that, although she received no alimony, she was planning to leave her job on July 1, 2014 to be a full-time stay-at-home parent, which she did.
  • On January 8, 2015, wife called husband to tell him of her intention to get married to the Utah resident and relocate to Utah.  Wife asked for husband’s permission to relocate with the children.  Husband refused, indicating that she could move and leave the children with him.
  • On March 16, 2015, wife filed a motion to relocate with the children to Utah without the need for a plenary hearing.  The court granted the motion – without a hearing – so long as a visitation schedule could be established through mediation.
  • On July 14, 2015, after unsuccessful mediation, with only wife suggesting a parenting plan, the court issued a supplemental order establishing a parenting time and communication schedule using most of wife’s suggestions.  Eleven days later, wife and the children “left for a vacation to Utah.”  Three days thereafter, she permanently relocated with the children in Utah.

In reversing and remanding for a plenary hearing, the court found:

  1. The best interests of the child standard should be applied if wife was found to have negotiated the settlement agreement in bad faith.
  2. If no bad faith finding is made, the court is to consider whether wife proved a substantial unanticipated change in circumstances “warranting avoidance of the agreed-upon non-relocation provision and simultaneously necessitating a Baures analysis.”
  3. If the settlement agreement was deemed to have been negotiated in good faith, but wife fails to prove a substantial unanticipated change in circumstances, the court is to apply the above-referenced best interests of the child standard.
  4. In other words, wife could only receive the “benefit” of the Baures standard if wife was found to have negotiated in good faith and proved a substantial unanticipated change in circumstances.

Under such guidance, the Court distinguished from the notable prior trial court decision of Shea v. Shea,wherein the father accused the mother of of manipulating the Baures procedure by settling the divorce, and immediately thereafter filing for removal so as to reply upon the more favorable burden of proof.  Here, the Court critically found that husband was entitled to a hearing to prove whether wife manipulated the situation to obtain “favorable Baures removal procedures” that:

  1.  When wife entered into the agreement, she may not have definitely known of the “material facts and circumstances forming the good faith reason for the removal request” (i.e., moving to Utah to marry her boyfriend).
  2. The non-relocation provision did not exist in the earlier matter.

In so holding, the court found:

Similar to the situation in Shea, the close proximity between the parties’ agreement and [wife’s] plans to relocate provides evidence of suspicious circumstances requiring a plenary hearing.  If, after holding a hearing, the family court finds that [wife] negotiated in bad faith, it should then analyze the relocation request under a “best interests” analysis.

The non-relocation was to be considered even if wife is found to have negotiated in good faith, “without manipulative intent” premised on New Jersey’s strong public policy favoring agreements that resolve marital disputes.  In damning tone, the Court found:

Thus, [wife], in a written and voluntarily agreed-upon contract, specifically surrendered her “freedom to seek a better life” in another state while obtaining primary custody of the children, and was well aware of that agreement when she chose to remarry and move far away.

While the relocation language of the agreement considered new employment as a basis for moving, it did not mention remarriage, thereby leading the Court to suggest that testimony would reveal whether remarriage was a considered eventuality at the time of the agreement and, thus, not an unanticipated substantial change in circumstance.  The Court also noted that, if the Baures standard was to ultimately apply, the trial judge would be charged with analyzing the effect on the children of moving away from both parents’ extended families.

When I first read the facts, I was saddened, but not at all shocked at what seemed to be a clear manipulation of the prevailing legal standards discussed above.  I have been involved in many cases on both sides of the relocation argument, and have seen the devastation that can result.  A difficult situation becomes all the more tragic when it is clear that one party is not proceeding in good faith.  What wife seemingly did here is just as bad as the non-custodial parent who claims de facto equal custodial status just to have the best interests standard applied.  It is for these reasons, in part, why the pending legislation mentioned above makes sense in some form – to remove this sort of gamesmanship from the equation when children are involved and the relationships with one or both of their parents is potentially at stake.  The Appellate Division certainly got it right here with a just result.

_______________________________________________________

Robert Epstein is a partner in Fox Rothschild LLP’s Family Law Practice Group and practices throughout New Jersey.  He can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.

Connect with Robert: Twitter_64 Linkedin

*Photo courtesy of Google free images.