The proper standard for motions for reconsideration has seemingly confounded judges and attorneys for years.  Just about 5 years ago, I wrote on post on this blog entitled Have Judges Been Getting the Standards for Motions for Reconsideration Wrong All Along?

In that post, I wrote about the Lawson v. Dewar precedential Appellate Division decision where Judge Fisher suggested that many, if not most trial court judges were getting the standard for reconsideration wrong all along, by not acknowledging that there was a different standard for reconsideration pendente lite (pre-judgement) vs. post-judgment. In that case, Judge Fisher first addressed the issue of timing – i.e. when a pre-judgment motion for reconsideration could be filed. Therein, he noted that:

We start with a frequent misconception about the time within which a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be filed. Defendants have argued that plaintiff was obligated to move for reconsideration within twenty days of the May 14, 2020 order. That is plainly wrong. Rule 4:49-2 sets a twenty-day time bar for filing motions to alter or amend “a judgment or order,” a phrase that encompasses only final orders, as Judge Pressler long ago observed in Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J. Super. 250, 258-59 (App. Div. 1987). No one has or could possibly argue the May 14, 2020 order is a final order. Rule 4:49-2 has no application here.

As to the pre-judgment standard, Judge Fisher made clear that:

Rule 4:42-2 declares that interlocutory orders “shall be subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice.” A motion for reconsideration does not require a showing that the challenged order was “palpably incorrect,” “irrational,” or based on a misapprehension or overlooking of significant material presented on the earlier application. Until entry of final judgment, only “sound discretion” and the “interest of justice” guides the trial court, as Rule 4:42-2 expressly states. Nearly forty years ago, Judge Michels said for this court in Ford v. Weisman, 188 N.J. Super. 614, 619 (App. Div. 1983) that, until the suit ends, a trial court “has complete power over its interlocutory orders and may revise them when it would be consonant with the interests of justice to do so.”  (internal citations omitted).  By invoking Cummings, the trial judge applied the wrong standard in denying plaintiff’s motion.

Judge Fisher went further noting:

We observe as well there is nothing in our jurisprudence to suggest reconsideration of an interlocutory order is prohibited unless the movant can provide something “new” or unless the prior judge acted in an “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable” manner.” …

In the final analysis, we urge judges not to view reconsideration motions as hostile gestures. To be sure, some are frivolous, vexatious or merely repetitious, and some constitute an unwarranted attempt to reverse matters previously decided solely because the prior judge is no longer available. But some reconsideration motions – those that argue in good faith a prior mistake, a change in circumstances, or the court’s misappreciation of what was previously argued – present the court with an opportunity to either reinforce and better explain why the prior order was appropriate or correct a prior erroneous order. Judges should view well-reasoned motions based on Rule 4:42-2 as an invitation to apply Cromwell’s rule: “I beseech you . . . think it possible you may be mistaken.” The fair and efficient administration of justice is better served when reconsideration motions are viewed in that spirit and not as nuisances to be swatted aside.  (Emphasis added)

This takes us to the reported (precedential) decision in Doglio v. Boasso America Corporiation, et al. decided on May 4, 2026. In this case, the Court was asked to decide whether the Rules of Court permit a trial court to sua sponte vacate its order denying reconsideration of a final order granting summary judgment pursuant to Rule 4:49-2.

In this case, an employment litigation, the trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment and then denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. A few weeks later, the trial court, sua sponte (i.e. on it’s own without either party requesting it), vacated both the summary judgment order and the order denying reconsideration and reinstated the employee’s complaint. The trial court also denied the employer’s motion for reconsideration “…because the court “sua sponte reconsidered its own order prior to the expiration of the [twenty] days for a motion for reconsideration, . . . [there was] no procedural deficiency [in] correcting its own error within [that]
time frame.” In its order, the trial court cited both Rule 4:49-2 and to caselaw interpreting Rule 4:42-2, using them interchangeably.

The employer appealed and the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the trial court could not sua sponte reconsider it’s own final order.

Back to the reason that I cited to my 5 year old blog post above. In the decision, the Appellate Division again noted that there remained confusion between the pre and post-judgment reconsideration rules. Speficially, Judge Berdote Byrne held that:

We note there has long existed confusion regarding the applicability of Rule 4:42-2, which governs reconsideration of interlocutory orders, and Rule 4:49-2, which controls reconsideration of final orders. See Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 131 (“[W]e write chiefly to point out commonly misunderstood distinctions between motions seeking reconsideration of final orders and motions seeking reconsideration of interlocutory orders.”). We write today to reduce this confusion.

Rule 4:49-2 provides that a party may move for “reconsideration seeking to alter or amend a judgment or final order [no] later than 20 days after service of the judgment or order upon all parties by the party obtaining it.” A timely filed Rule 4:49-2 motion tolls the time to appeal the judgment until the trial court disposes of the motion. R. 2:4-3(e). A reconsideration motion brought pursuant to Rule 4:49-2 “is primarily an opportunity to seek to convince the
court that either 1) it has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.” Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020) (quoting Guido v. Duane Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 87-88 (2010)).

While the Appellate Division noted that judges should be encouraged to correct errors (and quite frankly, too often that does not occur), there are limits. Specifically, Judge Berdote Byrne held:

We note trial courts have considerable freedom to self-correct decisions that they might consider incorrect—and we strongly encourage the appropriate exercise of that discretion. When trial judges believe they have made mistakes in their legal analysis or factual application, they may act on their own motion, provided the parties are informed of this contemplated action. This oversight is entirely appropriate and expected. Our court rules recognize mistakes will be made and wisely do not leave all errors to be caught by the net of appellate review but instead incorporate procedures permitting the correction of errors in
the trial court, once realized. By way of example, Rule 1:1-2 provides: “Unless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice.” Rule 1:7-4(b) states: “On motion made not later than 20 days after service of the final order or judgment upon all parties by the party obtaining it, the court . . . may amend the final order or judgment.” And Rule 4:42-2
permits the correction of interlocutory orders at any time prior to final judgment without limitation in “the interest of justice.”

However, we distinguish interlocutory orders, which may be self-corrected by the court at any time before final judgment, and final orders, which must comply strictly with the Rules of Court to ensure finality of proceedings and appropriate timeframes for appellate review. See Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 134 (noting interlocutory orders are “guided only by Rule 4:42-2 and its far more liberal approach to reconsideration, not the methodology employed when a motion is based on Rule 4:49-2”); Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 537 (2011) (stating the “entitlement to change a prior ruling in the interests of justice is what distinguishes an interlocutory order from a final judgment”).

With respect to final orders, we balance the trial court’s earnest attempt at self-correction with the parties’—and the court’s—need for finality. The concept of finality in litigation is essential to parties and to the sound administration of our courts. Rule 4:49-2 permits motions for reconsideration of final orders or judgments only within twenty days of their entry. The timeframe cannot be enlarged by the court nor with the consent of the parties.
Rule 1:3-4(c) unequivocally states: “Neither the parties nor the court may . . . enlarge the time specified by . . . [Rule] 4:49-2.” This non-enlargeable deadline is immutable. Even Rule 1:1-2’s allowance of the relaxation of any court rule in the interest of justice is proscribed by Rule 1:3-4(c)’s express prohibition of the enlargement of Rule 4:49-2’s twenty-day deadline. See R. 1:1-2(a) (“Unless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with . . . .” (emphasis added)).

Rule 4:49-2 promotes principles of finality and prohibits reconsideration of a final order denying reconsideration, whether on the motion of the court or a party. Plaintiff’s reliance on Lombardi is misplaced, as that case involved a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order pursuant to Rule 4:42-2, which is inapplicable here.

Because the order in question was final, Rule 4:49-2 controls. We conclude neither plaintiff, by motion, nor the trial court, on its own initiative, was permitted by Rule 4:49-2 to vacate the April 23 order denying reconsideration to plaintiff. The denial of a motion for reconsideration does not create a new final judgment that is itself subject to a successive motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 4:49-2.

In a way, this case reminds me a one of my cases that I blogged about all the way back in 2013 where the Appellate Division agreed with me that there is no such thing as a motion for reconsideration of a motion for reconsideration.

As I concluded my most five years ago, perhaps more importantly, trial judges will heed Judge Fisher’s and now Judge Berdote Byrne’s words and correct mistaken Orders as opposed to swatting aside reconsideration motions on principle. That said, once an Order is final, it is final. Of course, all of this can be avoided if trial judge’s heed Billy Joel’s guidance to “… get it right the first time that’s the main thing.”

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog. He is also the former and founding Co-Chair of the Family Law Department of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Morristown, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973) 994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.