I have written a lot on this blog regarding my love/hate relationship with the appointment of parent coordinators. In fact, one of the more read posts, to this day, is one from 2019 entitled The Futility of Parenting Coordination When a Parent Coordinator Won’t Be Decisive. I have also written about Appellate Division decisions finding that Judge’s cannot give parent coordinator’s binding authority. This did not change when the Court adopted formal rules and guidelines for parent coordinators in 2023.

Prior to the new rules, parent coordination was the wild west. At some point there was a pilot program in 6 counties that ultimately expired and was not renewed. In the non-pilot counties, judges often did whatever they wanted, though at some point, there was a decision that said if a non-pilot county was going to appoint parent coordinators, they had to follow the rules in place in the pilot counties. That seemed to make sense.

Once the pilot program expired, suggested Orders and guidelines were published but not required, so back to the wild west.

Often, the entire process is one which allows the difficult party to continue to drag things out and force the other party to incur fees, both with the parenting coordinator and then with the court, when a parent coordinator’s recommendation was inevitably rejected.

This was procedurally ameliorated because a lot of parent coordinators insisted, and/a lot of judges started including provisions in the Order that made the recommendations binding unless someone came to court. This did not stop all of the litigation regarding parent coordinator recommendations, but seemed to reduce it if the person saying no had the affirmative duty to come to court or face sanctions for violation of litigant’s rights.

But two reasonable universal truths regarding parent coordinators seemed to exist. One, they cannot make binding decisions (i.e. there has to be the process as set forth above.) Two, they are meant to implement, not create parenting plans nor change custody.

Yet, in the case of Tarica v. Drages, an unreported (non-precedential) Appellate Division decision released on October 31, 2025, adherence to those two universal truths seems to have gone awry.

In this case, the parties had a child in 2014 while they were living together in Pennsylvania. Soon after the child’s birth, mom moved to New Jersey. In August 2015, in a Pennsylvania court, the parties agreed to joint legal custody and “partial physical custody as mutually agreed upon by the parties, in writing. In September 2016, the Pennsylvania Court granted mom sole legal custody on an interim basis.

In 2022, plaintiff moved for sole legal custody in New Jersey, noting that dad only vistited the child 6-8 times over 7 years. The decision notes that there was a 2022 Order entered by the Pennsylvania courts stating there was no agreement between the parties as to Pennsylvania’s continued jurisdiction over H.D.’s custody. Now for custody jurisdiction nerds, this raises the obvious question as to how a NJ court could have addressed custody issues at all if a Pennsylvania court entered the first custody order but the opinion is silent on that.

In any event, dad opposed the application and sought enforcement of the 2015 custody order, the appointment of a reunification therapist and other relief.

The court held a 5 day hearing in which mom repeated that dad rarely visited the child and dad said that mom stymied his attempts to exercise parenting time. At the end of the hearing, the judge denied mom’s request for sole legal custody and appointed a parent coordinator to facilitate reunification of dad and the child. The court found mom not to be credible, particularly as to her claims that she wanted the child to have a relationship with dad, noting:

Although plaintiff claimed to want H.D. and defendant to have a relationship, the judge found the evidence “belie[d] her testimony” and “overwhelmingly demonstrate[d] her disdain for . . . defendant in her calculated efforts to erase him from [H.D.]’s life.” Those efforts included plaintiff’s decision to move with H.D. to New Jersey.

The judge found that the parties had an inability to cooperate and absent intervention, “… Plaintiff likely would “unreasonably delay or hinder defendant’s attempts to build a familial relationship with” H.D.” As a result, the judge appointed a parenting coordinator to implement a parenting plan fostering reunification between dad and the child.

In justifying the denial of sole custody, the decision noted that:

The judge considered the statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4, finding that although many of the statutory factors favored plaintiff, she could not ignore
the “salutary precedent in avoiding a mechanical application of the statute.” In
considering the child’s best interest, the judge concluded it was contrary to that
interest and “manifestly unjust” for H.D.’s formative years to pass without him
forming a familial relationship with defendant. The judge found that “[r]emoving defendant as a joint legal custodian of [H.D.] would sever the last tangible connection” in their already tenuous relationship. Because plaintiff had not demonstrated defendant unfit as a parent, the judge concluded joint legal
custody to be appropriate.

Now, aside from how jurisdiction got changed to New Jersey, the next head scratcher here is how/why the NJ court modified the 2015 granting of sole custody to mom.

Further, the court did not really explain how joint custody was appropriate when there was a clear inability to communicate and cooperate. Now, it seems that the court blamed that on mom. Certainly, it seems inappropriate to give sole custody to the parent that is thwarting effective (or any) co-parenting and who has been found to be the impediment to the other parent’s relationship with the child. That would essentially be rewarding the parent’s bad behavior which has seemingly harmed the child. The Court should have said that, as opposed to tying the decision to some concept of parental fitness for a parent that has barely seen a child over a 7 year period.

Unfortunately, the Appellate Division glossed over this issue simply citing the seminal case of Beck v. Beck for the proposition that “the best interests of the child are disserved by many aspects of sole custody” and moreover, noted that the judge found that mom had not demonstrated dad to be unfit.” This seems to ignore the rest of the factors in the custody statute as well as the seemingly real crux of the issue – i.e. mom’s interference with the relationship, though the court did address some of the fact findings regarding the issue – again, tying them to fitness as opposed to anything else.

As to the PC issue, interestingly, the Appellate Division cited case law that preceded the enactment of the PC rules and procedures, regarding a court’s authority to appoint a PC. Mom objected to the PC arguing that the appointment was improper because there was no parenting plan in place. This argument appears sound because the new Court Rule states that, “A Parenting Coordinator is a neutral individual appointed by the court to assist in implementing the parties’ parenting plan.”

While the trial court found that the appointment of the parent coordinator to be a “practical necessity” given the strained relationship between the dad and child, the parties’ difficulty in communicating, and their geographical distance, the Appellate Division did not explain how or why the Court Rule could/should be ignored.

Moreover, the parent coordinator was tasked not only with overseeing the reunification therapy – that seems ok – but also coming up with a parenting plan. That’s another curious part of the decision because the law in clear going back to P.T. v. M.S. and Parish v. Parish (which was my case), that courts cannot defer decision making to third parties, including a PC.

So while the trial court may have gotten in right, sort of, given the court’s findings about mom’s conduct, the rationale and implementation of the decision is troublesome because it seems to be at odds with the decisional law and the rules. The Appellate Division could have fixed this in the opinion, but didn’t so now there is this opinion out there, though non-precedential, that someone could argue should be considered by another trial court. That is unfortunate.

Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Department of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys. Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Morristown, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973) 994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.