Modification of Alimony

Most people are aware that a supporting spouse may be entitled to modify an alimony obligation upon a showing of “changed circumstances.” However, many people do not know that the “leg-work” that they have to do to set themselves up to succeed on such a Motion begins long before the parties ever go to Court, especially if a supporting spouse is asking for relief on the basis of a purported job loss or reduction in income.

Below is a non-exhaustive list of items that a Judge will look for when a supporting spouse is requesting to reduce his or her alimony obligations:

• Has the applicant proven that his/her circumstances have changed such that he/she would be entitled to a child support or alimony reduction – Common scenarios constituting changed circumstances include:
       o A reduction in a party’s income;
       o Illness;
       o Retirement;
       o The receipt of an influx of liquid assets;
       o Cohabitation of the supported spouse.…

Continue Reading Alimony Modification – A Judge's Checklist

In this economy, you would be surprised to see how many judges are jaded by applications brought by supporting spouses to reduce their support obligations based upon a reduction in income. After all, some judges entertain these applications on their daily docket and oftentimes see supporting spouses who are simply attempting to capitalize on the down economy and lack any actual merit to their cases. This blog post will explore one of the reactions by judges to this type of application; namely, denying the request of the supporting spouse outright without even holding a hearing, taking testimony, and making credibility findings.

Support obligations are always modifiable by the family court upon application of the supporting spouse.  Typically, this type of application requires the supporting spouse to make a threshold prima facie showing that “changed circumstances have substantially impaired the ability to support himself or herself.” Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980). When such a showing is made, the Court must next determine if a plenary hearing is warranted. This is sometimes referred to as the two-step Lepis analysis.…

Continue Reading Motions to Reduce Support: When Applications are Denied without a Plenary Hearing, What's Next?

I recently wrote a blog entitled "Sloppy Drafting of Marital Settlement Agreements Can Cause Great Harm, Usually to Only One of the Parties."   I am reminded why I wrote that post because as I read the new cases decided each day, it fortifies my belief that settlements must be clearly reduced to writing and that every effort should be made so that the document can only be interpreted in one possible way. I say this because as I read these cases and see the results based upon interpretations of agreements, I think that this could not be what the parties really intended.  

Specifically, two cases decided in the last two days jumped out at me and left me thinking "I see what the agreement says, but that really cannot be what the parties’ meant."

In Schaefer v. Kamery, an unreported (non-precedential) case decided on November 19, 2012, the holding of the trial court, that limited duration alimony continue even after the recipient remarried was upheld.  How can that be you ask since there is a statute (N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25) that says alimony terminates on remarriage?  How can that be you ask because you know that there is case law that says that rehabilitative alimony many continue after remarriage, because the rehabilitation plan is goal oriented (i.e. to get someone back in the workforce or improve their earning ability), which goal exists irrespective or remarriage.

The reason that alimony did not terminate on remarriage in this case is that the Property Settlement Agreement contained the following language:

Payment of alimony shall cease only upon the first to occur of: (1) the
expiration of the alimony term set forth above; (2) Husband’s death; or (3) Wife’s
death. The parties agree Wife’s involuntary termination from her current employer or
permanent disability preventing her continued employment shall be a changed
circumstance justifying review of Wife’s alimony obligation. No change in Husband’s
circumstances other than death shall constitute a changed circumstance affecting Husband’s right to alimony.

Part of the rationale for denying the motion was the aforementioned language and the fact that there may have been other interrelated financial terms.  Not also, the payor previously sought and was denied modification based upon cohabitation.  In fact, the current motion was the third motion to modify.

Having the benefit of 50-50 hindsight, unless someone was trying to pull a fast one and was planning on filing the motion because they knew that the support recipient was in a relationship, the better practice might have been to specifically say that remarriage and/or cohabitation would not impact the alimony, especially if there was not a real meeting of the minds on this issue.  Doing so may have saved the legal fees for 3 motions and an appeal.…

Continue Reading Mean What You Say, Write What You Mean

As we know, limited duration alimony ("LDA") is alimony for a definite period of time.  Unlike rehabilitative alimony where there is a goal in mind to be reached by the end of the rehabilitation period and which can possibly be extended of the goal has not been reached, per the statute, the term of LDA is not supposed to be able to be modified except for "unusual circumstances." Of course, even limited duration alimony is subject to modification based upon "changed circumstances." Of note, however, is that retirement has been recognized as a possible change of circumstances sufficient to seek a modification. 

The issue of whether early retirement could be used by an alimony payor in order to terminate his LDA obligation was recently addressed in the case of Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, an unreported (non-precedential) opinion released on November 5, 2012.  In that case, the parties agreed to an 8 year term of LDA at the time of the divorce in 2006, in the amount of $265 per week, that actually was reduced to $145 per week to take into account that the wife’s child support obligation because the husband had custody of the children.  

The husband had been working at Fort Monmouth for more than 30 years when it closed in 2011.  The husband asserted that though he had been offered a position in Aberdeen, Maryland, the net effect of the transfer would have resulted in a reduction of income and increased expenses.  Moreover, he was able to retire for health reasons and collect his retirement benefits.  As a result of a claimed inability to pay, the husband filed a motion to terminate his LDA obligation.  

The trial court denied the request finding that the early retirement was not a change of circumstances.  An unsuccessful motion for reconsideration was denied, as well.  The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, but for different reasons.…

Continue Reading Can a payor retire to get out of his limited duration alimony obligation?

We have previously blogged on the "rule of thumb", a dirty little secret used by judges and lawyers in New Jersey to come up with a "ball park" as to what alimony should be.  This "rule of thumb" does not take into account all of the statutory factors.  Rather, the formula simply subtracts the lower income (real or imputed) from the and multiplies the difference by a percentage.  I have been told that that percentage is 30% or one-third in the northern part of the state and 25% in the southern part.  Of course, judges really cannot use this formula and must make findings considering the law and all of the statutory factors which are:

(1) The actual need and ability of the parties to pay;
(2) The duration of the marriage or civil union;
(3) The age, physical and emotional health of the parties;
(4) The standard of living established in the marriage or civil union and the likelihood that each party can maintain a reasonably comparable standard of living;
(5) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability
of the parties;
(6) The length of absence from the job market of the party seeking maintenance;
(7) The parental responsibilities for the children;
(8) The time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, the availability of the training and employment, and the opportunity for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;
(9) The history of the financial or nonfinancial contributions to the marriage or
civil union by each party including contributions to the care and education of
the children and interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities;
(10) The equitable distribution of property ordered and any payouts on equitable
distribution, directly or indirectly, out of current income, to the extent this consideration is reasonable, just and fair;
(11) The income available to either party through investment of any assets held by
that party;
(12) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of any alimony award, including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a non-taxable payment; and
(13) Any other factors which the court may deem relevant.

While these factors are supposed to be consider and the "rule of thumb" is not, we hear judge’s recommending settlements using this rule of thumb all of the time.…

Continue Reading Appellate Court Rejects "Rule of Thumb" Formula to Calculate Alimony – Sort Of

If you’re a regular reader of this blog, you’ve seen many a post about changes in circumstances and modifications of support obligations.  In fact, Apple Sulit-Paralejo in our Atlantic City office recently published a post on the Ferstenfeld decision. The thing is with changed circumstances,  in this economic climate and job market, it is a popular topic for courts and new decisions are being delivered on a fairly frequent basis.

Today’s post is about proving the change in circumstances and stems from the unpublished Appellate Division decision of Romito v. Romito, A-0486-09, decided March 29, 2011. This appeal came from an Essex county trial court decision made after Mr. Romito filed what was at least his second motion to reduce his alimony and child support obligations stemming from a 2002 divorce and property settlement agreement.

Mr. Romito’s application was supported by his Certification attesting to the failure of his remaining businesses and a sworn statement of his ability to earn $52,000/yr working for a friend’s business, similar to what he had previously operated.  It was also supported by a current Case Information Statement and copies of income tax returns.  Part of the relief sought was a hearing pursuant to Lepis v. Lepis, to prove the changed circumstances.

Ms. Romito filed a cross motion in response opposing this application and seeking other forms of economic and additional relief.  Her application was supported by a Certification attesting that she and the children were in desperate financial straits due to Mr. Romito’s failure to pay his support obligations and his unfair competition with her business.  She attested that Mr. Romito owned the business of his friend that he claimed to only work at and that he was concealing income and living a lifestyle inconsistent with his alleged reduced economic circumstances.  It was also supported by her current Case Information Statement, tax returns and proof of expenses that were not paid.

In response, Mr. Romito denied the allegations made in the cross motion and attested that Ms. Romito’s economic problems were of her own doing and stemmed from her inability to profitably run the business.  He proposed that if Ms. Romito would agree to turn the Montclair office over to him, he’d pay her $2,000/month in alimony (still a reduction from the parties’ agreement but more than he’d been paying).…

Continue Reading Modifying Support – Proving Changed Circumstances

It seems as though a wave of cohabitation cases has recently swept across the Appellate Division in New Jersey. And for good reason. While well-settled is the concept that a supported spouse’s cohabitation typically will constitute a change of circumstances sufficient to justify end of a supporting spouse’s alimony obligation, the nuances of the law can be quite involved. This can been seen from the Appellate Division’s February decision in the case of Wonderlin v. Wonderlin, on which Sandra Fava blogged. That holding came down to evidence of the times and frequency that an unrelated male came and went from a former wife’s home, which, the Appellate Division ruled, entitled a former husband to discovery on the issue of whether the wife was cohabitating.

While the comings and goings of an unrelated male can be one indicia of cohabitation, in the case of Okoshi-Wilson v. Wilson, the Appellate Division examined a different source to prove cohabitation: the wife’s earnings as compared to her expenditures. There, the husband moved for a termination of his alimony obligation on the basis of the wife’s cohabitation with an unrelated male.

It seemed, based on the proofs submitted, that the husband had always earned a significantly greater salary than the wife, with the wife only earning about $47,000 in 2008 after her alimony of $22,500 per year was considered, as compared to the husband’s $164,164 the year prior. Despite this fact, the wife was apparently living in a posh, three-bedroom Upper East Side apartment, which she clearly was unable to afford on her salary alone. As it turned out, also a tenant of the same apartment was an unrelated male by the name of Steven Macy. This revelation led to the husband’s application for a termination of his alimony obligations. During the hearing at the trial level, Okoshi admitted that she had been able to maintain her New York City residence, because she was Macy’s tenant, allegedly paying him only $135 per week in rent and household work such as watering the plants, purchasing food, and collecting the mail. She further testified that Macy and his daughter only stay at the apartment about five times per month. Okoshi had documents to support some of her assertions — a lease signed by her and Macy and receipts for rent she paid in cash. She denied any romantic involvement with Macy and said he does not support her in any way.…

Continue Reading Can a landlord-tenant relationship terminate an alimony obligation based upon cohabitation?