The Importance of the Filing Date of the Complaint
A recent unpublished decision from the Appellate Division, McNamara v. McNamara, serves as a reminder that, when it comes to
Continue Reading Marriage: When Does it End?
A recent unpublished decision from the Appellate Division, McNamara v. McNamara, serves as a reminder that, when it comes to…
Continue Reading Marriage: When Does it End?
The Summer season can truly be the best time of the year with the kids out of school, great weather, barbecues, pools, baseball and more. Divorced parents, however, often experience…
Continue Reading Parenting Conflicts When School Is Out For Summer
Virtually every interspousal agreement contains a modification clause whereby the parties set forth procedures for subsequent enforceable modification. Many are constructed as follows:
No modification or waiver of any of the terms of this Agreement shall be valid unless: (1) in writing and executed by the party to be charged; or (2) ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon appropriate notice and upon an appropriate showing of changed circumstances as and if allowed under New Jersey law. The failure of either party to insist upon strict performance of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall not be deemed a waiver of any subsequent breach or default of any provision contained in this Agreement.
Note that there are two ways under this clause in which an agreement may be modified: (1) a subsequent writing; or (2) ordered by a court. As to the second, a court, generally, has the inherent power to modify support provisions of an agreement. Where an agreement restricts this power (such as would be the case in an agreement which contains a “non-modifiable” alimony obligation), the restriction will be upheld as long as it does not violate public policy.
However, for the purposes of this article, it is the first – modification by writing – as to which this article is addressed. Let’s take a look at the elements of the writing methodology:
(a) A writing; and
(b) Executed by the party to be charged.…
The phrases “he who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client” and “you get what you pay for” proved to be true in the recent unpublished New Jersey Appellate Division decision of Andreaci v. Andreaci, App. Div. Docket No. A-1934-08T31934-08T3, decided, January 25, 2010. In Andreaci, after 16 years of marriage, husband filed for divorce. The husband represented himself and the wife had a pro bono lawyer. The parties reached a settlement which was memorialized into a Marital Settlement Agreement and incorporated into the parties’ Judgment of Divorce. The Agreement provides, in pertinent part, the following:
The husband quickly fell behind on his child support payments. He was incarcerated on a bench warrant for non-support, and borrowed $5,000 to obtain his release from jail. Thereafter, husband filed a motion to seeking to reduce his support payments and other ancillary relief. The trial court set the matter down for a plenary hearing and in the interim reduced husband’s support payments to $225 per week.…
During the course of a litigation where children are involved, the parties will often come to an agreement as to custody and parenting time. By settling on this understandably emotional issue, the parties avoid having to go to trial, where the trial judge would have decided for them who has custody and what the parenting time schedule will be. Depending on when settlement occurs during the course of the litigation, the time and expense of obtaining a custody evaluation, which involves the children in the process as well, may also be avoided.
However, oftentimes after settling the issue and coming to an agreement, one or both parents will change their minds about what they just entered into for whatever the reason may be. He or she wants to change the agreement or simple rescind on its terms. We are actually involved in a litigation where the parties agreed to a holiday parenting time schedule with a parenting coordinator, the Court subsequently entered the terms of the Agreement in an Order, and the husband is still trying to back away from the agreement, having just filed a motion with the Court and leaving our client with no choice but to incur legal fees to respond.
The question then becomes, can they change the schedule so easily if they want to? The simple answer is no. A parent seeking a modification of a custody and parenting time agreement must show changed circumstances from when the agreement was made that the agreement is now not in the best interests of the children.…
As is widely known, the filing date of the complaint for divorce which actually leads to a divorce is the “cutoff date” for equitable distribution, that is, assets acquired up to that date are generally subject to equitable distribution, and assets acquired after that date are generally not. This is a general rule and cannot be taken as a total brightline test since there are no notable exceptions. Among these are: (1) assets acquired by way of gift or inheritance or intestate succession (death without a will) not from a spouse; (2) assets acquired with other assets which were either from a third party as in the first example of acquired by one party prior to the marriage. An exception to the cutoff date would be an asset acquired by one party after the cutoff date but with assets which were subject to equitable distribution. Again, these are general rules and there are always exceptions or other fact situations which render a general rule inapplicable. Obviously, it is best to consult qualified counsel since each circumstance is fact-sensitive, and the result usually turns on very specific development of the facts.
One exception to the timing of “cutoff date” rule is advantageous to the parties. Say that (for one reason or another) the parties are cooperative and want to attempt to negotiate an agreement before filing for divorce. Their hope is that they can amicable provide the other, through counsel, with sufficient documentary information upon which to adequately understand their financial circumstances and based on that understanding, negotiate an agreement, in which case, they can then file for divorce and obtain an uncontested termination of their marriage within a few weeks. Using this methodology, they can avoid certain judicial systemic entanglements.
As seen in Affluent Magazine.
Divorce for those of substantial wealth relative to those of limited wealth is an oxymoron – aspects of divorce between the two classifications are both similar and yet quite different. In final analysis, it is a question of degree – that is, the number of zeros behind the dollar signs. This summary discussion will deal with certain procedures and aspects of divorce which are similar to both. The distinctions lie in the availability and desirability of various procedural vehicles to the two groups.
Privacy and Confidentiality
Nearest to the hearts of you — the rich and famous (next to, of course, your money) — is privacy and confidentiality. None of you in your right mind wants to spread your dirty laundry in public – least of all those of you blessed with substantial wealth. With divorces of such persons being instant grist for media dissemination, generally, it is better for all concerned (especially their children on a whole host of levels) to have disposition of your matter not a matter of public spectacle. All too often, the perceived lesser-advantaged spouse may play the publicity card (or threaten to do so) in order to opt out a financial advantage – or in simple parlance – vie for “hush” money. Perception by the lesser-advantaged spouse that the financially-advantaged spouse will deal with her or him fairly (whatever that may mean) will usually go a long way toward negotiations where calmer minds prevail. Another method of seeking to assure a divorce far from the public eye is for a pre-marital agreement to address issues of confidentiality and mediation and/or arbitration out of the public limelight.…
Recently, in the unreported decision of Pacifico v. Pacifico, the Appellate Division reversed a trial court’s ruling establishing that an ex-wife provided sufficient proof to overcome a presumption established by the New Jersey Supreme Court that “current market value as of the time of the triggering event” should govern the value to which the ex-wife could exercise her option to purchase her ex-husband’s one-half interest in the marital home.
The parties executed a Property Settlement Agreement in December 1996, which was incorporated into the final judgment of divorce. The PSA provided that the marital residence was to be sold upon the youngest child reaching age 19 and that, at that time, the ex-wife had the first option (and then the ex-husband) to buy-out the former spouse’s interest in the home. If neither party wanted to exercise said option, it was to be sold. Once the youngest child turned 19, the ex-husband filed an application to compel the listing and sale of the property. The ex-wife then filed a cross-motion to buy out the ex-husband’s interest at the value determined by a broker’s market analysis in 1996 – long before the ex-wife application. …
Most people have heard or had experience with an attorney who’s behaviors were, one could say, questionable. What most have not considered is what implications an attorney’s unethical or questionable behaviors could have on them.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has provided some guidance on this very topic in the recent decision of Brundage v. Estate of Carl V. Carambio. Carol Brundage hired her attorney to represent her in her claim for palimony against the estate of her deceased paramour. She probably had very little knowledge of what other matters her attorney was handling in his office. Little did she know that her attorney, just months before beginning his representation of Carol Brundage, represented another woman, Jeanette Levine, in a different county, but also for a claim of palimony. Carol Brundage also is likely not to have known that in Ms. Levine’s case, the trial court determined that she would not succeed on her claim for palimony because cohabitation was an essentail element for success on a palimony claim, and those parties had not lived together. Her attorney filed an appeal raising the question of whether cohabitation is an indispensible element of a cause of action for palimony. (Click here for Eric Solotoff’s blog entry above on the recent Supreme Court decision in that regard). Carol Brundage never lived with her now deceased paramour.
Her attorney went on to represent Carol Brundage with his appeal on the Levine matter pending. The Estate filed an application to dismiss Ms. Brundage’s Complaint claiming that cohabitation was an essential element. In his representation of Ms. Brundage, her attorney convinced the trial court that cohabitation was not essential and thus the Estate’s application was denied. In his argument, her attorney failed to mention his experience with the trial court in Ms. Levine’s case nor did he mention that the issue was pending on appeal.
The Estate then filed a motion for leave to appeal with the Appellate Division. In opposing that motion, the attorney did not disclose the contrary conclusion reached by the trial court in Ms. Levine’s matter or the fact that an appeal was pending. The Appellate Division denied the Estate’s motion and eventually the parties’ settled.…