I’ll admit, the title of this post is somewhat cynical. Often there are disputes regarding what particular provisions of Marital Settlement Agreements (MSA) mean. Is the meaning plain on its face, or is there an alternative meaning based upon the negotiations. Sometimes, these disputes come from either inartful drafting, or the fact that MSAs go through several drafts back and forth and this is the best you can do. And sometimes, it’s because one party has a hidden agenda and is looking to get over in the future.

I am reminded of this because I read a case today, Fuller v. Fuller, an unreported (non-precedential) Appellate Division case decided on June 25, 2026, where at least one party was arguing that a hearing was needed to determine what was intended by the word “reasonable.”

The parties in this case divorced in 2007. Their MSA included a pretty typical clause requiring the parties to meet and confer regarding a child’s college education as each child entered their junior year of high school, to discuss potential schools and costs. As many MSAs do, there was seemingly an expectation that the children would or at least could take out loans and that the parties’ responsibilities would be determined after the loans and other financial aid was applied.

The MSA also limited the costs to what it would cost for Kean University, which while a private college, it bears a “reasonable” (there’s that word again), cost compared to many other private schools which could cost about twice as much.

In September 2017, when the first child was getting ready for college, dad reached out to mom suggesting that they exchange financial information and go to mediation to address the issues. Mom responded that she was unable to afford either a mediator or college and suggested that the issue be addressed at a later date.

About 9 months later in May 2018, the parties entered a consent order that said that direct child support would terminate and with regard to college, stated:

The children will be required to apply for financial aid, including reasonable student loans,
scholarships, grants and work study. After deducting all aid from each child’s college costs, the defendant will be responsible for the remaining college costs, i.e., tuition, room, board, fees charged by the school, books and school supplies. The parties will cooperate to complete and submit [a Free Application for Federal Student Aid] or other form in order to maximize each child’s financial aid. (Emphasis added)

In 2018 and 2019, the children took at loans with dad as co-signor. In 2019, mom expressed concern about the interest rate and amount of debt the children would have. Dad responded that he would help the children the best he could and encouraged mom to “feel free to help.”

Fast forward to 2023 when mom’s attorney wrote to defendant asserting that he had “”effectively placed the entire college expense payment burden on the children’s shoulders with each child owing upwards of $50,000″ contrary to the consent order and demanded payment of the children’s college expenses, including the loans.” Dad’s counsel responded and provided information that dad paid close to $50,000 towards the children’s college expenses. So it looks like dad paid about 50%.

Unsatisfied by the response, mom filed a motion in December 2023 claiming a willful violation of the consent order by failing to pay the children’s college expenses. The trial judge denied mom’s motion finding that the language of the consent order was clear and unambiguous and that dad did not have to reply the children’s loans.

Mom appealed and lost.

First, the Appellate Division restated the obvious, “A consent order is, in essence, an agreement of the parties that has been approved by the court.”

Then the Appellate Division restated the black letter law regarding agreements:

Settlement agreements, including settlement agreements resolving matrimonial disputes,
are “governed by basic contract principles.” Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45. Under those guiding principles, “a court should not rewrite a contract or grant a better deal than that for which the parties expressly bargained.” Ibid. “[W]hen the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result.” Ibid. “To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the expression of the terms of a settlement agreement, a hearing may be necessary to discern the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was entered and to implement that intent.” Ibid. A party may ask a court to “set aside” a settlement agreement that was “achieved through coercion, deception, fraud, undue pressure, or unseemly conduct.” Brundage v. Est. of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008) (quoting Peskin v. Peskin, 271 N.J. Super. 261, 276 (App. Div. 1994)).

Despite claiming before the trial court that she was forced into signing the consent order, the Appellate Division noted that she did not seek to set it aside for coercion, etc. In fact, they noted that she sought to enforce it.

The Appellate Division reiterated the finding that the Consent Order was clear and unambiguous and moreover, required the children to apply for all financial aid, including reasonable student loans and then only after that, would dad be responsible for the remaining costs.

It then seems like mom’s argument shifted to one asserting that the loans were not “reasonable” and yet another alternative, that the court should have held a plenary hearing (trial) to determine the meaning of “reasonable student loans.”

The Appellate Division disagreed that a plenary hearing was warranted. Specifically, they held:

Plaintiff was not entitled to a plenary hearing. She did not demonstrate the language of the consent order, including the phrase “reasonable student loans,” was ambiguous. See Quinn, 225 N.J. at 44 (finding a hearing may be necessary to determine the parties’ intent regarding an ambiguous term). Nor did she demonstrate the student loans were unreasonable or the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on that issue. See Bermeo, 457 N.J. Super. at 83
(finding a hearing may be necessary to resolve disputed issues of material fact). She did not, for example, submit a certification of an expert witness, opining the student loans were unreasonable given the parties’ respective credit ratings and what was otherwise available in the marketplace. Instead, she made unsupported “[c]onclusory allegations.” G.M., 453 N.J. Super. at 13. On this record, plaintiff was not entitled to a plenary hearing.

Now making children apply for student loans is often a sticky negotiation. The decision provides little about the parties’ finances but the fact that they limited their contributions initially the cost of Kean, and further that they included student loan provisions in both the MSA and Consent Order suggests that the kids weren’t going to get a blank check to go wherever they wanted and expect mom and dad to pay.

Often parents want children to have some skin in the game, and even in cases where there are larger income and assets, people have a student loan provision in the MSA, often limiting it to Federal Direct Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans (formerly known as Stafford Loans) which are $5,500 per year.

Here, it is hard to say whether this was inartful drafting or an attempt to have the court make a better deal. That said, given the costs, the juice was obviously not worth the squeeze.

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog. He is also the former and founding Co-Chair of the Family Law Department of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Morristown, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973) 994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.