Archives: Chester Divorce Attorneys

Whether it is because of busy dockets or the fact that the issues could be hard to decide, especially without a plenary hearing, the use of parent coordinators (PC) began becoming more frequent about 10 years ago.  Sometimes it was by consent but other times, it was foisted upon warring parties whether they wanted it or not.  A new reality of “let the parenting coordinator referee the disputes” became a new reality for many.  In fact, in 2007, the Supreme Court implemented a pilot program for the use of parent coordinators in several counties which had both guidelines and a model order.  The goals were laudatory:

A Parenting Coordinator is a qualified neutral person appointed by the court, or agreed to by the parties, to facilitate the resolution of day to day parenting issues that frequently arise within the context of family life when parents are separated. The court may appoint a Parenting Coordinator at any time during a case involving minor children after a parenting plan has been established when the parties cannot resolve these issues on their own.

The Parenting Coordinator’s goal is to aid parties in monitoring the existing parenting plan, reducing misunderstandings, clarifying priorities, exploring possibilities for compromise and developing methods of communication that promote collaboration in parenting. The Parenting Coordinator’s role is to facilitate decision making between the parties or make such recommendations, as may be appropriate, when the parties are unable to do so. One primary goal of the Parenting Coordinator is to empower parents to develop and utilize effective parenting skills so that they can resume the parenting and decision-making role without the need for outside intervention. The Parenting Coordinator should provide guidance and direction to the parties with the primary focus on the best interests of the child by reducing conflict and fostering sound decisions that aid positive child development.

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What was clear was the “The Parenting Coordinator may not make any modification to any order, judgment or decree, unless all parties agree and enter into a consent order” though this was often honored in the breach and PCs were vested with far more authority than the law allowed.

The issue that then came up was whether a Parent Coordinator appointed in a non-pilot program county had to follow the Supreme Court Guidelines.  We and others had cases where we objected to what we believed was the PC overstepping their roles and heard both PCs and court’s say that they were not bound to the pilot program guidelines.  The Appellate Division disagreed in Milne v. Goldenberg, a reported decision that we previously blogged on.

In 2012, the pilot program ended, however, the use of parent coordinators was not abolished.  Rather, court’s could still appoint PCs and parties could agree to use them.  Does that mean that a court could simply defer decision making to the PC?  Once again, the answer was a resounding no in the case of Parish v. Kluger, an unreported (non-precedential) decision of the Appellate Division decided on March 17, 2016, which was the latest chapter in the long standing litigation between these parties.  In fact, I was involved in the original reported decision in this matter dealing with similar issues, as we blogged on in 2010.  In that decision, the Appellate Division held that judge’s must decide enforcement motions, noting:

We also emphasize that judicial review of enforcement motions, no matter how time consuming, is essential to discerning which motions pose problems mandating immediate attention and which describe matters that are trivial. If a court finds a motion is based on unsubstantiated allegations; is frivolous, repetitive, or intended to harass the former spouse; is the result of abusive litigation tactics; or is designed to interfere with court operations, the judge has the power to craft appropriate sanctions to curb such manipulations. When the imposition of sanctions fails, injunctive relief may be warranted.

The Court also made clear that parent coordinators could not address enforcement issues nor could they modify parenting plans. Further, a trial court must make decisions on motions and cannot abdicate that responsibility to third parties or experts.

One would think that with this history in this case, that it couldn’t happen again, but it did.  In the 2016 decision, the Appellate Division wrote:

If, as plaintiff claimed, defendant was preventing him from exercising parenting time as per the MSA, then he was entitled to a remedy. If, as defendant claimed, plaintiff failed to exercise his parenting time out of disinterest, then the court’s decision to not alter parenting time was appropriate. The court should have resolved that dispute. When the court’s decision is considered in its entirety, it could be interpreted – as plaintiff has interpreted it – to vest in the parenting coordinator the resolution of the parties’ conflicting positions as to why the MSA parenting plan was not working. The court has no authority to delegate its decision making to a parenting coordinator. Further, a trial court has no authority to require parties to “abide by [the parenting coordinator’s] recommendations.”

That last sentence is important, “…court has no authority to require parties to “abide by [the parenting coordinator’s] recommendations.”  Too often, PC orders would expressly or impliedly give the PC the final say, with the trial court as a rubber stamp and/or requiring the losing party to file a motion so that the PC’s recommendation would not become a de facto Order.

The takeaway from this case is clear.  PC’s don’t make decisions.  Court’s make decisions.  Court’s cannot tell parties to follow a recommendation of a PC in advance, and moreover, even after it is issued, without fully assessing the issues and making independent fact findings.  Given that this is the case, in the real high conflict cases where one of the parties is inevitably going to oppose a PC recommendation and take the issue to court, what is the point of having a PC in the first place?

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Eric SolotoffEric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Roseland and Morristown, New Jersey offices though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com. Connect with Eric: Twitter_64 Linkedin

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When we all think of insurance, we often think of medical insurance, car insurance and homeowner’s insurance as these seem to be the necessary and everyday types of insurance. Life insurance, which for some can be synonymous with high premiums, is one of the first costs to go when seeking to reduce your budget. I often find that the issue of life insurance is something that typically does not cross a person’s mind when they are getting divorced, whether they are the supporting spouse or the supported spouse, especially if the parties did not maintain life insurance during the marriage.

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Often times however, when a supporting party has an ongoing alimony and/or child support obligation, a court may order (or the parties will agree) that a life insurance policy will continue (or be implemented) as a method of financially protecting a dependent party and/or child in the event of the supporting party’s premature death.

In other words, the same reasons an intact family would procure life insurance, remain after the divorce. All too often however, an obligation to maintain life insurance is the forgotten provision of a divorce settlement agreement in that either 1) it is noticeably absent from the agreement, or 2) it is not being maintained. Obviously, either of these scenarios is troublesome for the supported spouse and could ultimately cause substantial financial ruin should a situation that life insurance seeks to protect against come to fruition.

In the recent case of Ashmont v. Ashmont, Judge Lawrence Jones recently released an unpublished (non-precedential) yet persuasive opinion on how to deal with the issue of life insurance between divorced parties. In Ashmont, the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement required that the wife would receive permanent alimony and child support for the parties’ children. In order to secure same, the parties agreed that the husband would carry life insurance as a means to protect against the loss of financial support in the event of an untimely death.

Several years after the parties were divorced, wife brought an enforcement action against the husband for a breach of their agreement for his failure to provide proof that he was maintaining life insurance as well as for sanctions for his past and alleged ongoing violations of his life insurance obligations. At the time of the hearing, husband admitted that he had been in violation of this obligation, but had recently brought himself into compliance by securing a new policy, consistent with the terms of the parties’ agreement.

Although wife acknowledged that husband was now compliant, she still sought sanctions against the husband for his prior failure to maintain the policy and for allowing his dependents to go uninsured for such a long period of time. It was clear that husband only complied with the obligation after wife was forced to bring litigation and wife feared that husband would simply fail to pay the next scheduled premium.

In his opinion, Judge Jones lays out four tips regarding life insurance and divorce:

• The court may direct that the supported spouse or other parent be named as the owner of the policy, if permitted by the insurance company. This option is particularly relevant when the supporting spouse has a history of failing to adhere to his or her court-ordered life insurance obligations. Being the “owner” of the policy, rather than the “beneficiary” or the “insured”, allows for the party to receive any and all notices and communications from the insurance company regarding the status of the policy, including invoices, notices of proposed cancellation, change in policy terms and renewal dates;

• When a party willfully breaches a court-ordered obligation to carry life insurance, the court may issue multiple forms of relief, including but not limited to ongoing financial sanctions, until such time as the defaulting party complies with the obligation;

• When a party violates a court order, but ultimately complies prior to the conclusion of enforcement litigation, such compliance does not completely erase or negate the violation. Nonetheless, remedial and corrective conduct is equitably relevant on the issue of mitigating sanctions and penalties which might otherwise be imposed under the circumstances. In this case, the wife had asked for a sanction of $7,440.00, the amount of money that husband had saved over the years by failing to comply with his obligation. Finding it a mitigating factor that husband ultimately did cure the defect and that wife was not financially harmed, husband was sanctioned $2,500.00 and was ordered to reimburse wife her $50.00 filing fee for the enforcement motion; and

• As life insurance is an ongoing financial obligation intrinsically related to spousal and/or child support, an insurance provision in a judgment of divorce or settlement agreement is potentially subject to post-judgment modification upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances, pursuant to Lepis v. Lepis 83 N.J. 139, 145-46 (1980). This situation may occur when a term policy naturally expires and the insurance is either much older or less healthy than at the time of divorce, meaning the cost of the policy could be substantially increased and thus revisited by the Court.

While no one wants to think about the consequences associated with an untimely death, the takeaway from this case is that as the supported spouse/parent, it is imperative that you are “in the know” regarding the insurance policies that could very well dictate your financial security (and your children’s) for the rest of your life. If your ex-spouse has an obligation to secure their support payments with life insurance and you have not seen recently seen a copy of the policy, it might be time to reach out and connect with them to ensure the policy is current.

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LLauren Koster Beaver, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP
Lauren K. Beaver is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Law Blog and an attorney in Fox Rothschild LLP’s Family Law Practice Group. Lauren practices out of the firm’s Princeton, New Jersey office representing clients on issues relating to divorce, support, equitable distribution, custody, and parenting time. Lauren also offers mediation services to those looking to procure a more amicable divorce. Lauren can be reached at (609) 844-3027 or lbeaver@foxrothschild.com.

In my opinion, most people (typically women) decide whether or not to change their name to a maiden name at the actual time of the divorce proceeding, if not sooner.  The decision is a largely personal one and in my years of practice I’ve heard the gamut of reasons why to or not to change from the married name.  N.J.S.A. 2A:34-21 is the statute that governs legal name changes in our state.

Rarely do we see the courts chime in on this issue, because generally its quite mundane.  However, a recent published trial court opinion stemming out of Passaic county gives guidance on when is the appropriate time to make a request for a name change and how timing may be everything when it comes to this issue.

In the matter of Leggio v. Leggio, Mrs. Leggio filed an application with the family court seeking to change her name.  She provided the court with a copy of her dual judgment of divorce from bed and board entered in 2004.  Ten years later, she sought to change her name.

A critical point in this matter that cannot be overlooked is the distinction between a divorce from bed and board and a divorce.  New Jersey does not recognize legal separation for married people.  However, a divorce from bed and board has been considered by many to be the closest available option to a legal separation.  However, those who enter into a divorce from bed and board are not legally divorced and their marital bond is not dissolved. As an example, they can still remain on their spouse’s health and/or car insurance.  In order to become ‘divorced’, in the true sense of the word, from a divorce from bed and board, one party must file an application with the court seeking to convert their judgment into a final judgment of divorce.

The Leggio’s never did that.  So, when Mrs. Leggio came to the court seeking to change her name, the court looked to the statute which explicitly states, “The court, upon or after granting a divorce from the bonds of matrimony to either spouse…may allow either spouse…to resume any name used by the spouse…before the marriage…,or to assume any surname.”  This very language gives our courts authority to grant a name change incident to or after a “divorce from the bonds of matrimony”.  Because a divorce from bed and board does not dissolve the bonds of matrimony, the court held that a name change could not be granted unless and until a final judgment of divorce is entered.  The mere passage of time is insufficient.

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Sandra C. FavaSandra C. Fava is a partner in the firm’s Family Law Practice, resident in the Morristown and Roseland, NJ offices. You can reach Sandra at 973.994.7564 or sfava@foxrothschild.com.

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Yesterday, I blogged on the proposed alimony reform legislation in New Jersey.  At the end of that post, I posited the following questions.  Is this really a radical change, or in many respects, does it simply codify what is often done in practice anyway? Will it really take away advocacy when circumstances so require?

Aside from removing the term "permanent alimony" and perhaps sickening reaction in causes in some people, does the proposed legislation really do more than codify the case law or what was done in practice, in many respects.  Remember, is "permanent alimony" really permanent now anyway?  Can’t people seek to retire already and isn’t retirement a change of circumstances?  Don’t people already negotiate, when appropriate, limited duration alimony when people are divorcing close to retirement age, as opposed to buying a second litigation to occur a few years later? 

The following are some other random thoughts, in no particular order and of no particular importance. 

1)  Is "indefinite alimony" a nicer term for "permanent alimony"

2)  While certainly possible and appropriate in many circumstances under existing law for marriages of less than 20 years, permanent alimony was infrequently given in marriages less than 20 years after the limited duration alimony statute was enacted. In fact, I heard someone on a panel at the State Bar Convention last year state that 20 years was sort of a magic number ensuring permanent alimony.

3)   The concept of imputing income to someone that is unemployed or underemployed essentially  already exists in the case law and child support guidelines, and thus, really is not new.

Continue Reading Random Thoughts Regarding The Proposed Alimony Reform Statute

There are many cases that say that the settlement of litigation ranks high in the public policy of this state,  As such, there are many cases that say that an agreement can be enforced, even if it is not reduced to a writing, if the major terms have been agreed to.  As my client learned in Brawer v. Brawer, the unexpressed intention not to be bound is irrelevant.  There is no place in the law for second thoughts where the parties have expressed their agreement.  In fact, in a case called Bistricer, the judge said:

… the proposition that a case is not settled until the last “i” is dotted and the last “t” is crossed on a written settlement agreement carries the germ of much mischief. A party could, in bad faith, waste the time of the court and the other litigant in protracted settlement negotiations, and then, after a “framework” has been established, wiggle out of that framework by creating a flood of new issues and questions.

Just as you can’t wiggle out of a settlement, similarly, you cannot appeal a settlement.  This issue reared its head in the case of Courboin v. Courboin, an unreported (non-precedential) opinion decided on February 21, 2013.  In this case, after two days of trial, the parties settled and put their settlement on the record. The husband testified that he agreed to be bound.  As part of that settlement, the home was to be sold.

Continue Reading If You Enter Into An Agreement or Consent Order, You Can't Appeal It

Several years ago, I posted a blog entitled "Some Times You Just Have to Try a Case."  In that post, I discussed that there are some times where a litigant simply refuses to settle making a trial inevitable.  Are there times, however, when a trial might be less costly, quicker and preferable to long, drawn out, and perhaps insufferable negotations.  I have dubbed these mind numbing, perhaps bad faith negotiations, where sometimes you take one step forward and two steps back and sometimes, no issue is ever resolved, and sometimes, you make an offer about alimony and the response is about equitable distribution – death by a thousand paper cuts.  Whether intentional or not, you wonder whether a trial would have just been bettter.

I ponder that after recently concluding a case that, while having one little twist, which we got past several months ago, then endured numerous mediation sessions, numerous Intensive Settlement Conferences at the Courthouse and even more than one scheduled uncontested hearing where even the final changes had final changes, plus new changes.  In fact, I have recently had several cases where it took an inordinate amount of mediation sessions to resolve simple cases.  In one reasonably simple case, the parties went to mediation 6 or 7 times, before attorneys attended and even then, it did not settle despite the outcome being obvious.  In another, after 9 mediation sessions (7 with lawyers present), the case remains unsettled though only small dollars in the big picture remain in dispute. 

In your garden variety case, the inordinately drawn out process only serves to either wear a party out and forces the righteous client to give up to either move on or stop the bleeding of legal fees.  Otherwise, they incur a large legal bill just to get to the place they should have been had the other side acted reasonably (presuming for the second that they have negotiated fairly and reasonably.)

While I understand the desire to avoid trial at all costs for all of the usual reasons – finality, having control of your own destiny as opposed to putting the decision in the hands of a stranger, etc.- if the process comes to a place where all things considered, you cannot do worse if you go to trial, maybe a party should consider pulling the plug on these expensive snails pace and/or bad faith drawn out negotiations,  Perhaps the threat, if it is a real threat and you actually start doing what is necessary to prepare for trial, will stop the nonsense and get the other side to end the case once and for all. 

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild’s Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

Every month, I get an email with entitled Case Update from the ABA Family Law section which contains blurbs from interesting decisions throughout the country.  This week, I got the December 2012 update and had to take two steps back when I read the following blurb:

Trial court may, in an initial custody determination, consider a parent’s sexual conduct as it relates to that parent’s character, without a showing that the conduct has been detrimental to the child; court may also consider fact that parent does not regularly attend church.

Wow!!!  Mind you, the case is from Alabama, not New Jersey.  In New Jersey, I doubt very much that conduct which is not detrimental to the child would be considered, whether it is gambling (and I actually had a case where a father, a bookie in his spare time, took his kids when he was meeting his bookie), use of pornography, affairs, an affinity for S&M, etc. 

That said, the blurb appealed to my "prurient interests" and hooked me in so I had to read the case.  I figured that there must be some crazy conduct going on.  I figured. at the very least, I may have a good story to tell.

Wrong!  The parties were divorced in 2007 but the ancillary issues, including custody were bifurcated.  The custody hearing took place in 2010.  What was the crazy sexual conduct that impacted the custody determination, you then ask.  The mother was living with her fiance’,  The relationship, by the way, did not become sexual until 2009.  By the way, part of the reason for the delay in addressing custody was that the issue was put on the back burner in the divorce decree until the conclusion of criminal proceedings against the father for the alleged sexual abuse of the mother’s child from a prior relationship.

Continue Reading A Parent's Sexual Conduct and Whether they Take Their Kids to Church Can Impact a Custody Determination ….. In Alabama

I recently wrote a blog entitled "Sloppy Drafting of Marital Settlement Agreements Can Cause Great Harm, Usually to Only One of the Parties."   I am reminded why I wrote that post because as I read the new cases decided each day, it fortifies my belief that settlements must be clearly reduced to writing and that every effort should be made so that the document can only be interpreted in one possible way. I say this because as I read these cases and see the results based upon interpretations of agreements, I think that this could not be what the parties really intended.  

Specifically, two cases decided in the last two days jumped out at me and left me thinking "I see what the agreement says, but that really cannot be what the parties’ meant."

In Schaefer v. Kamery, an unreported (non-precedential) case decided on November 19, 2012, the holding of the trial court, that limited duration alimony continue even after the recipient remarried was upheld.  How can that be you ask since there is a statute (N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25) that says alimony terminates on remarriage?  How can that be you ask because you know that there is case law that says that rehabilitative alimony many continue after remarriage, because the rehabilitation plan is goal oriented (i.e. to get someone back in the workforce or improve their earning ability), which goal exists irrespective or remarriage.

The reason that alimony did not terminate on remarriage in this case is that the Property Settlement Agreement contained the following language:

Payment of alimony shall cease only upon the first to occur of: (1) the
expiration of the alimony term set forth above; (2) Husband’s death; or (3) Wife’s
death. The parties agree Wife’s involuntary termination from her current employer or
permanent disability preventing her continued employment shall be a changed
circumstance justifying review of Wife’s alimony obligation. No change in Husband’s
circumstances other than death shall constitute a changed circumstance affecting Husband’s right to alimony.

Part of the rationale for denying the motion was the aforementioned language and the fact that there may have been other interrelated financial terms.  Not also, the payor previously sought and was denied modification based upon cohabitation.  In fact, the current motion was the third motion to modify.

Having the benefit of 50-50 hindsight, unless someone was trying to pull a fast one and was planning on filing the motion because they knew that the support recipient was in a relationship, the better practice might have been to specifically say that remarriage and/or cohabitation would not impact the alimony, especially if there was not a real meeting of the minds on this issue.  Doing so may have saved the legal fees for 3 motions and an appeal.

Continue Reading Mean What You Say, Write What You Mean

If I were to tell you that the victim of domestic violence was put out of the marital home and the abuser was granted temporary custody of the kids, you would say I was crazy.  The Appellate Division would agree and in reported (precedential) decision released on October 19, 2012 in the case of J.D. v. M.A.D.(ironically), reversed such a holding by a Camden County trial court. 

In this case, the defendant’s discovery of the victim’s infidelity lead to an act of domestic violence.  The victim, however, wanted to remain in and work on the marriage.  The defendant wanted "space" and somehow convinced the victim to leave the home and sign a document giving him primary custody of the children.  The parties later reconciled and the victim returned to the house.  However, unable to control his anger over her affair, a number of additional acts of domestic violence occur ed, culminating with the entry of a TRO against the defendant.  At the Final Restraining Order hearing, the judge then entertained argument "as to who should have possession of the marital home and as to who should have
temporary custody of the children."  The trial judge decided that it should be the defendant, finding that the anger only occur ed when the parties were together and as such because the defendant had been the primary caretaker, he was awarded temporary custody and the victim was excluded from the marital home. 

The victim appealed and the Appellate Division reversed, holding:

The trial court’s findings, set forth in the beginning of this opinion regarding the events over the course of the seven months following defendant’s discovery of his wife’s extramarital affair, are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and we do not disturb them. The facts as found, however, do not overcome the presumption embodied in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b(11), governing the court’s award of temporary custody
in a proceeding under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, "that the best interests of the child are served by an award of custody to the non-abusive parent." Moreover, these facts cannot support an order granting exclusive possession of the marital home to the party the court has found to have perpetrated the abuse.

Continue Reading Perpetrator of Domestic Violence Cannot have the victim removed and get temporary custody of the kids, can he?

An issue that has vexed us in the past is whether the rules enacted by the Supreme Court regarding parent coordinators were to be applied to all parent coordinators appointed by the Court.  In 2006, the New Jersey Supreme Court implemented a pilot program in four vicinages (Bergen, Morris/Sussex, Union and Middlesex) for parenting coordinators.  The link above provides the Supreme Court mandated guidelines and procedures which have also been discussed on this blog previously.

The problem arose when a parenting coordinator was appointed outside of one of those vicinages.  To my chagrin, I have heard judges state and lawyers argue that since their vicinage was outside of the pilot program, they did not have to follow the guidelines.  This was often in the context of a court improperly vesting a parent coordinator with authority which approached or could be argued to be an abdication of the judicial role. 

Finally, we have an answer to this question in the reported (precedential) case of Milne v. Goldenberg decided on September 12, 2012.  The case seems like a never ending, "war of the roses" type custody battle and also has some interesting discussion regarding the role of a Guardian ad Litem and procedures related thereto.  That said, the parent coordinate issue was addressed because the court appointed an attorney who was not on the court approved, pilot program parenting coordinator list. 

Continue Reading Finally an Answer to the Question about whether the Supreme Court Guidelines Apply to Parent Coordinators appointed in Counties Outside of the Pilot Program