Archives: Property Settlement Agreements

Signed into law on January 19, 2016, New Jersey’s emancipation law is set to take effect on February 1, 2017 and will apply to all child support orders issued prior to or after its effective date.

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One of the highlights of the new law is that it will dramatically impact when and how child support orders will terminate. Specifically, it provides that unless otherwise indicated in a court order or judgment, the obligation to pay child support shall terminate without order on the date a child marries, dies or enters into military service.

Child support will also terminate automatically when a child reaches 19 years of age unless (a) another age for such termination is specified in a court order, which shall not extend beyond the date the child reaches 23 years of age; (b) a written request seeking the continuation of child support is submitted to the court by a custodial parent prior to the child reaching the age of 19; or (c) the child receiving support is in an out of home placement through the Division of child Protection and Permanency in the Department of Children and Families.

Just ahead of the effective date of the statute, Judge Jones issued an opinion on the effect of one child’s emancipation in Harrington v. Harrington. In Harrington, the parties divorced in 2012. The parties have three children, all of whom were unemancipated at the time of the divorce. As such, the parties’ settlement agreement provided that the father would pay the mother the sum of $240 per week in child support for all three children. In what would become a decisive fact in the case for Judge Jones, he noted that the child support was unallocated, rather than broken down or allocated into specific dollar amounts for each child – either on a one-third per child basis or otherwise.

Following the divorce, the father paid child support as agreed without requesting an modifications, even when their oldest child began college. In September, 2014 the parties mutually agreed to emancipate their two oldest children. Two orders were entered confirming the emancipation, but the amount of child support that the father paid remained the same. Further, neither party submitted or exchanged updated financial information or filed any motion.
In June, 2015, the last remaining unemancipated child graduated high school and decided not to proceed to college. The father continued to pay $240 per week in child support nonetheless, without any objection by either party.

In February, 2016, a year-and-a-half after the first two children were emancipated, the father filed a motion for the retroactive allocation of child support to $80 per child, and downward modification of one-third per emancipated child, effective September, 2104. He also sought to emancipate the youngest child and terminate his obligation. The mother consented to the emancipation of the youngest child, but opposed the retroactive modification that the father sought.
With regard to the issue of retroactive emancipation, the Court initially grappled with which law to apply in this situation: should it apply the anti-retroactivity statute which prohibits the retroactive modification of unallocated child support, or does the case law with regard to retroactive emancipation apply?

In reaching its decision, the Court devised a set of equitable factors that should be examined:

1) How much time has passed between the date of one child’s emancipation and the filing date of the obligor’s present motion for retroactive modification of unallocated child support for the remaining unemancipated child or children?

2) What are the specific reasons for any delay by the obligor in filing a motion to review support based upon emancipation?

3) Did the non-custodial parent continue to pay the same level of child support to the obligee, either by agreement or acquiescence, and of his or her own decision and free will, even after he/she could have filed a motion for emancipation at a prior point in time?

4) Did the custodial parent or child engage in any fraud or misrepresentation that caused the obligor’s delay in filing a motion for emancipation and support modification motion?

5) If the non-custodial parent alleges that the custodial parent failed to communicate facts that would have led to emancipation and modification of support at an earlier date, could the non-custodial parent have nonetheless otherwise easily obtained such information with a reasonable degree of parental diligence and inquiry?

6) If the obligor’s child support obligation was unallocated between multiple unemancipated children of the parties, will a proposed retroactive modification of child support over a lengthy period of time be unduly cumbersome and complicated, so as to call into question the accuracy and reliability of the process and result?

7) Did the custodial parent previously refrain from seeking to enforce or validly increase other financial obligations of the non-custodial parent, such as college contribution for any remaining unemancipated child, because during such time period, the non-custodial parent continued to maintain the same level of unallocated child support without seeking a decrease or other modification?

8) Is the non-custodial parent seeking only a credit against unpaid arrears, or rather an actual return of child support already paid to, and used by, the custodial parent toward the financial expenses of the child living in the custodial parent’s home?

9) If the non-custodial parent seeks an actual return of money previously paid to the custodial parent, what is the estimated dollar amount of child support that the non- custodial parent seeks to receive back from the custodial parent, and will such amount likely cause an inequitable financial hardship to the custodial parent who previously received such funds in good faith?

10) Are there any other factors the court deems relevant to the analysis?

In applying the above factors to the present case, the Court considered the following factors: nearly a year and a half passed between the effective date of the emancipation for the older two children and the filing of the father’s motion; there was no reason provided to explain the delay in filing; during that period, the father continued to pay the same level of child support to the mother; there was no evidence submitted that the mother or the children engaged in any type of fraud; the mother and children communicated facts that would have led to a modification of support; and, a retroactive modification of support to 2014 may be unduly complicated given the fact that no financial information was submitted for the period of time in question – 2014-2016.

The Court noted that a hearing should to be scheduled to examine these factors and weigh the comparative equities to determine whether to exercise its discretion and retroactively modify unallocated child support prior to the motion filing date, based upon a prior emancipation of one or more children. However, the Court was somber in its knowledge that this would not be an easy task – i.e. to recreate what child support *might* have looked like over a two year period of time.
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Eliana Baer, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP Eliana T. Baer is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Eliana practices in Fox Rothschild’s Princeton, New Jersey office and focuses her state-wide practice on representing clients on issues relating to divorce, equitable distribution, support, custody, adoption, domestic violence, premarital agreements and Appellate Practice. You can reach Eliana at (609) 895-3344, or etbaer@foxrothschild.com.

With summer just beginning, many people have visions of swimming pools, beaches and family vacations. Others in New Jersey have visions of Sallie Mae, tuition bills and book fees.

After four years of what has become obligatory college contribution pursuant to the mandates of Newburgh v. Arrigo, many parents in the state are then faced with the daunting possibility of an additional 3-4 (maybe more?) years of opening their wallets and contribute toward the cost of graduate school; sometimes for their 24, 25, 26 or 27 year old children who are not yet considered emancipated pursuant to our current laws. Many times, child support also continues during that period.

45567922 - graduate figure made out of falling sand from dollar sign flowing through hourglass

Indeed, New Jersey courts have recognized that completion of undergraduate education is not the determinative factor for either declaring emancipation or terminating child support. Many times, the determination as to whether child support would continue, and along with it the parents’ obligation to contribute toward the cost of the child’s education, focused largely on the whether the child, is “beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtains an independent status of his or her own”.

New Jersey is in fact one of the few states in the country that still requires divorced parents to pay for their children’s college educations. Even fewer require contribution toward graduate school. However, New Jersey remained an outlier in that regard.

For example, in the 1979 case of Ross v. Ross, the Chancery Division declared that the parties’ daughter could not be considered emancipated as she was attending law school after obtaining her undergraduate degree.

As recently as 2010 in Mulcahey v. Melici, the Appellate Division upheld a trial court’s determination that a 23 year old child was not emancipation and was entitled to contribution toward her education costs as well as continued child support. Eric Solotoff previously blogged about this case in his post entitled: I Don’t Have to Pay for My Kid’s Graduate School, Do I?

The New Jersey Emancipation Statute, signed into law on January 19, 2016, is set to take effect on February 1, 2017, and may change the way courts view graduate school contribution.

Whereas previously emancipation was a fact specific inquiry focusing on the level of independence of the child, now, child support “shall not extend beyond the date the child reaches 23 years of age.”

Does this mean that the possible obligation to contribute toward a child’s graduate school education is a thing of the past? If emancipation must occur by the age of 23, and the obligation to contribute hinges on the question of whether the child is emancipated, how could a parent be required to contribute to graduate school?

Another interesting question will be whether an agreement to pay for graduate school at the time of the divorce, pre-statute will be enforced.
Recall also the New Jersey Rutgers University professor who was ordered to pay more than $112,000 for his daughter to attend Cornell Law School in 2014 because he had agreed to contribute in his divorce settlement agreement, but failed to place any cap on tuition.

The enforcement of agreements to contribute toward college is extensively addressed in Robert Epstein’s – Appellate Division Addresses Enforceability of Settlement Agreement as to College in New Published Decision – but it will be interesting to see if the same principles are applied when it comes to graduate school.

We will keep you posted as the case law is decided.
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Eliana Baer, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP Eliana T. Baer is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Eliana practices in Fox Rothschild’s Princeton, New Jersey office and focuses her state-wide practice on representing clients on issues relating to divorce, equitable distribution, support, custody, adoption, domestic violence, premarital agreements and Appellate Practice. You can reach Eliana at (609) 895-3344, or

When we all think of insurance, we often think of medical insurance, car insurance and homeowner’s insurance as these seem to be the necessary and everyday types of insurance. Life insurance, which for some can be synonymous with high premiums, is one of the first costs to go when seeking to reduce your budget. I often find that the issue of life insurance is something that typically does not cross a person’s mind when they are getting divorced, whether they are the supporting spouse or the supported spouse, especially if the parties did not maintain life insurance during the marriage.

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Often times however, when a supporting party has an ongoing alimony and/or child support obligation, a court may order (or the parties will agree) that a life insurance policy will continue (or be implemented) as a method of financially protecting a dependent party and/or child in the event of the supporting party’s premature death.

In other words, the same reasons an intact family would procure life insurance, remain after the divorce. All too often however, an obligation to maintain life insurance is the forgotten provision of a divorce settlement agreement in that either 1) it is noticeably absent from the agreement, or 2) it is not being maintained. Obviously, either of these scenarios is troublesome for the supported spouse and could ultimately cause substantial financial ruin should a situation that life insurance seeks to protect against come to fruition.

In the recent case of Ashmont v. Ashmont, Judge Lawrence Jones recently released an unpublished (non-precedential) yet persuasive opinion on how to deal with the issue of life insurance between divorced parties. In Ashmont, the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement required that the wife would receive permanent alimony and child support for the parties’ children. In order to secure same, the parties agreed that the husband would carry life insurance as a means to protect against the loss of financial support in the event of an untimely death.

Several years after the parties were divorced, wife brought an enforcement action against the husband for a breach of their agreement for his failure to provide proof that he was maintaining life insurance as well as for sanctions for his past and alleged ongoing violations of his life insurance obligations. At the time of the hearing, husband admitted that he had been in violation of this obligation, but had recently brought himself into compliance by securing a new policy, consistent with the terms of the parties’ agreement.

Although wife acknowledged that husband was now compliant, she still sought sanctions against the husband for his prior failure to maintain the policy and for allowing his dependents to go uninsured for such a long period of time. It was clear that husband only complied with the obligation after wife was forced to bring litigation and wife feared that husband would simply fail to pay the next scheduled premium.

In his opinion, Judge Jones lays out four tips regarding life insurance and divorce:

• The court may direct that the supported spouse or other parent be named as the owner of the policy, if permitted by the insurance company. This option is particularly relevant when the supporting spouse has a history of failing to adhere to his or her court-ordered life insurance obligations. Being the “owner” of the policy, rather than the “beneficiary” or the “insured”, allows for the party to receive any and all notices and communications from the insurance company regarding the status of the policy, including invoices, notices of proposed cancellation, change in policy terms and renewal dates;

• When a party willfully breaches a court-ordered obligation to carry life insurance, the court may issue multiple forms of relief, including but not limited to ongoing financial sanctions, until such time as the defaulting party complies with the obligation;

• When a party violates a court order, but ultimately complies prior to the conclusion of enforcement litigation, such compliance does not completely erase or negate the violation. Nonetheless, remedial and corrective conduct is equitably relevant on the issue of mitigating sanctions and penalties which might otherwise be imposed under the circumstances. In this case, the wife had asked for a sanction of $7,440.00, the amount of money that husband had saved over the years by failing to comply with his obligation. Finding it a mitigating factor that husband ultimately did cure the defect and that wife was not financially harmed, husband was sanctioned $2,500.00 and was ordered to reimburse wife her $50.00 filing fee for the enforcement motion; and

• As life insurance is an ongoing financial obligation intrinsically related to spousal and/or child support, an insurance provision in a judgment of divorce or settlement agreement is potentially subject to post-judgment modification upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances, pursuant to Lepis v. Lepis 83 N.J. 139, 145-46 (1980). This situation may occur when a term policy naturally expires and the insurance is either much older or less healthy than at the time of divorce, meaning the cost of the policy could be substantially increased and thus revisited by the Court.

While no one wants to think about the consequences associated with an untimely death, the takeaway from this case is that as the supported spouse/parent, it is imperative that you are “in the know” regarding the insurance policies that could very well dictate your financial security (and your children’s) for the rest of your life. If your ex-spouse has an obligation to secure their support payments with life insurance and you have not seen recently seen a copy of the policy, it might be time to reach out and connect with them to ensure the policy is current.

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LLauren Koster Beaver, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP
Lauren K. Beaver is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Law Blog and an attorney in Fox Rothschild LLP’s Family Law Practice Group. Lauren practices out of the firm’s Princeton, New Jersey office representing clients on issues relating to divorce, support, equitable distribution, custody, and parenting time. Lauren also offers mediation services to those looking to procure a more amicable divorce. Lauren can be reached at (609) 844-3027 or lbeaver@foxrothschild.com.

I see it all the time.  The fight rages on for the fight’s sake.  Each party sure that they are right.  Each party insistent that they must win.  The lawyers pile on, adding fuel to the fire.  Worse yet, some times this happens when the major issues are resolved and the battle continues because of minor issues or non-issues.

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In these cases, sometimes the parties don’t even know that they are as close to settlement as they are. Often, they don’t quantify the remaining amount in dispute to figure out that right or wrong, they will never in a lifetime recoup the legal fees it will cost to be right.  Clearly, they don’t consider the emotional cost being right is exacting and/or the value of putting the issue behind you.

Now some people will continue to fight because the fight is all they have left of the marriage or they are otherwise emotionally unable to let go and move on.  In those cases, you may have to wait them out, as we have blogged about in the past.

Some times, it is better to avoid the fight altogether and compromise the number.  As I have said before, sometimes it is better to look at the big picture and negotiate numbers as opposed to how you got to the number because you may ultimately agree to compromise on the number but will never agree how you got there.

However, most people are sane and rational when removed from the stress of the divorce.  Sometimes, you need to take a step back and figure out which issues there is agreement on and which issues remain open.  For the issues that remain open, it is then wise to quantify them to see how much is really at stake.  Figure out what you would get if you won and if you lost and also look at the midpoint.  Then think about how much it is going to cost to get a decision and decide (1) does the cost exceed the amount at issue and (2) is it worth losing the resolution on the major issues?

Most importantly, figure out if it is really worth it to be right or whether it is better to be done.


Eric SolotoffEric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Roseland and Morristown, New Jersey offices though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

Photo credit: Copyright: <a href=’http://www.123rf.com/profile_cteconsulting’>cteconsulting / 123RF Stock Photo</a>

Lawyers and litigants alike have long understood the importance of maintaining a good credit rating before, during, and after the divorce. As the parties, particularly one who has not had significant employment during the marriage know, a positive credit rating is critical to establish a new residence, purchase vehicles, and start a new, single life. Often however, the actions of one party can have the effect of damaging irreparably the credit rating of the other. This often happens in the context of one party failing to pay the mortgage on a former marital home or refinancing the mortgage to remove the other party as obligor. Recently, this issue was examined by the court in the case of LH v. DH.

In that case, the parties’ settlement agreement at the time of divorce provided that:

…it is the intent of the parties that the wife shall maintain and keep the marital home… Husband shall execute a quit claim deed transferring his interest in the former marital home to wife, and husband’s attorney shall hold the same in escrow pending wife’s refinance of the mortgage in her name. Wife will have nine months from the date of this agreement to obtain refinance of the mortgage in her name.

This is a very common provision which is found in many settlement agreements. In this case, however, the wife failed to refinance the mortgage removing the husband as an obligor. The husband did not take any action to enforce this obligation initially. However, a couple of years after the divorce, he went to purchase a new home of his own. When he applied for a mortgage, he discovered that his credit rating had been negatively impacted, and he was unable to obtain a favorable rate for a mortgage as a result of the fact that his name was still on the mortgage for the former marital home. He then made an application in court seeking enforcement of the settlement agreement and to appoint him as attorney-in-fact to sign any documents to list the home for sale and sell it.

The court agreed with the husband and granted his request. Importantly, however, the court’s decision took notice of the fact that “as a matter of indisputable knowledge, a positive credit rating and score is one of the most valuable and important assets a party may presently possess. Simply put, a strong credit report and score can enable one with relatively limited assets or income to make substantial purchase is which he or she could not otherwise afford…. Reciprocally, a negative credit rating and score can have a detrimental and sometimes disastrous effect on the party’s financial health, often crippling the party’s ability to obtain a loan, either at a favorable rate or at all, for significant purchases such as a house, car, school tuition, or other expensive items, will potentially and simultaneously limiting the individuals healthy financial growth for years.”

This acknowledgment by the court is very significant. As a practical matter, when an agreement provides time to a party refinance a mortgage or loan, it is important for the other party to regularly check his or her credit score. Additionally, when deadlines pass under the terms of an agreement, it may be critical to take appropriate action to enforce its provisions. While this can be sometimes emotionally difficult given the fact that former spouses and often children are living in the house, the repercussions can be devastating.

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MillnerJennifer_twitterJennifer Weisberg Millner is a partner in Fox Rothschild LLP’s Family Law Practice Group. Jennifer is resident in the firm’s Princeton Office, although she practices throughout the state. Jennifer can be reached at 609-895-7612 or jmillner@foxrothschild.com.

As a lover of all things Coldplay, I was sad to hear that lead singer Chris Martin and his wife of more than 10 years, Gwyneth Paltrow, were divorcing. Gwyneth Paltrow announced the separation on her website Goop.com and used the term “conscious uncoupling” to describe their approach to divorce.  Although the term had been originally coined by marriage and family therapist, Katherine Woodward Thomas, as with anything else endorsed by celebrities, the phrase went viral after her post.  It was of particular interest to me personally given my chosen profession as a divorce lawyer.

As professionals, especially ones whose practice is client-centric, we are always striving for better ways to do our jobs.  In my case, that means getting clients their desired result in the most effective and streamlined way possible. After practicing for several years, experience has shown me time and time again, that people going through divorce are most satisfied with the process when they feel they have control over it (i.e., are “conscious[ly] uncoupling”) and can proceed with a form of alternative dispute resolution (such as mediation) rather than traditional, costly, protracted litigation.

Even as American culture has become more progressive and accepting, divorce is still considered taboo and is almost always surrounded by extreme negativity and hostility.  Even if the couple themselves wants to proceed amicably, they are unfortunately often allowing others in their life (parents, siblings, friends, new boyfriend or girlfriend) to control the dialogue and encourage them to dig in their heels.

Once people “dig in”, it is often impossible to “dig out”.  Protracted litigation only intensifies negativity and hostility. The idea that divorce has to be a negative experience then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which divorcing parties behavior, is influenced by their expectation that divorce must be awful.  I believe if you change the conversation surrounding divorce and allow yourself to “consciously uncouple” you will have much more satisfying experience surrounding your divorce.

I recently completed a 40-hour divorce mediation training program. This program has only solidified my beliefs that in many cases, a mediated divorce, is a better divorce. That is not to say that litigation is never necessary. There are some circumstances that cannot be mediated and some people that simply cannot effectively participate in mediation. That said though, divorce is multi-dimensional: it is legal, it is financial, and it is emotional. The great thing about mediation is that it can effectively address each of those dimensions.

(1) LEGALLY

Whether you litigate or mediate, you achieve the same end result: a legal divorce.  A mediated divorce however is often faster, less adversarial and provides more flexible and creative resolutions, narrowly tailored to your specific family dynamic.  It also allows for a more confidential process than airing out your dirty laundry in a series of public court filings and appearances.

(2) FINANCIALLY

I will never say “always” or “never” because I’ve come to learn that nothing is absolute.  A mediated divorce however, can certainly be more cost effective. Spending less to uncouple leaves more to be divided between the parties and therefore places both parties in a better position to maintain financial independence and stability post-divorce.

(3) EMOTIONALLY

Although emotions can run high during mediation, there is a much more focused approach on compromise and collaboration rather than “winning” as is seen in litigation. When people feel their spouse is negotiating in good faith and trying to be part of the solution, rather than part of the problem (i.e., zealously litigating over the smallest of disputes), they walk away feeling better about uncoupling, which leads to healthier relationships with themselves, their ex-spouse, and future romantic partners.

The takeaway from all of this is that choosing to uncouple, does not always have to be adversarial, financially draining and emotionally damaging. Take control of your divorce and find avenues in which to minimize the long-term effects.  Before deciding to wage war against your spouse, consult with an experienced and trained family law mediator to see how mediation can work for you.

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Lauren K. Beaver is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Law Blog and an attorney in Fox Rothschild LLP’s Family Law Practice Group. Lauren practices out of the firm’s Princeton, New Jersey office representing clients on issues relating to divorce, support, equitable distribution, custody, and parenting time.  Lauren also offers mediation services to those looking to procure a more amicable divorce. Lauren can be reached at (609) 844-3027 or lbeaver@foxrothschild.com.

Your lawyer has just told you what you are likely to receive for child support and your jaw has dropped because you know the amount comes nowhere near the actual cost of supporting the children. How then, do you get your soon-to-be ex-spouse to pay what you consider to be a fair amount for the children?

In a recent unreported decision, the court ordered an enhanced amount of child support ($50,000) but was then reversed on appeal because the judge failed to conduct an analysis and explain why he deviated from the formula which is used to calculate support for children.

Copyright: boykung / 123RF Stock Photo
Copyright: boykung / 123RF Stock Photo

In the vast majority of cases, child support is determined through the use of a formula known as the New Jersey Child Support Guidelines, which are found in Appendix IX-A of the Court Rules. This formula is a rebuttable presumption in both establishing and modifying all child support orders. Under the court rules, the Guidelines have to be applied in all matters whether contested or not. The court rules contain 53 pages of really small print explaining how they work. But generally, the idea is that each parent is responsible for a portion of the cost of raising children and the amount it costs to raise children is based on statistical averages throughout the state, depending on the parents’ combined income.

For cases in which the parents’ combined income is over the poverty line, and below $187,200 net, the guidelines apply, and the appropriate child support amount is applied to the case.  If the combined income is over that amount, then the Guidelines are applied, and an additional amount is added. The amount that is added is based on the remaining family income and the following factors:

(1) Needs of the child;

(2) Standard of living and economic circumstances of each parent;

(3) All sources of income and assets of each parent;

(4) Earning ability of each parent, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, custodial responsibility for children including the cost of providing child care and the length of time and cost of each parent to obtain training or experience for appropriate employment;

(5) Need and capacity of the child for education, including higher education;

(6) Age and health of the child and each parent;

(7) Income, assets and earning ability of the child;

(8) Responsibility of the parents for the court-ordered support of others;

(9) Reasonable debts and liabilities of each child and parent; and

(10) Any other factors the court may deem relevant.

When a parent believes that the number under the Guidelines is inappropriate (even when income does not exceed $187,200), the court has discretion to deviate from that amount if circumstances exist such that the guidelines amount is unfair.  The court can take the following factors into consideration when deviating from the Guidelines:

(1) equitable distribution of property;

(2) income taxes;

(3) fixed direct payments (e.g. mortgage payments);

(4) unreimbursed medical/dental expenses for either parent;

(5) tuition for children (i.e. for private, parochial, or trade schools, or other secondary schools, or postsecondary education);

(6) educational expenses for either parent to improve earning capacity;

(7) single-family units (i.e. one household) having more than six children;

(8) cases involving voluntary placement of children in foster care;

(9) special needs of gifted or disabled children;

(10) ages of the children;

(11) hidden costs of caring for children such as reduced income, decreased career opportunities, loss of time to shop economically, or loss of saving;

(12) extraordinarily high income of a child (e.g. actors, trusts);

(13) substantiated financial obligations for elder care that existed before the filing of the support action;

(14) the tax advantages of paying for child health insurance;

(15) one obligor owing support to more than one family (e.g. multiple prior support orders);

(16) the motor vehicle purchased or leased for the intended primary use of this child subject to the support order;

(17) parties sharing equal parenting time; and

(18) overnight adjustment for multiple children with varying parenting time schedules.

This list is not exhaustive. There are several other reasons why the Guidelines can be deviated from.  The important thing is to build a case which addresses any and all reasons to deviate from the Guidelines-up or down.  When there are extenuating circumstances, it is critical to compile documents and information which substantiate the claim. While there is certainly no guarantee, the Perry case demonstrates that judges are willing to consider the issue, but have to be given the correct information.

Jennifer Weisberg MillnerJennifer Weisberg Millner is a partner in Fox Rothschild LLP’s Family Law Practice Group. Jennifer is resident in the firm’s Princeton Office, although she practices throughout the state. Jennifer can be reached at 609-895-7612 or jmillner@foxrothschild.com.

The BBC has recently reported that Cristiano Ronoldo, the soccer superstar, has given his agent a Greek Island for a wedding gift. While a Greek island may not be the typical wedding gift for most couples, the question of how the wedding gifts are divided in the event of a divorce certainly comes up often.

Copyright: photografier / 123RF Stock Photo
Copyright: photografier / 123RF Stock Photo

New Jersey, as well as the majority of states, considers all property that was acquired during the marriage to be subject to equitable distribution. This includes property which is obtained in contemplation of the marriage. Many clients like to take the position that she gets whatever gifts came from her side of the aisle and he gets whatever gifts came from his side of the aisle. Well, if the parties agree to this, fine. But if not, it’s all up for grabs. This does not mean you have to break up the 12 place setting of Lenox, but there has to be a fair distribution. So maybe one gets the Lenox and the other gets the Waterford Crystal.

Dividing personal property can be one of the most emotional parts of a marriage’s demise.  It’s one of those “hit you in the face,” “this is really happening” moments of the divorce. Unfortunately, it is a component of the divorce which can be used as a means to show the anger and hurt of the dissolution. When one spouse knows that something is meaningful to the other, it is sometimes used as a weapon.

That having been said, equitable distribution does not mean equal distribution. Rather, other factors will be taken into consideration when determining what a reasonable distribution of property, including wedding gifts, is. One factor which may be important is how soon after the wedding is the termination of the marriage occurring. In a situation in which a marriage falls apart shortly after the nuptials, it may be appropriate to have a disproportionate distribution of assets, including wedding gifts. On the other hand, 10 years and two kids later, the more equal distribution may likely occur.

Getting through distribution of property can be difficult for all involved. This includes the parties, the lawyers, the judges, and the children. Hopefully, a cool Meltemi Greek wind will blow in the right direction and calm things down rather than churn them up.

Jennifer Weisberg MillnerJennifer Weisberg Millner is a partner in Fox Rothschild LLP’s Family Law Practice Group. Jennifer is resident in the firm’s Princeton Office, although she practices throughout the state. Jennifer can be reached at 609-895-7612 or jmillner@foxrothschild.com.

As a matter of public policy, New Jersey Courts favor the enforcement of agreements reached between parties. Since Marital Settlement Agreements (“MSA”) are entered into consensually and voluntarily, they are often approached with a predisposition in favor of their validity and enforceability.  That notwithstanding, these agreements are enforceable only if they are fair and equitable. A bedrock principle of New Jersey divorce jurisprudence is that parties may be able to modify support provisions within their divorce agreements if they are able to show a continuing change of circumstances.

Although the ability to modify agreements based on a change of circumstances is essentially the default so to speak, parties are free to contract around same. Often times in exchange for additional financial considerations, such as unequal asset division or a “discount” on alimony, parties will agree that the amount of years alimony is paid and/or the actual amount of alimony paid each year is non-modifiable regardless of a change of circumstances, foreseeable or otherwise.

Unfortunately all too often parties are entering into agreements that are “non-modifiable” without really thinking through the consequences of same in an effort to “get the deal done” only to have it come back to haunt them.  This is exactly what happened to Mr. Fiorenza in the recent unpublished (non-precedential) case of Fiorenza v. Fiorenza.

In Fiorenza, the parties were married for 24 years and had three children. At the time of their divorce, they were able to come to a resolution regarding the Husband’s alimony and child support payments and agreed that Husband would pay $100,000 per year in alimony ($8,333/per month) and $833.00 per month in child support. Shortly after the divorce however, Husband stopped paying support and Wife filed an application to enforce the support provisions of the parties’ divorce agreement.

The parties were able to resolve their differences and entered into a Consent Order, which lowered Husband’s total support obligation to $5,000 per month ($833.00 of which would be considered child support), included an escalation clause that support would go up if his income did and vacated $10,000 in support arrears.  The parties also agreed however that the new support amount would be non-modifiable and included that if there was a default on this new payment structure, that the total support amount would revert back the original amount under the parties initial MSA. Specifically, the parties agreed:

No matter defendant’s annual gross income, at no time shall monthly support be lower than $5,000, except after the emancipation of [the parties’ youngest child] when the child support component may be reduced”.

After the entry of the Consent Order, Husband made the new support payments for a period of one year but then again stop paying altogether.  Wife immediately filed an application to enforce the terms of the Consent Order and asked that the initial amount of support be reinstated.  In response, Husband cross-moved for a reduction in alimony.

Both the trial Court and Appellate Court upheld the parties’ agreement and increased the support payment back to the original amount in the parties’ MSA (due to Husband’s default on the new support payments) noting that each party got the “expected benefit and burden of the contract”. Because of Husband’s current inability to pay the full support amount however, the Court set a reduced alimony and child support figure of $2,500 per month and allowed the difference between the MSA support award of $8,333 and the $2,500 to accrue as arrears.

The take away from this case is that you should think long and hard before you include any non-modifiable provision in your divorce agreements and consult with an experienced attorney to discuss the ramifications of same. Although you might feel you are getting a tangible benefit in the present by agreeing to a non-modifiable provision, it is important to think through all the circumstances that may occur in the future that would complicate your ability to comply with same (such as loss of income/employment) as you cannot expect a Court to simply invalidate the terms of your settlement agreement because you now view them as unfair with the benefit of hindsight.

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Lauren Koster Beaver is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Lauren practices in Fox Rothschild’s Princeton, New Jersey office and focuses her state-wide practice on representing clients on issues relating to divorce, equitable distribution, support, custody, premarital agreements and Appellate Practice. You can reach Lauren at (609) 844-3027, or lbeaver@foxrothschild.com.

Romeo and Juliet, Sir Lancelot and Guinevere, Katniss Everdeen and Peeta Mellark – for some of these star-crossed lovers, their journeys ended with hemlock, in exile, or…well…no spoilers.  For Easton and Mercer, their romance ended with an annulment on the grounds of equitable fraud in a lengthy decision delivered by Judge Jones in Ocean County New Jersey in Easton v. Mercer.

The union between Easton and Mercer began like many others.  The parties met in 2008 as young twenty-somethings, and began a dating relationship that lasted 2 years.  At the time, each were still living in their parents’ homes.

In 2010, Easton proposed to Mercer and she initially accepted.  Her parents, however, objected, disapproving of Easton as a “suitable husband” for their daughter.

Even so, over the elder Mercers’ objections, their marriage plans went full steam ahead and the parties planned a small ceremony to take place in 3 months’ time.

In October, 2010, the parties formally applied for a marriage license and the next month they went ahead with their small ceremony, which took place in the home of Easton’s parents.  Mercer’s parents were not invited.

While Easton and Mercer had planned to begin their lives together under the same roof, those plans never came to fruition.  Mercer advised Easton that she intended to remain residing with her parents until she could “break the news of the marriage to her mother and father after the fact.”

Well, the “after the fact” news was not taken well.  Mercer’s parents insisted that she renounce the marriage and remain living with them.  While Eason tried to convince Mercer to resume their relationship, his efforts were unsuccessful, and Mercer remained at her parents’ home, “never returning to [Easton] again.”

Yet, for the next 4 years, the parties stayed married and never took any steps to formally dissolve their marriage.  Finally, in 2014, Easton filed for an annulment of the marriage on the grounds of fraud as to the essentials of the marriage “by bowing to parental pressure and abandoning both him and her marital vows.”

Many people are unfamiliar with the particulars of annulments.  That is for the simple reason that they are not often applied for in our courts, namely because of the limited circumstances that it covers.  Instead, divorce is a far more common cause of action for the dissolution of a marriage.

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Copyright: pockygallery / 123RF Stock Photo

The major difference between an annulment and a divorce is that in an annulment, the facts giving rise to grounds for the dissolution of the marriage typically precede the marriage itself, whereas the causes for divorce arise during the marriage.  Annulment also differs radically from divorce in that an annulment legally declares a prior marriage retroactively null and void, as if having never happened in the first place.

The grounds for annulment have historically been very limited; among them are:

(a) Already existing, concurrent marriage of one of the parties

(b) Prohibited degrees of relation

(c) Impotence

(d) Incapacity to Consent, Duress or Fraud

(e) One of the parties was underage at the time of the marriage

In a case of an allegation of fraud, as was the allegation in the Easton case, New Jersey courts have held that there needed to have been some intention to deceive the other party.

For example, marriages have been annulled where there was premarital fraudulent representation of intent to have children; insistence of having children where the party previously indicated they did not wish to have children; belief that other party would practice Orthodox Judaism but really have no intention of doing so; a history of undisclosed hereditary chronic tuberculosis; and, concealment of a severe heroin addiction.

The common thread among all of the above example is that there was clear intent by one party to deceive the other.  However, in the Easton case, such intent could not be found – “on its surface, the evidence does not reasonably support a finding that defendant knowingly intended to deceive plaintiff before the marriage by purposely supplying him with false information.”

But, on the other hand, the Court found that even without this previously required intent to deceive, there was never any real marriage of substance between the parties; the marriage both started and ended with the ceremony itself.

After setting forth the history of equitable fraud as a cause of action, Judge Jones ruled that the marriage could be annulled on the grounds of equitable fraud, even where there is no evidence to suggest that Mercer purposefully sought to lie to or deceive Easton.

He reasoned: “In the present matter, while defendant may not have actually intended to deceive plaintiff, an objectively reasonable analysis of the facts and evidence in this case reflects the undeniable reality that deep down, defendant never truly had a genuine commitment to a marital relationship with plaintiff in the first place.”

While Judge Jones went on to hypothesize at length as to the reasons Mercer could have chosen not to pursue the marriage, he concluded that Easton was deserving of the annulment – “‘I do’ does not mean ‘I do’ after I go home for a few weeks and talk with my parents some more.'”

While this case was one of first impression, Judge Jones reasoned his decision using existing case law and equitable doctrine. This couple never lived together, they were not financially dependent on one another and they never held themselves out as husband and wife. It is important to remember that had these parties undertaken any of the privileges or duties of marriage, the result likely would have been different. However, the facts of the case certainly justified an annulment on equitable grounds.

Judge Jones has been known for his lengthy and well-reasoned decisions, often pioneering areas of family law, and frankly, saying what others are too afraid to put into words, let alone in 20-30 page decisions. In fact, I blogged on 2 such decision in the past: one on college contribution for families with multiple children and another on overseas travel. Easton v. Mercer is yet another decision that may be often cited by practitioners when similar issues arise. It will be interesting to see what Judge Jones has in store next.

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head_BaerEliana Eliana T. Baer is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Eliana practices in Fox Rothschild’s Princeton, New Jersey office and focuses her state-wide practice on representing clients on issues relating to divorce, equitable distribution, support, custody, adoption, domestic violence, premarital agreements and Appellate Practice. You can reach Eliana at (609) 895-3344, or etbaer@foxrothschild.com.