Search results for: intrastate

I started reading C.G. v. D.W., an unreported (non-precedential) Appellate Division case released on March 1, 2024, sucked in by the opening sentence about the court’s denial of an intra-state move. As there aren’t that many cases on that issue since the A.J. v. R.J. case I blogged about in 2019.

But the decision took a left turn because it turned, not on the merits of the intrastate move, but rather, on the failure to address the child’s preference, which is one of the factors, and the failure to interview the child.

Because the decision is basically limited to that issue, the facts are not all that important other than as follows. The parties had on child in 2012, married in 2013, separated in 2016 and divorced in 2017. The parties essentially shared residential custody. The child attend a school reasonably close to the parties where he had an IEP for English and math and to provide speech and occupational therapy. Mom, who remarried and had 3 children with her new husband, sought to move 60 miles away, in the Fall of 2021. Dad moved to block the move and a hearing was ordered.

The parties agreed to retain a joint custody expert but either never did and as such. there was no expert testimony at the trial. Additionally, prior to the commencement of testimony, mom requested that the court interview the child. The court said that it would do so at some point in time and invited the parties to submit proposed questions. It doesn’t appear that they did so and the interview never took place.

The trial court denied the move and mom appealed. As noted in the title, the Appellate Division vacated the decision and remanded for the interview to take place.

In their analysis, the Appellate Division noted the need for the court to review the matter under the prism of the statutory factors for custody, one of them being: “…the preference of the child when of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent decision.”

The Appellate Division then noted the Court Rule (R. 5:8-6) regarding child interviews which notes in the plain language that it is discretionary but “If the court elects not to conduct an interview, it shall place its reasons on the record.” In this case, despite the indication that the interview would occur at some point, it didn’t, and the court also did not place it’s reasons for not having the interview on the record.

The court further noted that if the court can glean the child’s preference from another source, such as expert testimony,, that could be a reason for the court to not interview a child. The court noted that:

In the absence of expert testimony, it is difficult, if not impossible, to analyze the “preference of the child” factor.

The court then cited the famous quote from Mackowski v. Mackowski as follows:

Too often, judges deciding issues in the Family Part must rely solely on the “voices” of the attorneys who prepare the competing affidavits and certifications on the pretense that the litigant is speaking. [The judge’s interview] insures that where custody is a “genuine and substantial” issue, the judge will not be insulated from seeing and hearing the subject of the dispute. The “voice” seen and heard will not be that of the lawyer or litigant but that of the child who is the subject of the dispute. The value of a properly conducted interview enabling the judge to see and hear the child first-hand outweighs the possibility of harm that may befall a child by being subjected to the interview process. On balance, it is not the interview that is ultimately harmful, but the custody dispute between the parties that potentially wre[a]ks havoc with the child.

The decision noted that “neither party accepted the court’s invitation to submit proposed questions, nor was the child produced for an interview” but that was clearly not enough to meet the mandate of court rule. The Appellate Division then threw mom’s lawyer under the bus stating:

No doubt the better practice would have been for plaintiff’s counsel to more actively pursue the scheduling of the child interview. Nevertheless, this is ultimately the court’s responsibility, particularly when it advised the parties of its intent to interview the child [sic.]

Now based upon the substantive facts, who knows if the preference would matter. That said, the case shows what can happen when all of the formalities are not followed.

Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Department of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Morristown, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973) 994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

For decades, when a custodial parent wanted to move out of state, it would not be unusual to hear that if the court or other party won’t let me leave New Jersey, she will just move to Cape May, or some other point far away from North or Central Jersey.  When someone wanted to move just across the river to New York or Pennsylvania, you might hear an exasperated utterance about being able to move to Cherry Hill but not 10 miles away to New York City.

And by and large, that was the law.  That is, while a court could restrict a custodial parent from removing children from the State of New Jersey, there was little stopping them from intrastate moves.  While there was case law that said that that might be a change of circumstances if it impacts the non-custodial parent’s parenting time, by and large people were free to move about the state.  In fact, about a dozen years ago, I had a case where the ex-husband file a motion seeking to prevent my client from moving from Hudson County to Monmouth County.  After getting our brief wherein we presented the law, his story changed from the mother being the parent of primary residence (as set forth in the parties’ Agreement, to him being the “de facto Parent of Primary Residence.”  The trial did not go well for him and my client moved as was her right.

Just as the Bisbing case that we previously blogged on made it much more difficult for the custodial parent to move out of state, the paradigm of the custodial parent being permitted to move, without restriction, was seemingly ended on October 7, 2019, when the Appellate Division rendered the reported (precedential) opinion in A.J. v. R.J. 

In A.J., the parties were divorced in 2013.  They had two children who were 10 and 8.  The mother was the parent of primary residence and the father had alternate weekend (Friday to Sunday)  and Wednesday overnight parenting time – 4 out of 14 overnights which my what is often seen these days, is not much.  The mother remarried and had a third child, with whom she lived with her husband and two other children in a two bedroom apartment in Elizabeth.  She moved in March 2018, because her landlord increased the rent and would not give her additional time to search for another residence before doing so. She searched without success for a suitable residence in Elizabeth,Somerset, and Florence. Prior to the move, the parties only had one text conversation in July 2017, in which the mother stated that she wished to move and was searching locally and as far as Mount Laurel and the father asked her to remain local because it  he claimed would be unfair to him and the children to move far away.

After the move, the father filed an Order to Show Cause seeking to block the move and change custody. The Judge entered an order giving him 3 weekends a month, ordered mediation and scheduled a plenary hearing to determine whether the mother would be permitted to remain in Mount Holly and also ordered that the children remain in school in Elizabeth.  Mediation was unsuccessful and after a plenary hearing, the trial judge ordered the mother had to return with the children and live within 15 miles of Union.   As noted by the Appellate Division:

Significantly, although the judge’s decision recognized “Baures . . . has since been overruled by Bisbing,” his reasoning relied upon our decision in Schulze v. Morris, 361 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 2003), which applied the Baures factors to determine whether a parent could relocate intra-state. Applying a preponderance of the Baures factors, the trial judge explained “[p]laintiff’s decision may not have been solely driven by a desire to alienate the children from their father, but was certainly done in wanton disregard of his rights, with the result being that his relationship with them will clearly suffer.” The judge concluded the distance between the parties’ residences increased the travel time from “minutes away” to “slightly over an hour[.]” The judge noted if the children resided in Mount Holly defendant could no longer leave work early to tend to a sick child, enjoy additional parenting time, or attend extracurricular activities as he had in the past. The judge found the surreptitious nature of the move belied plaintiff’s explanation that she did not inform defendant because she did not have time.

The mother failed to move back, claiming it was impossible for her to break her lease and she could not afford two homes.  The father filed an Order to Show Cause seeking a transfer of custody which was granted and the mother appealed.

As to the mother’s argument that changing custody as a sanction was inappropriate, the Appellate Division disagreed.  However, in this case, additional proceedings and findings were necessary in order to do so.  Specifically, the Court held:

However, we hold Rule 5:3-7(a)(6) requires a separate adjudication, which considers the children’s best interests and findings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-4, before the sanction is ordered. Additionally, because the relief granted under Rule 5:3-7(a) is coercive in nature and derived from Rule 1:10-3, the sanctioned parent may seek termination of the sanction when the parent complies with the court’s order. The court should be solicitous of such applications.

This is because custody matters directly impact the welfare of children. The designation of a parent of primary residence is a consequential decision because “the primary caretaker has the greater physical and emotional role” in a child’s life. Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 598 (1995). Where there is already a judgment or an agreement affecting custody in place, it is presumed
it “embodies a best interests determination” and should be modified only where there is a “showing [of] changed circumstances which would affect the welfare of the children.” Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. Div. 1993). In the context of a transfer of child custody as a sanction, affording both parents the ability to address whether a transfer of custody is i n
the best interests of the children and requiring the court to make the necessary statutory findings provides the necessary process and a reviewable record. Therefore, a best-interest hearing and findings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 is required where a court transfers custody as a sanction

Here, because the trial court did not consider the best interest facts before changing custody, that part of the Order was reversed and remanded.

The Appellate Division also reversed the relocation decision because the court used the prior standard (Baures) instead of Bisping.  The Appellate Division note: “Because the science and anticipated outcomes undergirding the Baures factors have not borne out as the Court anticipated and no longer apply to interstate removals, they should not apply to the intra-state relocations discussed in Schulze.”

The Appellate Division then set forth the new standard to be followed for intra-state relocations, as follows:

We further hold where a parent of primary residence seeks an intrastate relocation and the parent of alternate residence opposes it, the parent of alternate residence must convince the court the move constitutes a change in circumstance affecting the best interests of the children. If a prima facie case is established, the trial court must assess custody and parenting time, by applying the N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 factors to determine whether the best interests of the children requires a modification of one or both.

It is interesting that the parent of alternate residence bears the burden of showing that the move is not in the children’s best interests even though they aren’t the one seeking the change.  On the other hand, the custodial parent’s ability to move, which may have certain constitutional implications, is being hampered and in fact, a 15 mile radius clause is being imposed on her when the non-custodial parent can move anywhere he wants.   In this case, the non-custodial parent had only minimal parenting time.  The move really only implicated the mid week overnight.  Why wasn’t the interim relief of an extra weekend  per month, or some extra time during the summer, enough to address the issue?  Given that only one day per week was implicated, why wasn’t the radius clause larger given the mother’s clear financial distress?  It is one thing where 50-50 or substantial parenting time (5 or 6 out of 14 overnights every two weeks), but when it is 4 out of 14  – which is the minimum to have technical “shared parenting” as defined by the child support guidelines, or less, should a custodial parent really need court approval?

My guess is that one or both parties will see Certification to the Supreme Court. Stay tuned.

_________________________________________

Eric S. Solotoff, Partner, Fox Rothschild LLP

Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Morristown, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973) 994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

 

Just over a year after the New Jersey Supreme Court changed the standard to be applied in removal, or interstate relocation, cases, the Appellate Division in Dever v. Howell (an Appellate Division set to be published and, thus, will be precedential) is here to remind us that the burden to show cause for the proposed removal is not optional, cannot be an afterthought, and cannot be shifted to the party who opposes the move.

N.J.S.A. 9:2-2’s Cause Requirement and Bisbing

As a refresher, N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 is the New Jersey statute that addresses intrastate removal and provides as follows:

When the Superior Court has jurisdiction over the custody and maintenance of the minor children of parents divorced, separated, or living separate, and such children are natives of this State, or have resided five years within its limits, they shall not be removed out of its jurisdiction against their own consent, if of suitable age to signify the same, nor while under that age without the consent of both parents, unless the court, upon cause shown, shall otherwise order.  The court, upon application of any person on behalf of such minors, may require such security and issue such writs and processes as shall be deemed proper to effect the purposes of this section.

Put another way, if you wish to relocate out of New Jersey with your children, but the other parent does not agree, then the only way that you can engage in the desired removal is to file an application with the Court.  The Court may only grant the application if sufficient “cause” for the move is shown.  The purpose of the cause requirement is to preserve the rights of the other parent and the relationship between that parent and the children.

The definition of “cause” was the subject of the much-talked about August 2017 New Jersey Supreme Court decision, Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309 (2017).  Prior to Bisbing, “cause” meant different things depending on whether the party who sought to remove the children out of state was the parent of primary residence for the children, or whether there was a truly shared parenting arrangement.  Under the now defunct Baures v. Lewis standard, the Parent of Primary Residence had a less onerous burden to show cause, and needed only prove that 1) the requested move was being sought in good faith; and 2) that the requested move would not be inimical to the child’s best interests.  In cases where there was truly a shared parenting arrangement (i.e. neither party was deemed the “parent of primary residence”), a request to relocate with the children was treated as an application to modify the existing custody arrangement, and the court was required to conduct a best interests analysis to determine if such a modification was appropriate; if so, then this would serve as sufficient “cause.”

In Bisbing, the Court did away with these distinctions and essentially leveled the “cause” playing field.  Now, regardless of the type of parenting arrangement in place, “cause” is demonstrated by showing that the proposed move is in the best interests of the child.  In making this determination, the Court is to be guided by the statutory factors outlined in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 which are the lodestar of every custody determination; however, the court is not limited to these factors in its analysis.  Indeed, the Bisbing Court specified that “[a] number of the statutory best interests factors will be directly relevant in typical relocation decisions and additional factors not set forth in the statute may also be considered in a given case.”  Any “additional” factors would be specific to the circumstances of the individual case.

Dever v. Howell and the Cause Requirement in Action

In a newly published (i.e. precedential) decision, the Appellate Division examined the cause requirement.  In this case, Mr. Dever and Ms. Howell had two children together.  Although Mr. Dever was the parent of primary residence, the parties shared joint legal custody.  In 2015, Mr. Dever considered relocating to Florida with the children, and the parties engaged in negotiations around that proposed move, including a parenting time schedule for Ms. Howell.  Although they were able to enter into an agreement in May 2015 regarding Mr. Dever’s proposed move to Florida with the children, ultimately he chose not to go, and he and the children remained in New Jersey.

In November 2016, Ms. Howell filed an application with the Court seeking overnight parenting time with the children.  The parties began to negotiate, and agreed to ask the Court to wait to hear Ms. Howell’s application in the hopes that they could resolve the issues amicably.  However, three days before the judge was to hear the motion, Mr. Dever told Ms. Howell that he and the children would be moving to South Carolina the next morning.  He offered Ms. Howell ten minutes to say goodbye to the children.  Despite Ms. Howell vehemently objecting, he moved the children to South Carolina without her consent, and without a court order permitting him to do so.

Ms. Howell ultimately filed an Order to Show Cause (an application seeking emergent, or immediate, relief from the Court) seeking the return of the children to New Jersey.  After a trial, the Superior Court judge found that Mr. Dever had intentionally removed the children from New Jersey without Ms. Howell’s consent and without filing an application so that the Court could determine whether there was cause for the move, in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:2-2.  The Court (correctly, in this writer’s opinion) found that the May 2015 agreement that the parties entered into for the removal of the children to Florida did not signify an agreement for them to be removed to South Carolina, as Mr. Dever claimed.  The judge ordered Mr. Dever to return the children to New Jersey.

Mr. Dever asked the Superior Court to reconsider his decision and, when that was unsuccessful, Mr. Dever appealed.  In both cases, he argued that the judge could not compel him to return the children to New Jersey from South Carolina without requiring Ms. Howell to show cause for him to do so.  In other words, he argued that – now that the children had been living in South Carolina for some time – the burden to show cause should shift to Ms. Howell to show that it was in the children’s best interests to return to New Jersey.  On appeal, Mr. Dever argued that N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 did not require him to obtain an order before moving.

The Appellate Division, rightfully, shot down Mr. Dever’s claim that he could remove the children without consent or a court order, and then force the other parent to demonstrate that it is in the children’s best interests to return to New Jersey:

According to plaintiff’s logic, defendant would need to file a motion to return the children, who he had removed in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:2-2, and as part of that motion, assume the burden.  Such an approach would encourage individuals to first remove children from this jurisdiction, then later seek court approval.  When the other parent objects beforehand, the process envisioned by N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 is for the parent seeking to relocate to first apply for an order permitting relocation, establish “cause,” then relocate only if permitted by the court.  The process does not permit a parent to show on an application to return the children that it would be in their best interests to do so.

When the other parent objects, the parent seeking removal of the children has the ultimate burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence.  Requiring the burden of proof to shift to defendant to show that it would be in the children’s best interests, as a condition precedent to returning them to New Jersey, ignores the Legislature’s reason for requiring a preliminary determination of “cause” under N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 before the actual removal.  It is to “preserve the rights of the noncustodial parent and the child to maintain and develop their familial relationship.”  Bisbing, 230 N.J. at 323 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Under the facts of this case, preserving defendant’s rights to maintain and develop her familial relationship with the children required – by the plain text of N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 – that plaintiff first obtain an order, before removing the children, by showing “cause” existed for the relocation to South Carolina.

The Appellate Division made clear here that the old adage, “act now, and ask forgiveness later” does not apply in removal cases.  In order to carry out the intent of the statute – to preserve the relationship between the non-custodial parent and the child – one has to either obtain consent, or show cause before a court before the move occurs, not after.

Parents considering an interstate relocation with their children from New Jersey should take heed.  If you move with your children out of New Jersey without obtaining consent or a court order, you will very likely be required to return the children.  But even worse, when the Court ultimately does decide the issue of whether the move is in the children’s best interests, it may ding you for having taken matters into your own hands and moved without going through the proper channels.  Arguably, a failure to do so is a good indicator to the Court that you are not willing to co-parent or consider the child’s relationship with the other parent, and that will undoubtedly cause the Court to hesitate to allow the move.

 

headshot_diamond_jessicaJessica C. Diamond is an associate in the firm’s Family Law Practice, resident in the Morristown, NJ, office. You can reach Jessica at (973) 994.7517 or jdiamond@foxrothschild.com.

In many custody disputes, a primary area of concern is one parent’s ability to relocate with the children after the divorce is over.  Relocation requests have been characterized as often resulting in “heart-wrenching” decisions.  As we have previously discussed on this blog, the legal standard to be applied to a parent’s interstate removal application differs if the parent is the primary caretaker as compared to an equal/”shared” physical and legal custodian with the other parent.  The two standards are briefly explained below:

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Equal/”Shared” custodial parents:  If the parents “truly share both physical and legal custody,” then the moving parent must prove that the best interests of the children would be better served by residential custody being primarily vested with the relocating parent.

One primary custodial parent:  On the other hand, if one parent is the primary caretaker, that parent’s request to relocate with the children is governed by the two-prong Baures test – specifically, the moving party has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there is a good faith reason for the move; and (2) the move will not be inimical to the children’s interests.  The Baures test is analyzed in the context of twelve (12) factors set forth in that case, and is more favorable to the primary custodian seeking relocation.  In fact, it is this favorable standard that often sees non-custodial parents claiming “de facto” equal custodial status in response to a primary custodian’s relocation motion so as to convince the trial judge to utilize the best interests standard.  As an aside, there exists pending legislation that would alter this favorable legal standard.

What happens, then, if there exists a so-called non-relocation agreement and a primary custodian seeks to relocate interstate?  The Appellate Division was faced with that issue in the newly published (precedential) decision of Taormina Bisbing v. Bisbing.  Here are the facts that you need to know:

  • The parties were married in 2005 and the children were born in 2006.  Both parties were highly-paid professional employees, with wife earning more than husband.
  • In early 2013, husband investigated job opportunities in Colorado and California.  The parties separated in August, 2013 and, in November, wife began a long distance relationship with a Utah resident who had children from a prior marriage.  The Utah resident owned a business in Idaho and had business interests requiring him to frequently travel to California and Louisiana.
  • On March 8, 2014, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement wherein they agreed to joint legal custody, and that wife would have primary residential custody under the condition that she would not relocate outside of New Jersey.  The MSA also provided that dad would have “broad, reasonable and liberal timesharing” of the children – Father’s Day, his birthday, every other weekend and on one weeknight during the weeks when he did not have parenting time, every other Thanksgiving, Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, New Year’s Eve, New Year’s Day, and school breaks.  Each parent was entitled to attend all sporting events and activities regardless of which parent was scheduled to have parenting time.
  • As to relocation, the agreement provided:

The parties agree that each shall inform the other with respect to any change of residence concerning himself or herself or the said   minor Children for the period of time wherein any provision contained in this Agreement remains unfulfilled. The parties represent that they both will make every effort to remain in close proximity, within a fifteen (15) minute drive from the other. Neither party shall permanently relocate with the Children from the State of New Jersey without the prior written consent of the other. Neither parent shall relocate intrastate further than 20 miles from the other party. In the event either party relocates more than 20 miles from the other party, the parties agree to return to mediation to review the custody arrangement. In the event a job would necessitate a move, the parties agree to discuss this together and neither will make a unilateral decision. Neither party shall travel with the minor Children outside of the United States without the prior written consent of the other party.

The parties hereby acknowledge that the Children’s quality of life and style of life are provided equally by Husband and Wife.

The parties hereby acknowledge a direct causal connection between the frequency and duration of the Children’s contact with both parties and the quality of the relationship of the Children and each party.

The parties hereby acknowledge that any proposed move that relocates the Children any further away from either party may have a detrimental impact upon the frequency and duration of the contact between the Children and the non-moving party.

  • On April 16, 2014, a final judgment was entered that incorporated the terms of the settlement agreement.  Husband represented that, after the divorce, he was very involved in the children’s lives, coached their teams, took them to activities, and attended school events.
  • One month after the divorce, wife sent an email to husband telling him that, although she received no alimony, she was planning to leave her job on July 1, 2014 to be a full-time stay-at-home parent, which she did.
  • On January 8, 2015, wife called husband to tell him of her intention to get married to the Utah resident and relocate to Utah.  Wife asked for husband’s permission to relocate with the children.  Husband refused, indicating that she could move and leave the children with him.
  • On March 16, 2015, wife filed a motion to relocate with the children to Utah without the need for a plenary hearing.  The court granted the motion – without a hearing – so long as a visitation schedule could be established through mediation.
  • On July 14, 2015, after unsuccessful mediation, with only wife suggesting a parenting plan, the court issued a supplemental order establishing a parenting time and communication schedule using most of wife’s suggestions.  Eleven days later, wife and the children “left for a vacation to Utah.”  Three days thereafter, she permanently relocated with the children in Utah.

In reversing and remanding for a plenary hearing, the court found:

  1. The best interests of the child standard should be applied if wife was found to have negotiated the settlement agreement in bad faith.
  2. If no bad faith finding is made, the court is to consider whether wife proved a substantial unanticipated change in circumstances “warranting avoidance of the agreed-upon non-relocation provision and simultaneously necessitating a Baures analysis.”
  3. If the settlement agreement was deemed to have been negotiated in good faith, but wife fails to prove a substantial unanticipated change in circumstances, the court is to apply the above-referenced best interests of the child standard.
  4. In other words, wife could only receive the “benefit” of the Baures standard if wife was found to have negotiated in good faith and proved a substantial unanticipated change in circumstances.

Under such guidance, the Court distinguished from the notable prior trial court decision of Shea v. Shea,wherein the father accused the mother of of manipulating the Baures procedure by settling the divorce, and immediately thereafter filing for removal so as to reply upon the more favorable burden of proof.  Here, the Court critically found that husband was entitled to a hearing to prove whether wife manipulated the situation to obtain “favorable Baures removal procedures” that:

  1.  When wife entered into the agreement, she may not have definitely known of the “material facts and circumstances forming the good faith reason for the removal request” (i.e., moving to Utah to marry her boyfriend).
  2. The non-relocation provision did not exist in the earlier matter.

In so holding, the court found:

Similar to the situation in Shea, the close proximity between the parties’ agreement and [wife’s] plans to relocate provides evidence of suspicious circumstances requiring a plenary hearing.  If, after holding a hearing, the family court finds that [wife] negotiated in bad faith, it should then analyze the relocation request under a “best interests” analysis.

The non-relocation was to be considered even if wife is found to have negotiated in good faith, “without manipulative intent” premised on New Jersey’s strong public policy favoring agreements that resolve marital disputes.  In damning tone, the Court found:

Thus, [wife], in a written and voluntarily agreed-upon contract, specifically surrendered her “freedom to seek a better life” in another state while obtaining primary custody of the children, and was well aware of that agreement when she chose to remarry and move far away.

While the relocation language of the agreement considered new employment as a basis for moving, it did not mention remarriage, thereby leading the Court to suggest that testimony would reveal whether remarriage was a considered eventuality at the time of the agreement and, thus, not an unanticipated substantial change in circumstance.  The Court also noted that, if the Baures standard was to ultimately apply, the trial judge would be charged with analyzing the effect on the children of moving away from both parents’ extended families.

When I first read the facts, I was saddened, but not at all shocked at what seemed to be a clear manipulation of the prevailing legal standards discussed above.  I have been involved in many cases on both sides of the relocation argument, and have seen the devastation that can result.  A difficult situation becomes all the more tragic when it is clear that one party is not proceeding in good faith.  What wife seemingly did here is just as bad as the non-custodial parent who claims de facto equal custodial status just to have the best interests standard applied.  It is for these reasons, in part, why the pending legislation mentioned above makes sense in some form – to remove this sort of gamesmanship from the equation when children are involved and the relationships with one or both of their parents is potentially at stake.  The Appellate Division certainly got it right here with a just result.

 

*Photo courtesy of Google free images.

The issue of relocation comes up all the time between divorced parents.  One day mom calls dad and tells him that she plans on moving with the kids from Hoboken to Cherry Hill.  Perhaps she plans on moving into Manhattan from Morristown.  Whatever the intention, there is going to be an impact on the child and often an impact on an existing custody and parenting time arrangement.

The moving parent often argues that the move will be in his or her own best interests and, as a result, it will also be in the child’s best interests.  The other parent often argues that the move can only be against the child’s best interests because he or she will have potentially have less time with the child, or the time will be somehow altered, and the relationship will suffer, as a result.  Cases on this subject examine both points of view.  This, however, does not make the process any easier for either party, or, more importantly, the child at issue who may even be too young to realize what is happening until it is already done.

relocation truck

For instance, now mom and dad may live five minutes away from each other and everything has been going great from a parenting perspective since the divorce.  If dad has two overnights with Little Bobby every week, however, is that still going to be possible if mom is moving two hours away?  More importantly, is it still in Bobby’s best interests to travel back and forth for such a distance that frequently even if the time could feasibly still occur pursuant to the original schedule?  We have previously blogged that if the parent seeking to relocate is the primary residential custodian, the law makes it easier for an interstate (across state lines) or intrastate (within New Jersey) move than if there was a joint residential custodial arrangement, in which case the court will simply consider if the planned move is in the child’s best interests.

These legal standards often lead parents to include language in their custody and parenting time agreements addressing the issue of relocation.  While absolutely preventing some future move based on an agreement’s language may or may not hold up in court when the family judge is charged with analyzing a request based on its facts and circumstances in connection with the particular child at issue, the judge will still look at and consider the language mutually and voluntarily reached by the parties on the issue.

In Clemas v. Clemas, a new unpublished (not precedential) decision from the Appellate Division, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a dad’s effort to restrain mom from relocating with the parties’ children from Bridgewater to Egg Harbor.  The divorce settlement agreement provided that the parties would share joint legal custody (over major decisions) of the kids, with mom designated as the primary residential custodian.  They also agreed to designate Bridgewater as the desired school district “so long as one party is domiciled in the district”, but that when “either party applies to the Court to convert the Divorce from Bed & Board into a Final Judgment of Divorce, this provision shall be null and void.”

When mom filed to convert the divorce into a final judgment, dad learned from the kids that mom planned to move and cross-moved to restrain the move to Egg Harbor (approximately two hours away).  The trial judge denied dad’s request to stop the move finding that, because mom was the primary residential custodian, she was permitted to move within New Jersey.

On appeal, the dad argued that the trial court should not have denied his motion because the settlement agreement provided that mom’s designation as primary residential custodian “is for child support purposes and does not give either parent and enhanced or diminished parenting authority to either party.”  On this point, the trial judge held that this language did not alter mom’s right to relocate but, rather, only impacted upon joint legal custody decisions.  The Appellate Division agreed.  The judge also held that dad failed to demonstrate “changed circumstances” infringing upon the best interests of the kids, and had identified no reason why the new school district could not accommodate the kids’ needs, or demonstrate that he would not be able to maintain the same parenting schedule or a “reasonable alternative.”

Importantly, the trial judge also held that the agreement considered mom’s possible relocation when the divorce was finalized because the kids were no longer required to attend school in Bridgewater.  In other words, the geographic restraint was only temporary and no other restraints were included.

The Appellate Court agreed that the agreement did not prohibit mom from moving with the kids, nor was she required to make an application with the family court to do so.  Analyzing the legal standard for a primary residential parent to move within New Jersey, the Appellate Court noted that to have a trial on the issue, the parent opposing the relocation must make a showing that “a genuine issue of fact exists bearing upon a critical question such as the best interests of the children, interference with parental rights, or the existence of a good faith reason to move.”  Dad did not fulfill this initial burden.  The move, as a result, was upheld.

This case ultimately addresses the importance of including language in a custody and parenting time agreement regarding relocation, which, as always, is dependent upon a given set of circumstances and, of course, whether you are the primary residential custodian, the parent of alternate residence, or a shared residential custodian with equal parenting time.

 

*photo courtesy of freedigitalphotos.net

Picture this – you just settled the issues of custody and parenting time with your former spouse, and now she suddenly wants to move with the kids to another state, or to the complete opposite side of New Jersey (for those living in North Jersey, the trip down to South Jersey can take far longer than driving over the border into Manhattan).  You had no idea that this was going to happen and, perhaps, your ex-spouse even played coy about her plans for where she was going to live once the case is over.  What do you do?  Are you stuck based on what you agreed to in the settlement agreement?

Custody disputes and negotiations are oftentimes the most emotionally charged aspects of a divorce matter.  Decisions as to both legal custody (major decision making impact the child’s health, safety, and general welfare), and residential custody (where the child will live), are never to be taken lightly.  During the course of a custody dispute, the issue of relocation will commonly arise so as to determine whether either parent has any plans or intentions to move with the children after the divorce to an area different from where they lived during the marriage.

Importantly, however, a custodial expert and, if the matter goes to trial, a family part judge, must first address the issue of custody and parenting time before moving onto the issue of relocation.  In fact, the Supreme Court provided in its seminal case of Baures v. Lewis that “A removal case is entirely different from an initial custody determination.  When initial custody is decided, either by judicial ruling or by settlement, the ultimate judgment is squarely dependent on what is in the child’s best interests . . . Whoever can better advance the child’s interests will be awarded the status of custodial parent.”

What, then, is the importance of the initial custody determination on relocation?  Simply put – it is very important, because the legal standard that a court will utilize to determine whether a parent should be able to relocate with the children will depend, in large part, on whether that parent is a primary residential custodian, or joint residential custodian.

Without going into great detail, a primary residential custodian’s request to relocate interstate is analyzed under a standard more favorable to that parent, where the requesting parent need only show that there is 1) a good faith reason for the move, and 2) the proposed move will not be inimical to the child’s interests.  Within that standard, a court will look at several factors to determine whether the relocation request should be granted.

Even more liberal is the court’s view towards a primary residential custodian’s request to relocate within New Jersey – intrastate – to the point that it is not even considered a “removal.”  Approval to move to another part of the State is not even required!  Rather, the relocation may constitute what is known as a “substantial change in circumstances” meriting a modification to the existing cusodial and parenting time arrangement.  If the move is inimical to the child’s best interests, the factors used to analyze an interstate relocation request come into play to determine whether a modification should occur.  By great contrast, if the parents are joint residential custodians, the request to relocate will be analyzed under the far more balanced “best interests of the child” analysis.

It should come as no surprise, as a result, that some litigants will actually seek to deceive (or fraudulently induce) their ex-spouse during the course of custody and parenting time negotiations so as to obtain the primary residential custodian designation that will then render far easier a subsequent request to relocate.  Thus, while dad is under the belief that the kids are going to be living with mom somewhere near him, or near where they lived together during the marriage, mom may secretly have other plans in mind.

Not many reported cases have dealt with this issue.  In Shea v. Shea, a 2005 decision, mom sought to relocate to another state merely 3 months after the parties resolved custody and parenting time.  Dad objected, asserting that mom had used the custody negotiations as a “subterfuge in that she planned to seek removal shortly after the divorce was entered.”  The court held that dad could attempt to prove his allegations against mom if she fulfilled her initial burden to procure the court’s consent to the interstate removal – good faith and the move not being inimical to the child’s interests.  The same process would similarly occur in the course of an intrastate relocation request.  The court provided that if a determination was made that the parent requesting relocation sought such a strategic advantage against the other parent, then the court should return the non-custodial parent to equal footing with the custodial parent and review the request for relocation under the “best interests analysis” referenced above.

Thus, while it seems like a mountain to climb after an agreement has already been reached on custody and parenting time, the parent opposing relocation under such circumstances does have the ability to protect himself and his relationship with the children by proving what the other parent has done.

 

 

 

A very common question asked by divorced parents is whether the custodial parent has the right to move with the child either to another state (interstate) or to another location within New Jersey (intrastate).   In light of these questions, a review of the applicable legal standards for interstate and intrastate moves should provide some guidance.

INTERSTATE MOVE

 

N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 is designed to protect the parenting relationship between a child and a noncustodial parent when the custodial parent seeks to move to another state. In light of 9:2-2, the New Jersey Supreme Court in its seminal decision of Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J. 91 (2001) developed a set of 12 factors to consider when reviewing a custodial parent’s removal application (which have also been applied to an international move).   These factors are:

 

1.        The reasons given for the move;

2.       The reasons given for the opposition;

3.       The past history of dealings between the parties insofar as it bears on the reasons advanced by both parties for supporting and opposing the move;

4.       Whether the child will receive educational, health and leisure opportunities at least equal to what is available here;

5.       Any special needs or talents of the child that require accommodation and whether such accommodation or its equivalent is available in the new location;

6.       Whether a visitation and communication schedule can be developed that will allow the noncustodial parent to maintain a full and continuous relationship with the child;

7.       The likelihood that the custodial parent will continue to foster the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent if the move is allowed;

8.       The effect of the move on extended family relationships here and in the new location;

9.       If the child is of age, his or her preference;

10.   Whether the child is entering his or her senior year in high school at which point he or she should generally not be moved until graduation without his or her consent;

11.   Whether the noncustodial parent has the ability to relocate; and

12.   Any other factor bearing on the child’s interest.

 

Continue Reading Moves by a Custodial Parent Within the State and Outside of the State – What are the Considerations?