SHORT SALE FOR CASH? AGGRESSIVE PLAN MAY HELP DIVORCING COUPLES

On April 5th, the struggling housing market will face a new ally in the form of a short sale program being aggressively pushed by the Obama Administration to help millions of home owners escape from mortgage debt by selling their homes for less than the balance of the mortgage while receiving an additional monetary payment to do so.  As the government's attempts to assist homeowners struggling to make their mortgage payments have only slightly helped according to a recent article in the New York Times, the new program will pay $1,500 to the short selling homeowners to "relocate."

The benefits of the plan are hoped to be widespread, as lenders will ideally receive more money than with a foreclosure, the borrowers will experience a softer hit to their credit - including the lender's assurance that they will not later be sued for an unpaid mortgage balance - and fewer homes will be empty on the foreclosure market.  To protect from cases of fraud, lenders will utilize real estate agents, who will determine a home's value and, by correlation, the minimum acceptable sale price.  Adding another layer to this new system, the agent's determined value will not even be shared with the home owner, but the lender is required to accept any offer equal to or higher to such value.  What happens when a home owner has multiple mortgages on a single property, however, remains unclear.

From a family law standpoint, this plan provides the sort of good news that divorcing spouses struggling with what to do with their "under water" marital residence are looking for.  Whether it actually fulfills that glimmer of promise, however, remains unclear.  In the down real estate market, how to equitably distribute the home has proven challenging.  Oftentimes, neither party can afford to continue residing in the marital home, refinancing is unavailable due to the negative equity, neither party wants to face the credit hit of a foreclosure, and there is no money to cover the shortfall debt that might result where the house is sold for a price lower than the outstanding mortgage.

Short sales with a guarantee that the lender will not come after the borrowers such as that in the President's plan are therefore a desirable way out.  Short sales generally tend to be a risky, slow moving process with no guarantees.  With the Obama Administration's new plan to boost the housing market, hopefully such situations will take a turn for the better.

COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE: PANACEA OR RECIPE FOR DISASTER

Previously we blogged on alternate dispute resolution methods ("ADR") such as mediation and arbitration. "Collaborative Divorce" is another ADR method.

"Collaborative Divorce" is defined as  a form of alternative dispute resolution for divorcing couples where a  team approach is used to reach a settlement. Both parties to the divorce are supported by their lawyers; however, they work cooperatively with their spouse.  The collaborative process uses informal discussions and conferences attended by both spouses and their attorneys to settle all issues. The collaborative process is premised upon an atmosphere of honesty, cooperation, integrity, and professionalism. It requires that both spouses, with the assistance of their attorneys, provide all pertinent documents and information relating to the issues to be settled. In the event that experts are necessary, it encourages the use of jointly retained experts. Both spouses and attorneys are required to work together toward a shared resolution that is geared toward the future well being of the family. If the parties cannot reach a settlement through the collaborative process approach, the collaborative lawyers withdraw from the case and the parties then retain trial attorneys to pursue the matter in court.

Is collaborative divorce for everyone? I am a divorce litigator and people often come to me with complex, high conflict and/or high stakes cases so perhaps I am biased in that regard. Even still, I cannot see collaborative divorce being for everyone to be used in every case. Just as I wrote about my concerns about mediation, i.e. the possibility of a spouse taking advantage of an imbalance of power; the settle at all costs posture whether the resolution is fair to both parties or not; etc., I think that those pitfalls are just as possible in collaborative divorce.

For instance, I recently heard of a divorce case described as "freakish". At the same time, the husband was described as a "power broker" and the wife was a housewife with a young child. Most confusing was the revelation that the parties were involved in a "collaborative divorce."

To me, this sounded like a recipe for disaster. How can a "freakish" divorce be collaborative? If both parties are "power brokers" perhaps collaboration could work though it seems like both would want to "win." Collaboration seems unlikely when one party is a "power broker" and the other is not - capitulation seems more likely than collaboration. Ever wonder why the more powerful spouse wants to mediate?

Perhaps for a garden variety divorce with two reasonable people, this can work. In most other cases, it seems that the interests of the weaker party could be compromised. 

Hello Cohabitation. Goodbye Alimony.

What happens when a dependent spouse begins living with another partner? Well, in the recent unpublished decision of Hartelust v. Hartelust the Appellate Division reviewed this question. Docket No. A-2519-08T3, decided January 12, 2010. 

Plaintiff Nora Hartelust appealed from an August 1, 2008 Order that terminated Defendant Alexander Hartelust’s alimony obligation.   After twenty years of marriage the couple was divorced in January 2007. The judgment of divorce incorporated the property settlement agreement (PSA).   At the time, the couple had a fifteen year old child, Alexander was earning $60,000/year and Nora was earning $15,000 per year. The PSA stated that Alexander would pay $175 per week in child support, $220 per week in permanent alimony, and transfer his ownership in the marital home to Nora. The PSA did not address cohabitation.

In April of 2007, Alexander became aware that Nora was cohabitating in the former marital home with her boyfriend. Alexander immediately stopped paying alimony and in July 2007, three months later, filed a motion seeking termination of alimony.  After a plenary hearing where the parties, the boyfriend, and the couple’s son testified, the trial judge found that Nora was cohabitating with her boyfriend and was deriving an economic benefit. The judge ordered that Alexander stop paying alimony and awarded Alexander attorney’s fees. Nora appealed. On appeal the Appellate Division affirmed the termination of alimony because the trial judge had determined that based on credible testimony, Nora was cohabitating with her boyfriend and received an economic benefit from that cohabitation. The Appellate Division explained that once there is a prima facie showing of cohabitation, the burden of proof is shifted from the party seeking modification to the dependent spouse, who must show that he or she has not derived an economic benefit from the cohabitation. Nora could not overcome that burden.

Also on appeal was the award of attorney’s fees, which the Appellate Division reversed. The Appellate Division found that the judge failed to consider seven of the nine factors when determining if attorney’s fees were warranted. In this case the attorney failed to submit a Certification of Services, which impacted the Appellate Division's ruling. In order for attorney’s fees to be ordered, an attorney must submit a certification or affidavit of the services they provided.

 

While this matter is unpublished and therefore not binding, given the law of this state the outcome exemplifies the way the law was meant to be interpreted. Recently, virtually this very same issue was faced by a client and although the spouse admitted to cohabitation, the trial judge did not find that our client had met his prima facie burden and therefore, would not order a plenary hearing. While disappointing, this case further supports our belief that our client was entitled to this hearing, at the very least.

UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE IN SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CONTROLS OUTCOME

Oftentimes parties will sign an agreement settling all issues in their divorce matter only for one party to subsequently try to back away from those terms for any number of reasons.  Is it just that easy for a party to essentially change its mind?  The simple answer is generally no.  New Jersey has a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of fair and equitable agreements entered into on a consensual and voluntary basis.  If the agreement is somehow the product of fraud, unconscionable or otherwise demonstrates one party's effort to take advantage of the other, then the law provides the wronged party with an opportunity to "set aside" or "vacate" the agreement.  

What about those cases where there is no such wrongdoing?  Since marital settlement agreements are contracts and, as a result, generally enforced, Courts in this State will look to the terms of the agreement and apply basic contractual principles when addressing one party's claim as to the agreement's (or that provision's) enforceability.  For instance, where the agreement's language is unambiguous and the Court is called upon to interpret the terms at issue, the Court will not consider external (or "parol") evidence, such as, perhaps, oral discussions had at the time of the agreement's signing.  It will simply apply and interpret the terms before it.

This was the case in Dell'Osa v. Dell'Osa, a recent, unpublished (not precedential) Appellate Division decision where the husband claimed that the trial court improperly divided the parties' retirement accounts because his accounts were comprised of pre-tax funds while the wife's were comprised of after-tax funds.  The husband claimed that, as a result of this account structure, two Orders (known as Qualified Domestic Relations Orders or "QDROs") were needed to fairly divide the accounts, rather than just the Court dividing the accounts without such an Order to his claimed monetary disadvantage.

Affirming the trial court's decision, the Appellate Division found the settlement agreement language unambiguous as to this issue, finding that the agreement merely acknowledged the pre-tax and after-tax retirement contributions of the parties without requiring any equitable distribution to factor in a tax adjustment.  In its affirmance, the Appellate Division emphasized the notion that "A court may not make a better contract for either party than the one the parties drafted."  The Court also looked to other terms of the agreement in concluding that its interpretation of the unambiguous language was consistent with the terms of the agreement as a whole.

GOLDMAN SAGA CONTINUES

One would have hoped that Sean Goldman's return to the United States with father David Goldman would have been the end of this years-long international saga.  Sadly, however, that may not be the case.  News reports yesterday indicated that 9-year old Sean's Brazilian family will fight to regain "custody" of Sean, which is interesting since the family's actions and that of the boy's now deceased ex-wife really constituted an international abduction, thus leading to the boy's ultimate Court-Ordered return. 

After the family previously indicated that the fight was over, lawyers for the family will push to have the Brazilian court hear the boy's wishes after all - indicating as much on the same day that the boy returned home to Tinton Falls, New Jersey, claiming that it was "our home" when seeing the house where he will live once again.  Since the Supreme Court in Brazil does not convene until February, it would not be able to hear the family's arguments before then.

How the Brazilian family's ongoing legal actions will impact their likely future claim for visitation is unclear, as even their decision to publicly parade Sean through the streets in Brazil on the way to the United States consulate on Christmas Eve has been roundly criticized and, according to David Goldman, was a traumatic experience for Sean.  The family, however, has substantial financial resources and will likely fight this losing battle, seemingly at the wishes of Sean's maternal grandmother, until there is no avenue untapped.  For an additional prior blog post on this topic regarding Sean's return, click here as well.  Stay tuned for further details.

EDITOR'S NOTE:  We have previously blogged on grandparent visitation on several occasions.  Grandparent visitation is difficult to obtain in New Jersey following the US Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville and the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Moriarty v. Bradt and the cases that followed it.  Given the constitutional protections of the rights of a parent to parent their child(ren) free from interference from third parties, grandparents now must prove actual harm to the child if they do not receive visitation.  While on one hand, the death of a parent (as was the case in Moriarty) would be a factor in the grandmother's visitation request here on one hand, the abduction and the history in this case may mitigate that factor.  Moreover, one wonders whether, despite the harm that may be able to be proved in this case, given the circumstances surrounding the child's alleged bond with the grandmother and step father, that visiitation with these people who were allegedly part of the ordeal that kept father and son apart for several years, would overcome the harm.  ERIC S. SOLOTOFF

A PARENT'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FOR POST-HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION

What payment obligation, if any, do divorced parents have towards their child's post-high school education?  The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded more than 25 years ago that a child's right to support includes a "necessary education" after high school, whether it be a vocational school or college.  However, a parent's obligation to pay for such schooling depends generally on the expectations and abilities of the parties involved to pay, as set forth in 12 different factors including:

1.  whether the parent, if still living with the child, would have contributed toward the costs of the requested higher education;

2.  the effect of the background, values and goals of the parent on the reasonableness of the expectation of the child for higher education;

3.  the amount of the contribution sought by the child for the cost of higher education;

4.  the ability of the parent to pay that cost;

5.  the relationship of the requested contribution to the kind of school or course of study sought by the child;

6.  the financial resources of both parents;

7.  the commitment to and aptitude of the child for the requested education;

8.  the financial resources of the child, including assets owned individually or held in custodianship or trust;

9.  the ability of the child to earn income during the school year or on vacation;

10.  the availability of financial aid in the form of college grants and loans;

11.  the child's relationship to the paying parent, including mutual affection and shared goals as well as responsiveness to parental advice and guidance; and

12.  the relationship of the education requested to any prior training and to the overall long-range goals of the child.

 

Notably, these factors contemplate that the parent or child seeking payment towards educational expenses will be made before the expenses are actually incurred.  The Appellate Division addressed this timing issue in the recent unreported (not precedential) decision of Gorman v. Cruz, where it reversedd a trial court's denial of a mother's application to compel payment by the father for the daughter's beauty school because the child failed to apply for school costs from the father until the costs had already been incurred and paid.

Reversing the trial court's decision, the Appellate Division noted that delay in seeking payment from the parent is only one factor for consideration and by no means warrants an automatic denial.  The father had already contributed to the cost of the school, demonstrating his approval, or at least acquiescence towards his daughter's decision to obtain her cosmetology education, as well as his ability and willingness to pay.  The Appellate Division also rejected the father's argument that he was only obligated to pay for college - not a "technical" school like beauty school - relying on a rational construction of the terms of the parents' matrimonial settlement agreement as to the children's education and its general purpose to support the children in pursuing their career goals. 

As this case demonstrates, a thorough review of the 12 factors above, as well as the timing of the payment request, is necessary to determine a parent's obligation to pay for post-high school education costs.   

MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT- WHEN TO FILE

Under New Jersey law, a party of a divorce can seek modification of an order for child support or alimony if there is a “change of circumstance” that affects the income or earning ability of one of the parties.  Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980).  This proposition is one of the most common reasons for post-judgment motions in New Jersey Family law courts, especially in the current economy.  But in a recent unpublished New Jersey Appellate Division decision, Good v. Nedza, the Court affirmed a post-trial order, which did not permit a recalculation of child support or arrears because one of the parties failed to act on information they had obtained years earlier and had at the time when the parties entered a Consent Order for child support.

In Good, the parties were divorced in 2002.  At the time, Mr. Good was the primary provider and the wife, Ms. Nedza, was a homemaker.  The parties had three children.  They agreed that Mr. Good would pay child support and alimony, and they would share joint legal custody of the children with Ms. Nedza having primary residential custody.  Over the years circumstances changed.  By September 2005, all of the children were residing with Mr. Good and his child support obligation was terminated.  A Consent Order entered in January 2006 addressed Ms. Nedza’s child support obligation to Mr. Good.
 

In April 2008, Mr. Good filed an application with the court to increase child support payments based on an imputed income to Ms. Nedza of $85,000/year plus $25,000 in subsidized lifestyle (free apartment, Jaguar, vacations, etc.).  Mr. Good sought the payments to be retroactive to January 2006 because Ms. Nedza’s income was “erroneously” fixed at $25,000/year as a direct result of her misrepresentations in 2006.  Mr. Good also sought child support arrears retroactive to July 2004 based on Ms. Nedza’s misrepresentations. 

The judge found that Mr. Good’s motion was untimely under Rule 4:50-1, which allows orders to be vacated or modified if there is mistake, fraud, or newly discovered evidence.  But the motion must be filed within 1 year of the entry of the order pursuant to Court Rules.  In this case, the judge found not only that it was more than one year, but more importantly, that Mr. Good was aware of the alleged misrepresentations in 2006, prior to entering into the January 2006 Consent Order. Because Mr. Good was aware of the alleged misrepresentations in 2006, had taken discovery, had the opportunity for a plenary hearing, and then still entered into a Consent Order, he could not attempt to re-litigate an old issue.  The judge did order a recalculation of child support obligations as of January 2008 because there was a “change of circumstance” in the parties' income since January 2006, but would not assess arrears.

This case is a great example of what can occur if a party: (1) does not seek to enforce their rights in a timely manner; and (2) enters into a Consent Order prematurely.  It can be vital to act quickly when new information becomes available and not to settle on incomplete discovery.  Without knowing, future rights can be impacted.  This is not to say that where there is fraud or misrepresentation courts will not overturn or vacate prior decisions or Orders.  In those cases the burden of proof rests on the party making the allegations.  While many litigants are anxious to settle matters quickly or as cost efficiently as possible, sometimes rushing to do so can negatively affect your rights under the law.  Just as with most other things in life, having all the information is necessary to making an informed decision.
 

Will California Ban Divorce? Will New Jersey ban Same -Sex Civil Unions?

If a California web designer gets his way - Til death do us part? – will mean just that. John Marcotte, who runs the comedy website Badmouth.net, is attempting to put a measure on next year’s ballot that will ban divorce in California. The effort is meant to be satirical. The thought process behind the idea is that if California can pass Proposition 8, which bans same-sex marriage, allegedly to protect the sanctity of marriage, than what prevents California from going one step further and banning divorce?   

So far Marcotte has not collected the 694,354 signatures necessary to put the proposition on the ballot, but with a grass-roots movement and use of the Internet, he may achieve his goal – although it would be highly unlikely to pass.  And even if it did pass, it would certainly be found unconstitutional if challenged in court. But the proposition does raise an interesting question – does the State have an interest in protecting the sanctity of marriage?

Often opponents of same-sex marriage cite the sanctity of marriage as the reason same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry. On December 14, 2006, the New Jersey Legislature passed the Civil Union Act, providing for civil unions, which was signed into law by Governor Jon Corzine on December 21, 2006 and came into effect on February 19, 2007. Same-sex couples who enter into a civil union are provided almost all of the rights granted to married couples under New Jersey state law. However, under the provisions of the federal Defense of Marriage Act or DOMA, same-sex couples in marriages, civil unions, or domestic partnerships do not have any right or entitlement to the 1,138 rights that a married couple has under federal law.  

In New Jersey, Governor Jon Corzine has stated that he would sign a bill legalizing same-sex marriage if it comes to his desk before he leaves office in January. While Governor-elect, Christopher Christie said he would support a New Jersey constitutional amendment, similar to Proposition 8, that would ban same-sex civil unions. 

In a study released on November 25, 2009 by Quinnipiac University, New Jersey voters now oppose a law that would allow same-sex couples to marry by a slim margin of 49 – 46%. This reverses the 49 - 43% support for same-sex marriage in an April 23, 2009 survey by the independent Quinnipiac University. The poll taken by the university shows some interesting trends in who are the strongest supporters of same-sex marriage: Women support same-sex marriage 53 – 41%, while men oppose it 57 – 38%; Democrats support same-sex marriage 60 – 34%; Independents support same-sex marriage 49 – 45%; Republicans are against same-sex marriage 69- 25%; White voters split 49 - 47 %, while African -American voters oppose the measure 61 - 28 %.

 

The legalization of same-sex marriages is certainly a heated debate with proponents on both sides. But does California’s satirical proposition to ban divorce change your opinion? Does the State have the right to regulate who gets married – or gets divorced? If the State can tell you who you can and can’t marry – why shouldn’t they be able to tell who you can and can’t divorce?  And will New Jersey’s next governor enact New Jersey’s own Proposition 8? Its obvious that from the West Coast all the way to here in New Jersey, the same-sex marriage debate will continue………….        

YET ANOTHER CELEBRITY DIVORCE - DODGER STYLE

Since they have been in the news a lot lately, I have bloged a lot recently on celebrity divorces, be it John & Kate, Stephanie Seymour or Jim Nantz.  That is why the article from Billy Witz that recently appeared in the New York Times about the divorce of Frank McCourt and Jamie McCourt, the owners of the Los Angeles Dodgers got my attention.

Both parties claim to own the team - though Frank claims to be the sole owner.  Both worked for the team until recently, when Jamie was fired.  As a sign of the war to come, Jamie's lawyers budgeted her legal fees for this matter to be $2 million.  Per the article, the central issue is as follows:

"The key legal issue is whether the Dodgers are considered the McCourts’ community property. Under California law, a couple’s assets are split 50-50 unless a written agreement states otherwise. Shortly after buying the Dodgers, the McCourts put the team in Frank’s name and all their property in Jamie’s name to protect the homes from potential creditors. One of her lawyers, Michael Kump, said they would challenge the validity of the postnuptial agreement.

If the agreement is not valid, Fisher said, the McCourts would probably be forced to sell, as John Moores did with the San Diego Padres when he divorced."
 

The result would probably be the same in New Jersey.  It seems pretty clear that when people divorce, the cannot remain in business together.  In fact, in the well known Borodinsky case, the Appellate Division held:

 It seems almost doctrinal that the elimination of the source of strife and friction is to be sought by the judge in devising the scheme of distribution, and the financial affairs of the parties should be separated as far as possible.  If the parties cannot get along as husband and wife, it is not likely that they will get along as business partners.

Obviously this is the case with the fighting McCourts.  We will pay close attention as to how this works out but until then, play ball.