Coerced Prenuptial Agreement Set Aside

How many prenuptial agreements have language in them that the parties are entering into the agreement free from duress, coercion, undue influence, etc?  The answer is all of them.  Some even ask people to waive fraud - how you can do that I don't know because if you knew you were being defrauded, you probably wouldn't enter into the agreement.  How many times is the agreement presented at the last minute, after the bride to be's parents are out tens of thousands of dollars for the wedding?  How many times does the person presenting the agreement say "Don't worry about it, it doesn't mean anything", "don't worry about it, I'll give you more" or "don't worry about it, I'll rip it up in 5 years or after we have kids, etc?" 

This probably happens all to often or at least, more often then we want to believe.  In most cases, since you have said you have entered into the agreement free from duress, etc., you will have a hard time getting out of the agreement at the time of divorce.

But alas, comes the Petraikis case out of New York discussed in yesterday's New York Post.  In this case, Elizabeth argued that Peter coerced her signature, threatening to call off the wedding even though her father had already paid $40,000 for the reception.  She also claimed that he told her that he would rip up the agreement as soon as they had children.  The trial court set aside the prenup on the basis that Peter fraudulently induced Elizabeth to sign it.  The Appellate Court upheld this decision.

In New York, prenups are usually particularly hard to overturn so many deem this to be a landmark decision.  The take away here is that despite the recitations in the agreement, the door is open to try to prove contrary behavior and/or that there were additional promises outside of the agreement.  One wonders whether a video taped signing with the usual questions that the agreement was voluntarily being entered into would have saved the agreement.  That said, for the proponent of the agreement, you need to be really careful about what you say to induce the other side to sign an agreement and what pressure is put on to get an agreement signed.

 

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

 

SHOULD THE OTHER PARTY BE ALLOWED TO HAVE PARENTING TIME WITH HIS NEW GIRLFRIEND PRESENT?

Clients frequently ask whether it is appropriate for his or her spouse to exercise parenting time with the children in the presence of the new significant other.  The questions usually go something like this:

  • Can she be there when the kids are there?
  • Should they be sleeping in the same room with the kids right down the hallway?
  • How can he be there with the kids when I have not met him?
  • Does this impact our custody and parenting time dispute?
  • Are the kids going to get mixed messages?
  • Should we bring this to the court's attention and, if we do, will the judge even care?

These are just a few of the questions that may arise when your spouse starts dating someone in the middle of the divorce and wants to introduce the children to that person, have parenting time with that person present and, perhaps, have overnight parenting time with the kids just a few feet away in the room next door. 

With the changing times come changing attitudes towards such parenting time.  Exposing the children to a new girlfriend or boyfriend is not nearly as taboo as it once was, and, at least in New Jersey, it is generally accepted.  While this is an issue that can always be discussed between the parties and counsel, and while there are always certain cases where a judge might think twice about exposing the children to a new significant other, such as if there is a suspected harm to the children in doing so, there is usually no longer an issue. 

I find that judge's are less willing, however, to allow overnight parenting time, at least during the divorce, depending on a variety of factors including, but not limited to, the circumstances surrounding the new relationship, the sleeping arrangements, and the like. On the more extreme end, I recently had a case where my client's spouse had an affair and then demanded to exercise her overnight parenting time with the children present where the kids were aware of what was going on.  Evaluating the circumstances at issue, the trial judge sensibly precluded the boyfriend's presence during the wife's overnight parenting time. 

However, as opposed to Alabama - as highlighted in Eric Solotoff's recent blog post - such conduct will also likely have little to no impact on a custody dispute.

Thus, while you may dislike the idea of your children meeting the new boyfriend or girlfriend, changing social norms dictate that it is more likely to be accepted than not.  With that in mind, divorcing parents should work together to make the children understand and feel comfortable with the changing situation.  The dating spouse should take caution in how, when and where the children should first meet the new person in their life.  Ultimately, courts are going to watch out for the best interests of the children, and any hint that the situation poses a negative to the children will be immediately addressed as necessary.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group. Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.  

Preparing for the Divorce Process and How to Select a Divorce Attorney

On the heels of our New Years Resolution Divorce post, I thought it made sense to also resurrect our prior posts on preparing for the divorce process and how to select a divorce attorney. 

Previously, Sandra Fava, a contributor to this blog, did a piece on preparing for the initial divorce consultation with a lawyer. We also previously posted South Carolina matrimonial attorney, Mellisa Brown's article entitled "How to Find the Right Divorce Attorney for You."

The process, however, starts even before that. On our web site, we have an advice piece entitled Preparing for the Divorce Process.

Since it is linked to this post, I will not repeat everything contained in the piece. However, the topics contained in that piece are as follows:

  • Speak to an attorney now, not later
  • Selecting the right attorney (including how to get referrals for an attorney)
  • Gathering documentation
  • Preparing for the initial meeting
  • Telling the truth
  • Keeping a diary; and
  • Trusting your attorney for legal advice (as opposed to friends, family members, co-workers, etc.)

Do I stay or do I go? This is not an easy question to answer. However, if you are even
contemplating a divorce, divorce planning (and not in the nefarious way that often goes with this phrase) is essential, especially in difficult economic times. Divorce can be a long, highly charged, expensive process - emotionally and economically. Being prepared and keeping
perspective, at least as much as humanly possible, can help you save time and legal fees
while protecting your and your children's interests.

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

JUST THE FACTS JACK - OR A LEGITIMATE QUESTION OF CREDIBILITY?

It seems that moving parties are more often trying to overcome the defects of their motions by arguing that a plenary hearing should be held due to unresolved questions of fact or issues of credibility.  In other words, the litigant asks the court to hold a trial at some point in the future because the party asserts that the court cannot properly resolve the party's motion simply by reviewing the disputing positions of the respective parties set forth on paper. 

While the case law indicates that a court cannot resolve issues of credibility or disputed facts without a trial, involving testimony, properly submitted evidence and the like, litigants often try to use such case law as a crutch to get past the fact that their motion should be denied on its face.  What often happens, as a result, is that a court will err on the side of caution in the realm of judicial discretion and grant the hearing.  The collateral damage is the incurrence of additional counsel fees, and substantial time before the motion is actually decided, thereby leaving the parties in limbo.  While hearings are often necessary to resolve legitimate issues, the question is whether the issue is always legitimate.

For the financially superior moving party, this may be exactly what he or she wants, as convincing a court to grant a future hearing can be an effective tactic to pressure the financially inferior party to settle.  While that party can seek counsel fees from the court to help take them through the litigation against the other party on an even playing field, there is no certainty that such fees will be granted.

I recently experienced such a scenario where my client had not been paid alimony in quite some time.  She was afraid to file a motion, knowing that her former spouse would come after her with "guns blazing."  Finally, on the verge of financial destitution, she filed a motion to enforce the property settlement agreement compelling the husband to pay.  In response, the husband claimed that the parties had verbally agreed at some point in the past to terminate alimony.  There was no proof in support of his assertion other than his own words that there was such an agreement.  My client denied the existence of the agreement.

It was because of this disputed issue of fact, where the parties' respective certifications stood toe-to-toe with each other, that the court granted a plenary hearing to determine, through the taking of testimony and review of evidence, whether there was a prior agreement to terminate alimony.  The court did afford some interim financial relief, however, recognizing the financial situation faced by my client.

The judge's decision was completely reasonable and understandable - how else was the court to resolve the issue of whether there was an agreement without holding a trial to make that determination?  In fact, I have been on the opposite side of the very same sort of motion, advocating for the existence of a prior verbal agreement to terminate alimony, which the parties lived by for several years as an implied acknowledgment of same.  Ultimately, however, this is a problem that can plague each and every motion.  Whenever a spouse or former spouse seeks to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement, the other party can respond that there was a verbal agreement not to abide by such language, with the hopes of getting a plenary hearing. 

Many settlement agreements contain language that the agreement itself may not be modified unless the change is made in writing, and entered through formal measures.  Even this language, however, is not bulletproof, as a verbal agreement may, in fact, have been made, and the parties, as I reference in the last paragraph, may have lived by it for several years, thereby creating a strong argument for the opposing party.  Notwithstanding, there does arise an issue with the case law calling for a plenary hearing in the face of competing certifications.

I encountered another example recently where a father sought a reduction of his child support.  Every single document submitted on his behalf suggested that his financial situation had, if not improved, at least remained steady.  His certification, however, told a very different story, claiming the "gloom and doom" of his financial situation. Not surprisingly, my client disputed his claims, pointing in large part to the black and white numbers in the exhibits attached to dad's certification. 

Perhaps realizing the fatal defects of his application, dad's response was to the effect of, "mom's story is at odds with mine and, as a result, this court should hold a plenary hearing to find out the truth."  During oral argument, dad told the same story, to which we responded that numbers on a page are not "bells and whistles," or the subject of competing certifications.  Rather, it is simple fact, as it was clear that dad was simply seeking that plenary hearing with the hope of being able to pressure our client into an inequitable settlement since she could not afford a discovery period and trial.

When up against such a situation, it is important that you, as the litigant, point out that the situation is not a matter of competing certifications and credibility, but that the numbers at issue tell the true story.  It is also important to convey to the court that almost every case involves certifications at odds with each other, and that it should take more than simple "pen to paper", with no supporting evidence, to take up the court's time with a time consuming and expensive trial. 

The court calendars are experiencing enough backlog that there needs to be some sort of "gatekeeper" standard to ensure to prevent this sort of litigation.   Where there is a legitimate dispute of fact and credibility, then a hearing should certainly be granted so that testimony can allow the court to reach the truth of the matter.  Unfortunately, as with my prior post regarding motions for reconsideration, this is not always the case.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group.  Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.  

SOUR GRAPES AND A ROTTEN APPLE - WHEN RECONSIDERATION IS MORE LIKE FRUIT SALAD

Litigants who are displeased with the outcome of a judicial decision can rest assured that there exist multiple avenues by which a review of the decision may occur – mainly, in the form of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal.  This post focuses on the reconsideration route, which, despite the large number such motions that are filed, is actually supposed to be quite strict in its application. 

As a matter of common sense and an effort to avoid an even worse judicial calendar backlog than that which currently exists, reconsideration applications are not simply a way for the unhappy litigant to get another “bite of the apple”.   More often than not, however, it seems that reconsideration applications are exactly that –a way for the dissatisfied party to be heard again on the same issues with the hope that the trial judge will simply change his or her mind. 

Rule 4:49-2, which applies to reconsideration motions, does not provide much by way of direction.  Rather, it focuses largely on the deadline for filing.  It states:

 

Except as otherwise provided by R. 1:13-1 (clerical errors) a motion for rehearing or reconsideration seeking to alter or amend a judgment or order shall be served not later than 20 days after service of the judgment or order upon all parties by the party obtaining it.  The motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred, and shall have annexed thereto a copy of the judgment or order sought to be reconsidered and a copy of the court’s corresponding written opinion, if any.  

 

Various cases have fleshed out what constitutes a sufficient basis for reconsideration:

  • The court’s decision is based on plainly incorrect reasoning;
  • The court failed to consider evidence;
  • There is good reason for it to reconsider new information that was not available at the time of the prior judgment/order; 
  • By correlation, the motion may not be based on facts known by the moving party prior to the entry of the judgment or order; and
  • The motion may not simply be an effort by the moving party to reargue the motion and expand the record – the motion is not an opportunity for the previously losing party to attempt a second “bite of the apple”.

In the decision of Michel v. Michel, 210 N.J. Super. 218 (Ch. Div. 1985), the trial judge perfectly summed up the problems with motions for reconsideration, especially in the Family Part:

. . . This practice [filing motions for reconsideration], developed by attorneys, has become a mechanism by which unhappy litigants attempt once more to air their positions and relitigate issues already decided.  It has also been employed (although not in this case) as a method by which a party extends the time in which he must appeal. . . . Additionally, it is observed that the effect of such procedure is an unnecessary duplication of court time and counsel fees to the client.  Considering the volume of matrimonial motions, the result of this practice is to increase the backlog of the Court’s workload, only to be followed by, in the great majority of cases, the inevitable appeal.   Thus, not only is court time duplicated and thereby wasted, but also wasted are hundreds and thousands of dollars in legal fees generated. . . . Such practice should further be discouraged inasmuch as it tends to erode the policy of according finality to decisions of the Court.  If dissatisfied with a post-judgment order, a litigant has the right to appeal. 

 

The practice of allowing motions for reconsideration, however, leaves the responding party forever open to the threat of being summoned into court to relitigate an issue presumably decided.  Such is inherently unfair and offensive to our traditional notion of res judicata.  To routinely permit such practice to continue approaches a legal system, which recognized neither res judicata nor a statute of limitations - the litigant must live in constant anticipation that at any time he may be brought before a court to resolve an issue, which he thought, had been resolved. 

 

Despite such wisdom, it is clear that the moving party in the recently unpublished (not precedential)  Appellate Division decision of Proetto v. Proetto did not get the memo.  Utilizing the points I have outlined above, the Appellate Division found that the moving party appealing his denied motion for reconsideration was simply – and improperly – attempting to expand the record and regargue his originally denied motion.  As a result, his appeal went nowhere. 
There are lessons to be learned from the above that we as matrimonial attorneys have to stress to our clients:

 

  • A second bite may have you reaching into your wallet for the other party - Simply relitigating a previously denied motion will not only likely result in a denial, but you may also be compelled to pay the other party’s counsel fees for having to respond to the application a second time;
  • Provide all relevant existing evidence with your original motion - Do not suddenly produce evidence to the court that you should have – and could have – produced in the first place – i.e., if you are seeking a modification of alimony and you purposely do not include your most recent tax return, do not expect the court to react so kindly when, suddenly on reconsideration, the tax return is attached to your certification as a form of “new evidence”;
  • Be specific - The basis of your application should not simply be that it was an unfair result – the epitome of the “sour grapes” reaction.  Rather, the application needs to be specific, outlining just how the evidence upon which the trial court ruled was applied in error, or somehow overlooked a critical point that would have, and should have, resulted in a different decision.
  • Be strategic with your filing - If you plan on filing an appeal, filing a motion for reconsideration beforehand may simply provide the trial judge with an additional opportunity to cement the reasoning and findings for the prior decision, thereby rendering potentially more difficult the chances of success on appeal.  

Thus, while a motion for reconsideration is certainly a viable option when you receive an unfavorable result, it is important to realize that the court is not simply going to pretend that you never filed that prior motion.  Rather, if anything, your second motion will be looked at with greater scrutiny to make sure that you are not trying to bite the so-called apple to its core.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group.  Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.  

Read Aaron Weem's Interesting Post Entitled "Emotional Abuse Just As Harmful as Physical Abuse"

Aaron Weems is an attorney in our Blue Bell (Montgomery County), Pennsylvania office and editor of the firm's Pennsylvania Family Law Blog wrote an excellent post entitled "Emotional Abuse Just as Harmful as Physical Abuse."

While some of the local programs Aaron discusses for his county may not be available in New Jersey, the piece provides a good explanation of the issues and I encourage you to read it.

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

GETTING BY WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM YOUR FRIENDS - EXCEPT THAT ALL CASES ARE DIFFERENT

All too often I hear from clients about how they should end up with a specific result in their case because their friends went through divorces of their own and ended up with that desired result, or something similar.  I can certainly sympathize with a client who want to talk to their loved ones and other people who have gone through what they are going through to not only make sure that they are getting a fair result, but also for the simple purpose of comfort during a stressful time.  

It is critical, however, for each litigant to understand that every case is different and rests on its own facts and circumstances.  Each set of parties are also different from case to case, and as a result, each outcome is different.  It is always important that a client understands this to be the case as we explain to them the divorce process, what the law is and how it is applied, and what reasonable expectation he or she should have as to how the results received by others.

For instance, I learned from another contributor to this blog that whenever a client asks how long their case is going to take, the answer is generally "it depends."  It depends on you.  It depends on your spouse.  It depends on the facts of your case.  While matrimonial attorneys often have a preliminary sense as to what alimony or equitable distribution may be based on prior experience, no one can look into the future to see exactly what will happen.  Most clients want the divorce process to be as short and amicable as possible, and, from what they have seen or heard, expect only the longest and most acrimonious divorce imaginable.  Thus, from the very start the client must be made aware that the length and outcome of a case depends, in large part upon the parties themselves.

There is, perhaps, no better example of when this occurs than with the issue of alimony.  This is likely because it is generally a "hot button" issue, especially in New Jersey where alimony reform has been the subject of extensive recent discussion and attempted legislative change.  Also, unlike child support, which is generally based on the formulaic child support guidelines (unless further analysis is required where the parties' collective net incomes exceed the guidelines' limit), and unlike equitable distribution, which is generally a 50/50 split of marital assets (except with the distribution of the marital interest in a business), alimony is, perhaps, subject to greater shades of gray.

One of the first questions that I am always asked when it comes to alimony is for how long the alimony will be.  The question is then usually followed by the client stating how long the marriage was and what their understanding is from other people as to when permanent alimony comes into play.  Interestingly, while the length of the marriage is certainly an important factor, litigants often seem to treat it like the only factor, despite the alimony statute listing no less than fifteen factors for consideration. 

While there are certainly some predictors and practices to help advise a client in determining what alimony may be, there is no set of alimony guidelines or formula for calculation.  Rather, there are the factors I reference above, each of which is applied to the specific facts of a given case.  Thus, while the comfort afforded to a client in speaking with their loved ones is a strong draw, we as matrimonial attorneys must instill in them the notion that no result will ever be the same (nor should it be), especially in the context of settlement, where there is commonly a give-and-take between the issues of alimony and equitable distribution.  

Thus, while getting by with a little help from friends is often essential to providing comfort, advice, and compassion in a time of need, it is the matrimonial attorney who possesses the level of expertise upon which clients rely to take them through the divorce process and achieve a desired result under the circumstances of their specific case.  

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group.  Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.   

Deciding Whether to Settle or Defend Yourself Against a Persistent and Financially Superior Spouse

Reading and considering Eric Solotoff’s blog from earlier this week regarding the benefits of settlement, it is also critical to know when to settle and, quite frankly, whether to settle at all. This especially applies to those current or former spouses who simply cannot afford to litigate against a financially superior former spouse. This situation is often referred to as litigating on an "uneven playing field."

Trying to some degree to place myself in your shoes, it can only be an extremely difficult decision whether to, once again, go up against the other party with the bottomless wallet, or just settle for what they want and get it over with. These decisions may not only have an impact on your own wallet, but also on your family's overall well being, especially if children are involved. Too often, the other party knows this to be the case, which is why they will continue to file or threaten to file motions in the hope that you will eventually "give in" under the pressure.

This blog should not be taken as a sign of encouragement to litigate a case, but rather as a cautionary note for what you, as a litigant, may be sacrificing with your decision. Ultimately, it is you who has to wake up in the morning and be comfortable with your decision, which is why having all information at your disposal is, perhaps, the most important part of the decision-making process. 

One tell tale example that comes to mind revolves around a party’s threat that he will request all available remedies, including counsel fees, if he is forced to file a motion in the event that the alleged issues do not settle.  In family law motion practice, the party filing the motion (and for that matter, the other party filing a cross motion) will almost always ask for counsel fees from the other party, with a common justification being that he was compelled to file the motion only after the other party refused to settle the issues before the court.

Simply because the issues did not settle, however, does not mean that they should have settled, or that there were even any legitimate issues at all.  Last year I was in court for oral argument after a former husband filed a motion against his former wife for a modification of his parenting time. Notably, this was no less than the fourth time that dad had sought such relief in the past two years and his annual income was no less than six times that of my client, rendering her unable to continue litigating with dad on a so-called “even playing field."

Dad, however, conveniently forgot to mention to the new trial judge that his prior requests for relief were made at all, let alone denied (despite the fact each of his prior applications and the resulting Orders were a part of the court's file).  Of course this did not stop him from asking for counsel fees on the basis that our client allegedly refused to "settle" his latest requests to modify the parenting time schedule, when, in actuality, she was simply trying to defend herself against his latest litigation onslaught.  

Fortunately, the trial judge understood what was happening and not only denied dad's requests for relief, but directed him to pay my client's counsel fees as well.  Unfortunately, I have no doubt that dad will file another motion at some point soon for the same type of relief and, if denied, will file again and again until he gets what he wants because he knows that mom simply cannot afford to keep up with him.

I recently experienced another cautionary example in the midst of oral argument on a former husband’s latest motion to reduce his child support. Similar to the dad referenced above, this litigant had been denied his requests to lower his support obligation on no less than four prior occasions, essentially filing every two years and, in this latest instance, attempting to take advantage of a new trial judge unfamiliar with the matter.  Considering his financial superiority over our client, it was not surprising that he continued to come back time and again in an effort to get what he wanted.

In this case, as is often the case, the trial court, in advance of oral argument, issued a tentative order, based solely on a review of the motion papers and opposition.  In its order, the court determined that the father had fulfilled his initial burden of proof, thereby entitling him to a period of discovery and a trial to determine if his support should be reduced. Based on the tentative order, my client requested oral argument, since, once again, the former husband’s numbers simply did not add up.

During the midst of oral argument, the other attorney asked for a brief recess after my argument and, incredibly, asked to step outside and discuss a settlement because the judge had already "given him his plenary hearing." After argument concluded approximately thirty minutes or so later, he again asked if I wanted to discuss settlement - after the judge had just indicated that he would be conducting an entirely new review of the information and alleged issues before the court. It became clear that the husband was concerned with the weaknesses of his application and was trying to quickly settle before the court made its decision and potentially denied his requested relief.

I have no doubt that, he, like dad above, will continue to litigate every year or so until he gets what he wants - via financial pressure or otherwise.

In both of these examples, our clients considering the options of defending themselves against their financially superior adversaries, or acceding to their demands, and decided to proceed.  Each case is very different from the next, as is each litigant.  Ultimately it is you, based on your own circumstances, who has to decide how to proceed.

The court is there to protect the interests of both parties and, along with that, there are ways to ensure that you do not simply have to give in to the pressure of a determined adversary. Counsel fees, sanctions, and the like are available remedies designed to even the uneven playing field, and also to discourage the other party from continuing down a path of misconduct that may seemingly never end.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group.  Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.    

 

DIVORCE FROM A MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL'S PERSPECTIVE

Fox Rothschild's New Jersey Family Law Legal Blog welcomes Kelly Sutliff, MA, LPC, NCC, a licensed professional counselor with Kelly Sutliff, LPC, located in Madison, New Jersey, as a guest blogger.

Having known Kelly for over ten (10) years and speaking at length with her about the trauma that many children suffer through as a result of divorce, I thought it would be helpful for readers to hear about the mental and emotional impact of this process from a mental health professional. Below is an excerpt from a piece written by Kelly to better help parents going through a divorce understand the impact on their child.

"It's my fault". "My parents don't love me anymore". "I lost my family". "I'll never see my mom/dad again". These heartbreaking comments are commonly mentioned by children affected by divorce. Although these comments may be unrealistic, the sense of loss a child may feel as a result of his or her parents' divorce can be overwhelming and devastating. It is important for parents to help their children to cope with the divorce as well as to seek outside professional help, if needed.

Divorce can be an emotionally traumatic experience that can have an impact on a child's feelings of safety, security, and stability. Frequently, the stress children feel as a result of their parents' divorce relates to the family structure changing. Children fear change and the amount of changes that follow a divorce can be overwhelming and frightening. Many children also feel a loss of attachment to one or both of their parents after a divorce. Changes in scheduling and how often they see a certain parent can cause a certain amount of distress. The fear of being abandoned is also a fear that many children of divorced families face. Often, they feel that because one parent has moved out of the "family home", they are likely to lose the other parent at some point as well. They may blame themselves, feel unloved, and worry that they are the cause of their parents' relationship ending. Another factor that can lead to children's feelings of stress is hostility and fighting between parents. Arguments and tension between parents may make children feel angry, guilty, and alone. Some children feel "put in the middle" of their parents' arguments and believe that they are being asked to choose sides. The internal struggle that these children face when feeling this way can have profound negative effects on their behavior.

Parents can absolutely help their children through the process of divorce. Research indicates that it is vital to talk with your children about the divorce. Although this will certainly be painful for you, sharing general information about the divorce with your children will help to open the lines of communication between you and your children as well as foster a sense of trust. During conversations about the divorce, it will help to listen to what your children say and how they feel (even if you do not agree) and to reassure them that they are loved immensely and that the divorce is not their fault. It is also important to clear up any misunderstandings about the divorce that they may have. Another helpful strategy for parents is to maintain structure and stability as much as possible. Divorce causes many changes. It is important to help your children adjust to one change at a time. For many children, dealing with many changes at once can be overwhelming. Creating regular routines for children is helpful.

One of the most important factors in helping your children cope with divorce is maintaining an amicable relationship with your soon-to-be-ex. Although this may be very difficult at times, conflict between parents can have negative consequences on children. Limiting the amount and the intensity of conflicts between yourself and your soon-to-be-ex is vital. Remember, although you are not a couple any longer, you are obligated to parent your children together. Therefore, collaborating about child-rearing techniques and discipline will help your children significantly.

Some children deal with their parents' divorce with relatively few problems, while others have a very difficult time. Through individual and family therapy, children will be given the opportunity to discuss their thoughts and feelings and to communicate their concerns with an experienced professional who can assist them in developing healthy coping strategies. Not only does therapy benefit children, it will also help parents to continue to parent their children effectively, even though they are no longer a couple.

Kelly Sutliff can be reached at (973) 224-2574. Feel free to visit her website at www.kellysutlifflpc.com.

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Sandra Fava is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of Fox Rothschild's Family Law Practice Group. Sandra practices throughout New Jersey in all areas of family law and family law litigation. You can reach Sandra at (973)994-7564, or sfava@foxrothschild.com.

THE EMERGING ROLE OF OBESITY IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES

I read an interesting article on The Wall Street Journal.com about the ever growing use of a a child's battle with obesity as a tool for leverage in custody battles to prove one parent is unfit and therefore, should not have custody or should have a reduction in parenting time.

In some cases, parents are blaming a grossly overweight child on the other parent.  In others, it is the use of a child's diet (too much soda, fast food, potato chips) as evidence of bad parenting.  There are also those cases where one parent uses the obesity of the other parent to argue that he or she is simply physically unable to care for the children.

According to a sample of family lawyers from across the country, arguments like the ones above are being heard and utilized more frequently in family courtrooms.  For judges in New Jersey, and many other states, the standard when deciding these issues is what is in the best interest of the child.  The state of Pennsylvania recently altered its definition of best interest to include the physical and emotional well-being of a child.

The article goes on to tell us that "according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, approximately 17%, or about 12.5 million, of the nation's children and teens are obese. Since 1980, according to CDC statistics, obesity rates have nearly tripled."  The statistics are staggering.

Social scientists, legal experts and law professors agree that the rising statistic of both childhood and adult obesity will lead to continuing changes in the law, particularly as the law relates to custody and parenting time.  Thus far in New Jersey, no specific factor of weight or nutrition has been added to our best interest of a child definition/standard.  While there is no doubt that practitioners across the state have likely dealt with the issue in at least one facet, there is no published law which directly addresses these issues.  That said, the article raises an interesting perspective on how a child and/or a parent's weight and dietary habits may be considered in contested custody matters. 

 

ECONOMIC COERCION DOES NOT ALWAYS DO THE TRICK

Oftentimes, a less economically able party is faced with a spouse or former spouse who insists on litigating time and again simply because they can, hoping that the "war of attrition" will force the other party to give them what they want to avoid further motion practice.  We as family practitioners know that while the Rules of Court provide a party with the ability to seek a counsel fee award from the other party for a variety of reasons including, but not limited to, "evening the financial playing field," assisting a party in need where the other party has the ability to pay, or, commonly, addressing the other party's unreasonable behavior, courts do not always award fees even in what may seem like an obvious situation to do so. 

For example, a party bringing a motion to enforce litigant's rights may not receive an award of fees even if they tried to settle to no avail before filing the motion, especially where the other party "remedies" the issues before the Court actually decides the motion.  Of course, the motion would not have been filed had the other party earlier complied, but the effort to render issues "moot" after the motion is filed oftentimes sways a court not to award fees even though it was the motion itself that compelled compliance.

I recently dealt with the "war of attrition" litigant, who has filed the same motion against our client time and again - literally, the same motion each and every year post-divorce.  In each of the three years since the divorce, he was denied his requested relief in three separate motions.  As sure as the sky is blue, the former spouse again filed a motion this year - his fourth - for the very same type of relief as to parenting time.  Notably, the former spouse also retains a different attorney for each motion in an effort to cleanse the court's palette.  In two of the three prior denials of his requested relief, he was Ordered to pay our client substantial counsel fees since he makes six times the annual income of our client, and his repeated efforts to financially pressure our client into getting what he wants have proven transparent in the eyes of the court.

On this fourth occasion, the story was the same and, thankfully the result - a denial of the former spouse's requested relief and an award of full counsel fees for our client.  While the immediate result was positive, as it has been after each prior motion, I have no doubt that the former husband will again file a motion for the very same relief in 2012, 2013 and beyond until the child is emancipated upon whom the requested relief was based.  While one can only hope that our client will continue to successfully fend off his attacks, the more unfortunate problem is that she cannot stop him from filing his motions.  In fact, when he was denied time around, he verbally questioned the judge, incredulous that he would be denied again despite the lengthy history of denials and him being found to have not only acted unreasonably, but in bad faith, as to his litigation tactics.  It was this response that only further confirmed that we will be back in court next year, starting anew the annual litigation cycle that not only leaves our client financially drained, but also causes great emotional strain upon her and her family that cannot be remedied by a mere award of counsel fees.

THE USE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY AS A FORM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - THE APPELLATE DIVISION WEIGHS IN

The times, they are a'changing - at least when it comes to how the judicial system approaches harassment as an act of domestic violence in light of advanced technology used for communication.  In the newly reported (precedential) Appellate Division decision of L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., the Court addressed the use of electronic communications, specifically text messages, as a form of harassment.  Those claiming an act of harassment based on electronic communications might not like what the Appellate Division had to say, as detailed further below, but the decision provides a breadth of noteworthy language in shaping what is an extremely sound, rationale and common sense methodology to approach such cases in the future.

As a refresher, harassment is defined by New Jersey statute as follows:

[A] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another, he:

a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.

Addressing the struggles faced by courts in addressing harassment as an act of domestic violence, the Appellate Division noted

The facts presented here exemplify the complexity of human interactions and the strain they place on the Family Part judges as they struggle to distinguish between the cases that merit judicial intervention and those that do not.

Further addressing such difficulties in the context of modern technology and the facts at issue, the Court first provided an online definition of "texting" from www.netlingo.com as:

[t]he act of typing and sending a brief, electronic message (less than 160 characters) via a wireless network to another person so that they can view the short message on any number of mobile or handheld devices.

Providing it's first extremely notable quotation that will likely be cited time and again as these cases become more frequent, the Appellate Division noted: 

We conclude the evidence presented here shows only the convergence of modern technology and the foibles of human judgment.  Our ability to instantaneously and effortlessly send electronic messages has created a gateway unfettered by reflection and open to rash, emotionally driven decisions.  The ease and speed by which we transmit electronic messages has also created a commensurate expectation of an equally instantaneous response from the recipient.

In the case at issue, the parties utilized text messaging as a primary mode of communication about their children.  The Court acknowledged:

[T]exting provided an efficient means of exchanging information as parents, while avoiding the personal contact associated with a telephone call or a face-to-face encounter.  The limited number of words that can be sent at any one time in a text message also minimized the risk for extraneous matters to interfere with the primary dialogue of parenting.  Despite these qualities, texting is merely a tool, a means to an end.  Without reasonable cooperation, texting can lead to the frustration and misuse we witness here.  

Under such rationale, the Appellate Division found that the text messages were not sent with the requisite "purpose to harass" to establish the occurrence of harassment.  To that end, it found notable that the former wife responded only once to 18 messages sent by the husband inquiring as to the daughter's SAT scores and that if she had "simply answered" his question, he would have stopped texting.  Instead, her decision to ignore him was found to have essentially exacerbated the situation.  

The Appellate Division also found it was improper to consider texts by the husband's current wife as evidence of harassment, since there was no evidence that the husband directed his current wife to act on his behalf.  In fact, the former wife even acknowledged that the husband's only purpose in sending the texts was to inquire about the daughter, from whom he had become estranged, and that she was only "annoyed" by the texts after choosing to ignore them.  The Court even found the husband's frustration reasonable, albeit misguided, but, since it was limited to inquiries about the children, it lacked the "purpose to harass."  

Suffice it to say, L.M.F. is a fantastically interesting decision for family lawyers, standing out in this area of the law for a variety of reasons, most notable of which is its foray into the use of electronic communications as a form of harassment.  The intelligent way in which the Appellate Division approaches this issue, especially in the context of divorced spouses trying to co-parent while keeping their emotions in check, provides great guidance for both litigants and legal counsel moving forward. While it may not be as simple, as a result, to establish an incident of harassment in such a case, the decision upon review seems to come at a perfect time in the crossroads of domestic violence law and electronic communications.

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Robert Epstein is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of Fox Rothschild's Family Law Practice Group.  Robert practices throughout  New Jersey in all areas of family law and family law litigation.  You can reach Robert at (973)994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.

ISRAELI COURT FINES WOMAN FOR REFUSING TO DIVORCE HUSBAND

Recently I blogged on the difficulties experienced by some spouses left with no choice but to abide by New Jersey's "no fault" divorce process.  Looking at the husband in "Crazy, Stupid, Love", and discussing how, if the story there took place in New Jersey, he would have to get divorced simply because his wife wanted to.  Now from the Israeli newspaper "Haaretz" comes the story of a woman who was fined 200,000 shekels (approximately $56,000) by an Israeli court for refusing to divorce her husband, even after she was directed to do so by a Rabbinical court.  

Interesting was the Israeli court's rationale for the fine, deeming it to be sufficient compensation for the wife violating the husband's autonomy.  Also interesting was the wife's rationale for refusing the divorce.  While the husband proved to the court that his wife was infertile and, as a result, should be compelled to divorce him, the wife refused to grant the divorce or participate in the process because she believed that her husband (from whom she had separated years earlier) was simply interested in another woman.  Showing just how stern the court was with its ruling, it held that the fine would stand even if the parties subsequently divorced by agreement, and that the wife could be subject to future fines if she continued in her non-compliance.

Obviously this situation would not occur in New Jersey with its no-fault divorce option.  Further, although not an issue here since it was the husband who sought the divorce, it is worth noting the complexity and nuance involved with procuring a Jewish divorce.  Under Jewish law, a "Get" is a bill of divorce that a husband gives to a wife in order to "free her" to remarry.  A secular divorce will not do the trick, as the couple's marital status will remain unchanged under Jewish tenet.  We have blogged on this topic previously.  Notably, in the United States, a wife may seek relief from a civil court for an Order directing the husband to grant the Get, such as via an action for specific performance since there really is not sufficient legal remedy to redress the wife's injury including, among other things, her inability to remarry in the eyes of Jewish law.  In the eyes of the New Jersey judiciary, compelling a husband to obtain a Get provides is for a secular purpose - the end of the marriage.

While such a situation is different from that described herein, both situations reflect the broad cultural and religious spectrum that underlies the divorce process domestically and abroad.    

IRS PROVIDES GREATER PROTECTION TO "INNOCENT SPOUSES"

New changes implemented by the IRS to the "Innocent Spouse" rule provide greater protection for those spouses seeking relief under the broadly described "inequity" provision of the rule.  Generally, speaking, most spouses file joint tax returns and do not consider a subsequent tax liability that may befall upon them.  In the face of such a scenario, the innocent spouse rule can provide relief from liability for a partner's tax debt under certain conditions.  For a greater sense of the rule and its specifics,review this prior entry on our blog and the linked alert previously issued by our Family Law Department on the topic.

New protections afforded by the legislative changes relieve claimants of the strict confines of a 2 year limitation on filing claims when the spouse claims that it would simply be inequitable to hold him or her responsible, which, in actuality, covers a broad spectrum of claims not encompassed by the other more narrow provisions leading to innocent spouse status.  Previously under a claim of inequity, if the spouse did not file for relief within 2 years of receiving an IRS collection notice of the subject debt, that spouse was not entitled to relief.  Oftentimes, an otherwise qualified spouse would be denied relief even if they did not know of the notice until after 2 years had passed (including cases where one spouse hid the notice from the other) or, even more specifically in the case of an abused spouse, knew of the notice but was too afraid to notify the IRS from fear of spousal retribution.

Significantly, this rule will seemingly apply both prospectively and retroactively, and the IRS may even suspend collection efforts on pending debts.  Even better, if you were previously denied a claim for innocent spouse status under an inequity claim due to the 2 year rule, the IRS said that you can reapply for the very same relief in most cases.  Suffice it to say, the relief for eligible "innocent spouses" can be life altering.

If You Think that Your Job Related Life Insurance Is Enough, Think Again

It is typical for divorce agreements to contain a provision requiring an alimony payor to maintain life insurance to secure his alimony obligation and one, if not both parents to maintain life insurance to secure their obligations to their children.  In fact, Jennifer Millner, a contributor this this blog, and a partner in our Princeton office, recently did a post entitled Child Support Obligations Live on After Death, addressing what happens when a support obligor does not have the required life insurance at his death.

It is also typical for someone to cover their life insurance obligations through insurance they get as a benefit of their employment.  Many companies, for example, offer as a benefit, life insurance - one times their salary, three times their salary - for example.  What happens when someone leaves their job and loses this life insurance?

That issue was addressed by the Appellate Division in an unreported (non-precedential) opinion released on April 1, 2011 in a case entitled Starr v. Starr.  In this case, to secure his alimony, in the divorce agreement, it provided that, "Defendant shall designate plaintiff as a beneficiary of $150,000.00 of the proceeds of the group life insurance made available to him through his employment."  However, in 2005, he was given notice that his employment was terminating.  He did have the option of converting his group life insurance to an individual policy but he did not. 

Upon learning that the husband had not converted his policy, the wife filed a motion to compel the husband to obtain the required life insurance.  The husband opposed it claiming that the life insurance set forth in the Agreement was no longer available to him and the plain language of the agreement  "...did not require him to obtain an "individual or non-employment group life insurance policy" for the benefit of plaintiff." 

Both the trial court and Appellate Division disagreed with the husband's position holding that the
clear purpose of the life insurance provision in the JOD was to secure defendant's alimony payments. The court also found that defendant had a continuing obligation to secure his alimony obligation.

The Appellate Division also cited the statute creating the justification for the security.  The Court also noted that the purpose of life insurance is to assure a sufficient fund for the payor's support obligation should he die before fulfilling that responsibility. Further, the function of alimony can be maintained after the obligor's death by substituting insurance proceeds.

The lesson to take from this case is that if work related life insurance , which may be provided at little to no cost to the employee, is going to be the insurance used in the Agreement, the parties should specify what should happen if this insurance is no longer available.  In this case, the husband had the ability to convert the policy but that is not always the case.  Moreover, if the policy is converted from a group policy to an individual policy, the cost to the employee can go up dramatically.  Thus, if it is the parties' intention that the work related policy be maintained only so long as it is available through employment at little or no cost, they should say so in their agreement. 

Another issue that comes up from time to time is that someone has a term policy that either expires or the cost increases greatly such the the new premium or a new policy would be cost prohibitive.  Now, if a person does not have a support obligation to secure, this may be no big deal and they can choose not to have insurance anymore.  However, the problem arises if they have to secure alimony or child support.

In a situation where someone has a term policy that expires or has an increasing premium at a certain age, at the time of the divorce they may be better served to go out and get a new policy that covers their needs into the future, before the premiums become cost prohibitive (or even worse, before they can no longer get insurance).  Similarly, one must give serious consideration as to whether they want to use work related insurance to cover their obligation so that they are not in the same boat as Mr. Starr was in this case. 

GRANDPARENTS FACE A STEEP BURDEN IN SEEKING VISITATION

Oftentimes in typical family life, circumstances unfold between grandparents and their children that result in a "cutting of ties," so to speak, where contact ceases not only with the children, but with grandchildren as well.  By that time, grandparents have commonly formed loving ties and bonds with the grandchildren that are at a risk of breaking due to the conflict with the parents.  What are a grandparents' rights to have visitation with the grandchildren in such a situation?  The answer can be found in New Jersey's Grandparent Visitation Statute, N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, which imposes a difficult burden upon the grandparents to establish a right to visitation because the grandparent is essentially seeking to intrude upon the overwhelming strength of a parent's fundamental, constitutional right to raise their children.   

The statute sets forth as follows:

a.  A grandparent or any sibling of a child residing in this State may make application before the Superior Court, in accordance with the Rules of Court, for an order for visitation.  It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the granting of visitation is in the best interests of the child.

b.  In making a determination on an application filed pursuant to this section, the court shall consider the following factors:

(1) the relationship between the child and the applicant;

(2) the relationship between each of the child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing and the applicant;

(3) the time which has elapsed since the child last had contact with the applicant;

(4) the effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the child and the child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing;

(5) if the parents are divorced or separated, the time sharing arrangement which exists between the parents with regard to the child;

(6) the good faith of the applicant in filing the application;

(7) any history of physical, emotional or sexual abuse or neglect by the applicant; and

(8) any other factor relevant to the best interests of the child.

 c.  With regard to any application made pursuant to this section, it shall be prima facie evidence that visitation is in the child's best interest if the applicant had, in the past, been a full-time caretaker for the child.

In addition, because of the fundamental parenting rights I described above, the grandparents must also establish by a "preponderance of the evidence" that the "visitation is necessary is avoid harm to the child."  To do so, case law in New Jersey requires that the grandparents establish a "special need for continued contact" beyond the "ordinary grandparent-child relationship and its unwanted termination."  Allegations must be specific as to the harm that would befall upon the grandchildren, based upon the "unusually close" relationship between the grandparents and the children or on "traumatic circumstances such as a parent's death."  The mere potential loss of memories or the grandparents' love and care does not meet the grandparents' required burden.

It was upon an examination of the above that the Appellate Division in Levine v. Levine et al., affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a grandparent's application for visitation under the statute.  In so doing, the Appellate Division found that the grandparent failed to establish that his relationship with the grandchildren was anything more than "an ordinary healthy and loving grandparent-grandchild relationship." 

The Appellate Division also rejected the grandparent's request to have the grandchildren evaluated by a psychological expert, finding it unnecessary to expose the children to such a process when the situation posed a standard relationship, without any specific allegation of unusual harm or a special relationship.  The grandparent's submission of his own expert report, which was based solely on the grandparent's own statements (since the expert had not actually met with the parents or the children) failed to sway either the trial court or Appellate Division in his favor. 

This case confirms that, while New Jersey's Grandparent Visitation law does, in fact, provide certain rights and protections for grandparents that did not previously exist in this State, the fundamental rights of parents to raise their children carries far greater weight in the overall analysis.

NEW APPELLATE DIVISION DECISION REGARDING PARENTING COORDINATOR GRIEVANCES AND FEES

Following on the heels of Eric Solotoff's recent blog entry addressing the use of parenting coordinators, a new published (precedential) decision from the Appellate Division talks about grievances against parenting coordinators, parenting coordinator fees, and the need for a plenary hearing to address such issues.  In Segal v. Lynch, the Appellate Division addressed these issues in the context of a long, acrimonious history of events simply regarding the parenting coordinator's involvement in the highly contentious matter.

Soon after the trial court appointed the parenting coordinator pursuant to the Parenting Coordinator Pilot Program, the plaintiff called for the coordinators removal from the matter because the coordinator had contacted the trial judge to clarify the terms of an order.  In response to the plaintiff's indication that he would file a motion to have her recused, the coordinator pointed plaintiff to the Grievance Procedure outlined in the Pilot Program Guidelines, which required that plaintiff specifically outline his grievances to the coordinator before notifying the trial court.  A major issue of contention at both the trial level and on appeal was the parenting coordinator's indication that she would charge the plaintiff for her time taken to respond to his numerous grievances. 

After the grievances could not be resolved, the plaintiff submitted his grievance letter to the trial judge, who issued an Order to Show Cause why the coordinator should not continue in the matter and why plaintiff should not pay the coordinator's fees owed.  The trial judge ultimately found for the coordinator, concluding that the plaintiff's grievances were without merit and that the coordinator herself had acted "professionally and admirably" under very difficult circumstances.

In reviewing the matter on appeal, the Appellate Division reviewed the history of the Pilot Program, discussing the positive impact of parenting coordinators in helping to resolve various day-to-day parenting issues on the parties and the court calendar.  The Court directly quoted from the Guidelines as to the parenting coordinator's role:

The parenting coordinator's goal is to aid parties in monitoring the existing parenting plan, reducing misunderstandings, clarifying priorities, exploring possibilities for compromise and developing methods of communication that promote collaboration in parenting. The parenting coordinator's role is to facilitate decision-making between the parties or make such recommendations, as may be appropriate when the parties are unable to do so. One primary goal of the parenting coordinator is to empower parents to develop and utilize effective parenting skills so that they can resume the parenting and decision-making role without the need for outside intervention. The parenting coordinator should provide guidance and direction to the parties with the primary focus on the best interests of the child by reducing conflict and fostering sound decisions that aid positive child development. 

 Further, the parenting coordinator, as noted by the Court, cannot modify any Order or Judgment without mutual consent from the parties, as memorialized in a Consent Order.  To that end, as referenced in Eric's recent blog entry, the trial court cannot abdicate its role to the parenting coordinator. 

 

The Grievance Procedure set forth in the Guidelines is also more specifically set forth as follows:

 

               (8) Grievance Procedure — A party having a complaint or grievance shall discuss the matter with the Parenting Coordinator in person in an attempt to resolve it before pursuing it in any other manner. If the issue remains unresolved, the parties shall submit a written letter to the Parenting Coordinator detailing the complaint or grievance, with a copy to the other party, to both attorneys (if any), and to the attorney for the child(ren) if one is in place. The Parenting Coordinator shall within thirty (30) days provide a written response to both parties and the attorneys. The Parenting Coordinator at his/her discretion may schedule a meeting or conference call with the attorneys or with the attorneys and the parties in an effort to resolve the complaint. In situations where the grievance or complaint is not resolved by this process, the dissatisfied party may request a court hearing to make a determination on the issue(s).

 The Appellate Division concluded that the Grievance Procedure had been properly followed, but also concluded that there existed a contractual basis (in light of the parenting coordinator's retainer agreement) for the plaintiff to pay the coordinator's time for responding to his long list of grievances.  To that end, the coordinator's response served two (2) purposes - 1) it provided a defense to the charges against her, and 2) it constituted a "report" to the trial judge, from which the judge determined the baselessness of plaintiff's claims.  It was, therefore, also, a necessary component of the parenting coordinator's role to provide such a response for which she could charge fees to prepare.  The Appellate Division similarly noted that public policy was advanced by awarding the coordinator's fees for such work, finding that the inability to charge for such a response to grievances would effectively cripple the parenting coordinator program considering the number of parties dissatisfied with the process.

 

To that end, the Appellate Division concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a plenary hearing under the Pilot Program Guidelines, but that he was limited to merely requesting a hearing.  After such a request, it is then up to the trial judge to determine if such a hearing is warranted under a given set of circumstances.  In the present case, the trial judge concluded, in the mode of summary judgment (even though it was on the trial court's Order to Show Cause where summary judgment rules do not apply) that there existed no genuine issue of material fact warranting a hearing.  The plaintiff's act of simply referring to the coordinator as a liar did not justify a hearing.

 

Similarly, the Appellate Division concluded that the Guidelines also did not call for the holding of a hearing to resolve a pay dispute for fees incurred by the coordinator in performing her standard coordinator services (beyond responding to plaintiff's grievances).  The trial judge was found to not have simply "rubber stamped" the coordinator's requested amount of fees.  Rather, he conducted a searching review of the voluminous submissions before him in concluding that the services performed and amount charged by the coordinator were reasonable, and, as a result, no hearing was necessary.

 

While a parenting coordinator can serve a highly useful purpose under certain circumstances, this matter conveys how both parties must be willing to cooperate with the process, and how questioning the coordinator's role and performance might be a costly price to pay should a party's grievances not be resolved before a trial court addresses the matter.

 

HOW TO PREPARE FOR THAT INITIAL DIVORCE CONSULTATION

Visiting a divorce attorney for an initial consultation can be a difficult and intimidating proposition.  For some, it is the realization that their marriage may be over.  For others, it is simply the discussion of such deeply personal matters with a stranger.

Nerves or trepidation aside, the main purpose of the initial consultation is to learn about the process and understand what your rights and obligations could be.  The law is never black and white but has many shades of gray.  A good consultation will explain the black and white and touch upon the relevant areas of gray. 

The initial consultation is also important because this process lets you interview your potential counsel.  Not only is it important that you find the attorney you plan to hire to be competent and best able to represent your interests, but its important that you also like your potential counsel.  Sounds trivial but keep in mind that your divorce lawyer is someone who is quickly going to learn the good and the bad of you and your most personal relationship, your marriage.  Secrets aren't helpful and a level of trust is required.

So what can you do to make sure you get the most out of this initial consultation and at the same time provide counsel the relevant and important information needed?  Here are some suggestions:

1. While tempting, the initial consultation may not always be the appropriate time to divulge the day to day history of your 20 year relationship with your spouse.  Use the time wisely.  We ask prospective clients to complete an initial questionnaire providing us with relevant information.  This questionnaire serves as a road map so the important facts are not overlooked.

2. Be honest.  Answer all questions honestly remembering that the answers you provide will guide the attorney's responses.

3. Be familiar with your finances.  Bring, or at least review, your last 3 tax returns, pay stubs, W-2's, K-1's, business tax returns (or at least know the names of business entities), and if possible, create a list of assets and debts. 

4. Think about your main concerns before the meeting.  Consider writing down those questions you feel you need answered before you can proceed.  This will help you to get that information you are meeting with an attorney to receive.

5. Keep an open mind.  Attorneys are not magicians.  Not every question may be answerable at the initial consultation.  Sometimes further information or research is needed.  You don't just want an answer, you want the correct answer.

6. Be prepared.  Not all facts will favor your case.  Part of the initial consultation is to learn the strengths and weaknesses of your position and what may lie ahead in the divorce process.

A good initial consultation will be informative and comforting.  You should walk away having questions answered and armed with information that will hep you decide your next steps.  The attorney should walk away with the same.  As the process unfolds, more information will be revealed and/or strategy may change.  Working together, you can ease the stress that divorce will surely bring. 

When Change of Circumstances is Not Really a Change Necessary to Modify Custody

This post was written by Jessica Goldberg, a new associate in the Family Law Practice Group in the Roseland office and also, a new contributor to this blog.

The recent Appellate Division’s decision in Dunn v. Willis, although unpublished and therefore not precedential, brings up some interesting issues regarding custody disputes. First, it is important to note that when a judge is asked to consider a change in custody, that judge must first find that there has been a change in circumstances warranting further proceedings. In Dunn v. Willis the Judge concluded that the mother, who was seeking custody of her son, had failed to show the necessary changed circumstances. The Appellate Division agreed with the Family Court Judge and within its’ decision a warning can be construed about the dangers of too often involving the Court in family matters.

The history of this case is as follows: Mom, unmarried, had an alcohol abuse problem and although she had stopped drinking by November 2002, she was participating in an inpatient rehabilitation program and the Division of Youth and Family Services was involved with the family. In January 2003 the Court entered a consent order, signed by mom, the child’s maternal grandparents, and the child’s paternal grandparents. This consent order gave custody to the maternal grandparents and visitation rights to the paternal grandparents with the condition that the child’s father not be present during their visitation time. In August of 2003 mom was awarded parenting time with her child. In 2004 mom’s stability begins to become apparent – she is out of rehab, she has a full-time job and she has bought a home near the child’s school. In October 2004 mom makes a motion for a change in custody, but the Court denies this motion. In May 2007 mom gets a bachelors degree in nursing. In December 2007 the Court enters an order increasing mom’s parenting time, however, the Court again denies mom custody. Finally, in April of 2008 mom is awarded joint legal custody with her parents, the child’s maternal grandparents. Another order is entered in June 2008 restricting mom from making unilateral decisions without approval from her parents with whom she shares custody.

Then, in June 2009, mom files a motion, now the subject of this Appellate decision, to obtain custody of her son. By this time mom is working full-time as a nurse and is about to receive her Masters Degree in nursing. Her relationship with the child’s father has improved to the point where they are communicating and the child is building a relationship with his father and the father’s younger son. During this entire time the child has lived with his maternal grandparents and an older half-sister, however, the half-sister is now going off to college and mom asserts that the child, now eleven years old, wants to live with her. The Court, however, denies mom’s request to interview the child or appoint an expert to evaluate whether a change would be in the child’s best interest. The Court denies mom’s motion on the grounds that mom has failed to show the necessary changed circumstances.

The Appellate Court, in affirming the Judge’s decision, points out that the Judge who addressed the Custody issue in 2009 had also entered the orders in December 2007 and June 2008. The Appellate Court states that “[the circumstances relevant on this application were only those that had changed since April 2008” when mom was awarded joint legal custody. The Appellate Court highlights that mom’s success and progress from the circumstances that surrounded her family in 2003, when her parents were awarded custody of her son, were all known in 2008 when she received joint custody. Therefore, all of moms’ progress cannot be considered in 2009. When we look at the facts of this case from 2003 through 2009 we see substantial changes – mom went from a parent with an alcohol problem in an inpatient rehabilitation program to a homeowner with a full-time nursing job on the verge of receiving a Master’s degree. When the case is considered from 2008 to 2009, however, as the Family Court Judge considered it, there are very few changes in circumstance.

This case can be viewed as a warning about litigating a matter too frequently. This child had been living with grandparents for a long time and it is not clear from the facts that it would have been in his best interest to go and live with mom. If, however, the Court had not been so involved through out the years and if the Judge had been looking at the facts for the first time in 2009 since the initial consent order in 2003, it is safe to say that he would have at least found a significant change in circumstances and, at the very least, he would have been compelled to proceed with an investigation into the custody matter – interview the child, appoint an expert, etc. I concede that it is difficult to stay out of Court when the Division of Youth and Family Services is involved.  But there is a lesson here for any party getting involved in a custody matter. A party should be careful about how many times they file a motion and ask the Courts to review the facts of their case. If a party has designs about seeking major changes in a parenting plan or custodial situation in the future, a party should be careful about entering into a consent order for small changes.  They should be wary of baby steps, because each time a Court enters an order, whether by consent or otherwise, those facts and that time period become the circumstances and point in history a judge will look to first when asked to consider the matter again.
 

A BUSY WEEK FOR CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES CONTINUES

Following on the heels of an earlier blog entry this week addressing "alimony escalators" in the context of proving a change in circumstances meriting a decreased alimony obligation, a new unreported (not precedential) decision from the Appellate Division in the matter of Eick v. Eick, found that the husband had fulfilled his initial "changed circumstances" burden meriting the matter being sent back to the trial court for a plenary hearing on the issue. 

In Eick, the husband was a self-employed bookbinder who was obligated to pay permanent alimony to his former spouse pursuant to a February 2007 property settlement agreement in the amount of $1,500 per month, as well as $2,000 per month in child support for the parties' two younger children (a number agreed upon that went beyond the child support guidelines calculation).  Critically, the PSA established that such figures were based on an income of $117,000 for the husband and $29,000 for the defendant.  As an important aside, it is important in any settlement agreement to note what incomes were utilized to determine support so that a baseline figure exists should the issue arise in the future.

In March 2009, the payor husband filed a motion to reduce his support obligations based on an alleged change in circumstances - a claim that his business had "declined dramatically" due to online research tools utilized by many clients that rendered the need for his services substantially diminished.  He also claimed that his business had suffered due to the growth of imported bond printed material, as well as the general downturn in the economy. 

Interestingly, the former husband supported his application by submitting the report of an employability expert, who concluded that, while he could learn new skills, changing careers was not a realistic possibility after 27 years in the bookbinding business.  The report further concluded that his best option was to stay in his industry, anticipate a continued decrease in business volume, revenue and earnings, and consult with a career counselor or business consultant to determine available options.

In reversing and remanding the trial court's decision denying the husband's modification motion, the Appellate Division noted that not only had his income decreased, but that the wife's income had "significantly increased" - an undisputed fact set forth in the wife's Case Information Statement that the trial court failed to address.  The Appellate Division also concluded that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as to whether the husband's decreased earning situation was of a permanent or temporary nature, since a temporary situation is not enough to merit a changed circumstances finding.  Even though the trial court noted that the bookbinding industry had undergone difficult times when the PSA was entered, the judge also noted that the situation was further "complicated" by the downward economy.  As a result, the trial court's denial of the husband's application was reversed and remanded for a plenary hearing.

VETERAN'S DISABILITY PENSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY DEEMED INCOME FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING ALIMONY

In an unreported (non-precedential) decision in the case of Brown v. Brown  released on May 25, 2010, the Appellate Division determined that veterans disability benefits and social security benefits are income for purposes of determining alimony.  In this appeal of an Order that granted some alimony reduction but not as much as the former husband sought, the facts are not particularly interesting.  That said, what was interesting was that the reduction was not as much sought (and in actuality, the ex-husband sought an elimination of alimony, because the court considered the veteran's disability pension and Social Security over his objection.  In fact, he tried to argue that the spendthrift provisions (provisions that prevent creditors from attacking certain assets/benefits) in the relevant federal laws prevent such consideration but the Court noted that a spouse seeking support was not a creditor within the meaning of the law.

The matter was, however, remanded because the trial court did not analyze the statutory factors when reducing the support.  As noted in my blog last week about the Walsh case, when dealing with a motion to modify alimony, once the Court determines ta ht there is a change of circumstances, they have to look at the needs of both parties.  In fact, if the Court makes an initial finding of a change of circumstances, the court must analyze how much the alimony should be in a modification application the same way it would in an initial alimony application.   

READ MARK ASHTON'S EXCELLENT POST ENTITLED "A DIVORCE NEGOTIATION PRIMER"

Mark Ashton, a partner in our Exton, Pennsylvania office, and a contributor the firm's Pennsylvania Family Law blog, wrote an excellent post on that blog entitled "A Divorce Negotiation Primer".

There are several points I would like to highlight:

  • negotiations are confidential and cannot be introduced in court, except for very limited circumstances, but not as to the ultimate issue that is the subject of the negotiations.
  • negotiation is intended to narrow issues
  • at the time of trial, no one is bound by the positions taken during negotiations
  • a party who negotiates backwards (for example making a demand, then increasing the demand), risks losing credibility in the negotiations and also causes their attorney to lose credibility.
  • Put all issues on the table as early as possible so as not to spring new issues when settlement appears near and/or give a party false hope of settlement when the parties are not really all that close.

As usual, Mark's advice is good advice. 

SHORT SALE FOR CASH? AGGRESSIVE PLAN MAY HELP DIVORCING COUPLES

On April 5th, the struggling housing market will face a new ally in the form of a short sale program being aggressively pushed by the Obama Administration to help millions of home owners escape from mortgage debt by selling their homes for less than the balance of the mortgage while receiving an additional monetary payment to do so.  As the government's attempts to assist homeowners struggling to make their mortgage payments have only slightly helped according to a recent article in the New York Times, the new program will pay $1,500 to the short selling homeowners to "relocate."

The benefits of the plan are hoped to be widespread, as lenders will ideally receive more money than with a foreclosure, the borrowers will experience a softer hit to their credit - including the lender's assurance that they will not later be sued for an unpaid mortgage balance - and fewer homes will be empty on the foreclosure market.  To protect from cases of fraud, lenders will utilize real estate agents, who will determine a home's value and, by correlation, the minimum acceptable sale price.  Adding another layer to this new system, the agent's determined value will not even be shared with the home owner, but the lender is required to accept any offer equal to or higher to such value.  What happens when a home owner has multiple mortgages on a single property, however, remains unclear.

From a family law standpoint, this plan provides the sort of good news that divorcing spouses struggling with what to do with their "under water" marital residence are looking for.  Whether it actually fulfills that glimmer of promise, however, remains unclear.  In the down real estate market, how to equitably distribute the home has proven challenging.  Oftentimes, neither party can afford to continue residing in the marital home, refinancing is unavailable due to the negative equity, neither party wants to face the credit hit of a foreclosure, and there is no money to cover the shortfall debt that might result where the house is sold for a price lower than the outstanding mortgage.

Short sales with a guarantee that the lender will not come after the borrowers such as that in the President's plan are therefore a desirable way out.  Short sales generally tend to be a risky, slow moving process with no guarantees.  With the Obama Administration's new plan to boost the housing market, hopefully such situations will take a turn for the better.

COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE: PANACEA OR RECIPE FOR DISASTER

Previously we blogged on alternate dispute resolution methods ("ADR") such as mediation and arbitration. "Collaborative Divorce" is another ADR method.

"Collaborative Divorce" is defined as  a form of alternative dispute resolution for divorcing couples where a  team approach is used to reach a settlement. Both parties to the divorce are supported by their lawyers; however, they work cooperatively with their spouse.  The collaborative process uses informal discussions and conferences attended by both spouses and their attorneys to settle all issues. The collaborative process is premised upon an atmosphere of honesty, cooperation, integrity, and professionalism. It requires that both spouses, with the assistance of their attorneys, provide all pertinent documents and information relating to the issues to be settled. In the event that experts are necessary, it encourages the use of jointly retained experts. Both spouses and attorneys are required to work together toward a shared resolution that is geared toward the future well being of the family. If the parties cannot reach a settlement through the collaborative process approach, the collaborative lawyers withdraw from the case and the parties then retain trial attorneys to pursue the matter in court.

Is collaborative divorce for everyone? I am a divorce litigator and people often come to me with complex, high conflict and/or high stakes cases so perhaps I am biased in that regard. Even still, I cannot see collaborative divorce being for everyone to be used in every case. Just as I wrote about my concerns about mediation, i.e. the possibility of a spouse taking advantage of an imbalance of power; the settle at all costs posture whether the resolution is fair to both parties or not; etc., I think that those pitfalls are just as possible in collaborative divorce.

For instance, I recently heard of a divorce case described as "freakish". At the same time, the husband was described as a "power broker" and the wife was a housewife with a young child. Most confusing was the revelation that the parties were involved in a "collaborative divorce."

To me, this sounded like a recipe for disaster. How can a "freakish" divorce be collaborative? If both parties are "power brokers" perhaps collaboration could work though it seems like both would want to "win." Collaboration seems unlikely when one party is a "power broker" and the other is not - capitulation seems more likely than collaboration. Ever wonder why the more powerful spouse wants to mediate?

Perhaps for a garden variety divorce with two reasonable people, this can work. In most other cases, it seems that the interests of the weaker party could be compromised. 

Hello Cohabitation. Goodbye Alimony.

What happens when a dependent spouse begins living with another partner? Well, in the recent unpublished decision of Hartelust v. Hartelust the Appellate Division reviewed this question. Docket No. A-2519-08T3, decided January 12, 2010. 

Plaintiff Nora Hartelust appealed from an August 1, 2008 Order that terminated Defendant Alexander Hartelust’s alimony obligation.   After twenty years of marriage the couple was divorced in January 2007. The judgment of divorce incorporated the property settlement agreement (PSA).   At the time, the couple had a fifteen year old child, Alexander was earning $60,000/year and Nora was earning $15,000 per year. The PSA stated that Alexander would pay $175 per week in child support, $220 per week in permanent alimony, and transfer his ownership in the marital home to Nora. The PSA did not address cohabitation.

In April of 2007, Alexander became aware that Nora was cohabitating in the former marital home with her boyfriend. Alexander immediately stopped paying alimony and in July 2007, three months later, filed a motion seeking termination of alimony.  After a plenary hearing where the parties, the boyfriend, and the couple’s son testified, the trial judge found that Nora was cohabitating with her boyfriend and was deriving an economic benefit. The judge ordered that Alexander stop paying alimony and awarded Alexander attorney’s fees. Nora appealed. On appeal the Appellate Division affirmed the termination of alimony because the trial judge had determined that based on credible testimony, Nora was cohabitating with her boyfriend and received an economic benefit from that cohabitation. The Appellate Division explained that once there is a prima facie showing of cohabitation, the burden of proof is shifted from the party seeking modification to the dependent spouse, who must show that he or she has not derived an economic benefit from the cohabitation. Nora could not overcome that burden.

Also on appeal was the award of attorney’s fees, which the Appellate Division reversed. The Appellate Division found that the judge failed to consider seven of the nine factors when determining if attorney’s fees were warranted. In this case the attorney failed to submit a Certification of Services, which impacted the Appellate Division's ruling. In order for attorney’s fees to be ordered, an attorney must submit a certification or affidavit of the services they provided.

 

While this matter is unpublished and therefore not binding, given the law of this state the outcome exemplifies the way the law was meant to be interpreted. Recently, virtually this very same issue was faced by a client and although the spouse admitted to cohabitation, the trial judge did not find that our client had met his prima facie burden and therefore, would not order a plenary hearing. While disappointing, this case further supports our belief that our client was entitled to this hearing, at the very least.

UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE IN SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CONTROLS OUTCOME

Oftentimes parties will sign an agreement settling all issues in their divorce matter only for one party to subsequently try to back away from those terms for any number of reasons.  Is it just that easy for a party to essentially change its mind?  The simple answer is generally no.  New Jersey has a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of fair and equitable agreements entered into on a consensual and voluntary basis.  If the agreement is somehow the product of fraud, unconscionable or otherwise demonstrates one party's effort to take advantage of the other, then the law provides the wronged party with an opportunity to "set aside" or "vacate" the agreement.  

What about those cases where there is no such wrongdoing?  Since marital settlement agreements are contracts and, as a result, generally enforced, Courts in this State will look to the terms of the agreement and apply basic contractual principles when addressing one party's claim as to the agreement's (or that provision's) enforceability.  For instance, where the agreement's language is unambiguous and the Court is called upon to interpret the terms at issue, the Court will not consider external (or "parol") evidence, such as, perhaps, oral discussions had at the time of the agreement's signing.  It will simply apply and interpret the terms before it.

This was the case in Dell'Osa v. Dell'Osa, a recent, unpublished (not precedential) Appellate Division decision where the husband claimed that the trial court improperly divided the parties' retirement accounts because his accounts were comprised of pre-tax funds while the wife's were comprised of after-tax funds.  The husband claimed that, as a result of this account structure, two Orders (known as Qualified Domestic Relations Orders or "QDROs") were needed to fairly divide the accounts, rather than just the Court dividing the accounts without such an Order to his claimed monetary disadvantage.

Affirming the trial court's decision, the Appellate Division found the settlement agreement language unambiguous as to this issue, finding that the agreement merely acknowledged the pre-tax and after-tax retirement contributions of the parties without requiring any equitable distribution to factor in a tax adjustment.  In its affirmance, the Appellate Division emphasized the notion that "A court may not make a better contract for either party than the one the parties drafted."  The Court also looked to other terms of the agreement in concluding that its interpretation of the unambiguous language was consistent with the terms of the agreement as a whole.

GOLDMAN SAGA CONTINUES

One would have hoped that Sean Goldman's return to the United States with father David Goldman would have been the end of this years-long international saga.  Sadly, however, that may not be the case.  News reports yesterday indicated that 9-year old Sean's Brazilian family will fight to regain "custody" of Sean, which is interesting since the family's actions and that of the boy's now deceased ex-wife really constituted an international abduction, thus leading to the boy's ultimate Court-Ordered return. 

After the family previously indicated that the fight was over, lawyers for the family will push to have the Brazilian court hear the boy's wishes after all - indicating as much on the same day that the boy returned home to Tinton Falls, New Jersey, claiming that it was "our home" when seeing the house where he will live once again.  Since the Supreme Court in Brazil does not convene until February, it would not be able to hear the family's arguments before then.

How the Brazilian family's ongoing legal actions will impact their likely future claim for visitation is unclear, as even their decision to publicly parade Sean through the streets in Brazil on the way to the United States consulate on Christmas Eve has been roundly criticized and, according to David Goldman, was a traumatic experience for Sean.  The family, however, has substantial financial resources and will likely fight this losing battle, seemingly at the wishes of Sean's maternal grandmother, until there is no avenue untapped.  For an additional prior blog post on this topic regarding Sean's return, click here as well.  Stay tuned for further details.

EDITOR'S NOTE:  We have previously blogged on grandparent visitation on several occasions.  Grandparent visitation is difficult to obtain in New Jersey following the US Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville and the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Moriarty v. Bradt and the cases that followed it.  Given the constitutional protections of the rights of a parent to parent their child(ren) free from interference from third parties, grandparents now must prove actual harm to the child if they do not receive visitation.  While on one hand, the death of a parent (as was the case in Moriarty) would be a factor in the grandmother's visitation request here on one hand, the abduction and the history in this case may mitigate that factor.  Moreover, one wonders whether, despite the harm that may be able to be proved in this case, given the circumstances surrounding the child's alleged bond with the grandmother and step father, that visiitation with these people who were allegedly part of the ordeal that kept father and son apart for several years, would overcome the harm.  ERIC S. SOLOTOFF

A PARENT'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FOR POST-HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION

What payment obligation, if any, do divorced parents have towards their child's post-high school education?  The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded more than 25 years ago that a child's right to support includes a "necessary education" after high school, whether it be a vocational school or college.  However, a parent's obligation to pay for such schooling depends generally on the expectations and abilities of the parties involved to pay, as set forth in 12 different factors including:

1.  whether the parent, if still living with the child, would have contributed toward the costs of the requested higher education;

2.  the effect of the background, values and goals of the parent on the reasonableness of the expectation of the child for higher education;

3.  the amount of the contribution sought by the child for the cost of higher education;

4.  the ability of the parent to pay that cost;

5.  the relationship of the requested contribution to the kind of school or course of study sought by the child;

6.  the financial resources of both parents;

7.  the commitment to and aptitude of the child for the requested education;

8.  the financial resources of the child, including assets owned individually or held in custodianship or trust;

9.  the ability of the child to earn income during the school year or on vacation;

10.  the availability of financial aid in the form of college grants and loans;

11.  the child's relationship to the paying parent, including mutual affection and shared goals as well as responsiveness to parental advice and guidance; and

12.  the relationship of the education requested to any prior training and to the overall long-range goals of the child.

 

Notably, these factors contemplate that the parent or child seeking payment towards educational expenses will be made before the expenses are actually incurred.  The Appellate Division addressed this timing issue in the recent unreported (not precedential) decision of Gorman v. Cruz, where it reversedd a trial court's denial of a mother's application to compel payment by the father for the daughter's beauty school because the child failed to apply for school costs from the father until the costs had already been incurred and paid.

Reversing the trial court's decision, the Appellate Division noted that delay in seeking payment from the parent is only one factor for consideration and by no means warrants an automatic denial.  The father had already contributed to the cost of the school, demonstrating his approval, or at least acquiescence towards his daughter's decision to obtain her cosmetology education, as well as his ability and willingness to pay.  The Appellate Division also rejected the father's argument that he was only obligated to pay for college - not a "technical" school like beauty school - relying on a rational construction of the terms of the parents' matrimonial settlement agreement as to the children's education and its general purpose to support the children in pursuing their career goals. 

As this case demonstrates, a thorough review of the 12 factors above, as well as the timing of the payment request, is necessary to determine a parent's obligation to pay for post-high school education costs.   

MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT- WHEN TO FILE

Under New Jersey law, a party of a divorce can seek modification of an order for child support or alimony if there is a “change of circumstance” that affects the income or earning ability of one of the parties.  Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980).  This proposition is one of the most common reasons for post-judgment motions in New Jersey Family law courts, especially in the current economy.  But in a recent unpublished New Jersey Appellate Division decision, Good v. Nedza, the Court affirmed a post-trial order, which did not permit a recalculation of child support or arrears because one of the parties failed to act on information they had obtained years earlier and had at the time when the parties entered a Consent Order for child support.

In Good, the parties were divorced in 2002.  At the time, Mr. Good was the primary provider and the wife, Ms. Nedza, was a homemaker.  The parties had three children.  They agreed that Mr. Good would pay child support and alimony, and they would share joint legal custody of the children with Ms. Nedza having primary residential custody.  Over the years circumstances changed.  By September 2005, all of the children were residing with Mr. Good and his child support obligation was terminated.  A Consent Order entered in January 2006 addressed Ms. Nedza’s child support obligation to Mr. Good.
 

In April 2008, Mr. Good filed an application with the court to increase child support payments based on an imputed income to Ms. Nedza of $85,000/year plus $25,000 in subsidized lifestyle (free apartment, Jaguar, vacations, etc.).  Mr. Good sought the payments to be retroactive to January 2006 because Ms. Nedza’s income was “erroneously” fixed at $25,000/year as a direct result of her misrepresentations in 2006.  Mr. Good also sought child support arrears retroactive to July 2004 based on Ms. Nedza’s misrepresentations. 

The judge found that Mr. Good’s motion was untimely under Rule 4:50-1, which allows orders to be vacated or modified if there is mistake, fraud, or newly discovered evidence.  But the motion must be filed within 1 year of the entry of the order pursuant to Court Rules.  In this case, the judge found not only that it was more than one year, but more importantly, that Mr. Good was aware of the alleged misrepresentations in 2006, prior to entering into the January 2006 Consent Order. Because Mr. Good was aware of the alleged misrepresentations in 2006, had taken discovery, had the opportunity for a plenary hearing, and then still entered into a Consent Order, he could not attempt to re-litigate an old issue.  The judge did order a recalculation of child support obligations as of January 2008 because there was a “change of circumstance” in the parties' income since January 2006, but would not assess arrears.

This case is a great example of what can occur if a party: (1) does not seek to enforce their rights in a timely manner; and (2) enters into a Consent Order prematurely.  It can be vital to act quickly when new information becomes available and not to settle on incomplete discovery.  Without knowing, future rights can be impacted.  This is not to say that where there is fraud or misrepresentation courts will not overturn or vacate prior decisions or Orders.  In those cases the burden of proof rests on the party making the allegations.  While many litigants are anxious to settle matters quickly or as cost efficiently as possible, sometimes rushing to do so can negatively affect your rights under the law.  Just as with most other things in life, having all the information is necessary to making an informed decision.
 

Will California Ban Divorce? Will New Jersey ban Same -Sex Civil Unions?

If a California web designer gets his way - Til death do us part? – will mean just that. John Marcotte, who runs the comedy website Badmouth.net, is attempting to put a measure on next year’s ballot that will ban divorce in California. The effort is meant to be satirical. The thought process behind the idea is that if California can pass Proposition 8, which bans same-sex marriage, allegedly to protect the sanctity of marriage, than what prevents California from going one step further and banning divorce?   

So far Marcotte has not collected the 694,354 signatures necessary to put the proposition on the ballot, but with a grass-roots movement and use of the Internet, he may achieve his goal – although it would be highly unlikely to pass.  And even if it did pass, it would certainly be found unconstitutional if challenged in court. But the proposition does raise an interesting question – does the State have an interest in protecting the sanctity of marriage?

Often opponents of same-sex marriage cite the sanctity of marriage as the reason same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry. On December 14, 2006, the New Jersey Legislature passed the Civil Union Act, providing for civil unions, which was signed into law by Governor Jon Corzine on December 21, 2006 and came into effect on February 19, 2007. Same-sex couples who enter into a civil union are provided almost all of the rights granted to married couples under New Jersey state law. However, under the provisions of the federal Defense of Marriage Act or DOMA, same-sex couples in marriages, civil unions, or domestic partnerships do not have any right or entitlement to the 1,138 rights that a married couple has under federal law.  

In New Jersey, Governor Jon Corzine has stated that he would sign a bill legalizing same-sex marriage if it comes to his desk before he leaves office in January. While Governor-elect, Christopher Christie said he would support a New Jersey constitutional amendment, similar to Proposition 8, that would ban same-sex civil unions. 

In a study released on November 25, 2009 by Quinnipiac University, New Jersey voters now oppose a law that would allow same-sex couples to marry by a slim margin of 49 – 46%. This reverses the 49 - 43% support for same-sex marriage in an April 23, 2009 survey by the independent Quinnipiac University. The poll taken by the university shows some interesting trends in who are the strongest supporters of same-sex marriage: Women support same-sex marriage 53 – 41%, while men oppose it 57 – 38%; Democrats support same-sex marriage 60 – 34%; Independents support same-sex marriage 49 – 45%; Republicans are against same-sex marriage 69- 25%; White voters split 49 - 47 %, while African -American voters oppose the measure 61 - 28 %.

 

The legalization of same-sex marriages is certainly a heated debate with proponents on both sides. But does California’s satirical proposition to ban divorce change your opinion? Does the State have the right to regulate who gets married – or gets divorced? If the State can tell you who you can and can’t marry – why shouldn’t they be able to tell who you can and can’t divorce?  And will New Jersey’s next governor enact New Jersey’s own Proposition 8? Its obvious that from the West Coast all the way to here in New Jersey, the same-sex marriage debate will continue………….        

YET ANOTHER CELEBRITY DIVORCE - DODGER STYLE

Since they have been in the news a lot lately, I have bloged a lot recently on celebrity divorces, be it John & Kate, Stephanie Seymour or Jim Nantz.  That is why the article from Billy Witz that recently appeared in the New York Times about the divorce of Frank McCourt and Jamie McCourt, the owners of the Los Angeles Dodgers got my attention.

Both parties claim to own the team - though Frank claims to be the sole owner.  Both worked for the team until recently, when Jamie was fired.  As a sign of the war to come, Jamie's lawyers budgeted her legal fees for this matter to be $2 million.  Per the article, the central issue is as follows:

"The key legal issue is whether the Dodgers are considered the McCourts’ community property. Under California law, a couple’s assets are split 50-50 unless a written agreement states otherwise. Shortly after buying the Dodgers, the McCourts put the team in Frank’s name and all their property in Jamie’s name to protect the homes from potential creditors. One of her lawyers, Michael Kump, said they would challenge the validity of the postnuptial agreement.

If the agreement is not valid, Fisher said, the McCourts would probably be forced to sell, as John Moores did with the San Diego Padres when he divorced."
 

The result would probably be the same in New Jersey.  It seems pretty clear that when people divorce, the cannot remain in business together.  In fact, in the well known Borodinsky case, the Appellate Division held:

 It seems almost doctrinal that the elimination of the source of strife and friction is to be sought by the judge in devising the scheme of distribution, and the financial affairs of the parties should be separated as far as possible.  If the parties cannot get along as husband and wife, it is not likely that they will get along as business partners.

Obviously this is the case with the fighting McCourts.  We will pay close attention as to how this works out but until then, play ball.