ANOTHER CELEBRITY DIVORCE - CHILD SUPPORT IN HIGH INCOME CASES - THE APPELLATE DIVISION WEIGHS IN ON THE STRAHAN MATTER

Previously I blogged about child support in cases where the combined net income exceeds the upper levels of the Child Support Guidelines.  To see that post, click here.

That issue was prominent in the Appellate Division's decision in the Strahan case which was released on August 26, 2008 as a reported decision (meaning that the case has precedential effect). To see the full text of the case, click here.

This case involved the divorce of Michael Strahan, formerly of the New York Giants and his former wife, Jean.  At issue as to child support was support for their three year old twin daughters.

The trial court found that the basic child support amount under the guidelines was $35,984 a year but then found that the children had a supplemental need of $200,000 a year, for a total
of $235,984 a year.  Mr. Strahan was ordered to pay 91% of this.

The Appellate Division found several errors in the amount and allocation of child support. First, the trial court took as both accurate and reasonable Jean's budget, which included $27,000 per year in clothes, $30,000 per year in landscaping, gifts of diamonds for grandparents, a vacation for the nanny, etc.  The Appellate Division found that there was duplication between the children's needs and Jean's needs, that certain items should have been eliminated and that others were not reasonable. Further, the court held that while Mr. Strahan expressed  at trial his desire not "to spoil" the children and to teach them the value of money, the trial court  failed to address
plaintiff's "legitimate right . . . to determine the appropriate lifestyle of [his] child[ren]."

The Appellate Division also found that it was error not to impute income to Jean, who had earned $70,000 per year previously.  Interestingly, they commented that "employment opportunities were, in all likelihood, enhanced by her celebrity marriage. There is no question that as a healthy, educated, 41-year-old, (she) is capable of earning her own income."

The Appellate Division also reversed the requirement that Mr. Strahan maintain $7.5 million in disability insurance, in part because he had retired, and in part because it exceeded the life insurance that he was required to maintain.  The Court noted that if he became disabled, he would be entitled to file the same change of circumstances motion as any other litigant. 

However, Mr. Strahan's request to have the matter remanded to a new judge was denied.  The Appellate Division noted, once again, that an adverse ruling does not equate to bias. 

UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL EXPENSES ARE DEEMED CHILD SUPPORT -THE REQUIRMENT FOR PAYMENT CAN'T BE WAIVED BY LACK OF PROSECUTION

On March 27, 2008, the Appellate Division released the decision in Gotlib v. Gotlib.  This is a reported decision which means that it is precedential and must be followed by courts in the future. 

In this case, the plaintiff/ex-wife filed a motion seeking enforcement as to unreimbursed medical expenses and the payment of college expenses. She also sought to invalidate defendant/ex-husband's transfer to a third part for his share of the marital residence.

As to the issue of medical expenses, the parties were required per their Judgment of Divorce to equally share in these costs.  The plaintiff sought more than $23,000 in medical expense arrears, going back to 1996.  These expenses included those that were already awarded to her in 1997 when she was required to file an enforcement motion.  Though she was successful in the motion, the defendant never paid.  The defendant argued that plaintiff waived her right to enforce the Judgment's clear provisions requiring each party to pay one-half of the children's un-reimbursed medical expenses because she did not consult with him before the children visited certain physicians, and did not bill him on a monthly basis, as required by the Judgment.

The Appellate Division disagreed holding that a parent's obligation to pay un-reimbursed medical expenses should be deemed by a court reviewing a motion to enforce litigant's rights as an essential benefit to the parties' children. In this light, the right to receive these payments belong to the children, and is therefore is not subject to waiver by a custodial parent. That said, the non-custodial parent retains the right to question the reasonableness of any individual medical expense.

The Appellate Division made some interesting comments as to how parents should ideally act after a divorce:

"A parent from whom financial contribution is sought nevertheless retains the right to challenge the reasonableness of the medical expenses. Cooperation, discussion and consultation should be the guiding principles in any decision involving the welfare of the parties' children. In deciding what type of medical treatment is required, the need for the parties to behave and act like parents is paramount. This may require them to subordinate their adversarial interests as litigants in favor of their children's welfare."

They also set forth factors that should be considered when assessing medical expenses, as follows:

"Some of the relevant questions to be addressed when considering the reasonableness of a reimbursement request are: (1) was the treatment medically necessary; (2) was the medical treatment in response to an unforeseen emergency requiring immediate action; (3) did the treatment involve elective or cosmetic medical services, and if so, was it in the best interest of the child involved to undergo such treatment; and (4) in cases of elective or cosmetic medical treatment, was the decision economically sound, given the parties' financial resources. This list is by no means an exhaustive recitation of the issues to be considered in every case. These cases are, by necessity, factually sensitive. A proper resolution requires careful attention to the salient facts."

As to the college issue, the Appellate Division reversed the finding that the parties should equally share the costs remanded the matter to the trial court  to make factual findings, after conducting a plenary hearing, guided by the factors outlined in Gac v. Gac and Newburgh v. Arrigo. The reason for this was that the Judgment was silent as to how the parties would divide higher education expenses, however, in arriving at his decision, "the motion judge did not address the Newburgh and statutory factors reflected in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) ,,, The court simply appears to have divided the expenses equally."  In addition, the Court was concerned because the plaintiff also did not seek contribution from defendant until long after the expenses had been incurred, "thereby excluding him from the decision making process of whether his son should attend Curry College or whether his daughter should attend Ba'er Miriam Yeshiva, both private schools. (citations omitted).  Participation by both parents is an essential factor under Gac, expressly required by the JOD, and should have "weigh[ed] heavily against the grant of a future application. (citations omitted)."   

In Gac, a father was not required to pay for college because of similar reasons as in the case above.  This seemingly creates a contradiction in how medical expenses and college expenses are treated.  Seemingly, reimbursement for medical expenses cannot be waived for lack of prosecution of the arrears.  On the other hand, contribution for college costs can seemingly be waived if a parent waits until after college is completed to seek reimbursement.  The distinction, at least in this case, is that apparently, at least as to the medical expenses, the defendant was given the explanation of the medical expenses and the proofs near the time they were incurred and/or the defendant had knowledge of them - even if exact compliance with the Judgment was not made by the plaintiff. 

The Appellate Division also held that the mortgage on the former marital residence, held by one spouse as mortgagee to secure his equitable distribution interest, may be assigned to a third party. However, the court declined to decide whether the assignee is a holder in due course, because he was not a named party in the matter.

Obligation to maintain life insurance

Tasara Masaya v. Peter Griffin and Deirdre Newman

This case is an appeal from a final order of the Family Part. Peter Griffin was married to Deirdre Newman in 1985. They had two children. In 2000 Griffin and Newman divorced. The parties’ Property Settlement Agreement required that the two children remain the beneficiaries of Griffin’s $150,000 policy and his employer life insurance policy until their emancipation.  In 2004, Griffin had another child with Tasara Masaya. In 2005, Masaya filed a complaint for custody and child support.  The Court entered a Consent Order that provided Masaya with child support, arrears, child costs, and required Griffin to obtain life insurance of $200,000 to secure his child support obligation. In 2006, Masaya sought to enforce the Order regarding the arrears and the life insurance. Although Griffin was in the hospital at the time, the judge without knowledge of the PSA, awarded Masaya’s child 85% of the life insurance. 

Following Griffin’s death, an order to show cause was filed regarding the life insurance. The order to show cause informed the Court of the PSA, and the judge modified her previous Order. Masaya appealed. The appellate division cited Della Terza v. Estate of Della Terza, 276 N.J. Super. 46 (App. Div. 1994), when rendering its decision that “[w]hen incorporated in an agreement or court order, the parent’s obligation to provide such insurance for the benefit of his or her child gives the child an equitable interest in the proceeds of a policy of insurance on that parent’s life, regardless of the beneficiary designation in effect at the time or his or her death”.    

When a child of a deceased parent has an equitable interest in the proceeds of a life insurance policy, i.e. they are the beneficiary, because the deceased parent has an obligation to provide such insurance, that interest is enforceable as an equitable assignment. Taking it one step further, when a parent has other children born after the order establishing the obligation to maintain life insurance for the child of the marriage, the prior obligation is enforceable regardless of a subsequent redesignation of beneficiaries. In essence, the first in time still has an enforceable right under the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement and a subsequent child and subsequent obligation, does not nullify that obligation. 

Clients must be aware that if their Property Settlement Agreement obligates them to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of their child from the first marriage, oftentimes to secure a child support obligation, a subsequent remarriage and additional children born to that party do not trump their obligation to maintain satisfactory life insurance pursuant to the terms of their Agreement.