ALIMONY TERMINATES AT REMARRIAGE, DOESN'T IT?

Alimony terminates at remarriage, doesn't it?  At least that is what we have learned.  In fact, there is even a statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25, that says permanent or limited duration alimony terminates upon death or remarriage of the recipient.  This is not the case for reimbursement or rehabilitative alimony, per the statute, absent an agreement to the contrary or good cause. 

Fast forward to November 17, 2009, the date of the release of the unreported (non-precedential) Appellate Division opinion in the case of Kelly v. Arato.

In this case, the parties were married in 1985 and divorced in 2004.  Their agreement called for $100 per month of alimony and $3100 per month in child support.  The wife remarried 6 months after the divorce and the husband immediately stopped paying alimony.  Four years later, when the husband's attorney wrote to address college for the children, the wife raised the issue of the non-payment of alimony.  After cross motion, the trial judge denied the husband's motion to terminate alimony as well as the wife's motion for payment of alimony arrears.  Both parties appealed.

The problem in the matter appears to be in the drafting of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (PSA).  Per the PSA, alimony would continue "for the natural lives of the parties,
unless terminated by any one or more of the following" and then lists two events: repudiation or modification of the PSA by the written "mutual consent of the parties"; and defendant's death.

The wife argued that because remarriage is not included as an event that would terminate alimony the parties agreed it would continue. The husband argued that the parties did not have to expressly provide for what the Legislature commands and that the PSA's silence on that point reveals an
intention that the right to termination set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25 would apply.

The Appellate Division held:

In most instances, we would find little merit in the contention that the complete absence of any mention of remarriage in a PSA would permit a finding that the payor spouse waived the right set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25 to have alimony cease upon the supported spouse's remarriage. By way of comparison, Ehrenworth dealt with the enforceability of a PSA that stated the husband's alimony obligation would continue to be paid "regardless of whether or not the [w]ife remarries." 187 N.J. Super. at 345. Here, the PSA makes no mention of remarriage, but it does have a provision that may be plausibly read as excluding any other terminating event than those listed.  By the same token, the PSA's silence on the subject of remarriage also renders plausible the contention that defendant waived the rights set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25. In short, the language of the PSA neither conclusively establishes nor conclusively negates plaintiff's remarriage as an event that would terminate alimony. As a result, the judge was mistaken insofar as she held that, as a matter of law, the PSA required a continuation of alimony in this circumstance. The dispute cannot be resolved by resort to the four corners of the PSA. It requires a consideration of the parties' actual intentions at the time of formation.

As such, the matter was remanded for a hearing. 

There are a few things of interest to me.  If there really was an alimony obligation, why did the wife wait 4 years to say somthing about it. On the other hand, given the fact that the alimony was $1,200 per year and the child support was $37,200 per year - a rather odd support allocation - as well as how quickly the wife remarried, one could surmise that the remarriage was contemplated and the support negoatiated accordingly.

The bottom line is that this seemingly could have been avoided had the PSA been clear about the intention - whatever it is. 

One last comment - 4 years of aimony arrears total $4,800.  This litigation had to cost several times that amount with more litgation to come.  This seems to fail a cost benefit analysis on both sides. 

RELOCATION WITH CHILDREN OUTSIDE OF NJ

I have previously blogged on the standard courts consider when asked whether a custodial parent can relocate outside of New Jersey. 

In our global economy with the economic times being what they are, more and more often I hear people asking if they'll be allowed to move with their children after the divorce.  Recently, the Appellate Court in New Jersey issued an unpublished decision in what appears to have been a hotly contested divorce and relocation trial.  In Hryack v. Hyrack, A-1321-08T4, A-3645-08T2 (two consolidated appeals) decided October 29, 2009, the court gave its thorough analysis of the relocation issue as it pertained to this family.

The first question for a court to answer when faced with an application for relocation outside of New Jersey is whether the physical custodial relationship between the parents is one where one parent is the primary caretaker and the other the secondary caretaker. O'Connor v. O'Connor 349 NJ Super. 381, 385 (App. Div. 2002). If a court does find that the relationship between parties is one where one parent is the primary caretaker and the other the secondary caretaker, the request to relocate must be analyzed further with the standard set forth in the New Jersey Supreme Court case of Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J. 91 (2001).

Under the Baures case, the parent that wants to relocate with the children must provide evidence that shows that there is 1) a good faith reason for the move and 2) that the move will not be inimical to the children's best interest.  They should also propose a visitation schedule.

In other words, the parent seeking to move with the children must prove to the court that the request to move is being made in good faith and not, for example, to spite the other parent or thwart their parenting time with the children.  Also, the parent must show that moving with the children outside of NJ will not be contrary to the children's best interest.

If the parent who wishes to relocate can meet these two burdens of proof, then it becomes the other parent's responsibility to provide evidence opposing the move because its being done not in good faith or it is contrary to the children's best interest.

To assist courts, Baures provides 12 factors to serve as guide posts when assessing the issue.  They are :

1. Reasons given for the move.

 2. Reasons given for opposition.

3. Past history of dealings between the parties insofar as it bears on reasons advanced by both parties for supporting and opposing the move.

4. Whether child will receive educational, health and leisure opportunities at least equal to what is available here.

5. Any special needs or talents of the child that require accommodation.

6. Whether a visitation and communication schedule can be developed that will allow the non-custodial parent to maintain a full and continuous relationship with the child.

7. Likelihood that the custodial parent will continue to foster child's relationship with the non-custodial parent if the move is allowed.

8. The effect of the move on extended family relationships here and in the new location.

9. The child's preference.

10. Whether the child is entering his senior year in high school.

11. Whether the non-custodial parent has the ability to relocate.

12. Any other factor.

In the recently decided Appellate Division decision of Hyrack, the Court reversed and remanded to the trial court because there was not a thorough and detailed parenting plan addressing how the non-custodial parent would have sufficient time and access to the children so that his relationship with them was not impaired or injured based upon their move across country to California.

One of the lessons that Baures taught was the importance of both parties' efforts to create an alternative visitation plan that could bridge the physical separation between the noncustodial parent and the children.  Ways such as email, Internet cameras, visitation during school breaks, holidays, vacations and phone contact must all be considered.  What also must be considered is the cost of such a visitation plan.  What the court should focus on is whether the communication and visitation is detailed and sufficient enough to maintain and nurture the connection between the noncustodial parent and children.  An important consideration to be made is what the quality of the relationship will be between the children and the noncustodial parent.

Any parent seeking relocation must examine these factors carefully and set forth a detailed plan for visitation and parenting time that can be executed and that can maintain a quality in the relationship between the children and the other parent.

INTERESTING NEW ALIMONY REDUCTION CASE

We have blogged many times about cases dealing with motions for reductions of child support and alimony.  Obviously, that has been a hot topic given the economic downturn that our country has experienced over the last year or so.  Another interesting unreported (non-precedential) case was released on November 2, 2009.

That case was Miele v. Miele.  In this case, the parties divorced in 2005.  In their Agreement, the husband's support was based upon anticipated gross income of $165,000 per year.  The reason for this was because he involuntarily changed employment in 2005.   In 2004 he earned more than $331,000.  Because of these circumstances, the parties agreement required them to exchange W-2 and 1099 forms for 2006, 2007 2008.

The husband's post divorce income did not approach even the $165,000 level.  As a result, he made a motion to reduce his alimony in 2007 which was denied.   He filed another motion in 2008 which also was denied.  This time, he appealed. 

The Appellate Division reversed.  The Appellate Court found that the parties agreement recognized that there was an involuntary reduction in income and that the $165,000 number was a projection of future income that did not come to fruition.  Given that the husband had shown two, if not three straight years of income that was substantially below the anticipated gross income, he was entitled to, at the very least, entitled to a hearing. 

This case is instructive because I would anticipate that many current divorces will be faced with a similar situation of someone who lost their job and their new income is speculative.  The parties should attempt to include protections in the agreement that take into account that the income could go back to historical levels, as well as what should happen if it does not.