NJ Family Legal Blog : New Jersey Divorce and Family Lawyer & Attorney : Fox Rothschild Law Firm : Alimony, Child Support, Child Custody, Prenuptial Agreements, Essex, Morris, Mercer, Atlantic

Picture this - two spouses in a matrimonial dispute.  The husband (or former husband) files a motion to reduce his alimony.  In support of that motion, the husband files a certification, under oath, telling his side of the story about how he lost his job, has a disability, or whatever reason it is that has caused his down income.  On the flip side, the wife files her response to the husband's motion, with a certification of her own, telling her side of the story about the husband is still living lavishly, is lying to the court, and is simply doing what he has to do to reduce his payment obligation to her.  Not surprisingly, the two versions of events could not be more diametrically opposed.

In that scene, what is the trial judge supposed to do?  Is he just supposed to take the husband's word for it that he can no longer earn what he did before and that his entire financial picture merits a reduction of his support?  Is he supposed to believe the wife's response, about how her former husband is simply just a bad guy who refuses to pay that to which he agreed or was ordered.

Generally - but, of course - not always, a trial judge is not supposed to resolve the question of credibility, or who is telling the truth, simply by reading the papers submitted by each party.  When there is a dispute of fact, the judge is supposed to then order a hearing, during which time he will take testimony from the parties and then determine who is credible/truthful.  Ordering a hearing, though, does not happen in every case, as almost every case will inevitably involve some dispute of fact, to some degree.  If the judge ordered a hearing in each instance, the family part would be even more flooded than they already are. 

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There has been an alimony reform movement that has been gaining traction throughout the country.  Some of the major concerns appear to be this issue of permanent alimony and the lack of uniformity in alimony awards, both in amount and duration, from case to case.  In the recent past, alimony laws have been reformed in Florida, Massachusetts and Maryland.  Is New Jersey next?

On March 7, 2013, A3909 was introduced in the New Jersey Assembly, which, if passed, would radically change alimony as we know it in New Jersey. 

The following are a highlight of the changes:

• All references to permanent alimony are deleted from the statute, though, as noted below, for marriages of more than 20 years, an indefinite award of alimony can be be granted

• The concept of imputing income to someone that is unemployed or underemployed, which already exists in the case law and child support guidelines, would be codified

 

• The amount of limited duration alimony should not exceed the recipient's need or 30 to 35 percent in the difference between the parties gross incomes at the time of the initial award, though a court would have the discretion to deviate.  Some reasons for deviation would be advanced age, chronic illness, unusual health circumstances, whether the payer is providing or ordered to provide health insurance to the recipient, sources and amounts of unearned income not allocated in equitable distribution, the recipient's inability to become self-supporting based upon the abuse of the payer, and others, including a catch all "any other factors that a court deems relevant and material."

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In a story likely to make men worldwide a bit more insecure about themselves, a Taiwanese woman recently procured a divorce from her husband, in part, because he had a small penis.  Making matters worse was the wife's quote that "His penis is so small, like a kid's, only 5 centimeters long.  We've never had sex in our entire marriage."  

Likely in an effort to keep his parts private, the husband allegedly refused to have sexual intercourse with his wife prior to the marriage, citing religious reasons.  It was only on the parties' wedding night when the wife first discovered the "issue."  Notably, however, the wife also claimed that the husband was impotent and unable to fulfill his responsibility as a husband (in a response that most men could not argue with, the husband simply preferred to fulfill his duty in the morning, and was too tired when she came calling at around midnight).

This case brought to mind the recent matter, also subject to tabloid fodder, where a man was granted a divorce because he claimed his wife was ugly.  His claim was that their child looked nothing like the wife, and it was then that the wife revealed that she had undergone massive plastic surgery to make her more physically attractive.

Are these cases on the far side of bizarre?  Absolutely.  Do they provide the sort of subject matter that the New York Post, Huffington Post and Daily Mail feast on for readers.  Certainly.  How then, can they possibly relate to New Jersey law?  Well, as we have blogged about in the past, New Jersey is a "no fault" state, where people typically obtain a divorce based on irreconcilable differences without getting into such tawdry claims like a man's package size or a wife's looks.  

These types of claims, however, may be a basis for an annulment in New Jersey.  As many readers may know from the ongoing Kardashian/Humphries saga, an annulment nullifies the divorce retroactively, as if it never happened.  New Jersey's annulment law may be based on several claims including bigamy, duress, lack of age (non-age), incapacity, impotence, incest, and fraud.

Without getting into the details of what each of those options means, for the sake of this post and the husband's dignity, we can focus on the claims of impotence and fraud.  Here, aside from the husband's alleged lack of stature, the wife also claimed that the husband was impotent and unable to fulfill his husband-type duties.  The wife added that she did not discover this to be the case until the parties' wedding night.  In New Jersey, she could, as a result, potentially have a claim for an annulment based on the husband's impotence.  Whether such a claim, or that with the so-called "ugly" wife could fall under a claim of fraud is a stretch, but so are the facts of these cases.

While I am not sure what lessons can be learned here, one thing that can be said for sure is that, thankfully, in New Jersey, it is not the size that matters.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group. Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com. 

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We have written before on the topics of the use and misuse of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, and representing a litigant in a domestic violence matter.  Within the past few weeks, a few experiences have brought this topic back to the forefront, and I thought that now was a good time to address the issues, especially in the context of "resolving" such matters.  As a family law attorneys, we frequently encounter domestic violence as a component of our practice.  Whether it happens in the context of an ongoing divorce, entirely independent of a marital relationship, or something different altogether, each case is certainly different from the next, and each case resides on its own motivations, so to speak.  

What I mean by that is, the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act is a vital piece of legislation designed to protect actual victims of domestic violence.  Countless matters come across our desks involving legitimate, truthful victims in need of the law's immediate protection from an abusive defendant.  Some of the most difficult matters involve those where we represent real victims with tragic fears of harm, including those who are immersed in the cycle of violence looking for a way out.  Considering the risk to such a victim if a final restraining order is not granted, the import of the litigation is vital.

On the other hand, many cases - typically in the context of an ongoing divorce matter - involve a litigation-minded spouse simply looking to get the proverbial "leg up" over the other spouse in that separate, but related matter.  Since the law is liberal in its protection of victims, it is often quite easy to procure a temporary restraining order, where the alleged victim can seemingly state whatever allegation he or she deems appropriate so long as it results in procuring a TRO.  There are several well known cases addressing the judiciary's obligation to look out for those litigants who are trying to use the law to his or her advantage, as such an occurrence is unfortunately all too common. 

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Following up on my most recent blog post discussing pressure tactics used by one spouse against the other to force an inequitable settlement, I wanted to focus on the example where one spouse tries to "get around" the lawyers to privately discuss settlement with the other spouse.  In my prior entry, I noted that a financially superior spouse will often take this tack to impose his desired terms of settlement upon the other spouse.  The day after the Court enters a Judgment of Divorce ending the marriage, the financially inferior spouse wakes up and regrets the deal she just made.

While I am not generally against the notion of spouses talking to each other in an effort to resolve their matter, the involvement of lawyers is key for conveying notions of what is fair or unfair.  Here are a few questions that come to mind:

1.  How do you know whether the alimony and child support are fair?

2.  How do you know whether the equitable distribution is fair?

3.  How do you know what is an appropriate custody and parenting time arrangement?

4.  How do you know what you are entitled to under the law as a spouse, parent and litigant?

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How many prenuptial agreements have language in them that the parties are entering into the agreement free from duress, coercion, undue influence, etc?  The answer is all of them.  Some even ask people to waive fraud - how you can do that I don't know because if you knew you were being defrauded, you probably wouldn't enter into the agreement.  How many times is the agreement presented at the last minute, after the bride to be's parents are out tens of thousands of dollars for the wedding?  How many times does the person presenting the agreement say "Don't worry about it, it doesn't mean anything", "don't worry about it, I'll give you more" or "don't worry about it, I'll rip it up in 5 years or after we have kids, etc?" 

This probably happens all to often or at least, more often then we want to believe.  In most cases, since you have said you have entered into the agreement free from duress, etc., you will have a hard time getting out of the agreement at the time of divorce.

But alas, comes the Petraikis case out of New York discussed in yesterday's New York Post.  In this case, Elizabeth argued that Peter coerced her signature, threatening to call off the wedding even though her father had already paid $40,000 for the reception.  She also claimed that he told her that he would rip up the agreement as soon as they had children.  The trial court set aside the prenup on the basis that Peter fraudulently induced Elizabeth to sign it.  The Appellate Court upheld this decision.

In New York, prenups are usually particularly hard to overturn so many deem this to be a landmark decision.  The take away here is that despite the recitations in the agreement, the door is open to try to prove contrary behavior and/or that there were additional promises outside of the agreement.  One wonders whether a video taped signing with the usual questions that the agreement was voluntarily being entered into would have saved the agreement.  That said, for the proponent of the agreement, you need to be really careful about what you say to induce the other side to sign an agreement and what pressure is put on to get an agreement signed.

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

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We have done dozens of posts on this blog about alimony over the last 5 years.  Recent experiences have convinced me that it is time to get basics. Despite all of the cases that say that you can't use a formula (the rule of thumb we have discussed previously on this blog), more and more, people are espousing a blind adherence to the rule of thumb.  In one recent case with income of a few hundred thousand, an adversary told me that it was the maximum amount of alimony that I can get, despite the fact that it came no where close to meeting my client's already pared down budget.  In another case, where the income was a few million, one side was arguing that the rule of thumb was a minimum, as if there should be no consideration of any other factors.

Despite the calls for alimony reform and formulas, as we have said many times, courts deciding cases cannot use rules of thumb.  Even when they do, they can't tell you that they did.  Rather, they have to review the alimony factors set forth in the statute - remember them?  Here, they are again, from N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b):

(1) The actual need and ability of the parties to pay;

(2) The duration of the marriage or civil union;

(3) The age, physical and emotional health of the parties;

(4) The standard of living established in the marriage or civil union and the likelihood that each party can maintain a reasonably comparable standard of living;

(5) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties;

(6) The length of absence from the job market of the party seeking maintenance;

(7) The parental responsibilities for the children;

(8) The time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, the availability of the training and employment, and the opportunity for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;

(9) The history of the financial or non-financial contributions to the marriage or civil union by each party including contributions to the care and education of the children and interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities;

(10) The equitable distribution of property ordered and any payouts on equitable distribution, directly or indirectly, out of current income, to the extent this consideration is reasonable, just and fair;

(11) The income available to either party through investment of any assets held by that party;

(12) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of any alimony award, including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a non-taxable payment; and

(13) Any other factors which the court may deem relevant.

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Early in case where children are involved, we discuss the different types of custody.  There is residential custody - i.e. who the children live with and the resulting parenting time for the other parent. Then there is legal custody which is decision making regarding issues of the health, education, religion and general welfare of the kids.  in 99% of the cases, the parties will share joint legal custody - it is usually a no brainer.  in fact, In the New Jersey Supreme Court’s seminal decision of Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 497-501 (1981), the Court stated as follows with regard to whether joint custody should be awarded:

At a minimum both parents must be ‘fit’ that is, physically and psychologically capable of fulfilling the role of parent.

That said, the minimum requirement of joint legal custody is the ability to communicate and cooperate on some basic level as it relates to the best interests of the children.  The Court in Beck further noted:

The judge must look for the parents’ ability to cooperate and if the potential exists, encourage its activation by instructing the parents on what is expected of them. . . [W]hen the actions of [an uncooperative] parent deprive the child of the kind of relationship with the other parent that is deemed to be in the child’s best interests, removing the child from the custody of the uncooperative parent may well be appropriate as a remedy of last resort.

Again, in Beck, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has written:

The most troublesome aspect of a joint custody decree is the additional requirement that the parents exhibit the potential for cooperation in matters of child rearing. This feature does not translate into a requirement that the parents have an amicable relationship. Although such a positive relationship is preferable, a successful joint custody arrangement requires only that the parents be able to exclude their personal conflicts from their roles as parents and that the children be spared whatever resentments and rancor the parents may harbor. Beck v. Beck, 480, 498 (1981).

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I sit here stewing on this overcast Friday because the other side reneged on the settlement in two matters, after we believed we were all but resolved in both.  Whether or not these were enforceable settlements is a topic for another blog.  That said, one is particularly frustrating because the other side essentially undid a package proposed by them a few mediation sessions ago which been discussed at a few mediation sessions, only to come back with a new proposal that was accepted by my client. 

The problem is that no one ever just says "my client changed his/her mind."  This would be a fine answer especially in situations where we have laid the ground rule that there is no deal until it is signed of by everyone.  Rather than truth, we get hit with lame, absurd, and/or intellectually dishonest explanations as to why there never was a deal in the first place, and/or why the back tracking (a nice way to say bad faith negotiations) was justified.

What are some of the "dog ate my homework" excuses we have heard.

• My client didn't really understand (Were you, the attorney not there?)"
• the mediation session was chaotic and ended abruptly (note - no denial that there was a deal)
• my client didn't believe that any agreements were reached that date (of course, the lawyer isn't saying that there were no agreements reached)
• "Oh, is that what we agreed to"
• My client never agreed to that
• We may be close on the big stuff (how is that when we accepted your offer on the "big stuff")
• My client was very emotional
• My client was hungry
• My client didn't take their medication or took too much medication

I am sure that my colleagues could add dozens more.  That said, if a non-binding settlement is reached, wouldn't it be just better to tell the truth - i.e. my client changed her mind - then create anger and bad feelings spewing nonsense to cover for the acceptable truth?  I'm just sayin ...

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com. 

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On the heels of our New Years Resolution Divorce post, I thought it made sense to also resurrect our prior posts on preparing for the divorce process and how to select a divorce attorney. 

Previously, Sandra Fava, a contributor to this blog, did a piece on preparing for the initial divorce consultation with a lawyer. We also previously posted South Carolina matrimonial attorney, Mellisa Brown's article entitled "How to Find the Right Divorce Attorney for You."

The process, however, starts even before that. On our web site, we have an advice piece entitled Preparing for the Divorce Process.

Since it is linked to this post, I will not repeat everything contained in the piece. However, the topics contained in that piece are as follows:

• Speak to an attorney now, not later
• Selecting the right attorney (including how to get referrals for an attorney)
• Gathering documentation
• Preparing for the initial meeting
• Telling the truth
• Keeping a diary; and
• Trusting your attorney for legal advice (as opposed to friends, family members, co-workers, etc.)

Do I stay or do I go? This is not an easy question to answer. However, if you are even
contemplating a divorce, divorce planning (and not in the nefarious way that often goes with this phrase) is essential, especially in difficult economic times. Divorce can be a long, highly charged, expensive process - emotionally and economically. Being prepared and keeping
perspective, at least as much as humanly possible, can help you save time and legal fees
while protecting your and your children's interests.

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

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Back in 2009, we blogged about the possible inclusion of Parental Alienation Syndrome in the long awaited next version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). 

In that post, I discussed a US News and World Report article that addressed a movement afoot to add "parental alienation" to the next addition of the DSM (ie. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) published by the American Psychiatric Association.

However, as expected for some time, the American Psychiatric Association board of trustees has recently approved the DSM 5 which has will be released in May 2013 and it has been confirmed that Parental Alienation Syndrome will not be included in the DSM V.

I am sure that this is both a defeat to some and a happy time for others. As I noted back then, while there appears to be little debate on whether parental alienation in both subtle and not so subtle forms goes on, there is a debate as to whether it represents a mental illness. On top of that, there is concern that certain opposition to visiting with a parent could either be age appropriate (eg. a teenager being oppositional) or otherwise justified.

No matter where you stand on the debate as to whether parental alienation is a mental illness, it is clear that alienating behavior in whatever form, big or small, cannot be good for the children that are exposed to it.  That said, because it will not be in the DSM, the debate over the issue shall rage on.  Moreover, without a diagnostic code, it will be difficult to get insurance companies, where coverage for mental health issues is often challenging, to pay for treatment related to parental alienation.
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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

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When settling a case, the parties and their lawyers can be far more creative in settlement then a judge can be if the case is tried.  While family judges have wide discretion in their decision making, creativity is crafting the most beneficial result for both parties is rarely something they can do.  In fact, in many ways, they are constrained from the type of creativity that we see every day in divorce agreements. 

What if you are a high earner, but your income fluctuates greatly from year to year?  While a judge will likely have no choice but to determine your average income over 3 to 5 years and base support upon that as well as the rest of the statutory factors, you may want to agree on some kind of formula so that there is fairness year over year, i.e. you pay more in a better year and less in a down year. For example, if your average income is $2,500,000 but your income fluctuates between $1 million and $4 million per year.  You would really hate paying alimony in those years you only make $1 million.  If a judge decided this case using averages, you might be forced to pay your entire net income, or more, to you ex spouse in the down year.  Similarly, a judge could never say that support "automatically" is reduced or even reviewed if your income is less than $X in the future. 

This concept was reiterated again by the Appellate Division on October 29, 2012 in an unreported  (non-precedential) decision in the case of Means v. Snipes.  In this case, after a trial, the judge decided that in the event that defendant's annual income fell below $2 million, he would receive a reduction in alimony. This is the one thing that both parties agreed was in error - a rare agreement in a very contentious case.

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Is prenuptial agreement reform coming to New Jersey? It appears to be the case.

Prenuptial Agreements are meant to fix parties rights and responsibilities in advance, so as to avoid litigation and aggravation in the future.  In fact, right up front in many if not most prenuptial agreements there is a "Statement of Intention" as follows:

It is the intention of the parties in entering into this Agreement that in the event of the termination of the marriage by divorce or death, certain rights shall be fixed in advance. It is their intention to avoid litigation and intrusion into their professional and personal lives and the lives of their families and business associates, which would perhaps otherwise occur if this Agreement had not been entered into.

Unfortunately, unlike in many other states, where prenuptial agreements are ironclad as long as there was full disclosure and the other procedural requirements are met, that has not been the case in New Jersey.  The major reason for this is that in New Jersey, aside from setting aside a prenup due to failure to follow the procedural requirements, including full disclosure, agreements can be set aside if they are deemed to be unconscionable, not only when they are entered into, but when they are to be enforced at the time of the divorce.  As a result, I have heard judges say that they have never enforced a prenuptial agreement.  I have heard other judges give the rationale that because you don't know what is going to happen in the future, it is unfair to enforce the agreement against a spouse where she/he waives alimony or the equitable distribution rights.  That rationale misses the point as that is the entire reason for a prenuptial agreement.

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It seems to make sense that when parties who are business together get divorced, one party has to go.  The theory of "this town isn't big enough for the both of us" comes to mind.  In fact, as far back as 1978, the courts of New Jersey recognized this seemingly common sense fact in a case called Borodinsky.  In that case, the Court held:

It seems almost doctrinal that the elimination of the source of strife and friction is to be sought by the judge in devising the scheme of distribution, and the financial affairs of the parties should be separated as far as possible. If the parties cannot get along as husband and wife, it is not likely they will get along as business partners ...

There is no restriction on the court with regard to ordering distribution in kind of the eligible assets or awarding a monetary equivalent thereof. But, nonetheless, the judge should consider the former relationship of the parties and the fact that post-divorce peace is more conducive to the welfare of the parties.

But what if you agree to stay in business with your former spouse after the divorce?  What happens when things go bad?  Can you simply force a dissolution or buy out?

This was the issue in the case of Moriello v. Moriello, an unreported (non-precedential) case decided by the Appellate Division on July 17, 2012.

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While it doesn't happen in every case, from time to time there is a request made by a client or opposing counsel to tape the meeting between the opposing expert.  This happens more frequently in contested custody cases, but it could happen as to any expert, I suppose.  The general rule seemingly had been that these sessions can be taped (with notice - not surreptitiously).  Why do people want to do this?  Some people are not trusting.  Others want to make sure that they are not misquoted in an experts report.  Some even do this if an expert is known to ask leading types of questions suggesting a response that may then be used against the party being interviewed.

A question recently arose as to whether the experts can be compelled to tape all interviews, not only of the one party, but of the children too.  In a reported (precedential) trial court opinion in the case of Koch v. Koch which was decided last year but approved for publication last week, the judge refused to allow all interviews to be taped.  Specifically, the court concluded that concludes that a party has the right to record his or her own interviews with a psychologist or psychiatrist, but does not have the right to compel the other party’s expert to record interviews of the other party or the parties’ children.

As to the general rule noted above, the judge here was not so sure and the opinion included a threshold discussion as to whether expert interviews in a custody case could be taped since the case that lawyers generally relied on involved the taping of a session with a psychologist in a civil litigation.  Notwithstanding the conclusion, the judge noted:

Accordingly, a custody evaluation is an expert report where the court expects, and is
assisted by, the independent professional judgment of a licensed mental health expert.  Requiring recordings could undermine the very purpose of the evaluation. If the children know that they are being recorded, and know that their parents are in a custody dispute, the children might be less candid for fear that their parents will hear what they say to the evaluator. Such recordings effectively bring the parents into the children’s interviews and could distort the information needed to prepare an accurate and balanced evaluation.

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Having just experienced several months of "interesting", to say the least, negotiations on several matters, it got me thinking about creating a list of things to do if you really don't want to settle your case.  Hey, every body is entitled to their day in court if they want it. So what if there is nothing that can be gained from it.  So what if you can't win.  So what if forcing the matter to trial will create other legal issues.  So what if trial will cost tens of thousand of dollars.  Here is the list:

10.  Ignore your expert's advice.  What do they really know about the value of your business or how a judge will likely assess your total income/cash flow?  What does an accountant know about taxes, or more importantly, how the IRS may address the creative accounting practices that you or your business have employed?  What does the custody expert really know? 

9.  Ignore your lawyer's advice.  What do they know anyway?  If your lawyer is telling you that you should jump at the deal on the table because it looks like a huge win, disregard it.  If they tell you that you have real exposure on certain issues or may be forced to pay your spouses legal fees, roll the dice. If your attorney tells you that they are willing to try your case, but that you should consider settlement because the cost of the settlement will be less than the cost of the trial plus the absolute minimum you have to pay, don't believe it.  And what does your lawyer know about the law or the judge anyway?

8.  Ignore the facts of your case.  Trust your ability to spin the facts in a way that doesn't make sense.  Plus, how can they prove if you're lying.

7.   Ignore what the neutrals are saying.  What do the Early Settlement Panelists know?  What does the mediator know?  When the judge has a settlement conference and gives directions, what does she/he know?  Assume that the people that have no "horse in the race" are aligned with your spouse or their attorney, have been bought off, or are just plain ignorant.  Really, it has nothing to do with the facts of your case or the reasonableness of your position.

6.  Ignore the law.  It doesn't apply to you anyway.

5.  Continue to misrepresent things, even when the other side has documents to disprove virtually everything you are saying.  Assume that you will be deemed more credible than the documents.

4.   Believe that the imbalance of power that existed during the marriage will allow you to bully your spouse into an unfair settlement.  Assume that your spouse's attorney wont try protect her/him.  All lawyers roll over on their clients, right?

3.   Take the position that you would rather pay your lawyer than your spouse. Ignore that fact that this tactic usually ends with your doing both, and maybe your spouse's lawyer too.

2.  Pretend as if your spouse never spent a second with the kids in the past and has no right to do so in the future.  Make false allegations of neglect or abuse.  Ignore the social science research that says that it is typically in the children's best interests to spend as much time as possible with each parent.  What do the experts know about your kids anyway?  And while you are at it, bad mouth your spouse to or in front of the kids. Better yet, alienate them.  Then fight attempts to fix the relationship.

1.   Take totally unreasonable positions implementing any or all of above and on top of that, negotiate backwards.  Ignore the maxim "Pigs get fat, hogs get slaughtered."  Put deals on the table and then reduce what you are offering.  Negotiate in bad faith.  Negotiate backwards.  Don't worry that this conduct may set your case back.

The above is clearly facetious and tongue in cheek. I do not recommend this behavior.  It is usually self destructive and short sighted.  But, believe it or not, these things happen all of the time.  While I am not saying that no case should ever be tried, because sometimes trials are necessary, if you want to ensure a costly trial that may not go well for you, try the things on this list.  And if it is your day in court that you want, be careful you wish for.

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

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We have all seen and heard those familiar words in the title of this entry in moves or on TV.  This is part of the "Miranda" warning administered by a police officer when they are arresting someone.  Do these words also have a place in divorce court?  Not in the same way, but in reality they do.

Other than settlement communications, attorney/client and other privileged communications, everything else is just about fair game.  That is why Facebook, emails and texts have become such a treasure trove in divorce cases as people freely put things in writing that they might not otherwise say, and perhaps even broadcast it to the world.

But what about what you say in another court in another case?  Can that be used against you?  Sure can.  The concept is called judicial estoppel, and it was on display again yesterday in the unreported (non-precedential) decision from the Appellate Division in Romano v. Romano.

Without getting in to all of the details of this case, the relevant details relating to judicial estoppel are as follows,  On the wife's name was on the deed of the marital home, a finding made by a judge during a domestic violence trial, despite the husband claiming he was on the deed.  Thereafter, the husband filed for bankruptcy relief.  In that filing, he answered "none" on the part of petition asking if he had a legal or equitable interest in any real property.  In the later divorce case, he listed the aforementioned home as a marital home subject to equitable distribution. 

The trial judge awarded the home to the wife based on the husband's representation to the bankruptcy court that he had no interest in the property.

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Melissa Brown, an attorney in Charleston, South Carolina, is a fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and one of the preeminent family lawyers in South Carolina.  I had the occasion, last week, to read her excellent article on her blog entitled "Jurists & Lawyers Ignorant of Social Media Can Unintentionally Harm Litigant's and Clients."  I thought that the article was so good that I asked Melissa if I could re-post it as a guest blog on this blog, and she graciously agreed.  Her article is as follows: 

In a lengthy opinion following a discovery motion in a personal injury case, Judge Richard Walsh of Franklin County, Pennsylvania ordered Plaintiff to disclose her login information for her Facebook account. Defense counsel had argued that Plaintiff had previously posted photographs and comments about her going to the gym and enjoying activities that she had previously testified under oath that she could no longer do as a result of the accident.

Apparently, at some point in the past, Plaintiff’s Facebook profile was “public” and accessible by defense counsel. On that basis, the judge granted defense counsel unfettered access to Plaintiff’s Facebook account. The judge wrote in a footnote, “The Court does not hold that discovery of a party’s social networking information is available as a matter of course. Rather, there must be a good faith basis that discovery will lead to relevant information. Here, that has occurred because Jennifer Largent’s profile was formerly public. In other cases, it might be advisable to submit interrogatories and requests for production of documents to find out if any relevant information exists on a person’s online social networking profiles.” However, despite the footnote commentary, Judge Walsh ruled that Plaintiff has to give over her username and password for her Facebook account thereby granting defense counsel access to Plaintiff’s messages and chats that are never “public” or accessible except to the individual to whom such messages are sent. In addition, by allowing unfettered access to Plaintiff’s account, Judge Walsh’s ignored his own observations that defense counsel was only entitled to information that could lead to discoverable evidence. One has to wonder if Judge Walsh understood the overly broad nature of his order and if Plaintiff’s attorney tried to protect his client by arguing that such ruling was overly broad and intrusive.

This author only has access to the court’s order and knows nothing else about this case. However, it seems clear that Judge Walsh is unfamiliar with the multiple functionalities of Facebook. One wonders if he knew he was granting access to chat logs and private messages in addition to “publicly” posted information. One also wonders if Plaintiff’s own attorney possessed enough information about the various components of Facebook to object to the Court’s ruling as overly broad or to offer less intrusive remedies to permit access to properly discoverable information while still protecting his client’s private (and irrelevant) information.
 

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In August 2011, I posted an article on this blog entitled "Appellate Court Rejects 'Rule of Thumb' Formula to Calculate Alimony - Sort Of."  In that article, I noted that there was a dirty little secret used by judges and lawyers in New Jersey to come up with a "ball park" as to what alimony should be. This "rule of thumb" does not take into account all of the statutory factors. Rather, the formula simply subtracts the lower income (real or imputed) from the and multiplies the difference by a percentage. I have been told that that percentage is 30% or one-third in the northern part of the state and 25% in the southern part.

More importantly, I noted that judges really cannot use this formula and must make findings considering the law and all of the statutory factors.  This post was as a result of a case where the judge seemingly used the formula to determine alimony.  The Appellate Division remanded the matter to the trial court to determine alimony using the alimony factors.

So much to my surprise, a new case came out yesterday emanating from a legal malpractice case filed by a litigant against her divorce attorney.  Lo and behold, the Appellate Division notes that using this "rule of thumb is an appropriate way to calculate alimony. 

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A little more than a year ago, we blogged on the reported Appellate Division Case, Tannen v. Tannen, which addressed the issue of trusts in the context of family law cases.  Relatedly, we blogged on the impact of income from a discretionary trust and whether it reduced a party's need.

In Tannen, the trial court, relying on the newest version of the Restatement of Trusts, required the trustee of a discretionary trust to make distributions to the beneficiary of the trust. Though the trust assets earned significant income, there was no requirement in the trust document for the distribution of the income to the beneficiary. 

The Appellate Division reversed, holding that by applying existing law, which has incorporated various provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, Wendy’s beneficial interest in the Wendy Tannen Trust was not an “asset held by” her for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(11) of the alimony statute. As  such, the panel determined that no income from the Wendy Tannen Trust should have been imputed to Wendy in determining Mark’s alimony obligation. Addressing the trial court's reliance on the newest Restatement, the Appellate Division noted:

[a]s a court of intermediate appellate jurisdiction, we do not presume to adopt the Restatement . . . as the law of this state and apply its provisions to the facts of this case. Given the significance of its principles in the context of [the New Jersey statute dealing with the power of a court to impute income to a party in a divorce action), such determination would be more appropriately made by our Supreme Court.

As a result, as practitioners, we all awaited the Supreme Court's decision on this expecting that they would tell us one way or the other whether trial court's rationale would become the law of this state.  Doing so might have weakened the sanctity of trusts, but might have been consistent with the jurisprudence of this State that is typically deferential to and supportive of the support recipient for public policy reasons. 

The Supreme Court decided - drum roll please - :The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed,
substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Messano’s opinion of the Appellate Division reported at 416 N.J. Super.248 (2010)."  This one sentence opinion is an anticlimactic end to what could have been a very interesting discussion of an important legal issue.  Because Judge Messano deferred to the Supreme Court on a policy issue, as a student of the law, it would have been interesting to hear our high court explain their rationale given the limitations that the Appellate Division expressed in their opinion.

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501 or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.



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A few weeks ago, I posted a piece on this blog about the business valuation concept known as reasonable or replacement compensation.  After that post, I received an email from a well known business valuation expert, Sam Rosenfarb of Rosenfarb LLC, with an attachment containing an article that he wrote regarding the issue of the change of value of a business after the date of Complaint for Divorce.  That article along with the ever growing backlog in the family courts created by the budget crisis and other factors got me thinking more about this topic. In some counties, it may be more than three years to get a trial date at this time.

Why is this important?  In New Jersey, passive assets (e.g. real estate, bank accounts) are typically valued as of the date of distribution.  On the other hand, active assets, such as a business, where the value could be tied to the efforts of the business owner, are typically valued as of the date of the divorce Complaint.  As such, in your typical case, the increase or decrease in value post-complaint is not considered though there is an ability to raise the issue in extreme circumstances.

This issue was relevant in a case that both Sam and my prior firms were involved in where it took nearly a decade for the case to get to trial and where the business increased in value substantially over that time.  That case started before New Jersey implemented "Best Practices" wherein, systemically, the goal was to get all cases resolved in a year.  Even cases that were more complicated and which had business valuation issues, could usually get a trial date within 18 months.  As such, the days of the 4 year, 5 year or longer case, where changes in value would likely occur, became less the norm as they had been before "Best Practices."

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Trials in divorce matters are kind of like the Loch Ness monster - lots of people of heard of it, but few have actually seen it.  The system is currently set up such that there are many vehicles to get people to a settlement.  Moreover, most cases should be settled.  In fact, as I have blogged in the past, the cases that often get tried are ones where one, if not both parties, are totally unreasonable and unrealistic. As noted in prior blogs,there are, however, bona fide cases that cannot be settled and must be tried.

Many judges have a pre-trial Order or letter citing requirements of things that must be done before trial.  One of the things often on the list is that counsel are supposed to confer to to see if the can reach any stipulations as to facts, and sometimes legal issues.  Court's have noted that "stipulations serve as a tool that enables parties to avoid the expense, trouble, and delay of adducing proofs on facts that, absent a stipulation, are contestable."  Though I have one colleague that refuses to enter in to stipulations because he feels that it throws off the flow or leaves holes in his presentation, generally, stipulations are a good thing because it cuts down on what is already limited trial time. 

Courts often also require parties to confer about joint exhibits for the same reason.  Once the parties agree, the exhibits are marked and should go into evidence without the need for authentication of other testimony.  Examples of things that are commonly joint exhibits are tax returns, bank records, prior court orders and transcripts, credit card records, and the like. 

The question then is, does a trial court have to accept the stipulation, and if they don't, what is supposed to happen.
 

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Yesterday, I blogged about the constitutional protections given to parents when in a custody dispute with a grandparent, including whether a psychological parent receives the same protections that a biological parent receives in such disputes (the answer is no - but you knew that because you read yesterday's post.)

A related topic is what is the standard to apply when a biological parent is in a custody dispute with a third party.  On the same day that the Appellate Division decided the case I blogged about yesterday, they also decided the case of Schwear v. Prigge and Schwear though that case is unreported (non-precedential). This case involved a custody dispute between a natural mother and her child's paternal uncle.  I will spare you the tortured history of the case and focus on what the law is. 

Custody disputes between a natural parent and a third party are governed by Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235 (2000).  As the Court in Schwear noted:

In such a dispute, there is a presumption in favor of the natural parent which arises from a parent's "fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution" and is "rooted in the right to privacy." ... The parent's right to custody is not absolute, however.The presumption in favor of the parent will be overcome by "a showing of gross misconduct, unfitness, neglect, or 'exceptional circumstances' affecting the welfare of the child[.]" 

When a third party seeks custody, the court must engage in a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine whether the presumption in favor of the legal parent is overcome by either a showing of "unfitness" or "exceptional circumstances."
If either is satisfied, the court must then decide whether awarding custody to the third party would promote the best interests of the child. (Citations omitted).

The rights of a parent have constitutional implications.  As such, whenever they might be abridged, there is a heightened scrutiny that much be applied.

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

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Last week, Larry Cutler posted a piece on this blog entitled "Are Mediation Proceedings Really Sacred and Secret?"  The inspiration for this post was a recent published Appellate Division case Willingboro Mall, Ltd. V. 240/242 Franklin Avenue, L.L.C.., a case in which a mediator actually filed a certification and testified.  That, however, is the exception but not the rule. 

Often enough, parties go through mediation and believe that they have reached agreement.  It happens in divorce cases, and as evidenced in Willingboro Mall, it happens in other litigations.  Can the mediator testify that (1) there was a settlement and (2) what the terms are?  R. 1:40-4(c) includes a  restriction that "[no] mediator may participate in any subsequent hearing of the mediated matter or appear as a witness . . . for any person in the same or related matter.." The reported case of Lehr v. Afflito reiterates that the involvement of the mediator is improper absent a valid waiver by both parties.

Should this be the case, however?  If the ultimate issue as to whether or not a matter was settled is in dispute, who better than the mediator to answer that limited question?  If the parties agree ta ht the matter was settled but disagree on what the terms were, who better to answer that question too?  Parenthetically, if you go on the New Jersey Judiciary Web Site, there is a form for use by a mediator which is to be submitted to the Court after mediation called the Mediation Case Information Form.  The form requires the mediator to advise the matter is fully settled, partially settled or not settled.  Seemingly, this form would not be evidential under Lehr.

Since the Court places such high importance on the settlement of a matter on a public policy basis, would requiring mediators to report these things, if there was a dispute, really up end the confidentiality of the process.  Doesn't settlement signal the end of the process? Interestingly, in Willingboro Mall, Judge Fall (a former Family Part Judge), noted the following in response to the plaintiff's position that for a matter to be settled during mediation, there must be a contemporaneous writing on the spot:

Plaintiff's position also ignores the reason for referring a matter to mediation. The process is utilized to afford the parties an opportunity to present their position before an experienced professional with the goal of resolving some or all of the differences between the parties. See State v. Williams, 184 N.J. 432, 441 (2005). In contrast to arbitration, the mediation process is non-binding only in the sense that the process is not designed or intended to impose a result on any party. Indeed, such a result is the antithesis of the mediation process. Mediation is also not intended or designed as a meaningless and impotent detour on the way to judgment. The very purpose of the process is to resolve the dispute. (Emphasis added).

People can always make one of the ground rules of mediation or a settlement conference that there is no settlement until it is reduced to a writing signed by all parties.  That said, if they don't do that and then settle at mediation, should a party be allowed to renege, or even claim that there was no deal without the one person, without a vested interest in the litigation, telling the Court about the settlement?  As ADR is becoming more prevalent, my guess is that we have not seen the last of this issue.

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

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In cases where a party owns a business, as justification for a disproportionate split of the business in equitable distribution, we often hear that the titled spouse has to be rewarded for their effort, ingenuity, ideas, etc. related to the business.  While arguably those things could be part of the analysis of the statutory factors, there really is not any law suggesting that this must be so.  In fact, the real justification that I can really get my arms around as to why a business would be disproportionately distributed is the fact that it is often pregnant with capital gains.  While the law is pretty clear that we cannot reduce the value because of hypothetical tax consequences, we can certainly look to same in the percentage distribution.  This makes sense because the failure to do so may actually give the non-titled spouse a greater percentage if taxes are ignored.

That said, I have heard this "sweat equity" argument over the years but have rarely seen a case where it was articulated.  That is until today when the Appellate Division released the unreported (non-precedential) opinion in Falkowski v. Falkowski.

In this case, the husband renovated two homes., purportedly without the assistance of the wife. The first was a premarital home which he renovated during the marriage.  The second, renovated after the parties' child was born and she left the workforce, was purportedly done on his days off (he worked full time as well.)  For the first house, the husband's "sweat equity" garnered him an additional 5% of the equity in the asset.  For the second home, the husband received 65% and the wife 35%.  In so ruling, the judge said:

[Husband] worked for five years to build that house into what it is, I gather, today. The testimony was pretty clear. Aside from the fact that [wife] had no say in it, and [husband] did all this with his friends, over five years he gutted everything to the frame. And he replaced everything. And he was fairly passionate when he testified about it too, all the work he did.

. . . . [I]t was a monumental amount of work. I was impressed with the fact that he
basically took the house down to its bare frame and bare rafters and built the entire
thing over. For those reasons I am not splitting this asset equally either. I
believe it's fairer to recognize that sweat equity and give him 65% of the net value and give [wife] 35% of the net value.

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The New Jersey Judiciary website provides each days published and unpublished Appellate Division decisions.  If you read this blog with any frequency, you know that we often write about the decisions that are released.  Today there were three decisions from post-judgment divorce cases.  We will likely blog in more detail about some or all of them in the future.  What is interesting is that despite the fact that historically, appeals succeed only approximately 20% of the time, there were reversals in all three cases. 

In one, alimony was modified and permanent alimony was awarded without the court holding a plenary hearing (i.e. trial) on the contested issues. 

In another, the trial judge modified child support, multiplying the old child support amount  by the percentage increase in the plaintiff's income.  The Appellate Division held that a simple mathematical calculation does not comply with the mandates of the statute and case law.  They further held that while the percentage increase is an important factor in determining the support obligation, it is not exclusive and does not relieve the trial judge of performing the required analysis
prescribed by the statute and case law.

In the third, there were conflicting certifications regarding a husband's application to reduce support and the wife's cross application for enforcement.  Not only was there no plenary hearing ordered despite conflicting certifications, there was not even oral argument on the motion allowed despite both parties requests for same.

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I have to admit it.  I have not always been a fan of the 4-way conference.  Often, they have been the bastion of bad behavior, posturing and often just not as productive as mediation with attorneys present or negotiations back and forth, in writing, between counsel.  That said, I am beginning to come around to seeing the usefulness of earlier meetings and earlier mediations, where appropriate, to try to resolve as much as possible, as early as possible.  In fact, I was recently reminded of the importance of the willingness to meet when an opposing counsel was fired, seemingly because that attorney refused to meet or even pick up a phone to discuss issues.

The meetings do not have to be simply for settlement.  More often than not, couples continue to reside in the same household while the divorce case is pending.  Often in these cases, at best, people are on edge and at worst, it is the War of the Roses.  In these situations, an early meeting can be helpful to address conduct and civility within the home and perhaps interim exclusive parenting time between each party and the child(ren).  The alternative could be a domestic violence situation (real or bogus) which could possibly have been avoided.  Temporary support issues can be discussed.  The use, sale and/or restraints on assets can be addressed.  A source of funds for payment of counsel or expert fees can be discussed.  There really is no limit to what can be addressed.

Since custody and parenting time are issues that the courts want to have resolved sooner than later, because custody evaluations take a long time and are expensive, an early meeting can root out whether there are bona fide issues, or whether a settlement on these issues can be reached. 

Other times, these meetings are a good opportunity to allow one or both party with something "on their chest" to have the cathartic experience of getting something off their chest.  In some cases, this allows the issues in the case to be addressed now that this is behind the parties.

In other cases, the entire case can be settled or at least a framework for settlement can be reached, subject to the exchange of certain documents so that each side can be comfortable that they know everything that there is to know.  Even if you cannot settle, you get to learn about the other side's positions, issues, perhaps evidence, etc. 

While we are used to and adept at litigation and while some cases require some (if not a lot of litigation), this is not the case in every divorce.  Even in high conflict matters, meetings and opening a real dialog can help to keep the lid on things so that the attention can be turned to the real issues.  Figuring when to meet is the trick.  Refusing to meet, at all, is usually a mistake.  Usually something good can come of it.

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This post was written by Melissa M. Ruvolo, a new Family Law associate, in our Roseland office, and soon to be an official contributior to this blog.

Our blog frequently features discussions regarding what constitutes domestic violence to warrant the issuance of a Final Restraining Order (FRO). Perhaps the most frequently alleged “predicate act of domestic violence” is harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. What may constitute “harassment” was recently raised in the unpublished Appellate Division decision of A.B. v. L.S.M. decided on May 6, 2011.

The parties were unmarried but had been living together for almost four years. They had two daughters – a 3-year old and a 22-month old. During an argument, the defendant called the plaintiff a “b-tch” and the plaintiff admitted she may also have cursed and yelled at him. The defendant attempted to leave the home but while doing so, got a flat tire. When he tried to fix it with a car jack, the plaintiff twice tried to remove the jack from under the car and the defendant pushed her shoulders each time. She threw the daughter’s sippy cup at his face and broke his nose. Both parties applied for temporary restraining orders, which were dismissed. The defendant eventually moved out of the home and parenting time was ordered by the Court.

Two months later, the defendant went to the plaintiff’s home and knocked on her bathroom window, pleading to speak with her. The plaintiff refused. On the way home from plaintiff’s house, the defendant sent her an apologetic text message stating that he had no idea how much he had hurt her and would leave her alone.

Several days later, when the defendant went to the plaintiff’s home to pick up the children for parenting time, he asked to speak with her. He told her he “really missed her” and wanted to “hug and kiss her.” She responded that she didn’t want to talk to him or “have him touch her.” Later that evening, the defendant sent a text message to the plaintiff claiming the children forgot a teddy bear and blanket. She offered to bring them to his home and he agreed. When the plaintiff arrived at the defendant’s front door, he told her the children were already asleep, leading her to believe that the entire incident was a ploy to get her there. According to the plaintiff, the defendant grabbed her to prevent her from leaving and she told him not to touch her. The plaintiff’s friend, who was waiting in the car, witnessed the defendant give the plaintiff an unwanted “bear hug.”

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The usual result after a domestic violence trial where the parties had been living together at the time of the entry of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) is that a Final Restraining Order (FRO) will be entered and the defendant kept out of the home, or the TRO will be dismissed and the defendant would be free to move in.  What usually does not happen, and in the majority of cases cannot happen, is that the trial judge dismissed the TRO but Orders the defendant out of the home anyway.  However, that is exactly what the trial judge did in the case of C.R. v. A.R., an unreported (non-precedential) Appellate Division opinion released on May 5, 2011. The Appellate Division disagreed that this was proper in this case and reversed.

After the trial, the trial judge dismissed the domestic violence complaint, finding that the evidence did not
demonstrate the occurrence of any acts of domestic violence. However immediately upon explaining why the complaint should be dismissed, the trial judge stated the following:

Now, I am somewhat troubled by what [Abby] indicated on the stand. And I think she, in a way, was conveying a message for all the children, and whether she felt, since she's the oldest and the adult, that she should be the spokesperson for all the girls. But it's clear that they don't want the parents living together.

And I —— I tend to agree with them. I don't think it would be in the parents' best interest to be living in the house together, in light of what's been going on.  So, since I do have the matrimonial act case in front of me, I am going to enter civil restraints. And the bottom line is I am going to prohibit [Alan] from resuming to reside in the house. And that's on a temporary basis and without prejudice, but I think it would be in the best interests of the girls if that happened right now, especially in light of the fact that [Abby's] going to be leaving shortly, will be out of the country, and I —— assume that she has somewhat been the —— the leader or the caretaker for the girls while this has been going on for the last two months. So, [Alan], I am not going to allow you back in the house to live.

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My father used to tell a bad joke that went "Q. Why do men die before their wives?  A. Because they want to."  Bad joke aside, while there are many studies that show that men are typically financially better off then women after a divorce, are they happier?  There is now a study that suggests that maybe they are not.

In fact, Aaron Weems, an associate in our Bucks County office and editor of our Pennsylvania Family Law Blog recently posted an interesting piece on that blog on the The Longevity Project, entitled "Ladies: Get Divorced and Live Great; Guys, Get Divorced and Die Early."

Aaron noted that  the authors concluded that after going through a divorce women tend to thrive and live long, active lives, while men, quite simply, do not. They die early. Aaron further noted that the impact on divorce was surprising: men who divorced, stayed divorced, or remarried and divorced again saw their mortality rates rise far above their long-married peers. Women, on the other hand, seemed to thrive after they divorced (single women and widows did similarly well). The authors reasoning was that women often left bad marriages and, for possibly the first time in their adult lives, found themselves in charge of their own life and were invigorated by the opportunity to live independently.

In any event, both Aaron's blog and the study itself are interesting reads and food for thought.  I will leave the joke telling to my father, however.

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It is typical for divorce agreements to contain a provision requiring an alimony payor to maintain life insurance to secure his alimony obligation and one, if not both parents to maintain life insurance to secure their obligations to their children.  In fact, Jennifer Millner, a contributor this this blog, and a partner in our Princeton office, recently did a post entitled Child Support Obligations Live on After Death, addressing what happens when a support obligor does not have the required life insurance at his death.

It is also typical for someone to cover their life insurance obligations through insurance they get as a benefit of their employment.  Many companies, for example, offer as a benefit, life insurance - one times their salary, three times their salary - for example.  What happens when someone leaves their job and loses this life insurance?

That issue was addressed by the Appellate Division in an unreported (non-precedential) opinion released on April 1, 2011 in a case entitled Starr v. Starr.  In this case, to secure his alimony, in the divorce agreement, it provided that, "Defendant shall designate plaintiff as a beneficiary of $150,000.00 of the proceeds of the group life insurance made available to him through his employment."  However, in 2005, he was given notice that his employment was terminating.  He did have the option of converting his group life insurance to an individual policy but he did not. 

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Previously, Sandra Fava, a contributor to this blog, did a piece on preparing for the initial divorce consultation with a lawyer.  The process, however, starts even before that.  On our web site, we have an advice piece entitled Preparing for the Divorce Process. 

Since it is linked to this post, I will not repeat everything contained in the piece.  However, the topics contained in that piece are as follows:

1. Speak to an attorney now, not later
2. Selecting the right attorney (including how to get referrals for an attorney)
3. Gathering documentation
4. Preparing for the initial meeting
5. Telling the truth
6. Keeping a diary; and
7. Trusting your attorney for legal advice (as opposed to friends, family members, co-workers, etc.)

Do I stay or do I go? This is not an easy question to answer. However, if you are even
contemplating a divorce, divorce planning (and not in the nefarious way that often goes with this phrase) is essential, especially in difficult economic times.  Divorce can be a long, highly charged, expensive process - emotionally and economically. Being prepared and keeping
perspective, at least as much as humanly possible, can help you save time and legal fees
while protecting your and your children's interests.

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If you have been through the process of divorce and have a spousal support obligation to your ex, you should have been advised that aside from explicitly stating an end date for your spousal support obligation, there are few ways to end the payments.  Death is certainly one of them.  If your ex remarries that is a second.  What happens when your ex is living with someone else?

The issue of cohabitation has been dealt with by the courts in NJ in case law since the 1970's.  The issue in and of itself is not new.  How the courts have dealt with allowing parties to prove the issue has been somewhat fuzzy, until a recent unpublished Appellate Division decision provided what seems like some much needed, long time coming, guidance.  If you haven't already, take a look at Wonderlin v. Wonderlin .

So what's the guidance- well let's start with the basic principles cases like Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 NJ 185 (1999) and Gayet v. Gayet, 92 NJ 149 (1983) have given us.  In Gayet, the court told us we need to look at whether the cohabitating couple bears the "generic character of a family unit as a relatively permanent household".  In Konzelman, the court told us that the relationship in question needed to show signs of "stability, permanency and mutual interdependence".  The proof required is that "of an intimate relationship in which the couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage" which include but are not limited to "living together, intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts, sharing living expenses and household chores, and recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle".  The problem for litigant's and practitioners alike has been, how do you prove such intimate details at first blush so as to convince a court that you have met your burden of proof and now the alleged cohabitating ex must produce evidence to show there is no economic benefit of the relationship and the spousal support is still needed?

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I recently blogged on the issue of how to treat unreported income, perks and other personal expenses paid through the business and the treatment of same for support purposes.  As noted in that post, the issue comes up both for support and business valuation purposes. 

In order to value a business, the experts come up with an income stream that gets capitalized.  That income stream is tax affected.  That is where the issue gets interesting.  More often than not, the experts tax affect the entire income, after adding back the perks, personal expenses, non-operating expenses, unreported income, etc. 

I have asked several of the forensic accountants why this is being done if this is note the economic reality for the business owner in that case.  More often than not, I have been told that you cannot assume that a buyer of the business would not declare all of the income and/or would improperly pay expenses through the business.  From a pure business valuation perspective, this seems correct and reasonable.

For purposes of equitable distribution, that remains questionable.  In the seminal case on business valuation in divorce in NJ, Brown v. Brown, discounts for lack of marketability and lack of control were not considered because the business was not really being sold.  Some have argued that Brown means a value to the holder standard is to be applied.  While I am not sure that that is the case, if discounts are not applied because there is no sale, then why are these excess perks and personal expenses tax affected when doing so artificially reduces the value of the business?  Put another way, if the business owner is not paying taxes on these things, why should there be this fictional tax be applied, which only serves to reduce value? At some point, I am sure this issue will be litigated further.  Until then, we will continue making the arguments on both sides.

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Last year I wrote the indented piece below about the "New Year's Resolution Divorce."  We got a lot of response to that post, including it being cited elsewhere, so I thought I would re-run it.

Over the years, I have noted that the number of new clients spikes a few times of the year, but most significantly right after the new year.  Out of curiosity, I typed "New Years Resolution Divorce" into Google and got 540,000 results in .29 seconds.  While not all of the search results were on point, many were extremely interesting.  It turns out that my intuition about this topic was right and that there are several reasons for it.

One article on Salon.com put divorce up there with weight loss on New Years resolution lists. Also cited in this article was that affairs are often discovered around the holidays.  Another article linked above attributed it to "new year, new life".  Another article claimed that the holidays create a lot of pressures at the end of the year that combine to put stress on people in unhappy or weak relationships.  Family, financial woes, etc. associated with the holidays add to the stress.  Turning over a new leaf to start over and improve ones life was another reason given.  This seems to be a logical explanation for a clearly difficult and perhaps heart wrenching decision.

In my experience, people with children often want to wait until after the holidays for the sake of the children.  There is also the hope, perhaps overly optimistic, that the divorce will be completed by the beginning of the next school year.  These people tend to be in the "improving ones life" camp. 

So as divorce lawyers, we hope to avoid or at least resolve in advance the holiday visitation disputes that inevitably crop up, then relax and enjoy the holiday as we await the busy season to begin. 

In 2010, the phenomena started early for us and many other attorneys.  We were contacted by more people in December than in any year in recent memory.  Moreover, we have heard of more people telling their spouse it "is over" before the holidays this year.  I suspect that in some, it was the discovery/disclosure of a new significant other or perhaps pressure being exerted by that person that was the cause.  In other cases, the person just didn't want to wait until the new year to advise their spouse.  Whatever the reason, we await those who see 2011 as a chance for happiness or a fresh start.  Happy New Year?!?!

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Can a trial court tell a litigant is a divorce that they don't have to pay their lawyer more than a capped amount.?  On November 30, 2010, the Appellate Division in the unreported case entitled McClutchy v. McClutchy answered this question no.

In this case, what apparently was a hotly contested matter that went to trial, but which the trial judge deemed ordinary and not complex, at the end of the trial the court was called upon to assess the parties' respective request for counsel fees that they were asking the other party to pay. Normally, each attorney would submit a Certification of Services required by Court Rule explaining and listing the work done. In this however, the trial court limited them to a one page submission about what was owed and what had been paid.  Thereafter, the trial judge, thinking that the parties' respective fees were excessive ruled that the parties fees were capped at $50,000 each, despite that substantially more had been expended and was owed, and moreover, that the lawyers could not seek to collect the amount over and above.  One of the things the judge commented on was that he thought that the matter could have been handled by an associate, as opposed to experienced counsel of the client's choosing.

The Appellate Division reversed this decision finding that it was beyond the scope of the trial court's authority, especially where the client was not objecting to the fee.  Even if that were to have happened, there are other avenues to address this and the trial court could not do so.

This case, while clearly an aberration in the system, raises several issues.  First, if a client retains and wants pre-eminent counsel to represent them, it is not for the court to dispute their right to hire counsel of their choosing.  in addition, there are times where cases that seem "easy" or "garden variety" do not settle.  Some times it is because one party is unreasonable or acts in bad faith.  Some times it is because both parties are unreasonable.  Some times it is because one party does not want a divorce so they drag the matter out with the hopes that the other spouse will "come to his/her senses" and take him/her back.  Of course, by precluding the filing of a Certification of Services, the Court did not get to see what was done and perhaps did not get information as to why this seemingly easy case went to trial. 

This case is another cautionary tale.  Things aren't always as they seem.  Litigant's have a right to pursue issues in court and have a court make a decision on.  They also have a right to fully present their request for counsel fees to explain why the quantum of fees was what it was.

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On October 28, 2010, the Appellate Division issued a very interesting opinion in the case of Holden v. Holden.  While I will be doing another blog on the aspect of the case dealing with child support when the parties' incomes exceed the Child Support Guidelines, this blog deals with an interesting decision regarding determination of income - particularly net income - for child support purposes. 

In this case, the father's salary was $240,000,  In his submission to the court, her argued that his budget included a tax reserve for anticipated taxes and an amount for debt service for past due taxes.  The mother argued in response that the husband's gross income should be treated as net income (child support is calculated after determining net income under the Child Support Guidelines) since the husband had not paid federal taxes since 1997, and in fact, the father sought employment outside of the country to evade his taxes.

The trial court agreed with the mother finding that the father failed to present credible evidence of withholding taxes and based upon his past practice of ignoring his tax obligations, based his support obligation on $240,000.  The Appellate Division affirmed.

This is a refreshing application of economic reality to get to a fair result.  Though not precedential, I think the arguments can be possibly extended.  In your average case, the Child Support Guidelines calculate taxes based upon published tax schedules, as opposed to actual taxes paid.  If someones actual tax obligation is far less, because they have additional deductions or for any other reason, they actually have more net income than the Guidelines calculations might reflect.  This case certainly gives rise to an argument that actual taxes paid should be used. 

Moreover, sometimes we add back perquisites to income and, in fact, the Guidelines say that "in-kind" benefits are income.  However, if they in-kind benefits are not taxes, why should they be added to income and tax effected for support purposes?  Similarly, when someone is self employed and the business pays personal expenses (legitimate or not) that get added back to income, why should they be tax affected if tax is not actually paid? 

If the goal is fairness based upon economic reality, this case actually provides an arrow in an party's quiver to make the argument that reality should be considered.

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This post was written by Jessica Goldberg, a new associate in the Family Law Practice Group in the Roseland office and also, a new contributor to this blog.

The recent Appellate Division’s decision in Dunn v. Willis, although unpublished and therefore not precedential, brings up some interesting issues regarding custody disputes. First, it is important to note that when a judge is asked to consider a change in custody, that judge must first find that there has been a change in circumstances warranting further proceedings. In Dunn v. Willis the Judge concluded that the mother, who was seeking custody of her son, had failed to show the necessary changed circumstances. The Appellate Division agreed with the Family Court Judge and within its’ decision a warning can be construed about the dangers of too often involving the Court in family matters.

The history of this case is as follows: Mom, unmarried, had an alcohol abuse problem and although she had stopped drinking by November 2002, she was participating in an inpatient rehabilitation program and the Division of Youth and Family Services was involved with the family. In January 2003 the Court entered a consent order, signed by mom, the child’s maternal grandparents, and the child’s paternal grandparents. This consent order gave custody to the maternal grandparents and visitation rights to the paternal grandparents with the condition that the child’s father not be present during their visitation time. In August of 2003 mom was awarded parenting time with her child. In 2004 mom’s stability begins to become apparent – she is out of rehab, she has a full-time job and she has bought a home near the child’s school. In October 2004 mom makes a motion for a change in custody, but the Court denies this motion. In May 2007 mom gets a bachelors degree in nursing. In December 2007 the Court enters an order increasing mom’s parenting time, however, the Court again denies mom custody. Finally, in April of 2008 mom is awarded joint legal custody with her parents, the child’s maternal grandparents. Another order is entered in June 2008 restricting mom from making unilateral decisions without approval from her parents with whom she shares custody.

Then, in June 2009, mom files a motion, now the subject of this Appellate decision, to obtain custody of her son. By this time mom is working full-time as a nurse and is about to receive her Masters Degree in nursing. Her relationship with the child’s father has improved to the point where they are communicating and the child is building a relationship with his father and the father’s younger son. During this entire time the child has lived with his maternal grandparents and an older half-sister, however, the half-sister is now going off to college and mom asserts that the child, now eleven years old, wants to live with her. The Court, however, denies mom’s request to interview the child or appoint an expert to evaluate whether a change would be in the child’s best interest. The Court denies mom’s motion on the grounds that mom has failed to show the necessary changed circumstances.

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I suspect that anyone that read my last blog might think that I am against shared custody or that I believe it to be impossible.  That is not the case.  Rather, my point in that post was to address possibly bad faith requests for joint custody by those people who have historically neither spent a lot of time with the children nor did much of the actual parenting.

But shared parenting time is not an impossibility.  Supposedly, it requires parents who have the ability to communicate and cooperate.  That said, I have seen parents who cannot have a civil word with each other effectively co-parent. 

Shared parenting, by New Jersey standards, is anything between 28% (104 overnights) and 50% of the overnights with the children.  Curiously, these definitions actually stem from the child support guidelines.  When the newest iteration of the Guidelines came into being in 1997 or 1998, they had two different worksheets - a sole parenting worksheet and a shared parenting worksheet (104 overnights and over).  While non-custodial parents now got child support reductions with each overnight, the credit was greater using a shared parenting worksheet. As a result of the new guidelines, negotiations over additional overnights began, in many cases for obvious reasons.

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Following on the heels of an earlier blog entry this week addressing "alimony escalators" in the context of proving a change in circumstances meriting a decreased alimony obligation, a new unreported (not precedential) decision from the Appellate Division in the matter of Eick v. Eick, found that the husband had fulfilled his initial "changed circumstances" burden meriting the matter being sent back to the trial court for a plenary hearing on the issue. 

In Eick, the husband was a self-employed bookbinder who was obligated to pay permanent alimony to his former spouse pursuant to a February 2007 property settlement agreement in the amount of $1,500 per month, as well as $2,000 per month in child support for the parties' two younger children (a number agreed upon that went beyond the child support guidelines calculation).  Critically, the PSA established that such figures were based on an income of $117,000 for the husband and $29,000 for the defendant.  As an important aside, it is important in any settlement agreement to note what incomes were utilized to determine support so that a baseline figure exists should the issue arise in the future.

In March 2009, the payor husband filed a motion to reduce his support obligations based on an alleged change in circumstances - a claim that his business had "declined dramatically" due to online research tools utilized by many clients that rendered the need for his services substantially diminished.  He also claimed that his business had suffered due to the growth of imported bond printed material, as well as the general downturn in the economy. 

Interestingly, the former husband supported his application by submitting the report of an employability expert, who concluded that, while he could learn new skills, changing careers was not a realistic possibility after 27 years in the bookbinding business.  The report further concluded that his best option was to stay in his industry, anticipate a continued decrease in business volume, revenue and earnings, and consult with a career counselor or business consultant to determine available options.

In reversing and remanding the trial court's decision denying the husband's modification motion, the Appellate Division noted that not only had his income decreased, but that the wife's income had "significantly increased" - an undisputed fact set forth in the wife's Case Information Statement that the trial court failed to address.  The Appellate Division also concluded that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as to whether the husband's decreased earning situation was of a permanent or temporary nature, since a temporary situation is not enough to merit a changed circumstances finding.  Even though the trial court noted that the bookbinding industry had undergone difficult times when the PSA was entered, the judge also noted that the situation was further "complicated" by the downward economy.  As a result, the trial court's denial of the husband's application was reversed and remanded for a plenary hearing.

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Recently, I was at a mediation where the mediator, when telling us his assessment of my client's case, said that he was creating "settlement anxiety."  I had never heard this term but what I believe was meant was that the mediator wanted the client to have "anxiety" about his/her position in order to be more likely to make compromises and settle.  If the goal is getting a settlement at all costs, I guess it makes sense - but is it fair?

In most cases, there is a "realm of reasonableness" or a range in which any settlement would be essentially fair.   Perhaps, a fair alimony figure could be between $100,000 per year and $125,000 per year.  A fair resolution could be either of those numbers and anything in the middle.  In most cases, people, with all relevant facts and acting reasonably, negotiate within the realm of reasonableness, but at either end depending on which side of the case they are on.  In that case, a mediator trying to create "settlement anxiety" will try to express the flaws in either case to get the parties to meet somewhere in the middle to achieve a result that is fair.

But what about cases where one party is negotiating within the realm of reasonableness and the other is not?  Put another way, what about cases where one party has the law and the facts pretty much on their side as to most issues and the other side is taking a position that is absurd?  In this case, should the mediator be trying to create similar "settlement anxiety" in both parties?  Add another level - what if the mediator knows that the unreasonable party will never settle the matter in a reasonable fashion?  Should the mediator pressure/create the same amount of "anxiety" in the more reasonable party just to achieve a settlement even though everyone knows it is unfair?  Should the result be settlement at all costs?  Does this type of pressure on the righteous party just to get a deal done artificially undermine a party's relationship with her counsel and experts, if just for settlement purposes, they are told that their case is weak when it is not? 

In my humble opinion, pointing out the legitimate limitations in someones case in order to help create a settlement is fair and appropriate.  On the other hand, creating artificial anxiety just to get a settlement all all costs because one party is acting unreasonably or negotiating in bad faith is not.  The system should be fair and equitable and the parties are entitled to justice.  It is neither fair nor justice to lessen a party's confidence in their case, artificially, just because the other side will never settle in a fair and reasonable manner.  That does not mean a party cannot give more ore receive less just to get a case done and move on with their life.  That is their choice.  On the other hand, they should not be manipulated just because the other side refuses to be reasonable.  And as I have said before, sometimes you just have to try a case.

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On July 26, 2010, an equally divided New Jersey Supreme Court refused to hear an attack on civil union statute in a motion filed in the Lewis v. Harris case.  Rather, the Court's Order held that the matter cannot be decided without a trial like record and as such, denied the motion without prejudice for a new law suit to be filed.  The Order specifically noted that it made no determination on the consitutionality of the civil union statute.

In the dissent by the other three Justices, they framed the issue as follows:

Plaintiffs are six committed same-sex couples who have filed a motion in aid of litigants’ rights claiming that almost four years after Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (2006), and three-and-one-half years after passage of the Civil Union Act, N.J.S.A. 37:1-28 to -36, they still are denied the “full rights and benefits enjoyed by heterosexual married couples” mandated by the equal-protection guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. In their papers, plaintiffs detail a host of workplace, public accommodation, family law, economic, and various other “rights and benefits” that, they allege, are
not afforded to them despite the Civil Union Act and the command in Lewis. In addition to certifications by the parties, plaintiffs cite to the report of the Civil Union Review Commission, N.J.S.A. 37:1-36, a body established by the Legislature as part of the Civil Union Act to evaluate the Act’s success, which concluded that civil unions have failed to deliver the mandate of equality guaranteed by Article I, paragraph 1. However, plaintiffs’ record has not been tested in the crucible of a litigated matter. Thus, we realize that we do not have a sufficient basis for debating the merits of the application, which raises a matter of general public importance and one of constitutional significance.

The next step should be the development of a record on which those important issues can be resolved quickly. At the very least, oral argument would have helped to guide us on the best procedural course for creating such a record. We are disappointed that three members of the Court have voted to deny the motion without oral argument and that plaintiffs must now begin anew and file a complaint in the
Superior Court seeking the relief to which they claim they are entitled. If plaintiffs’ allegations are true -- and we will not surmise whether they are or are not -- then the constitutional inequities should be addressed without any unnecessary delay. Therefore, we would hope that the proceedings in the Superior Court will be conducted with all deliberate speed.

One wonders whether there would have been a different result had Justice Wallace had been granted tenure and there was a full court of seven members.  That said, stay tuned for the next installment once the next round of litigation of this issue begins.

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On June 15, 2010, the New York Times reported on several proposed new laws affecting family law practice in New York.  One was to adopt no-fault divorce, which has long been proposed and long been opposed. At present, one still must prove fault grounds for divorce in order to get a divorce.  This has lead to protracted litigation that some have called cruel and unnecessary.  As the no-fault bill has finally passed the Senate, there is an expectation that it will also pass the assembly.

New Jersey has had no fault divorce for many years, though in actuality, it has really been prevalent for the last 4 years or so when "irreconcilable differences" were added as a cause of action.  Prior to that, the only no-fault ground was 18 month separation.  As most people did not want to wait 18 months, the majority of divorce complaint alleged "extreme cruelty" that made it unreasonable and improper to require the parties to remain married.  In many ways this was somewhat bogus because there was rarely any real testimony about the allegations other than to re-affirm that what was in the complaint was true and correct and if asked to testify about it at length, the testimony would be substantially the same. 

That said, despite telling parties not to worry about it and not to get upset about it, they almost always did (not to mention that there was no a public record of very private gripes).  As such, the other party would then file a counterclaim alleging their own version of "cruelty."  Thankfully, irreconcilable differences has in most cases done away with the need to go through the financial and emotional expense of this type of Complaint (though there are times when it is still necessary for other reasons). 

The only thing that I miss as a divorce lawyer in not reviewing the cruelty complaint and counterclaim is that it may take a little longer to really understand the dynamic between the parties that often would come out loud and clear in their initial pleadings.  That said, no-fault is still better in most cases.

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In an unreported (non-precedential) decision in the case of Brown v. Brown  released on May 25, 2010, the Appellate Division determined that veterans disability benefits and social security benefits are income for purposes of determining alimony.  In this appeal of an Order that granted some alimony reduction but not as much as the former husband sought, the facts are not particularly interesting.  That said, what was interesting was that the reduction was not as much sought (and in actuality, the ex-husband sought an elimination of alimony, because the court considered the veteran's disability pension and Social Security over his objection.  In fact, he tried to argue that the spendthrift provisions (provisions that prevent creditors from attacking certain assets/benefits) in the relevant federal laws prevent such consideration but the Court noted that a spouse seeking support was not a creditor within the meaning of the law.

The matter was, however, remanded because the trial court did not analyze the statutory factors when reducing the support.  As noted in my blog last week about the Walsh case, when dealing with a motion to modify alimony, once the Court determines ta ht there is a change of circumstances, they have to look at the needs of both parties.  In fact, if the Court makes an initial finding of a change of circumstances, the court must analyze how much the alimony should be in a modification application the same way it would in an initial alimony application.   

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Mark Ashton, a partner in our Exton, Pennsylvania office, and a contributor the firm's Pennsylvania Family Law blog, wrote an excellent post on that blog entitled "A Divorce Negotiation Primer".

There are several points I would like to highlight:

• negotiations are confidential and cannot be introduced in court, except for very limited circumstances, but not as to the ultimate issue that is the subject of the negotiations.
• negotiation is intended to narrow issues
• at the time of trial, no one is bound by the positions taken during negotiations
• a party who negotiates backwards (for example making a demand, then increasing the demand), risks losing credibility in the negotiations and also causes their attorney to lose credibility.
• Put all issues on the table as early as possible so as not to spring new issues when settlement appears near and/or give a party false hope of settlement when the parties are not really all that close.

As usual, Mark's advice is good advice. 

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Previously we blogged on alternate dispute resolution methods ("ADR") such as mediation and arbitration. "Collaborative Divorce" is another ADR method.

"Collaborative Divorce" is defined as  a form of alternative dispute resolution for divorcing couples where a  team approach is used to reach a settlement. Both parties to the divorce are supported by their lawyers; however, they work cooperatively with their spouse.  The collaborative process uses informal discussions and conferences attended by both spouses and their attorneys to settle all issues. The collaborative process is premised upon an atmosphere of honesty, cooperation, integrity, and professionalism. It requires that both spouses, with the assistance of their attorneys, provide all pertinent documents and information relating to the issues to be settled. In the event that experts are necessary, it encourages the use of jointly retained experts. Both spouses and attorneys are required to work together toward a shared resolution that is geared toward the future well being of the family. If the parties cannot reach a settlement through the collaborative process approach, the collaborative lawyers withdraw from the case and the parties then retain trial attorneys to pursue the matter in court.

Is collaborative divorce for everyone? I am a divorce litigator and people often come to me with complex, high conflict and/or high stakes cases so perhaps I am biased in that regard. Even still, I cannot see collaborative divorce being for everyone to be used in every case. Just as I wrote about my concerns about mediation, i.e. the possibility of a spouse taking advantage of an imbalance of power; the settle at all costs posture whether the resolution is fair to both parties or not; etc., I think that those pitfalls are just as possible in collaborative divorce.

For instance, I recently heard of a divorce case described as "freakish". At the same time, the husband was described as a "power broker" and the wife was a housewife with a young child. Most confusing was the revelation that the parties were involved in a "collaborative divorce."

To me, this sounded like a recipe for disaster. How can a "freakish" divorce be collaborative? If both parties are "power brokers" perhaps collaboration could work though it seems like both would want to "win." Collaboration seems unlikely when one party is a "power broker" and the other is not - capitulation seems more likely than collaboration. Ever wonder why the more powerful spouse wants to mediate?

Perhaps for a garden variety divorce with two reasonable people, this can work. In most other cases, it seems that the interests of the weaker party could be compromised. 

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As tax season is upon is, the issue of whether to file joint returns is upon us as well.  i previously blogged about the topic of innocent spouse relief and the fact that the innocent spouse form that the IRS has published for those seeking innocent spouse status has many traps for the unwary. 

Today, I read an interesting article by the accounting firm Smolin Lupin "Spouses are Guilty Until Proven Innocent - Tax Liability Shared by Both." 

The article reminds that you are generally liable for paying the tax due, plus interest and any penalties. Moreover, even if the income and/or unreporting is attributable to your spouse, since the filing of a joint return creates joins and several liability, your wages can be seized by the IRS.

The article further reminds that one may qualify for "innocent spouse" relief if that taxpayer can prove:

• There is a substantial understatement of tax attributable to the grossly erroneous items of your spouse or ex-spouse.
• The hidden income belonged to your ex-spouse and you didn't benefit from it.
• You didn't know or have reason to know about the understatement.
• It would be inequitable to hold you liable.

The article closes with the following excellent piece of advice:

Don't count on innocent spouse relief if you know your spouse is cheating. Consider filing separate tax returns -- especially if you're in the process of a divorce. It may save you a bundle in the future.
 

As noted in my prior entry on this topic, since the innocent spouse form has to be signed under penalty of perjury, a wrong answer not only could preclude granting of Innocent Spouse Relief, but also could be used to assert - if not prove - tax fraud given a person's knowledge and involvement when the returns were filed.  As such, the bottom line is that great care should be taken when completing this form. A person seeking to do so should consult with an attorney and tax advisor, in advance, so as to not incriminate themself.

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Almost two years ago, in fact, one of the first blog posts even on this blog, I authored a post entitled "All Cases Have a Life of their Own." I just finished a case this week that gave me reason to think about this post again. 

In this case, one party just didn't want to get a divorce.  It did not make a difference that the other spouse made clear in no uncertain terms that the divorce was going to happen.  In fact, because the spouse asked the other to reconcile every single day, knowing that it would upset the other spouse, that spouse heard every day that the marriage was over.  Even the children's therapist advised that that spouse should move out given the impact of that spouse's continued presence on the children, etc.  Nothing sunk in.  Eventually, the finality of the trial date, in fact on the trial date, did the matter finally settle, but not without several last ditch attempts not to proceed with the divorce.  The real shame is that substantial fees had to be incurred to prepare for trial - an unavoidable problem because one spouse held out hope for reconciliation until the bitter end.

I have another matter, where a spouse is refusing to make settlement proposal but is demanding a settlement conference.  It seems clear that the desire is to get the other spouse in a room to bully that spouse into a settlement or otherwise because there is the expectation that the other spouse will capitulate just as always occur ed during the marriage.

Some spouses refuses to provide discovery or comply with others, hoping to wear the other spouse down.

The bottom line is that hopefully the put upon spouse will stay strong and not fall prey to the other parties unreasonable if not bad faith conduct.  More importantly, hopeful the Court's will protect that party with a fair and generous award of counsel fees.

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Previously, I blogged on the Appellate Division's reported (precedential) decision in Kay v. Kay.  The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Certification and the decision was rendered on January 6, 2010.  In a per curiam decision (i.e. no one specific Supreme Court Justice authored the opinion), the Appellate Division decision was affirmed for substantially the reasons set forth in Judge Grall's appellate opinion.

To reiterate what this case is about, the Appellate Division held that when the estate of a spouse who died while an action for divorce is pending presents a claim for equitable relief related to marital property, the court may not refuse to consider the equities arising from the facts of that case solely on the ground that the estate may not assert equitable claims against the marital estate sounding in constructive trust, resulting trust, quasicontract or unjust enrichment. In that case, the husband died basically penniless and the wife had assets in excess of $650,000 at the time.

The Appellate Division and now Supreme Court held that when the estate of a spouse who died while an action for divorce is pending presents a claim for equitable relief related to marital property, the court may not refuse to consider the equities arising from the facts of that case solely on the ground that the estate may not assert equitable claims against the marital estate sounding in constructive trust, resulting trust, quasicontract or unjust enrichment. This case rejects the holding in Krudzlo v. Krudzlo, a reported trial court opinion from 1990.

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Over the years, I have noted that the number of new clients spikes a few times of the year, but most significantly right after the new year.  Out of curiosity, I typed "New Years Resolution Divorce" into Google and got 540,000 results in .29 seconds.  While not all of the search results were on point, many were extremely interesting.  It turns out that my intuition about this topic was right and that there are several reasons for it.

One article on Salon.com put divorce up there with weight loss on New Years resolution lists. Also cited in this article was that affairs are often discovered around the holidays.  Another article linked above attributed it to "new year, new life".  Another article claimed that the holidays create a lot of pressures at the end of the year that combine to put stress on people in unhappy or weak relationships.  Family, financial woes, etc. associated with the holidays add to the stress.  Turning over a new leaf to start over and improve ones life was another reason given.  This seems to be a logical explanation for a clearly difficult and perhaps heart wrenching decision.

In my experience, people with children often want to wait until after the holidays for the sake of the children.  There is also the hope, perhaps overly optimistic, that the divorce will be completed by the beginning of the next school year.  These people tend to be in the "improving ones life" camp. 

So as divorce lawyers, we hope to avoid or at least resolve in advance the holiday visitation disputes that inevitably crop up, then relax and enjoy the holiday as we await the busy season to begin. 

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Over the years, I have noted that the number of new clients spikes a few times of the year, but most significantly right after the new year.  Out of curiosity, I typed "New Years Resolution Divorce" into Google and got 540,000 results in .29 seconds.  While not all of the search results were on point, many were extremely interesting.  It turns out that my intuition about this topic was right and that there are several reasons for it.

One article on Salon.com put divorce up there with weight loss on New Years resolution lists. Also cited in this article was that affairs are often discovered around the holidays.  Another article linked above attributed it to "new year, new life".  Another article claimed that the holidays create a lot of pressures at the end of the year that combine to put stress on people in unhappy or weak relationships.  Family, financial woes, etc. associated with the holidays add to the stress.  Turning over a new leaf to start over and improve ones life was another reason given.  This seems to be a logical explanation for a clearly difficult and perhaps heart wrenching decision.

In my experience, people with children often want to wait until after the holidays for the sake of the children.  There is also the hope, perhaps overly optimistic, that the divorce will be completed by the beginning of the next school year.  These people tend to be in the "improving ones life" camp. 

So as divorce lawyers, we hope to avoid or at least resolve in advance the holiday visitation disputes that inevitably crop up, then relax and enjoy the holiday as we await the busy season to begin. 

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Since they have been in the news a lot lately, I have bloged a lot recently on celebrity divorces, be it John & Kate, Stephanie Seymour or Jim Nantz.  That is why the article from Billy Witz that recently appeared in the New York Times about the divorce of Frank McCourt and Jamie McCourt, the owners of the Los Angeles Dodgers got my attention.

Both parties claim to own the team - though Frank claims to be the sole owner.  Both worked for the team until recently, when Jamie was fired.  As a sign of the war to come, Jamie's lawyers budgeted her legal fees for this matter to be $2 million.  Per the article, the central issue is as follows:

"The key legal issue is whether the Dodgers are considered the McCourts’ community property. Under California law, a couple’s assets are split 50-50 unless a written agreement states otherwise. Shortly after buying the Dodgers, the McCourts put the team in Frank’s name and all their property in Jamie’s name to protect the homes from potential creditors. One of her lawyers, Michael Kump, said they would challenge the validity of the postnuptial agreement.

If the agreement is not valid, Fisher said, the McCourts would probably be forced to sell, as John Moores did with the San Diego Padres when he divorced."
 

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We have blogged in the past about parental alienation and "Parental Alienation Syndrome."  There was an excellent article in US News and World Report on line posted on October 29, 2009.  To read the article, click here.  To view some of our prior posts on this topic, click here and here.

The article discusses a movement afoot to add "parental alienation" to the next addition of the DSM (ie. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) published by the American Psychiatric Association.  The new edition is scheduled to be published in 2012. 

While there appears to be little debate on whether parental alienation in both subtle and not so subtle forms goes on, there is a debate as to whether it represents a mental illness.  On top of that, there is concern that certain opposition to visiting with a parent could either be age appropriate (eg. a teenager being oppositional) or otherwise justified.  The people of this view are concerned that making parental alienation a mental illness could be invoked by an abusive parent to gain visitation with a child that has good reason to oppose contact.

No matter where you stand on the debate as to whether parental alienation is a mental illness, it is clear that alienating behavior in whatever form, big or small, cannot be good for the children that are exposed to it.

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