ANOTHER INTERESTING DECISION REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT IN HIGH INCOME SITUATIONS

On April 13, 2009, the Appellate Division issued a decision in the case of Cadavid v. Nieto which dealt in large part with the issue of child support in high income cases. To view the full text of the case, click here. 

We have previously blogged on this topic.  To view links to those prior posts, click here , here, and here.

In the Cadivad matter, the father appealed an Order requiring him to pay almost $9000 per month in child support.  Both parties were  immigrants from Colombia. The father is the successful founder and president of eight schools that teach English as a second language located in New Jersey, New York, Florida, and Canada. He also owns interests in several commercial properties in New Jersey and Florida as well as 4 homes.  In a June 2007 loan application, the father valued his various business interests at $8 million and the fair market value of his real estate holdings at $5.2 million. The trial judge calculated the father's annual income for purposes of child support at approximately $2 million annually.

On the other hand, the mother was a full time homemaker but had an associates degree from Bergen County Community College.

The parties had 3 children under age 10 at the time of the proceedings.

The parties' divorce in 2000.  In the divorce agreement, the father agreed to pay $100,000 in support per year which included $20,000 in limited duration alimony, as well as other expenses related to the marital home where the mother continued to reside, etc.  In 2003, after the parties' third son was born, the parties amended their agreement to increase child support by $300 per month.

In 2007, prior to the expiration of her alimony, the mother filed a motion to modify support and expressed her intention to move with the children from Bergen County to Warren, New Jersey.

After a several day trial, the trial court awarded the mother $8,839 per month in child support for the three children. The court also required the father to pay for the boys' summer camp costs and counseling expenses, but rejected the mother's request that he also pay for their other extracurricular expenses. The trail court further ordered the father to obtain a $2 million life insurance policy for the benefit of the children, and fixed arrears in the amount of $7,716. Finally, the court  awarded the mother $40,000 in counsel fees.  The father filed this appeal.

The father argued that the trial court unreasonably declined to impute income to the mother and instead was obligated to allocate to the mother a defined portion of the children's financial needs.
The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that imputation was not necessary given that the limited income that could be earned by the mother would be insignificant compared to the child care expenses she would have.  Specifically, the Court held:

Given the mother's limited potential earning capacity and lack of prior work experience, as well as the benefits of the mother personally attending to the boys' transportation and other after-school needs, there are reasonable grounds for the
judge's decision not to impute net positive earnings to the mother. The judge essentially determined that the child-care and other expenses that the mother would incur if she were employed would substantially eviscerate her potential income.
The judge observed that the mother drives the children "wherever they have to be when they have to be there on all of the extracurricular activities," and that her efforts in that regard "lessens the financial burden on [the father]." As the judge noted, the mother is "putting in the time, the energy, and many other things in order to take care of these children, [services] that otherwise someone else would have to be paid to do." The judge's reasoning is neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion, although we note that the father remains free to seek prospective relief on the imputation issue if circumstances materially change.

The fatter also objected to the shelter expenses on the mother's CIS because she lived in the new home with her fiance and his own son.   Endeavoring to remove the incidental benefit to the fiancé and his son for these shelter expenses, the mother generally applied a two-thirds (or four-sixths) fraction to the household costs for utilities, snow removal, cable access, and other
shelter items.  The mother also acknowledged, both on her CIS form and in her testimony, that the two-thirds fractional share for these items should be further reduced by applying a multiplier of three-fourths, so as to segregate out the children's portion from her own portion. The trial court and Appellate Division found this to be reasonable.

Similar analysis was given regarding mortgage expenses and real estate expenses.

The law is clear that in this case, if the other parent gets an incidental benefit of the child support, the Court is not offended.  What can be taken from this case is that the CIS was crucial in setting forth the children's expenses.  Moreover, by applying reasoned proportions to shared expenses, they will be sustained.

 

APPELLATE DIVISION AFFIRMS LIMITATION ON ADDITIONAL CHILD SUPPORT IN AN OVER GUIDELINES CASE

On December 31, 2008, the Appellate Division released the opinion in the case of Cardell v. Kirby.  In this case, child support over the guidelines was limited to a nominal amount by the trial court and the Appellate Division affirmed.  To see the full opinion, click here.

In this case, the defendant-father lived in NY with his wife and two children.  As some point, he became estranged from his wife and had a relationship with the plaintiff-mother  that resulted in a child born in November 2006.  Subsequent to that time, he resumed living with his wife.  The defendant seemingly earned or had the ability to earn more than $500,000 per year.  In fact, in 2006, he earned  just under $700,000 and the plaintiff earned just under $87,000

The plaintiff filed a complaint and motion seeking, among other things, $4,000 per week. The defendant began paying support of $2,600 per month and filed a cross motion seeking to limit his support to that amount.

The judge determined that the top child support due from the defendant to the plaintiff, inclusive of his share of child care, was $632.00 per week.  Noting that he had to add some amount over that, he added $17.50 per week to pay a portion of plaintiff's loan that was required to renovate her
apartment to accommodate the parties' daughterThe plaintiff appealed.

The Appellate Division noted the established principle that the needs of an infant are less than those of teenagers.  The Court also noted that "a balance must be struck between reasonable
needs, which reflect lifestyle opportunities, while at the same time precluding an inappropriate windfall to the child or to the custodial parent."  The Court disagreed with plaintiff's contention that the court erred by not considering the lifestyle that her daughter is entitled to, based on defendant's significant earnings.

The Court also rejected plaintiff's assertion that the court erred by failing to recognize that the amount of expenses declared in her December 2006 Case Information Statement only represented what she could then afford, "at a time when defendant was not paying support."  The Court noted that the trial judge correctly determined the child support based upon the information that it had before it at the time.

Read together, it seems as though plaintiff may have made a mistake by failing to include a CIS with not only her actual budget, but one that included a proposal of what her expenses would be if she was receiving the support that she sought.  Specifically, the quote from the reported Walton v. Visgil case, restated in the Isaacson case, probably should have been heeded.  The quote is as follows:

where as here, the children are entitled to share in a parent's good fortune, the custodial parent's budget should be broken down into two parts: the reality-based component dictated by his or her income and the added projections which will, in fact, allow the children to share in the other parent's financial gain. This could include, by way of example, private school tuition, private tutoring, summer camps, music or art lessons, sports clinics, vacations, study abroad, and the provision of transportation for a child who drives, to mention only a few possibilities. It could also include help to make the family home more presentable, assistance with the cost of a family car, or a larger amount of money for a teenager's clothing and incidentals. As we have said, these are only examples. What is important is that sufficient thought, effort and information is put into the two-part budget to give the trial judge a basis on which to act under Dunne and Zazzo.

Of course, in a case of a 9 months old, it is probably hard to come up with these types of extras.