NJ Family Legal Blog : New Jersey Divorce and Family Lawyer & Attorney : Fox Rothschild Law Firm : Alimony, Child Support, Child Custody, Prenuptial Agreements, Essex, Morris, Mercer, Atlantic

There are many cases that say that the settlement of litigation ranks high in the public policy of this state,  As such, there are many cases that say that an agreement can be enforced, even if it is not reduced to a writing, if the major terms have been agreed to.  As my client learned in Brawer v. Brawer, the unexpressed intention not to be bound is irrelevant.  There is no place in the law for second thoughts where the parties have expressed their agreement.  In fact, in a case called Bistricer, the judge said:

… the proposition that a case is not settled until the last “i” is dotted and the last “t” is crossed on a written settlement agreement carries the germ of much mischief. A party could, in bad faith, waste the time of the court and the other litigant in protracted settlement negotiations, and then, after a “framework” has been established, wiggle out of that framework by creating a flood of new issues and questions.

Just as you can't wiggle out of a settlement, similarly, you cannot appeal a settlement.  This issue reared its head in the case of Courboin v. Courboin, an unreported (non-precedential) opinion decided on February 21, 2013.  In this case, after two days of trial, the parties settled and put their settlement on the record. The husband testified that he agreed to be bound.  As part of that settlement, the home was to be sold.

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Several years ago, I posted a blog entitled "Some Times You Just Have to Try a Case."  In that post, I discussed that there are some times where a litigant simply refuses to settle making a trial inevitable.  Are there times, however, when a trial might be less costly, quicker and preferable to long, drawn out, and perhaps insufferable negotations.  I have dubbed these mind numbing, perhaps bad faith negotiations, where sometimes you take one step forward and two steps back and sometimes, no issue is ever resolved, and sometimes, you make an offer about alimony and the response is about equitable distribution - death by a thousand paper cuts.  Whether intentional or not, you wonder whether a trial would have just been bettter.

I ponder that after recently concluding a case that, while having one little twist, which we got past several months ago, then endured numerous mediation sessions, numerous Intensive Settlement Conferences at the Courthouse and even more than one scheduled uncontested hearing where even the final changes had final changes, plus new changes.  In fact, I have recently had several cases where it took an inordinate amount of mediation sessions to resolve simple cases.  In one reasonably simple case, the parties went to mediation 6 or 7 times, before attorneys attended and even then, it did not settle despite the outcome being obvious.  In another, after 9 mediation sessions (7 with lawyers present), the case remains unsettled though only small dollars in the big picture remain in dispute. 

In your garden variety case, the inordinately drawn out process only serves to either wear a party out and forces the righteous client to give up to either move on or stop the bleeding of legal fees.  Otherwise, they incur a large legal bill just to get to the place they should have been had the other side acted reasonably (presuming for the second that they have negotiated fairly and reasonably.)

While I understand the desire to avoid trial at all costs for all of the usual reasons - finality, having control of your own destiny as opposed to putting the decision in the hands of a stranger, etc.- if the process comes to a place where all things considered, you cannot do worse if you go to trial, maybe a party should consider pulling the plug on these expensive snails pace and/or bad faith drawn out negotiations,  Perhaps the threat, if it is a real threat and you actually start doing what is necessary to prepare for trial, will stop the nonsense and get the other side to end the case once and for all. 

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

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If I were to tell you that the victim of domestic violence was put out of the marital home and the abuser was granted temporary custody of the kids, you would say I was crazy.  The Appellate Division would agree and in reported (precedential) decision released on October 19, 2012 in the case of J.D. v. M.A.D.(ironically), reversed such a holding by a Camden County trial court. 

In this case, the defendant's discovery of the victim's infidelity lead to an act of domestic violence.  The victim, however, wanted to remain in and work on the marriage.  The defendant wanted "space" and somehow convinced the victim to leave the home and sign a document giving him primary custody of the children.  The parties later reconciled and the victim returned to the house.  However, unable to control his anger over her affair, a number of additional acts of domestic violence occur ed, culminating with the entry of a TRO against the defendant.  At the Final Restraining Order hearing, the judge then entertained argument "as to who should have possession of the marital home and as to who should have
temporary custody of the children."  The trial judge decided that it should be the defendant, finding that the anger only occur ed when the parties were together and as such because the defendant had been the primary caretaker, he was awarded temporary custody and the victim was excluded from the marital home. 

The victim appealed and the Appellate Division reversed, holding:

The trial court's findings, set forth in the beginning of this opinion regarding the events over the course of the seven months following defendant's discovery of his wife's extramarital affair, are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and we do not disturb them. The facts as found, however, do not overcome the presumption embodied in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b(11), governing the court's award of temporary custody
in a proceeding under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, "that the best interests of the child are served by an award of custody to the non-abusive parent." Moreover, these facts cannot support an order granting exclusive possession of the marital home to the party the court has found to have perpetrated the abuse.

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Melissa Brown, an attorney in Charleston, South Carolina, is a fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and one of the preeminent family lawyers in South Carolina.  I had the occasion, last week, to read her excellent article on her blog entitled "How to Find the Right Divorce Attorney for You."  Melissa has graciously allowed us to re-post her post.  Her article is as follows: 

When your marriage is falling apart and a divorce is imminent, it is critical to find a skilled, experienced, competent family law attorney to represent your interests. With a little bit of legwork and some patience, you can find a highly experienced divorce attorney who is the “right fit” for you. The following three simple steps outline a basic approach to put your case in the hands of the right attorney.

Step 1: Ask Your Friends for Attorney Referrals
Begin by asking your divorced friends, family members, and trusted coworkers for their thoughts about the attorneys who represented them – and the attorney who represented their ex-spouse.

Do not simply ask “Did you like your attorney?” Dig a little deeper. Be specific. Ask questions such as:

• After your experience what is the most important quality to have in a divorce attorney?

• What did you like the most/least about your attorney?

• Did you feel the attorney listened to you?

• Did you feel your attorney advocated for you?

• What was your opinion about the opposing attorney? (Surprisingly, it is not uncommon for one to have high regard for the opposing side’s attorney. Asking detailed questions about the opposing counsel’s performance can be enlightening.)

• Did your legal fees reflect the value and quality of the legal services that you received?

Pay attention to others’ responses. Take note of which attorneys’ work was valued and appreciated by their clients and which attorneys were a disappointment. Make a list of the attorneys whose work was appreciated and respected because these are the attorneys with whom you need to meet, interview and consider retaining.

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Mark Ashton, a partner in our Exton (Chester County, PA) office and former editor of our Pennsylvania Family Law Blog, wrote a very in depth and interesting post entitled "Qualified Personal Residence Trusts:  Are These Homes Subject to Claims in Equitable Distribution", on that blog.

Mark discusses how an estate planning tool called a Qualified Personal Residence Trust (QPRT) can be used to get appreciating residential property out of a person’s estate, and possibly, to avoid increase in value claims in equitable distribution in Pennsylvania.  The post does an excellent job explaining how this works.

In Pennsylvania, the passive increase in value on separate property (premarital, inherited, etc.) is subject to equitable distribution.  Mark talks about the possibility of using a QPRT to avoid these claims because the recipient never has a possessory interest in the trust assets.

These same concerns do not exist in New Jersey because passive appreciation on separate assets is not subject to equitable distribution as long as the asset is not put in joint names or otherwise commingled (active appreciation or increase in value due to the efforts of either or both of the spouses would be subject to equitable distribution). 

Other issues regarding the use of trusts and their impact on divorce have been previously reported on this blog.  In fact, the issue of trust income and whether a trust can be compelled to distribute income where the trust documents do not allow it, is before the New Jersey Supreme Court in Tannen v. Tannen.  Stay tuned for an update when that case is decided.

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Last year, we published a post entitled He Who Hesitates (To Sell Former Marital Home) May Have Lost.  However, the Supreme Court disagreed in Sachau v. Sachau decided May 11, 2011.

In Sachau, the marital home was supposed to be sold on a triggering event, the emancipation of the youngest child, which in this case was in 1984.  The house wasn't sold then but in 1990, the wife began making inconsistent payments at inconsistent intervals to the husband through 2004 totalling almost $80000.  When the husband became unable to support himself, he filed a motion to compel the sale of the house in 2006.

Without getting into the legal steps it took to get to a hearing, the trial judge ultimately concluded that there was no agreement between the parties in respect of the valuation date and that the 1984 value of the home was $120,000 and that was the valued to be used.  As such, the husband's share was filed at  $144,915.62 (which included interest) and the wife's share was $417,472.64. The judge further determined that the wife would be credited for payments made. Moreover, the judge noted that the equities were in parity and that “the passage of time ha[d] not caused a change in position to the
detriment of [Barbara].” The husband appealed, and as noted in our prior post, the Appellate Division affirmed.

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Different forms of social media, Facebook in particular, have become the divorce lawyer's best friend as a source of damning evidence.  In fact, we have blogged about this before.  The New York Post today had a story that must serve as a primer on what not to do what when you are seeking permanent alimony alleging disability. 

In this case out of Staten Island, the wife sought permanent alimony alleging that she could not work, rarely left home and rarely socialized because of injuries from a 1996 car accident.  Notwithstanding that tale of woe, she was belly-dancing for hours a day  and then spending several more hours a day blogging about it. And if blogging was not enough, when she was asked by a Facebook friend why she was not posting pictures from her performances, the wife responded, "Gotta be careful what goes online, pookies. The ex would love to fry me with that."

He did. And so did the Court.  Instead of getting the $850 per month in permanent alimony she sought, she received an award of only $400 a month for two years. She also got only 40% from the proceeds of the sale of the marital home and her husband was granted a substantial award of  legal fees for her "dilatory tactics."

What is the lesson from this?  Those who post evidence of their fraud upon their spouse and the Court have no one to blame but themselves when they are exposed. 

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I have recently blogged about the need for courts to award counsel fees when a party successfully enforces an agreement or an Order.  As noted, all too often, court's do not award counsel fees, or when then do, the award is not the entire amount of fees incurred.  This potentially empowers to wrong doer because there is no ramifications to their non-compliance.

That issue arose in the unreported (non-precedential) opinion in the case of Bello v. Bello decided on April 1, 2011.  After the parties' divorce, the wife was forced to file 5 post-judgment enforcement applications.  She was successful and was awarded fees for each.  However, at the fifth motion, she was only awarded $1000 because the trial judge "stated that "I don't want to cut off support for the [wife] in favor of counsel fees."  The wife unsuccessfully sought reconsideration contending that the amount was too low given the husband's lavish lifestyle and significant assets.  She then appealed.

The Appellate Division reversed and remanded the matter back to the trial court to determine the proper amount holding:

After carefully considering the entire record, we conclude that the judge's reasoning for limiting counsel fees to $1000 contradicted his finding that the husband had a substantial income and several assets. The husband lives in a home worth $1,000,000 with a tennis court and swimming pool, drives a 2007 Mercedes sedan, owns two other cars, pays $1500 per month for his mortgage, is the sole proprietor of Mendham Eyecare business, earns more than $200,0001 a year, and refused to pay his child support and alimony obligations. In addition to finding that the husband had "plenty of resources to pay his obligations," the judge found that a review of the husband's case information statement demonstrated "at least $14,000 of excess [money available]."

We therefore reverse because the judge's finding that the husband cannot afford a fee greater than $1000 is "manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence."

Perhaps this decision will be a deterrent and ensure future compliance. 

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I recently heard a person say that their spouse believed his alimony and child support would be based solely on his salary.  I am sure he would like that but that statement is wishful thinking at best.  If he was correct, several hundred thousand dollars each year would be his alone and not considered for support.  Aside from potentially being unfair, it is not the law.

In fact, in New Jersey, the definition of income from support purposes includes all sources of income.  In fact, the Child Support Guidelines includes, but is not limited to 23 possibilities for income, as follows:

a. compensation for services, including wages, fees, tips, and commissions;
b. the operation of a business minus ordinary and necessary operating expenses (see IRS Schedule C);
c. gains derived from dealings in property;
d. interest and dividends (see IRS Schedule B);
e. rents (minus ordinary and necessary expenses - see IRS Schedule E);
f. bonuses and royalties;
g. alimony and separate maintenance payments received from the current or past  relationships;
h. annuities or an interest in a trust;
i. life insurance and endowment contracts;
j. distributions from government and private retirement plans including Social Security, Veteran's Administration, Railroad Retirement Board, deferred compensation, Keoughs and IRA's;
k. personal injury awards or other civil lawsuits;
l. interest in a decedent's estate or a trust;
m. disability grants or payments (including Social Security disability);
n. profit sharing plans;
o. worker's compensation;
p. unemployment compensation benefits;
q. overtime, part-time and severance pay;
r. net gambling winnings;
s. the sale of investments (net capital gain) or earnings from investments;
t. income tax credits or rebates (excluding the federal and state Earned Income Credit and the N.J. homestead rebate);
u. unreported cash payments (if identifiable);
v. the value of in-kind benefits; and
w. imputed income

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Picture this scenario.  Parties are married - perhaps even happily - for 14  years.  They have three kids - 12, 10 and 6.  Wife has been a stay at home parent for the last 12 years. Husband is the Type A, master of the universe, over achiever type.  He works in New York City, leaving the house at 6 am and coming home at 7 p.m. The wife took the children to most of their medical and dental appointments, most of the play dates, most of the activities, attended most of the school events, etc.  Maybe the husband went to some, maybe he didn't.  Maybe the husband played his golf or tennis on the weekends - maybe he was part of the suburban shuttle taking the kids to the vast myriad of activities and sports kids are involved in - or both.  In very much of a traditional marriage, the wife was responsible for the kids and the house and the husband was responsible for making the money.  This is not meant to be a social commentary - just a description about how the parties divided the labor and defined their roles in the marriage. 

Fast forward - now the parties are getting a divorce.  A discussion of custody and parenting time has to be had.  One would be surprised about how many times I have seen the husband in these matters demanding 50-50 shared parenting with the kids, almost as if the historical status quo never happened. All too often, this demand is coupled with an attack on the wife's mental health and/or parenting abilities.  This of course leads to the obvious question - if she was so crazy/unstable/incompetent, etc. why did you leave the children in her care for the last X years?

This is not to say that shared parenting is presumptively not reasonable or in the children's best interests. But what is the genesis of the request.  Is it power, control, the desire to pay less child support, the desire to hurt the spouse for having the audacity to divorce them?  Is it a sincere belief that this is what is best for the children, whether it is or not?  Is it a combination of a realization of the time lost with the children in the past coupled with a fear of losing them completely?  Is it revisionist history and/or an exaggerated or grandiose belief regarding the person's actual involvement in the historical parenting of the children?  It is probably an amalgam of many of these things. 

The first question to ask is can the parent actually exercise the time that he is seeking?  If not, the resolution is easy.  Often in the cases, I have seen the parties go through stressful and expensive custody evaluations, with the obvious result - i.e. that the mother is recommended to be the primary custodial parent.  Custody then settles rapidly after that - with the father able to save face and say "I tried." 

That said, I have seen many parents become more involved parents after the divorce.  Maybe this was done for all of the wrong reasons.  Funny thing is that despite the reason, if their relationship with the children strengthens and their involvement increases, that may not be a bad thing either.

This blog is not meant to perpetuate stereotypes or dissuade good faith custody disputes. In fact, I have represented many fathers and have been successful in obtaining custody or shared parenting of some type for them.  On the other hand, before putting your children through a custody evaluation (or several if both parties get their own experts) and spending tens of thousands of dollars on the process, people should think long and hard about what they really want and what is really best for the children. 

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Though you don't see them much anymore, some times Marital Settlement Agreement contained escalator clauses which, in effect, provided for automatic increases in alimony or child support.  Some times they were a fixed percentage per year. Other times they were tied to the cost of living/Consumer Price Index. 

In the unreported (non-precedential) case of Burroughs v. Burroughs released on August 9, 2010, the effects of a 5% annual increase on alimony escalator clause was at issue.  In this case, the agreed upon alimony was $200 per week and based upon the husband's income of $60,000 at the time (1994).  The husband had comparable income until the year 2000 when he could no longer find same and went to work at Home Depot earning about half of what he made in the past.  In 2006, the alimony was increased to $337 per week, not due to a change of circumstances, but rather, by implementation of the escalator clause.  As an example why not to use such an escalator clause this reflects a 68.5% increase in support in about 10 years.

The husband's income continued at the less than time of the divorce levels until about 2007, when he established a business with a friend to try to increase his income from what he was earning at Home Depot.  This was not a success.  He ultimately filed a motion to terminate or reduce his alimony.  The motion was denied.

The Appellate Division reversed holding that the husband had made a showing of a change of circumstances by virtue of his Social Security statement showing far lower wages post-2000 than his alimony was based upon.  The effect of the escalator clause was also impacted on the showing of a change of circumstances (though this is curious because it certainly is a foreseeable event.)

The matter was remanded for discovery and a plenary hearing.

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In today's New York Post there was an article about a Long Island woman getting jail time for her repeated interference with her ex-husband's time with the parties' children.

The article describes how the woman tried to keep the father and his daughters apart for weeks at a time and that she even falsely alleged that he groped one of his daughters.  The story goes on to say how the mother went on expletive filled tirades about the father in front of the children.  Further, she often scheduled last minute trips and events meant to frustrate parenting time.  The father was forced to either consent to not disappoint the girls and when he did not, she would berate him.  The judges stated that she. "... is a vengeful roadblock, the barbed wire standing in the way of her two daughters and their desperate dad."

All of the above acts are very typical acts of parental alienation.  In the past we have blogged about programs dealing with parental alienation and the fact that there is some consideration to adding parental alienation as a diagnosis to the next DSM.  Parental alienation syndrome is a very polarizing term because the person who coined the phrase, Dr. Richard Gardner, was self-published and the scientific bases to his conclusions were questioned.   His proposed remedies to alienation were also severe and there were a few notorious cases where his recommendations were followed by tragic results.  On the other hand, there is more and more research about parental alienation and its insidious effects.  The alleged conduct of the mother above contains some classic alienating behavior.

But what is the remedy.  We have recently blogged that the NJ Appellate Division rejected tort damages for emotional distress as a remedy. in most cases.  There are criminal statutes to prevent interference with custody orders but, anecdotally, they rarely seem to be used.  Similarly, there are court rules allowing for sanctions for interference with parenting time.  However, all too often, this becomes a he said/she said situation and court's rarely hold hearings to get to the bottom of this much less impose sanctions.  In fact, often this kind of conduct results in the appointment of a parent coordinator, often adding another level of costs even though the Appellate Division, the the recent reported case Parish v. Parish (which was my case) has made clear that parent coordinators should not be dealing with enforcement issues. 

While jail is a drastic remedy and probably not appropriate in all cases, it is refreshing to see that a judge got tough with repeated custodial interference.  Perhaps this will serve as a deterrent to others, but probably not because many people who do this feel justified and/or believe that they are protecting their children.  We can only hope. 

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As we recently learned from the Fawzy case that we blogged on, parties have a right to private ordering and self determination of how they want to resolve their cases.  In Fawzy, the NJ Supreme Court held that people could arbitrate custody matters as long as certain procedural measures were taken.

Can people decide to submit an issue to an expert for a binding determination?  On March 10, 2010, in an unreported (non-precedential) decision issued by the Appellate Division in the case of Cully v. Cully, the question was answered affirmatively.

In this case, post-judgment litigation occur ed over the correct interpretation of a Property Settlement Agreement, more specifically, the correct form of a QDRO (the mechanism to divide an ERISA controlled retirement asset).  The judge suggested that the parties could elect to have a QDRO expert
review both parties' QDROs and decide which QDRO is acceptable. The parties would split the expert's fee, and the loser would reimburse the other party for counsel's fees. The parties adopted the judge's suggestion and agreed to be bound by the expert's determination.

With certain modifications, the expert suggested adoption of the husband's form of QDRO and it was ultimately entered as an Order of the Court.  The wife appealed arguing that the court should have held a hearing on the parties intent since the language in their Property Settlement Agreement was not entirely clear.

The Appellate Division affirmed the decision finding that the since the wife's attorney advocated for and agreed to a binding determination by the expert, the wife could not then object when the decision did not go in her favor.  In fact, the Appellate Division specifically stated:

Our judicial process's integrity would be damaged if defendant received a second bite at the apple because she is disappointed that the process, which her counsel agreed to and advocated for, resulted in a decision unfavorable to her.  Both the doctrines of invited error and judicial estoppel bar this court from considering defendant's claims regarding the trial court's decision to accept Ms. DeFuccio's determination in this esoteric area of family law.

There are several lesson here.  (1) When you agree to submit a matter for a binding determination, you are stuck with that decision. (2) When you are dealing with the division of pensions, and there is any possibility for different interpretations/ways to divide it, it may make sense to hire the QDRO expert before the settlement so that the correct language is in the PSA; (3) in a similar vein, if possible, have the QDRO signed the same day that the divorce is entered.  Here, it appears as perhaps imprecise drafting was the problem.  Moreover, if the issue ultimately required a determination of intent, the decision to allow an expert, or anyone for that matter, to make a binding determination without first determining what the intent was, is a curious one.

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