NJ Family Legal Blog : New Jersey Divorce and Family Lawyer & Attorney : Fox Rothschild Law Firm : Domestic Violence, Prenuptial Agreements, Child Custody

In a reported (precedential) trial court decision, Martin v. Martin, released on July 31, 2009, Judge Haas, in Burlington County ruled that there no longer is an automatic review of child support every three years.  Rather, for child support to be reviewed, the mere passage of time is not enough, and there has to be a showing of a change of circumstances.

The Court went on to point out that the three year review relates back to a prior version of a particular statute and has essentially been replaced by a Cost of Living Increase (COLA) every two years. 

While this is an interesting opinion and makes logical sense, since it is a trial court opinion, other trial court judges are not required to follow it.  Moreover, there is precedential decisional law that states that passage of time can be a change of circumstances as to child support because it is well known that as children get older, certain expenses increase.

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In an interesting unreported Appellate Division decision released on May 20, 2009, in the case of Williams v. Williams the appellate court affirmed a finding by the trial court that the former husband had not shown a change of circumstances and therefore was not entitled to eliminate his alimony obligation.  The case is also a primer of what not to do when seeking a reduction.

In this case, the husband was a long time employee at JP Morgan Chase making $185,000 per year.  His alimony obligation was $1,000 per month.  When he lost his job in August 2006, he immediately stopped paying alimony despite receiving one year of severance pay.

The husband asserted that he had tried but failed to find comparable work.  The opinion was not clear but given the final outcome, one can surmise that overwhelming proof of an unsuccessful job search was not supplied to the Court.  The husband further alleged that he had attempted unsuccessfully to establish a consultant business focusing on information technology. He claimed, however, that the only employment he could obtain was a position in a florist shop. It was not disputed that the florist shop was operated by his girlfriend.  Though the issue was ultimately decided for other reasons, these facts could also lead to a conclusion the he had not made an initial showing of a change of circumstances.

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Though we have blogged about this issue in the past, as it is particularly topical given the article in today's NJ Biz that New Jersey area (including the New York Metropolitan area) job losses are outpacing the national addresses. 

As noted on prior job posts. the standard for modifying support is that there has to be a substantial and continuing change of circumstances.  Moreover, in order to get relief, you must document your job search efforts to show the court that you have made a good faith effort to find a new job.

When a client loses their job, the following things should be done:

1. Retain all documentation from the employer showing that the job loss was involuntary.  If there is a severance agreement and any other documentation, that should be maintained as well as the final paycheck showing the severance received (if paid in a lump sum).
2. Keep a detailed log of all efforts made to find new employment with as much information as possible (who you contacted, when you contacted them, what they said, etc.)  If the communications were in writing, keep copies of all emails, resume's, cover letters, rejection letters, if you applied for a job on lie (i.e. Monster.com), confirmation that you applied for work.
3. If the problem is industry wide, any newspaper, trade or other articles or documentation showing that the industry has contracted or is having problems.

The question arises regarding what you do when offered a job that is not consistent with your prior earnings.  If you have been out or work for a short time, this creates a tough decision about whether to take this job or wait.  If you do take this job, my suggestion early after losing a job, my suggestion would be to continue your job search if at all possible.

If you have been out or work for some time and you have made a good faith job search, while possible, I find it hard to believe that a court would penalize someone for taking work - especially in this economy.

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When most parties enter into what is commonly referred to as a Property Settlement or Marital Settlement Agreement, they do so with the intention that this is a comprehensive agreement, resolving all the issues and a document that will govern their dealings with an ex-spouse going forward.

Oftentimes people are shocked to learn that some provisions in those agreements can be subject to modifications by a court.  Such is the case of the recent unpublished appellate division matter of Anello v. Anello, Decided March 23, 2009, A-2405-07T3. 

These parties were married in 1982 and divorced in 2002 by way of a dual final judgment of divorce incorporating the terms of their Property Settlement Agreement. ("PSA")  Two children were born of this marriage.  In the PSA entered into by the parties, the husband was entitled to alimony, to which there was a specific and detailed waiver of this right.  Husband waived the right to receive permanent alimony and gave wife a greater share of equitable distribution in exchange for a total and permanent waiver of a child support obligation for both children.  Husband did agree to contribute to college expenses and non-recurring extraordinary events for the children.  Husband's waiver of permanent alimony was expressly conditioned upon his non-payment of child support.

Some four years after the agreement was entered into, husband filed a motion seeking custody of the son, child support, alimony and counsel fees.  The parties entered into a Consent Order resolving this motion, which reserved the issues of child support and alimony pending discovery.

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There are times when litigants, without first seeking the advice of an attorney or at times, disregarding the advice of counsel, will file, on their own, motions to the court seeking to change or modify certain aspects of a previously entered agreement reached in resolution of a divorce proceeding or order entered by a court.  For example, an application seeking to change the custodial arrangement for a child.  Certainly individuals have open access to the courts and can choose to represent themselves in court in any type of proceeding.  However, this may not always be the best choice without first knowing, understanding and appreciating the ramifications of the action.

That said, in the recent unpublished deicion of Cacici v. Gallagher, A-4890-07T1, decided February 25, 2009 the parties had been divorced since 1997.  They had previously agreed to joint legal custody of their child and the defendant was designated primary residential parent.  This lasted for some time with plaintiff enjoying liberal visitation with the child.  Initially, after the divorce, the parties got along amicably and had a high level of communication with regards to issues involving their child.

In 2006, defendant was diagnosed with stage-four cancer and underwent surgery.  As a result of her serious illness, she was unable to care for the child and other issues related to the child emerged.  Plaintiff took residential custody of the child and on February 15, 2007, he was granted temporary residential custody of the child due to her difficulties in dealing with defendant's illness.  The child was having documented difficulties in dealing with her mother's illness that affected her school work, her moods, her personality, etc.  These changes were noted by the school's counselors and the child's therapist along with plaintiff.

In 2008, defendant filed, Pro Se (representing herself) an emergent application requesting additional parenting time with the child, alleging that plaintiff was alienating the child and that plaintiff would not allow the child to attend a pre-planned vacation with her  This application was denied and converted into a motion. Plaintiff filed a cross motion alleging several infractions of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement and requesting a denial of defendant's requests regarding parenting time and custody issues. 

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For many, litigation after a final judgment of divorce is a well known reality.  Oftentimes, especially when children are involved, issues arise regarding child support, other expenses for the children, enforcing terms of a judgment or agreement. 

In the matter of Warmke v. Warmke, Appellate Division, decided January 26, 2009, the Court faced such issues as noted above in what stemmed from post judgment motion practice.  Ms. Warmke filed an application with the trial court seeking to fix the amount of childcare arrears owed by Mr. Warmke, modify and enforce child support payments, modify parenting time, modify the amount of life insurance required by their agreement and for counsel fees.  Mr. Warmke filed a cross application requesting that Ms. Warmke contribute to summer camp expenses, a hearing aid for the older child, medical expenses, requiring her to share the transportation reimbursement from the public school and for counsel fees.

The Warmke's had been divorced since 1996 and had entered into an Agreement resolving the outstanding issues in their marriage.  They had two children, the eldest of which suffers from Down Syndrome, Pervasive Developmental Disorder, anxiety disorder, seizures, and hearing and vision impairments.

The parties' agreement provides for joint legal custody. Ms. Warmke has primary physical custody and Mr. Warmke receives liberal parenting time.  At some point after the agreement was entered into, the parties modified their parenting time arrangement, allowing Mr. Warmke primary physical custody during the school summer holiday.

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Pursuant to the statute, the general rule is that the tern of limited duration alimony cannot be extended without unusual circumstances.  A recent Appellate Division decision shed some light on what those circumstances could be.

Jane and Samuel had been married for less than seven years when they got divorced.  They had two children, ages 6 and 4 at the time of the divorce.  Both parties were attorneys although Jane stopped practicing law after the birth of their first child, within the first year of the marriage.  The parties negotiated and entered into an agreement designating Jane with residential custody of the minor children subject to Samuel's visitation and limited duration alimony in the amount of $500 per week for a period of four (4) years.  In addition, Samuel paid $500 per week in child support and child care related expenses to be paid 80% by Samuel, 20% by Jane.

At the time the parties negotiated their agreement, it was assumed that Jane would be able to obtain per diem employment in the law field.  Also, at that time, the oldest child was having difficulties with school and may have had ADD.  Since the time of the divorce, he has been diagnosed with ADD, Asperger's, Obsessive Compulsive disorder and Bi-Polar disorder.  As a result of these diagnosis, Jane argued that she was unable to obtain significant employment such that was contemplated at the time of the divorce.  Jane filed a motion seeking a continuation of her limited duration alimony, an increase in the amount of alimony, the production of financial information or in the alternative an increase in child support, and to establish a fund for their son's medical care.

The trial court denied Jane's application in its entirety.  She appealed and the Appellate Division reversed and remanded. the matter back to the trial court.  The Appellate Court held that an award of limited duration alimony may be modified based either upon changed circumstances or upon the non-occurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the award.  A court may modify the amount of such an award but shall not modify the length of the terms except in unusual circumstances.  N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c).

In this case, the Court found that Jane had established a change of circumstance for an increase in the amount of the limited duration alimony as well as an increase in the term based upon unusual circumstances, i.e. the health of the parties' eldest child.

The court was careful to explain in it's unpublished opinion that a modification to the time for payment of limited duration alimony as well as the amount would only be based upon an ability to prove changed circumstances or upon the non-occurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the award.  Thus, the burden is upon the party making the application (i.e. the recipient spouse) that circumstances have changed such that a modification is necessary and just.  Here, the child's condition was far worse than anyone anticipated at the time of the divorce and Jane simply could not work as contemplated when the matter was settled. 

To read the entire case, click here.

EDITOR'S NOTE:  This case in interesting because there is little law on extending limited duration alimony.  What  is also interesting is that the Appellate Division applied a similar analysis that is used when someone seeks to either extend rehabilitative alimony or convert it to permanent alimony.  Rehabilitative alimony is meant to provide a person with the opportunity to improve their earning ability in order to become self-sufficient, without the need for alimony.                                       Eric S. Solotoff

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One need only pick up any newspaper, turn on any radio or television or even have water cooler conversation, even with those who never used to speak about the economy, to know of the serious economic crisis that this country and the world appear to be facing.  Even today, we read that the stock markets took yet another tumble based upon the news of increased jobless rates.

These realities will no doubt start hitting the family court system if they have not already begun to hit. Specifically, there will be motions by people paying alimony and child support to reduce their support because they have lost their job or have suffered a significant decrease in income.

In the seminal NJ Supreme Court case of Lepis v. Lepis, the historical standard for a modification of support is the showing of a substantial and continuing change of circumstances.  We also know that temporary changes do not form the basis for a modification. 

In fact, in order to get relief, a litigant usually had to show that they have made a significant, diligent job search and despite their best efforts, they could not obtain comparable employment.  How long this had to be depended on the circumstances, but it was probably more than 90 days, or even more than 6 months. 

The question during these times is have we entered a brave new world.  Will someone who worked on Wall Street earning $500,000 per year who has lost their job be expected to get comparable employment?  Should they?  What about the financial professional whose income is based in large part on either commissions or a large yearly bonus that they always used to carry them for the entire year who wont be getting a bonus this year or their commissions are 50% less than last year? 

In the past, when someones income was sporadic, the case law and Child Support Guidelines require that you take an average of 3 or maybe 5 years.  Is that fair now when doom and gloom about the economy is being predicted?  Put another way, is the 3 or 5 year average indicative of what the payor can really earn in this economy? Will the earn at historical levels during the foreseeable future? 

If we use an average now, or impute the last income earned, is that fair?  Is only the payor being forced to sacrifice in that case (assuming for the moment that they even have the ability to pay the prior support which may be unlikely)? If they are forced to pay support based upon passed income, will they ever get the money back when then show in a year or two or three that their income has not and may never be the same> The answer is that this is doubtful. Is this fair?

While representing the recipient, what choice will attorneys have to argue that the laws of imputation and averaging, as the case may be, must be followed by the Courts?  I do not think that we can argue a deviation from the law, to the detriment of our clients.

On the other hand, attorneys for the payor's have to be bold in their arguments that the existing law is distinguishable based upon the current circumstances.  I also think that Judge's must be courageous in their decisions so that the reflect the economic realities.

If the current economic circumstances are ignored, then I foresee a lot more enforcement proceedings, if not a lot more arrest warrants issue for failure to pay support.  In the end, if things continue as they are economically, attorneys and judges should try to work together, creatively, to strive for fairness for all of the parties based upon the economic realities of today.

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In an interesting unpublished Appellate Division decision dated May 23, 2008 in the matter of Pechinka v. Pechinka, A-6089-06T3, the court affirmed a trial court decision that denied an ex-husband's motion to terminate his limited duration alimony. 

At the time of the divorce in 2002, the wife was earning $46,000.  The husband earned $116,000 per year.  They stipulated that there marital lifestyle was $7,000 to $7,500 per month for a family of four  "... in an average month on living expenses." 

In 2006, the wife earned almost $91,000 and with her alimony, she had $6,100 per month in net after tax funds.  This amounts to about 81% to 87% of the joint family net income/lifestyle before the divorce. 

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In an unreported decision of the Appellate Division on April 17, 2008 in the case of Swicinski v. Maul, the Court held that passage of time alone was a sufficient change of circumstance to warrant a modification of the father's parenting time.

In this case, the parties were never married. In 2003, when the child was six weeks old, the Court entered an Order granting the parties joint legal custody, designating the mother as primary residential custodian and granting the father parenting time every Sunday between 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., and between 6:00 p.m. every Monday through 6:00 p.m. the next day. Because that schedule was cumbersome and involved four round-trips in each three-day period, the parties voluntarily modified that schedule so that father's parenting time would begin on Sunday morning and conclude on Monday at 6:00 p.m.

In 2007, the father sought additional parenting time and it was opposed by the mother.  The trial court granted the additional time and the Appellate Division affirmed. 

The trial court noted and the Appellate Division agreed that  parenting time for an infant should be structured differently than parenting time with a 4-year old and that that alone was a change of circumstancee.  The father also had other changes in his life - a new wife, a new home and greater stability.

The trial court also noted that custody and parenting time issues are always subject to review.  That said, in practce, typically, a change of circumstances is necesseary to obtain a modification. 

What should be taken from this case is that the needs of a child differ depending on their ages.  Parenting time that may be appropriate for an infant or toddler, is not necessarily appropriate for an older child.  As such, just because parenting time is settled does not mean that it can never change with time.  This case confirms a common sense argument many have been making for some time.

For a link to the case, click here.

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In late 2007, in Calbi v. Calbi, 396 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2007),  the Appellate Division once again re-affirmed the notion that marital fault is all but irrelevant when assessing a party's right to receive alimony. 

In what was as tragic a case as any parent could imagine, Mr. Calbi sought to terminate or reduce his alimony after one of the party's two children died at the hands of the mother.  Specifically, while intoxicated, during an altercation, Mrs. Calbi kicked her son three times in the head and once in the neck.  He died as a result of the injuries he sustained.  Ultimately, Mrs. Calbi plead guilty to second degree aggravated assault for which she was to be imprisoned for approximately 3 years.  As a result of the grief and trauma associated with the loss of his son as well as the added responsibilities for caring for the parties' other son, Mr. Calbi fell behind on his alimony.  In light of all of the circumstances, he sought the reduction if not elimination of alimony. 

The trial judge ultimately that any application to terminate alimony should await Mrs. Calbi's release from prison.  However, the current support was suspended, but the prior arrears were not vacated and Mr. Calbi was ordered to pay them. 

The Appellate Division reversed holding that suspension of Mr. Calbi's alimony payments and vacation of the alimony arrears that accrued after death of parties' child was required.  Moreover, upon Mrs. Calbi's release from prison, Mr. Calbi was entitled to a hearing  to determine whether the child's death affected his ability to pay alimony. 

That said, the Court went back and reviewed the cases regarding fault, including the 2005 case of Mani wherein Justice Long held that marital fault was irrelevant to alimony except in two narrow instances: cases in which fault has affected the economic life of the parties, and “cases in which the fault so violates societal norms that continuing the economic bonds between the parties would confound notions of simple justice.”   Justice Long spoke of   “egregious fault,” which she defined as acts by their very nature, are different in kind, such as a spouse attempting to murder the other spouse; a spouse who as deliberately infected the other with a loathsome disease.  Justice Long went on to say,  "Underlying these examples is the concept that some conduct, by its very nature is so outrageous that it can be said to violate the social contract, such that society would not abide continuing the economic bonds between the parties. In the extremely narrow class of cases in which such conduct occurs, it may be considered by the court, not in calculating an alimony award, but in the initial determination of whether alimony should be allowed at all." 

Since Mrs. Calbi's actions were not deemed to be intentional, either in the criminal court or the family court, she was not precluded from receiving alimony no matter how contemptible or aberrant her conduct was. 

That said, if this conduct will not terminate alimony, then there is little by way of fault that would do so. 

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