RESOLVING ISSUES OF CREDIBILITY WITHOUT A TRIAL - HOW FAR IS TOO FAR?

Picture this - two spouses in a matrimonial dispute.  The husband (or former husband) files a motion to reduce his alimony.  In support of that motion, the husband files a certification, under oath, telling his side of the story about how he lost his job, has a disability, or whatever reason it is that has caused his down income.  On the flip side, the wife files her response to the husband's motion, with a certification of her own, telling her side of the story about the husband is still living lavishly, is lying to the court, and is simply doing what he has to do to reduce his payment obligation to her.  Not surprisingly, the two versions of events could not be more diametrically opposed.

 

In that scene, what is the trial judge supposed to do?  Is he just supposed to take the husband's word for it that he can no longer earn what he did before and that his entire financial picture merits a reduction of his support?  Is he supposed to believe the wife's response, about how her former husband is simply just a bad guy who refuses to pay that to which he agreed or was ordered.

 

Generally - but, of course - not always, a trial judge is not supposed to resolve the question of credibility, or who is telling the truth, simply by reading the papers submitted by each party.  When there is a dispute of fact, the judge is supposed to then order a hearing, during which time he will take testimony from the parties and then determine who is credible/truthful.  Ordering a hearing, though, does not happen in every case, as almost every case will inevitably involve some dispute of fact, to some degree.  If the judge ordered a hearing in each instance, the family part would be even more flooded than they already are. 

So at what point has a judge gone "too far" by resolving a dispute of fact on the papers without holding a hearing.  The recently decided Appellate Division matter of Scianni v. Scianni presented such a case.  Without going into too much detail, former husband sought to reduce his alimony from that set forth in a settlement agreement because he argued that he could no longer earn what he once did.  Wife disagreed and espoused on how her ex was still enjoying a lavish lifestyle, complete with a vacation villa in St. Maarten.  

 

In denying the husband's request for a reduction of his alimony, the trial judge made several findings of credibility on the papers alone, providing as follows in his decision: 

[W]hen I read this certification of Mr. Scianni I was very moved. However, in reading the certification of Ms. Scianni, there's a completely different picture painted of Mr. Scianni. And I realize that the problem that the [c]ourt is so often faced [with], . . . faced every single time I get one of these motions, is that you got two different certifications . . . at completely different ends of the spectrum.

 And it's very difficult to sort truth from fiction, and who's telling the truthAnd oftentimes you're probably better off just throwing the certifications out the window and making a decision based on something else.  However, in this case, what really rings a bell of credibility to me is the certification of Ms. Scianni. She says that, hey, do not believe Mr. Scianni. This is a divorce which was hotly contested. It was, it lasted for approximately four plus years. And that Mr. Scianni . . . knows no boundaries and will do everything he can to not have to pay his obligation and fight me.  I would note that Mr. Scianni has been current up until this time. But Ms. Scianni in her certification provides some proofs which certainly raise red flag[s] with the [c]ourt as to whether or not Mr. Scianni is being sincere and candid with the [c]ourt. And I don't think he is.  He's crying poverty yet he is still able to maintain a vacation villa down in St. Martin at the Ritz Carlton, and I would . . . note that according to the certification of Ms. Scianni, that this was a property which was underwater figuratively in that they owed, the parties owed money on this property. Now the property is current, up to date, paid off, and Mr. Scianni claims, well, you know, it's the mortgage on the property is really my cousin, but I have to hire a lawyer down in St. Martin to make some changes.

 You know, and Ms. Scianni goes on to further state that you know, he claims he's driving a borrowed car, but he recently was seen driving a Mercedes Benz. If it is a borrowed car, why doesn't he provide any proof as to who the real owner of the borrowed car is. And if he was to do that, then the [c]ourt . . . might be surprised as to who really is the owner of the borrowed car. That certainly raises a red flag as well.

 Ms. Scianni also points out that his practice that he's still working, that his practice, I should not go by his recent tax returns, that Mr. Scianni has been known to take cash in the past and not declare that on his tax returns, and that it is certainly not beyond Mr. Scianni to do that. This is a woman that has lived with Mr. Scianni, knows what Mr. Scianni is like. And that certainly has a ring of credibility to it as well.

I have highlighted certain portions of the trial court decision above, each of which causes alarm as to the trial court's findings.  The Appellate Division also took issue with several portions of the trial court's comments, indicating that, while a trial court has broad discretion in reviewing a request to modify alimony, and that not every factual dispute merits a plenary hearing, the factual disputes surrounding the husband's ability to generate income merited a trial.

 

It further noted that the "red flags" uncovered by the trial court in the papers does not escape the need for a hearing to properly resolve the factual dispute with testimony, nor does a reliance by the court upon one spouse's indication that she knows what the other spouse is like.  As a result, the Appellate Division not only remanded the matter for further proceedings, but also directed that such proceedings be before a new trial judge in light of the credibility findings already made by the former judge.

 

This was an interesting decision for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that not often do we come across cases where an entire decision is overturned on the basis of the credibility findings, or lack thereof.  While there is often a gray area as to when a factual dispute between parties merits a hearing with testimony, this case fell beyond that area where the findings of credibility on major facts in dispute was clear and required a reversal.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group. Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com

 

WOMAN OBTAINS DIVORCE DUE TO HUSBAND'S SMALL MANHOOD

In a story likely to make men worldwide a bit more insecure about themselves, a Taiwanese woman recently procured a divorce from her husband, in part, because he had a small penis.  Making matters worse was the wife's quote that "His penis is so small, like a kid's, only 5 centimeters long.  We've never had sex in our entire marriage."  

 

Likely in an effort to keep his parts private, the husband allegedly refused to have sexual intercourse with his wife prior to the marriage, citing religious reasons.  It was only on the parties' wedding night when the wife first discovered the "issue."  Notably, however, the wife also claimed that the husband was impotent and unable to fulfill his responsibility as a husband (in a response that most men could not argue with, the husband simply preferred to fulfill his duty in the morning, and was too tired when she came calling at around midnight).

 

 

This case brought to mind the recent matter, also subject to tabloid fodder, where a man was granted a divorce because he claimed his wife was ugly.  His claim was that their child looked nothing like the wife, and it was then that the wife revealed that she had undergone massive plastic surgery to make her more physically attractive.

 

Are these cases on the far side of bizarre?  Absolutely.  Do they provide the sort of subject matter that the New York Post, Huffington Post and Daily Mail feast on for readers.  Certainly.  How then, can they possibly relate to New Jersey law?  Well, as we have blogged about in the past, New Jersey is a "no fault" state, where people typically obtain a divorce based on irreconcilable differences without getting into such tawdry claims like a man's package size or a wife's looks.  

 

These types of claims, however, may be a basis for an annulment in New Jersey.  As many readers may know from the ongoing Kardashian/Humphries saga, an annulment nullifies the divorce retroactively, as if it never happened.  New Jersey's annulment law may be based on several claims including bigamy, duress, lack of age (non-age), incapacity, impotence, incest, and fraud.

 

Without getting into the details of what each of those options means, for the sake of this post and the husband's dignity, we can focus on the claims of impotence and fraud.  Here, aside from the husband's alleged lack of stature, the wife also claimed that the husband was impotent and unable to fulfill his husband-type duties.  The wife added that she did not discover this to be the case until the parties' wedding night.  In New Jersey, she could, as a result, potentially have a claim for an annulment based on the husband's impotence.  Whether such a claim, or that with the so-called "ugly" wife could fall under a claim of fraud is a stretch, but so are the facts of these cases.

 

While I am not sure what lessons can be learned here, one thing that can be said for sure is that, thankfully, in New Jersey, it is not the size that matters.

 

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group. Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com

"RESOLVING" A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MATTER - A CAREFUL BALANCING ACT

We have written before on the topics of the use and misuse of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, and representing a litigant in a domestic violence matter.  Within the past few weeks, a few experiences have brought this topic back to the forefront, and I thought that now was a good time to address the issues, especially in the context of "resolving" such matters.  As a family law attorneys, we frequently encounter domestic violence as a component of our practice.  Whether it happens in the context of an ongoing divorce, entirely independent of a marital relationship, or something different altogether, each case is certainly different from the next, and each case resides on its own motivations, so to speak.  

What I mean by that is, the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act is a vital piece of legislation designed to protect actual victims of domestic violence.  Countless matters come across our desks involving legitimate, truthful victims in need of the law's immediate protection from an abusive defendant.  Some of the most difficult matters involve those where we represent real victims with tragic fears of harm, including those who are immersed in the cycle of violence looking for a way out.  Considering the risk to such a victim if a final restraining order is not granted, the import of the litigation is vital.

On the other hand, many cases - typically in the context of an ongoing divorce matter - involve a litigation-minded spouse simply looking to get the proverbial "leg up" over the other spouse in that separate, but related matter.  Since the law is liberal in its protection of victims, it is often quite easy to procure a temporary restraining order, where the alleged victim can seemingly state whatever allegation he or she deems appropriate so long as it results in procuring a TRO.  There are several well known cases addressing the judiciary's obligation to look out for those litigants who are trying to use the law to his or her advantage, as such an occurrence is unfortunately all too common. 

For example, where two parties are engaged in a custody dispute, New Jersey's custody statute and law dictates that a final restraining order against one party results in a presumption that the victim will procure custody of the child.  Similarly, two parties often live in the marital home during a divorce, either because neither party wants to leave, neither party can afford to leave, etc.  A restraining order against one party will - at least temporarily - force that party to leave the home.  From there, the so-called "victim" can use the temporary situation as leverage to keep the other spouse out of the marital home. It is because of such potential incidents that Eric Solotoff, in the "use and misuse" blog entry referenced above, suggests the use of a recording device to document the truth of what transpired.

 

What do I mean by leverage, especially since such a term seems completely incongruous with domestic violence?  As a threshold matter, it is important to understand that a domestic violence matter cannot be settled or resolved, which is why I used quotations around "resolving" in the title to this entry.  The law, however, does allow for an interesting device by which the victim may voluntarily withdraw his or her domestic violence and enter into a consent order with the other party that incorporates into the order what are commonly referred to as "civil restraints."  

 

Essentially, all of the restraints and protections contained in the restraining order can be transferred to an order - mutually agreed upon by both parties - and entered by the trial judge in the divorce or custody/support matter, rather than the domestic violence judge.  Defendants generally prefer this type of arrangement because it removes the risk associated with having a final restraining order entered against them, with all of the penalties/negatives associated with such entry.  It is this preference, however, upon which alleged victims will often rely to procure additional relief under the threat of a final hearing against the significant other.

 

This form of order cannot be entered into the domestic violence matter, especially since a component of this type of arrangement involves the voluntarily withdrawal and dismissal of that matter.  The differences between a final restraining order and the consent order include, but are not limited to, enforcement (a violation of the final restraining order can result in a criminal charge, while a violation of the consent order is addressed by a way of a motion for enforcement, with potential monetary relief), and the ability to include a wide range of terms in the consent order that would not otherwise be found in the restraining order.  For instance, where an incident of domestic violence is alleged at or near the outset of a matter, the alleged victim will often attempt to procure all sorts of interim financial or custodial relief that would otherwise have to be sought by way of a motion for pendente lite relief.  

 

Negotiating with a cloud of domestic violence allegations hanging overhead is not your typical negotiation, for sure.  At any time, negotiations can break down and the matter will proceed to the final hearing on the domestic violence complaint that everyone was trying to avoid.  Considering the issues at hand, one party reneging on the terms of an agreement can typically do so without consequence - simply put, it is highly unlikely that a trial court would ever enforce the terms of a settlement agreement against either party when allegations of domestic violence are involved. 

 

Even worse, a strong set of allegations against a defendant really pushes that party's back up against the wall - i.e., proceed to a final hearing with the risk of the final restraining order in view, or concede to all sorts of language in a consent order that the other party would likely never have procured without the existing allegations of domestic violence.  At the end of the day, it is an emotionally charged and difficult high wire act where the wrong statement, step, or proposal can result in the breakdown of the negotiating process and commencement of the final restraining order hearing.

 

Thus, while a domestic violence matter can be "resolved," the settlement picture is often a lot more crowded, complicated, and even potentially strategic than one would think.  Having experienced legal counsel to guide you through this process, whether you are the victim or the defendant in a domestic violence matter, is critical.  The stakes are too high not to know and understand your rights in this area of family law.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group. Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com

THE MORNING AFTER THE DIVORCE CASE ENDS - A CAUTIONARY TALE

Following up on my most recent blog post discussing pressure tactics used by one spouse against the other to force an inequitable settlement, I wanted to focus on the example where one spouse tries to "get around" the lawyers to privately discuss settlement with the other spouse.  In my prior entry, I noted that a financially superior spouse will often take this tack to impose his desired terms of settlement upon the other spouse.  The day after the Court enters a Judgment of Divorce ending the marriage, the financially inferior spouse wakes up and regrets the deal she just made.

While I am not generally against the notion of spouses talking to each other in an effort to resolve their matter, the involvement of lawyers is key for conveying notions of what is fair or unfair.  Here are a few questions that come to mind:

1.  How do you know whether the alimony and child support are fair?

2.  How do you know whether the equitable distribution is fair?

3.  How do you know what is an appropriate custody and parenting time arrangement?

4.  How do you know what you are entitled to under the law as a spouse, parent and litigant?

I recently had a case where, no matter how many times I asked the other lawyer to convey to her client not to discuss the terms of settlement with my client, he continued to do so.  What was my concern?  Well, each time my client came back to me with allegedly agreed upon terms of settlement, they seemed to get worse and worse for her.  I would then advise her on what I thought was fair and unfair, and made suggestions as to a response that I should make to his lawyer, rather than my client to her spouse directly.  I then wouldn't hear any response from the other lawyer, but, like clockwork, the husband would call my client and berate her for what she proposed through counsel.  

At the end of the day, my client simply gave in to the husband's financial pressure and took a deal that was against my recommendation.  She was not interested in litigating the matter to learn more about his finances, what he really could and could not afford to pay (even though he admitted during a settlement conference to a far higher income than that set forth in his formal settlement position), and was not interested in hearing from the Early Settlement Panel or a mediator what she was actually entitled to, or what was reasonable.  She knew that there was a very good chance that she was going to wake up the next morning and regret when she signed the settlement agreement.  It was the husband's relentless pressure and refusal to bend on any issue, though, that ultimately carried the day.  Clearly, he knew she would cave if he put enough pressure on her.

What is the lesson to be learned here?  While the short-term resolution of your matter might lift a great weight off of your shoulders in the short-term, it is the long-term damage that you may have caused for yourself that you will live to regret.  Taking the time to work with a divorce lawyer to know and understand your rights, and what the potential long-term impact of settlement will be is not a sign of wanting to spend money on lawyers and "fight" in court.  Rather, it is usually a thoughtful way of proceeding to protect yourself, your children, and your future.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group. Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com

NEW ARBITRATION TRACK PROPOSED IN FAMILY MATTERS

There can be many benefits to arbitrating your case, rather than litigating your case through the court system including, but not limited to, a faster proceeding, a more amicable process, decreased litigation costs (despite having to pay the arbitrator), a jointly selected person to preside over your case (perhaps a retired family court judge or an experienced family law attorney), and greater privacy in your matter (especially encouraged in matters involving potential tax issues).  In a move designed to further the use of this private, alternative dispute resolution method between parties in family law matters, the Supreme Court of New Jersey Family Practice Committee has proposed a new "arbitration track".

Interestingly, this new rule would allow the court system to still keep an eye over your matter, impose time limits on the length of the matter, provide specific procedures for parties to follow, and actually incentivize parties to consider this method by giving priority to an arbitration, as if it were an actual trial.

 Presently, Rule 5:1-4 of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey establishes different "tracks" for each family case:

1.  Priority track if the matter involves contested custody or parenting time issues.

2.  Complex track if the matter appears likely to require a "disproportionate" expenditure of court and litigant resources in preparation for trial and at trial due to the number of parties, number of claims/defenses, legal difficulty of the issues, factual difficulty of the issues, the length/complexity of discovery, or a combination of all of the above.

3.  Expedited track if it appears that "it can be promptly tried with minimal pretrial proceedings, including discovery," as further detailed in the rule.

4.  Standard track if the matter does not qualify for any of the other three tracks listed above.

You might ask the question - how and when will a court know what track my case should be assigned to.  Well, the rule provides for that too - "as soon as practicable after all parties have filed Family Case Information Statements," (a required document detailing income, assets, liabilities, and budgets) or after a Case Management Conference (a status conference with the court), whichever is sooner.  The parties may also often agree on what track to assign to their case.  Importantly, if the parties agree to a track, the matter will not be assigned to a different track except if there is "good cause" to do so.

The proposed Arbitration Track would be added to this rule, "in the event that the parties enter into a written consent order or agreement to arbitrate issues presented in actions pending before the Family Part."  Straying from the provision above allowing the parties to demonstrate "good cause" in support of a different track assignment or reassignment, a matter on the arbitration track cannot be reassigned even if good cause exists to do so.  Essentially, once you have decided to go down the arbitration track, it is not easy to get off.

Certain notable conditions/prerequisites proposed by the Committee include:

1.  Requiring each party to execute a proposed Arbitration Questionnaire (recommended for inclusion in the Appendix to the Court Rules) prior to executing an agreement or consent order to arbitrate.  Each party's questionnaire would be attached to the agreement or consent order, demonstrating that each party understood the implications of the agreement to arbitrate.

2.  Mandating that no arbitration shall be pending for more than a year following arbitration track assignment (which may be modified on this issue for good cause shown).

3.  Arbitration track cases should be given "scheduling consideration" when fixing trial dates in other matters - an interesting incentive as I highlighted at the outset.

4.  The required certification pursuant to Rule 5:4-2(h) shall indicate that the parties have a written agreement to arbitrate.

The proposed procedure covers all agreements to arbitrate family matters between "parties to any proceeding arising from a family or family-type relationship", except when the matter involves a) the annulment or dissolution of a relationship; b) actions involving the Division of Child Protection and Permanency; c) domestic violence actions; d) juvenile delinquency actions; e) family crisis actions; and f) adoption actions.  

As to an arbitrator's award, the rule proposes:

1.  Unless the agreement or consent order provides otherwise, "any interim award of the arbitrator shall be subject to confirmation by the court in accordance with R. 4:42-1(b)."

2.  Unless the agreement or consent order provides otherwise, "the final award of the arbitrator shall be confirmed pursuant to the procedures set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:23-1, et seq. and/or N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1, et. seq."

Thus, it appears that the arbitration agreements will still allow parties to decide what issues will be subject to arbitration and even the degree to which an arbitrator's award will be subject to court confirmation.   A sample written agreement and the proposed questionnaire are also provided.  

It is in the sample agreement where the parties can determine the scope of the arbitration, and wherein it indicates that the matter will remain in the court system while arbitration proceeds pursuant to the proposed time limits.  The proposed agreement also contains language as to arbitrator costs/payment, discovery, the right to review of an arbitrator's award, evidence rules, and the arbitrator's authority.  

Comments on the proposed rule are due by April 1, 2013.  It will be interesting to see if and how proposed track proceeds, and how it will impact upon parties use of alternative dispute resolution.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group. Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com

MOM INSULTS SON ON FACEBOOK - LOSES CUSTODY

There is never a shortage of new and interesting stories involving social media that impact upon our world of family law.  We have previously blogged about what NOT to do online, because there may be a spouse ready and willing to use such online postings, pictures and the like against you in your divorce proceeding. 

Apparently the Mom in the case of Melody M. did not read our blog posts. In a decision from a New York appellate court that garnered enough attention that I first read about it in the New York Daily News, Mom lost legal custody of the children for being mean to her oldest child on Facebook.

The basic facts were relatively straightforward.  The parties entered into a separation agreement in 2006 providing for joint custody of their three children, with "alternating physical placement."  In 2009, the parties stipulated to continuing joint legal custody, with Dad having primary physicla custody and Mom having scheduled parenting time for an evening each week and on weekends during the school year.  In 2010, Mom commenced the first proceeding to increase her parenting time.  Dad opposed the requested modification, and, among other things, sought his own form of modification by requesting that he be granted sole legal custody of the children.

In granting Dad's request for sole legal custody, the Family Court found a change in circumstances based on what it deemed was a "sufficient deterioration in the parties' relationship . . ." In determining what legal custody situation would be in the best interests of the children, the Family Court noted that Mom had engaged in a "pattern of inappropriate behvavior" that had an impact on the oldest child, who happened to also have mental health issues and received counseling. Aside from not participating in the counseling, failing to heed the counselor's recommendations, and often asking Dad to pick up oldest son during her parenting time because she had difficulty in dealing with the child's behavior, Mom also testified to swearing and yelling at the child, as well as using "physical means" towards him.

It is here when the case then took a turn towards the more unusual, as the Family Court also noted that Mom utilized Facebook "to insult and demean the child, who was then 10 years old, by, among other things, calling him an 'a-shole'." Even worse, Mom actually testified "without remorse" that she called her son that expletive on Facebook because that is what "[h]e is" and thought it important for her Facebook friends to know. Encapsulating Mom's testimony, the Court concluded that "charitably stated," Mom's testimony "reflected a lack of insight as to the nature of her conduct toward her oldest child."

The Court even went so far as to impose an Order of Protection against Mom, precluding Mom from posting anything to or about her children.on any social media site, even of a positive nature.

While this case was out of New York, it could certainly apply in New Jersey as well. Mom's conduct here was abhorrent, especially considering the age and mental troubles of the child to whom her postings were directed. It is a simple reminder, though, that anything you do, say, or think online can be used against you in a family law proceeding, whether it be divorce, custody, domestic violence, and the like.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group. Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com

DO YOU KNOW THE LAW BEHIND YOUR OWN CASE?

Recently I posted about questioning whether your own attorney knows what he is doing and, as part of that question, whether the attorney knows the law surrounding your divorce or related family law matter.  A related question worth discussion is whether you know and understand the law and how it impacts your case.

With busy schedules filled to the brim with jobs, childcare responsibilities, and other daily stressors, I do not want my clients to undertake the unnecessary burden of purchasing a family law textbook and learning its contents front to back.  I do, however, encourage my clients to at least become familiar with the main points of the law.  For instance, most clients seem to know the general principles of equitable distribution in New Jersey - i.e., most assets, under the law, are subject to a 50/50 distribution absent any other factors, credits, or details; most clients also know, and readily offer, his or her awareness of New Jersey's permanent alimony option. 

It was a recent incident that brought this issue to my attention.  During a first meeting with the parties and a custody expert in a very acrimonious matter, the expert asked one spouse whether her lawyers had explained to her the law of relocation.  She answered "no," despite relocation being one of the primary issues in the case and her desired result.  The expert then asked if her attorneys had made her aware of the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Baures v. Lewis, and the Appellate Division's decision in O'Connor v. O'Connor, each of which are seminal cases on the issue of relocation.  The wife answered "no" to each.  Our client, by contrast, was aware of these cases because we took the time to advise him of the cases, and explain their underlying principles.  The expert then directed the wife to ask her attorneys to explain to her the law and those cases.

What is the lesson to be learned here?  If your client is going to spend tens of thousands of dollars, if not more, litigating an issue, make sure that he or she understands the law.  If there is a lack of understanding, or lack of awareness, then how is he or she supposed to know whether their position is reasonable, whether it is worth litigating over, and whether to settle?  An informed client better knows the risks, perils, pitfalls, and chances of success, no matter what area of law is involved.  In family law, where the stakes are often higher and more emotional, it is even more critical. 

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group. Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.   

SHOULD THE OTHER PARTY BE ALLOWED TO HAVE PARENTING TIME WITH HIS NEW GIRLFRIEND PRESENT?

Clients frequently ask whether it is appropriate for his or her spouse to exercise parenting time with the children in the presence of the new significant other.  The questions usually go something like this:

  • Can she be there when the kids are there?
  • Should they be sleeping in the same room with the kids right down the hallway?
  • How can he be there with the kids when I have not met him?
  • Does this impact our custody and parenting time dispute?
  • Are the kids going to get mixed messages?
  • Should we bring this to the court's attention and, if we do, will the judge even care?

These are just a few of the questions that may arise when your spouse starts dating someone in the middle of the divorce and wants to introduce the children to that person, have parenting time with that person present and, perhaps, have overnight parenting time with the kids just a few feet away in the room next door. 

With the changing times come changing attitudes towards such parenting time.  Exposing the children to a new girlfriend or boyfriend is not nearly as taboo as it once was, and, at least in New Jersey, it is generally accepted.  While this is an issue that can always be discussed between the parties and counsel, and while there are always certain cases where a judge might think twice about exposing the children to a new significant other, such as if there is a suspected harm to the children in doing so, there is usually no longer an issue. 

I find that judge's are less willing, however, to allow overnight parenting time, at least during the divorce, depending on a variety of factors including, but not limited to, the circumstances surrounding the new relationship, the sleeping arrangements, and the like. On the more extreme end, I recently had a case where my client's spouse had an affair and then demanded to exercise her overnight parenting time with the children present where the kids were aware of what was going on.  Evaluating the circumstances at issue, the trial judge sensibly precluded the boyfriend's presence during the wife's overnight parenting time. 

However, as opposed to Alabama - as highlighted in Eric Solotoff's recent blog post - such conduct will also likely have little to no impact on a custody dispute.

Thus, while you may dislike the idea of your children meeting the new boyfriend or girlfriend, changing social norms dictate that it is more likely to be accepted than not.  With that in mind, divorcing parents should work together to make the children understand and feel comfortable with the changing situation.  The dating spouse should take caution in how, when and where the children should first meet the new person in their life.  Ultimately, courts are going to watch out for the best interests of the children, and any hint that the situation poses a negative to the children will be immediately addressed as necessary.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group. Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.  

JUST THE FACTS JACK - OR A LEGITIMATE QUESTION OF CREDIBILITY?

It seems that moving parties are more often trying to overcome the defects of their motions by arguing that a plenary hearing should be held due to unresolved questions of fact or issues of credibility.  In other words, the litigant asks the court to hold a trial at some point in the future because the party asserts that the court cannot properly resolve the party's motion simply by reviewing the disputing positions of the respective parties set forth on paper. 

While the case law indicates that a court cannot resolve issues of credibility or disputed facts without a trial, involving testimony, properly submitted evidence and the like, litigants often try to use such case law as a crutch to get past the fact that their motion should be denied on its face.  What often happens, as a result, is that a court will err on the side of caution in the realm of judicial discretion and grant the hearing.  The collateral damage is the incurrence of additional counsel fees, and substantial time before the motion is actually decided, thereby leaving the parties in limbo.  While hearings are often necessary to resolve legitimate issues, the question is whether the issue is always legitimate.

For the financially superior moving party, this may be exactly what he or she wants, as convincing a court to grant a future hearing can be an effective tactic to pressure the financially inferior party to settle.  While that party can seek counsel fees from the court to help take them through the litigation against the other party on an even playing field, there is no certainty that such fees will be granted.

I recently experienced such a scenario where my client had not been paid alimony in quite some time.  She was afraid to file a motion, knowing that her former spouse would come after her with "guns blazing."  Finally, on the verge of financial destitution, she filed a motion to enforce the property settlement agreement compelling the husband to pay.  In response, the husband claimed that the parties had verbally agreed at some point in the past to terminate alimony.  There was no proof in support of his assertion other than his own words that there was such an agreement.  My client denied the existence of the agreement.

It was because of this disputed issue of fact, where the parties' respective certifications stood toe-to-toe with each other, that the court granted a plenary hearing to determine, through the taking of testimony and review of evidence, whether there was a prior agreement to terminate alimony.  The court did afford some interim financial relief, however, recognizing the financial situation faced by my client.

The judge's decision was completely reasonable and understandable - how else was the court to resolve the issue of whether there was an agreement without holding a trial to make that determination?  In fact, I have been on the opposite side of the very same sort of motion, advocating for the existence of a prior verbal agreement to terminate alimony, which the parties lived by for several years as an implied acknowledgment of same.  Ultimately, however, this is a problem that can plague each and every motion.  Whenever a spouse or former spouse seeks to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement, the other party can respond that there was a verbal agreement not to abide by such language, with the hopes of getting a plenary hearing. 

Many settlement agreements contain language that the agreement itself may not be modified unless the change is made in writing, and entered through formal measures.  Even this language, however, is not bulletproof, as a verbal agreement may, in fact, have been made, and the parties, as I reference in the last paragraph, may have lived by it for several years, thereby creating a strong argument for the opposing party.  Notwithstanding, there does arise an issue with the case law calling for a plenary hearing in the face of competing certifications.

I encountered another example recently where a father sought a reduction of his child support.  Every single document submitted on his behalf suggested that his financial situation had, if not improved, at least remained steady.  His certification, however, told a very different story, claiming the "gloom and doom" of his financial situation. Not surprisingly, my client disputed his claims, pointing in large part to the black and white numbers in the exhibits attached to dad's certification. 

Perhaps realizing the fatal defects of his application, dad's response was to the effect of, "mom's story is at odds with mine and, as a result, this court should hold a plenary hearing to find out the truth."  During oral argument, dad told the same story, to which we responded that numbers on a page are not "bells and whistles," or the subject of competing certifications.  Rather, it is simple fact, as it was clear that dad was simply seeking that plenary hearing with the hope of being able to pressure our client into an inequitable settlement since she could not afford a discovery period and trial.

When up against such a situation, it is important that you, as the litigant, point out that the situation is not a matter of competing certifications and credibility, but that the numbers at issue tell the true story.  It is also important to convey to the court that almost every case involves certifications at odds with each other, and that it should take more than simple "pen to paper", with no supporting evidence, to take up the court's time with a time consuming and expensive trial. 

The court calendars are experiencing enough backlog that there needs to be some sort of "gatekeeper" standard to ensure to prevent this sort of litigation.   Where there is a legitimate dispute of fact and credibility, then a hearing should certainly be granted so that testimony can allow the court to reach the truth of the matter.  Unfortunately, as with my prior post regarding motions for reconsideration, this is not always the case.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group.  Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.  

SOUR GRAPES AND A ROTTEN APPLE - WHEN RECONSIDERATION IS MORE LIKE FRUIT SALAD

Litigants who are displeased with the outcome of a judicial decision can rest assured that there exist multiple avenues by which a review of the decision may occur – mainly, in the form of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal.  This post focuses on the reconsideration route, which, despite the large number such motions that are filed, is actually supposed to be quite strict in its application. 

As a matter of common sense and an effort to avoid an even worse judicial calendar backlog than that which currently exists, reconsideration applications are not simply a way for the unhappy litigant to get another “bite of the apple”.   More often than not, however, it seems that reconsideration applications are exactly that –a way for the dissatisfied party to be heard again on the same issues with the hope that the trial judge will simply change his or her mind. 

Rule 4:49-2, which applies to reconsideration motions, does not provide much by way of direction.  Rather, it focuses largely on the deadline for filing.  It states:

 

Except as otherwise provided by R. 1:13-1 (clerical errors) a motion for rehearing or reconsideration seeking to alter or amend a judgment or order shall be served not later than 20 days after service of the judgment or order upon all parties by the party obtaining it.  The motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred, and shall have annexed thereto a copy of the judgment or order sought to be reconsidered and a copy of the court’s corresponding written opinion, if any.  

 

Various cases have fleshed out what constitutes a sufficient basis for reconsideration:

  • The court’s decision is based on plainly incorrect reasoning;
  • The court failed to consider evidence;
  • There is good reason for it to reconsider new information that was not available at the time of the prior judgment/order; 
  • By correlation, the motion may not be based on facts known by the moving party prior to the entry of the judgment or order; and
  • The motion may not simply be an effort by the moving party to reargue the motion and expand the record – the motion is not an opportunity for the previously losing party to attempt a second “bite of the apple”.

In the decision of Michel v. Michel, 210 N.J. Super. 218 (Ch. Div. 1985), the trial judge perfectly summed up the problems with motions for reconsideration, especially in the Family Part:

. . . This practice [filing motions for reconsideration], developed by attorneys, has become a mechanism by which unhappy litigants attempt once more to air their positions and relitigate issues already decided.  It has also been employed (although not in this case) as a method by which a party extends the time in which he must appeal. . . . Additionally, it is observed that the effect of such procedure is an unnecessary duplication of court time and counsel fees to the client.  Considering the volume of matrimonial motions, the result of this practice is to increase the backlog of the Court’s workload, only to be followed by, in the great majority of cases, the inevitable appeal.   Thus, not only is court time duplicated and thereby wasted, but also wasted are hundreds and thousands of dollars in legal fees generated. . . . Such practice should further be discouraged inasmuch as it tends to erode the policy of according finality to decisions of the Court.  If dissatisfied with a post-judgment order, a litigant has the right to appeal. 

 

The practice of allowing motions for reconsideration, however, leaves the responding party forever open to the threat of being summoned into court to relitigate an issue presumably decided.  Such is inherently unfair and offensive to our traditional notion of res judicata.  To routinely permit such practice to continue approaches a legal system, which recognized neither res judicata nor a statute of limitations - the litigant must live in constant anticipation that at any time he may be brought before a court to resolve an issue, which he thought, had been resolved. 

 

Despite such wisdom, it is clear that the moving party in the recently unpublished (not precedential)  Appellate Division decision of Proetto v. Proetto did not get the memo.  Utilizing the points I have outlined above, the Appellate Division found that the moving party appealing his denied motion for reconsideration was simply – and improperly – attempting to expand the record and regargue his originally denied motion.  As a result, his appeal went nowhere. 
There are lessons to be learned from the above that we as matrimonial attorneys have to stress to our clients:

 

  • A second bite may have you reaching into your wallet for the other party - Simply relitigating a previously denied motion will not only likely result in a denial, but you may also be compelled to pay the other party’s counsel fees for having to respond to the application a second time;
  • Provide all relevant existing evidence with your original motion - Do not suddenly produce evidence to the court that you should have – and could have – produced in the first place – i.e., if you are seeking a modification of alimony and you purposely do not include your most recent tax return, do not expect the court to react so kindly when, suddenly on reconsideration, the tax return is attached to your certification as a form of “new evidence”;
  • Be specific - The basis of your application should not simply be that it was an unfair result – the epitome of the “sour grapes” reaction.  Rather, the application needs to be specific, outlining just how the evidence upon which the trial court ruled was applied in error, or somehow overlooked a critical point that would have, and should have, resulted in a different decision.
  • Be strategic with your filing - If you plan on filing an appeal, filing a motion for reconsideration beforehand may simply provide the trial judge with an additional opportunity to cement the reasoning and findings for the prior decision, thereby rendering potentially more difficult the chances of success on appeal.  

Thus, while a motion for reconsideration is certainly a viable option when you receive an unfavorable result, it is important to realize that the court is not simply going to pretend that you never filed that prior motion.  Rather, if anything, your second motion will be looked at with greater scrutiny to make sure that you are not trying to bite the so-called apple to its core.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group.  Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.  

Read Aaron Weem's Interesting Post Entitled "Emotional Abuse Just As Harmful as Physical Abuse"

Aaron Weems is an attorney in our Blue Bell (Montgomery County), Pennsylvania office and editor of the firm's Pennsylvania Family Law Blog wrote an excellent post entitled "Emotional Abuse Just as Harmful as Physical Abuse."

While some of the local programs Aaron discusses for his county may not be available in New Jersey, the piece provides a good explanation of the issues and I encourage you to read it.

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Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric practices in Fox Rothschild's Roseland, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973)994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

GETTING BY WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM YOUR FRIENDS - EXCEPT THAT ALL CASES ARE DIFFERENT

All too often I hear from clients about how they should end up with a specific result in their case because their friends went through divorces of their own and ended up with that desired result, or something similar.  I can certainly sympathize with a client who want to talk to their loved ones and other people who have gone through what they are going through to not only make sure that they are getting a fair result, but also for the simple purpose of comfort during a stressful time.  

It is critical, however, for each litigant to understand that every case is different and rests on its own facts and circumstances.  Each set of parties are also different from case to case, and as a result, each outcome is different.  It is always important that a client understands this to be the case as we explain to them the divorce process, what the law is and how it is applied, and what reasonable expectation he or she should have as to how the results received by others.

For instance, I learned from another contributor to this blog that whenever a client asks how long their case is going to take, the answer is generally "it depends."  It depends on you.  It depends on your spouse.  It depends on the facts of your case.  While matrimonial attorneys often have a preliminary sense as to what alimony or equitable distribution may be based on prior experience, no one can look into the future to see exactly what will happen.  Most clients want the divorce process to be as short and amicable as possible, and, from what they have seen or heard, expect only the longest and most acrimonious divorce imaginable.  Thus, from the very start the client must be made aware that the length and outcome of a case depends, in large part upon the parties themselves.

There is, perhaps, no better example of when this occurs than with the issue of alimony.  This is likely because it is generally a "hot button" issue, especially in New Jersey where alimony reform has been the subject of extensive recent discussion and attempted legislative change.  Also, unlike child support, which is generally based on the formulaic child support guidelines (unless further analysis is required where the parties' collective net incomes exceed the guidelines' limit), and unlike equitable distribution, which is generally a 50/50 split of marital assets (except with the distribution of the marital interest in a business), alimony is, perhaps, subject to greater shades of gray.

One of the first questions that I am always asked when it comes to alimony is for how long the alimony will be.  The question is then usually followed by the client stating how long the marriage was and what their understanding is from other people as to when permanent alimony comes into play.  Interestingly, while the length of the marriage is certainly an important factor, litigants often seem to treat it like the only factor, despite the alimony statute listing no less than fifteen factors for consideration. 

While there are certainly some predictors and practices to help advise a client in determining what alimony may be, there is no set of alimony guidelines or formula for calculation.  Rather, there are the factors I reference above, each of which is applied to the specific facts of a given case.  Thus, while the comfort afforded to a client in speaking with their loved ones is a strong draw, we as matrimonial attorneys must instill in them the notion that no result will ever be the same (nor should it be), especially in the context of settlement, where there is commonly a give-and-take between the issues of alimony and equitable distribution.  

Thus, while getting by with a little help from friends is often essential to providing comfort, advice, and compassion in a time of need, it is the matrimonial attorney who possesses the level of expertise upon which clients rely to take them through the divorce process and achieve a desired result under the circumstances of their specific case.  

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group.  Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.   

Deciding Whether to Settle or Defend Yourself Against a Persistent and Financially Superior Spouse

Reading and considering Eric Solotoff’s blog from earlier this week regarding the benefits of settlement, it is also critical to know when to settle and, quite frankly, whether to settle at all. This especially applies to those current or former spouses who simply cannot afford to litigate against a financially superior former spouse. This situation is often referred to as litigating on an "uneven playing field."

Trying to some degree to place myself in your shoes, it can only be an extremely difficult decision whether to, once again, go up against the other party with the bottomless wallet, or just settle for what they want and get it over with. These decisions may not only have an impact on your own wallet, but also on your family's overall well being, especially if children are involved. Too often, the other party knows this to be the case, which is why they will continue to file or threaten to file motions in the hope that you will eventually "give in" under the pressure.

This blog should not be taken as a sign of encouragement to litigate a case, but rather as a cautionary note for what you, as a litigant, may be sacrificing with your decision. Ultimately, it is you who has to wake up in the morning and be comfortable with your decision, which is why having all information at your disposal is, perhaps, the most important part of the decision-making process. 

One tell tale example that comes to mind revolves around a party’s threat that he will request all available remedies, including counsel fees, if he is forced to file a motion in the event that the alleged issues do not settle.  In family law motion practice, the party filing the motion (and for that matter, the other party filing a cross motion) will almost always ask for counsel fees from the other party, with a common justification being that he was compelled to file the motion only after the other party refused to settle the issues before the court.

Simply because the issues did not settle, however, does not mean that they should have settled, or that there were even any legitimate issues at all.  Last year I was in court for oral argument after a former husband filed a motion against his former wife for a modification of his parenting time. Notably, this was no less than the fourth time that dad had sought such relief in the past two years and his annual income was no less than six times that of my client, rendering her unable to continue litigating with dad on a so-called “even playing field."

Dad, however, conveniently forgot to mention to the new trial judge that his prior requests for relief were made at all, let alone denied (despite the fact each of his prior applications and the resulting Orders were a part of the court's file).  Of course this did not stop him from asking for counsel fees on the basis that our client allegedly refused to "settle" his latest requests to modify the parenting time schedule, when, in actuality, she was simply trying to defend herself against his latest litigation onslaught.  

Fortunately, the trial judge understood what was happening and not only denied dad's requests for relief, but directed him to pay my client's counsel fees as well.  Unfortunately, I have no doubt that dad will file another motion at some point soon for the same type of relief and, if denied, will file again and again until he gets what he wants because he knows that mom simply cannot afford to keep up with him.

I recently experienced another cautionary example in the midst of oral argument on a former husband’s latest motion to reduce his child support. Similar to the dad referenced above, this litigant had been denied his requests to lower his support obligation on no less than four prior occasions, essentially filing every two years and, in this latest instance, attempting to take advantage of a new trial judge unfamiliar with the matter.  Considering his financial superiority over our client, it was not surprising that he continued to come back time and again in an effort to get what he wanted.

In this case, as is often the case, the trial court, in advance of oral argument, issued a tentative order, based solely on a review of the motion papers and opposition.  In its order, the court determined that the father had fulfilled his initial burden of proof, thereby entitling him to a period of discovery and a trial to determine if his support should be reduced. Based on the tentative order, my client requested oral argument, since, once again, the former husband’s numbers simply did not add up.

During the midst of oral argument, the other attorney asked for a brief recess after my argument and, incredibly, asked to step outside and discuss a settlement because the judge had already "given him his plenary hearing." After argument concluded approximately thirty minutes or so later, he again asked if I wanted to discuss settlement - after the judge had just indicated that he would be conducting an entirely new review of the information and alleged issues before the court. It became clear that the husband was concerned with the weaknesses of his application and was trying to quickly settle before the court made its decision and potentially denied his requested relief.

I have no doubt that, he, like dad above, will continue to litigate every year or so until he gets what he wants - via financial pressure or otherwise.

In both of these examples, our clients considering the options of defending themselves against their financially superior adversaries, or acceding to their demands, and decided to proceed.  Each case is very different from the next, as is each litigant.  Ultimately it is you, based on your own circumstances, who has to decide how to proceed.

The court is there to protect the interests of both parties and, along with that, there are ways to ensure that you do not simply have to give in to the pressure of a determined adversary. Counsel fees, sanctions, and the like are available remedies designed to even the uneven playing field, and also to discourage the other party from continuing down a path of misconduct that may seemingly never end.

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Robert Epstein is an associate in Fox Rothschild LLP's Family Law Practice Group.  Robert practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey office and can be reached at (973) 994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.    

 

THE USE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY AS A FORM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - THE APPELLATE DIVISION WEIGHS IN

The times, they are a'changing - at least when it comes to how the judicial system approaches harassment as an act of domestic violence in light of advanced technology used for communication.  In the newly reported (precedential) Appellate Division decision of L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., the Court addressed the use of electronic communications, specifically text messages, as a form of harassment.  Those claiming an act of harassment based on electronic communications might not like what the Appellate Division had to say, as detailed further below, but the decision provides a breadth of noteworthy language in shaping what is an extremely sound, rationale and common sense methodology to approach such cases in the future.

As a refresher, harassment is defined by New Jersey statute as follows:

[A] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another, he:

a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.

Addressing the struggles faced by courts in addressing harassment as an act of domestic violence, the Appellate Division noted

The facts presented here exemplify the complexity of human interactions and the strain they place on the Family Part judges as they struggle to distinguish between the cases that merit judicial intervention and those that do not.

Further addressing such difficulties in the context of modern technology and the facts at issue, the Court first provided an online definition of "texting" from www.netlingo.com as:

[t]he act of typing and sending a brief, electronic message (less than 160 characters) via a wireless network to another person so that they can view the short message on any number of mobile or handheld devices.

Providing it's first extremely notable quotation that will likely be cited time and again as these cases become more frequent, the Appellate Division noted: 

We conclude the evidence presented here shows only the convergence of modern technology and the foibles of human judgment.  Our ability to instantaneously and effortlessly send electronic messages has created a gateway unfettered by reflection and open to rash, emotionally driven decisions.  The ease and speed by which we transmit electronic messages has also created a commensurate expectation of an equally instantaneous response from the recipient.

In the case at issue, the parties utilized text messaging as a primary mode of communication about their children.  The Court acknowledged:

[T]exting provided an efficient means of exchanging information as parents, while avoiding the personal contact associated with a telephone call or a face-to-face encounter.  The limited number of words that can be sent at any one time in a text message also minimized the risk for extraneous matters to interfere with the primary dialogue of parenting.  Despite these qualities, texting is merely a tool, a means to an end.  Without reasonable cooperation, texting can lead to the frustration and misuse we witness here.  

Under such rationale, the Appellate Division found that the text messages were not sent with the requisite "purpose to harass" to establish the occurrence of harassment.  To that end, it found notable that the former wife responded only once to 18 messages sent by the husband inquiring as to the daughter's SAT scores and that if she had "simply answered" his question, he would have stopped texting.  Instead, her decision to ignore him was found to have essentially exacerbated the situation.  

The Appellate Division also found it was improper to consider texts by the husband's current wife as evidence of harassment, since there was no evidence that the husband directed his current wife to act on his behalf.  In fact, the former wife even acknowledged that the husband's only purpose in sending the texts was to inquire about the daughter, from whom he had become estranged, and that she was only "annoyed" by the texts after choosing to ignore them.  The Court even found the husband's frustration reasonable, albeit misguided, but, since it was limited to inquiries about the children, it lacked the "purpose to harass."  

Suffice it to say, L.M.F. is a fantastically interesting decision for family lawyers, standing out in this area of the law for a variety of reasons, most notable of which is its foray into the use of electronic communications as a form of harassment.  The intelligent way in which the Appellate Division approaches this issue, especially in the context of divorced spouses trying to co-parent while keeping their emotions in check, provides great guidance for both litigants and legal counsel moving forward. While it may not be as simple, as a result, to establish an incident of harassment in such a case, the decision upon review seems to come at a perfect time in the crossroads of domestic violence law and electronic communications.

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Robert Epstein is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of Fox Rothschild's Family Law Practice Group.  Robert practices throughout  New Jersey in all areas of family law and family law litigation.  You can reach Robert at (973)994-7526, or repstein@foxrothschild.com.

Three Matrimonial Appeals Decided Today - Three Reversals

The New Jersey Judiciary website provides each days published and unpublished Appellate Division decisions.  If you read this blog with any frequency, you know that we often write about the decisions that are released.  Today there were three decisions from post-judgment divorce cases.  We will likely blog in more detail about some or all of them in the future.  What is interesting is that despite the fact that historically, appeals succeed only approximately 20% of the time, there were reversals in all three cases. 

In one, alimony was modified and permanent alimony was awarded without the court holding a plenary hearing (i.e. trial) on the contested issues. 

In another, the trial judge modified child support, multiplying the old child support amount  by the percentage increase in the plaintiff's income.  The Appellate Division held that a simple mathematical calculation does not comply with the mandates of the statute and case law.  They further held that while the percentage increase is an important factor in determining the support obligation, it is not exclusive and does not relieve the trial judge of performing the required analysis
prescribed by the statute and case law.

In the third, there were conflicting certifications regarding a husband's application to reduce support and the wife's cross application for enforcement.  Not only was there no plenary hearing ordered despite conflicting certifications, there was not even oral argument on the motion allowed despite both parties requests for same.

What is the common theme in all of these cases.  The Appellate Division found that the trial court decided cases without doing all of the things that were necessary to decide the cases, most importantly, holding a hearing where there are contested facts. Trial judges are already over burdened so one can understand why they may want to cut to the chase.  While understandable, it is obviously not acceptable to the Appellate Division or the justice system in general.

Is the problem going to get worse.  There is already a shortage of judges.  In some cases, you are being told that you cannot get a trial date for years notwithstanding the "best practices" goal to resolve all cases in a year.  With the shortage of judges already and pending changes to the pension system which may cause sitting judges to retire and prevent good potential judges from wanting to become judges, one can see the problem getting worse and not better. While alternate dispute resolution like mediation and arbitration is an option to get more speedy justice and we use it all of the time, litigants are still entitled to have a free (relatively) and efficient justice system to resolve their disputes.  If dockets are over burdened already, will this become worse?

NEW APPELLATE DIVISION DECISION REGARDING PARENTING COORDINATOR GRIEVANCES AND FEES

Following on the heels of Eric Solotoff's recent blog entry addressing the use of parenting coordinators, a new published (precedential) decision from the Appellate Division talks about grievances against parenting coordinators, parenting coordinator fees, and the need for a plenary hearing to address such issues.  In Segal v. Lynch, the Appellate Division addressed these issues in the context of a long, acrimonious history of events simply regarding the parenting coordinator's involvement in the highly contentious matter.

Soon after the trial court appointed the parenting coordinator pursuant to the Parenting Coordinator Pilot Program, the plaintiff called for the coordinators removal from the matter because the coordinator had contacted the trial judge to clarify the terms of an order.  In response to the plaintiff's indication that he would file a motion to have her recused, the coordinator pointed plaintiff to the Grievance Procedure outlined in the Pilot Program Guidelines, which required that plaintiff specifically outline his grievances to the coordinator before notifying the trial court.  A major issue of contention at both the trial level and on appeal was the parenting coordinator's indication that she would charge the plaintiff for her time taken to respond to his numerous grievances. 

After the grievances could not be resolved, the plaintiff submitted his grievance letter to the trial judge, who issued an Order to Show Cause why the coordinator should not continue in the matter and why plaintiff should not pay the coordinator's fees owed.  The trial judge ultimately found for the coordinator, concluding that the plaintiff's grievances were without merit and that the coordinator herself had acted "professionally and admirably" under very difficult circumstances.

In reviewing the matter on appeal, the Appellate Division reviewed the history of the Pilot Program, discussing the positive impact of parenting coordinators in helping to resolve various day-to-day parenting issues on the parties and the court calendar.  The Court directly quoted from the Guidelines as to the parenting coordinator's role:

The parenting coordinator's goal is to aid parties in monitoring the existing parenting plan, reducing misunderstandings, clarifying priorities, exploring possibilities for compromise and developing methods of communication that promote collaboration in parenting. The parenting coordinator's role is to facilitate decision-making between the parties or make such recommendations, as may be appropriate when the parties are unable to do so. One primary goal of the parenting coordinator is to empower parents to develop and utilize effective parenting skills so that they can resume the parenting and decision-making role without the need for outside intervention. The parenting coordinator should provide guidance and direction to the parties with the primary focus on the best interests of the child by reducing conflict and fostering sound decisions that aid positive child development. 

 Further, the parenting coordinator, as noted by the Court, cannot modify any Order or Judgment without mutual consent from the parties, as memorialized in a Consent Order.  To that end, as referenced in Eric's recent blog entry, the trial court cannot abdicate its role to the parenting coordinator. 

 

The Grievance Procedure set forth in the Guidelines is also more specifically set forth as follows:

 

               (8) Grievance Procedure — A party having a complaint or grievance shall discuss the matter with the Parenting Coordinator in person in an attempt to resolve it before pursuing it in any other manner. If the issue remains unresolved, the parties shall submit a written letter to the Parenting Coordinator detailing the complaint or grievance, with a copy to the other party, to both attorneys (if any), and to the attorney for the child(ren) if one is in place. The Parenting Coordinator shall within thirty (30) days provide a written response to both parties and the attorneys. The Parenting Coordinator at his/her discretion may schedule a meeting or conference call with the attorneys or with the attorneys and the parties in an effort to resolve the complaint. In situations where the grievance or complaint is not resolved by this process, the dissatisfied party may request a court hearing to make a determination on the issue(s).

 The Appellate Division concluded that the Grievance Procedure had been properly followed, but also concluded that there existed a contractual basis (in light of the parenting coordinator's retainer agreement) for the plaintiff to pay the coordinator's time for responding to his long list of grievances.  To that end, the coordinator's response served two (2) purposes - 1) it provided a defense to the charges against her, and 2) it constituted a "report" to the trial judge, from which the judge determined the baselessness of plaintiff's claims.  It was, therefore, also, a necessary component of the parenting coordinator's role to provide such a response for which she could charge fees to prepare.  The Appellate Division similarly noted that public policy was advanced by awarding the coordinator's fees for such work, finding that the inability to charge for such a response to grievances would effectively cripple the parenting coordinator program considering the number of parties dissatisfied with the process.

 

To that end, the Appellate Division concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a plenary hearing under the Pilot Program Guidelines, but that he was limited to merely requesting a hearing.  After such a request, it is then up to the trial judge to determine if such a hearing is warranted under a given set of circumstances.  In the present case, the trial judge concluded, in the mode of summary judgment (even though it was on the trial court's Order to Show Cause where summary judgment rules do not apply) that there existed no genuine issue of material fact warranting a hearing.  The plaintiff's act of simply referring to the coordinator as a liar did not justify a hearing.

 

Similarly, the Appellate Division concluded that the Guidelines also did not call for the holding of a hearing to resolve a pay dispute for fees incurred by the coordinator in performing her standard coordinator services (beyond responding to plaintiff's grievances).  The trial judge was found to not have simply "rubber stamped" the coordinator's requested amount of fees.  Rather, he conducted a searching review of the voluminous submissions before him in concluding that the services performed and amount charged by the coordinator were reasonable, and, as a result, no hearing was necessary.

 

While a parenting coordinator can serve a highly useful purpose under certain circumstances, this matter conveys how both parties must be willing to cooperate with the process, and how questioning the coordinator's role and performance might be a costly price to pay should a party's grievances not be resolved before a trial court addresses the matter.

 

HOW TO PREPARE FOR THAT INITIAL DIVORCE CONSULTATION

Visiting a divorce attorney for an initial consultation can be a difficult and intimidating proposition.  For some, it is the realization that their marriage may be over.  For others, it is simply the discussion of such deeply personal matters with a stranger.

Nerves or trepidation aside, the main purpose of the initial consultation is to learn about the process and understand what your rights and obligations could be.  The law is never black and white but has many shades of gray.  A good consultation will explain the black and white and touch upon the relevant areas of gray. 

The initial consultation is also important because this process lets you interview your potential counsel.  Not only is it important that you find the attorney you plan to hire to be competent and best able to represent your interests, but its important that you also like your potential counsel.  Sounds trivial but keep in mind that your divorce lawyer is someone who is quickly going to learn the good and the bad of you and your most personal relationship, your marriage.  Secrets aren't helpful and a level of trust is required.

So what can you do to make sure you get the most out of this initial consultation and at the same time provide counsel the relevant and important information needed?  Here are some suggestions:

1. While tempting, the initial consultation may not always be the appropriate time to divulge the day to day history of your 20 year relationship with your spouse.  Use the time wisely.  We ask prospective clients to complete an initial questionnaire providing us with relevant information.  This questionnaire serves as a road map so the important facts are not overlooked.

2. Be honest.  Answer all questions honestly remembering that the answers you provide will guide the attorney's responses.

3. Be familiar with your finances.  Bring, or at least review, your last 3 tax returns, pay stubs, W-2's, K-1's, business tax returns (or at least know the names of business entities), and if possible, create a list of assets and debts. 

4. Think about your main concerns before the meeting.  Consider writing down those questions you feel you need answered before you can proceed.  This will help you to get that information you are meeting with an attorney to receive.

5. Keep an open mind.  Attorneys are not magicians.  Not every question may be answerable at the initial consultation.  Sometimes further information or research is needed.  You don't just want an answer, you want the correct answer.

6. Be prepared.  Not all facts will favor your case.  Part of the initial consultation is to learn the strengths and weaknesses of your position and what may lie ahead in the divorce process.

A good initial consultation will be informative and comforting.  You should walk away having questions answered and armed with information that will hep you decide your next steps.  The attorney should walk away with the same.  As the process unfolds, more information will be revealed and/or strategy may change.  Working together, you can ease the stress that divorce will surely bring. 

FEARS OF A SUPPORTED SPOUSE - MAINTAINING THE "STATUS QUO" DURING A DIVORCE PROCEEDING

Perhaps its the stress of family life during the holiday season, but many clients of late have claimed that the supporting spouse has stopped supporting the family as he did during the marriage.  The reasons are varied, but often of the same cloth - i.e., the payor spouse claims that he is now earning less money than before, the payor spouse claims that the payee spouse is overspending (despite there being no change from the marital lifestyle) and believes that the supported spouse should get a job after having never worked during the marriage, or, most egregiously, that they simply believe that the marriage is over and a support obligation is over unless a Court directs otherwise.

These situations often leave the supported spouse afraid and wondering how they are going to meet everyday expenses for herself and the kids, while also litigating a divorce matter against their financially superior spouse.  Often this is part of the supporting spouse's underlying strategy - economic coercion, i.e., essentially trying to force the supported spouse to settle under his terms without going through a protracted litigation.

It is those hardball tactics, however, that often create the protracted litigation sought to be avoided.  New Jersey's support statutes and case law dictate that the "status quo" lived during the marriage is to be maintained during the divorce process.  This does not only mean that the supporting spouse will continue to contribute as he did during the marriage.  Insurances and beneficiaries on assets will be maintained, and commonly, restraints on assets will be imposed to prevent a sudden transfer or spending of money.  In addition, the supported spouse will often need counsel fees to litigate on an "even playing field" with the supporting spouse to avoid the coercive situation I described above.

Case Information Statements play a critical role in resolving these situations, whether by amicable settlement or as part of what is called a motion for pendente lite support (support during the proceedings).  The Case Information Statement or "CIS" must be filed by each party early on after the filing of a Complaint for Divorce.  It contains a section known as Part D, under which there are three Schedules - A, B and C.  These schedules require the party to fill in all expenses on a monthly basis as to the marital lifestyle, as well as the person's current lifestyle, including fixed costs (such as the mortgage and utilities) and miscellaneous expenses that come as part of everyday life - even down to hair care and dry cleaning. 

The task of completing the CIS can be daunting, but it is a pivotal component to resolving any pendente lite support issues because it aids in demonstrating how much support you will need as the supported spouse during the divorce proceedings (as well as assist in litigating long-term financial issues beyond the proceeding).  Inevitably, even though the CIS is signed under oath, the parties will almost always have contrasting lifestyle expenses, often with the supported spouse having a higher lifestyle than that set forth by the supporting spouse.  From there, whether the issues will resolve amicably without having to file a motion depends on the parties, the lawyers, and a given set of facts.

If the matter does not resolve amicably, the supported spouse is generally left with no choice but to file a motion to have a court address and resolve the issues.  It can safely be said that such a motion is often the most important one that will be filed in a given case.  In the client's eyes, filing a motion is a daunting task, as the client has to evaluate whether they want to proceed in such a fashion, spend the money to have counsel prepare and argue the motion - all without knowing what she will end up once the matter is in the hands of a trial judge.  Plus, the other spouse will almost always not merely oppose the motion, but file for relief of his own, such as a set parenting time schedule.  The trial judge will read certifications from each party containing various allegations and exhibits that may be difficult for the parties to see on paper as the life stories has been laid bare for the court.  It is then up to the court, after hearing oral argument from the lawyers, to make findings of fact and decisions after oral argument.

What will the ultimate result be?  Your legal counsel will hopefully have advised you in advance as to what may or may not happen.  Whether the trial judge believes your certified statements as to the marital lifestyle and your needs (as well as those of the children) to continue maintaining the "status quo" during the divorce proceeding cannot be predicted. 

As this is one of the most important, if not the most important motion filed during the proceeding, a client must ensure that they have retained counsel capable of understanding the issues, what to ask for, how to present your case, and, oftentimes, demonstrating an empathy for your position.  The mechanisms in place that I have described above exist to protect the supported spouse and eliminate or reduce the fear experienced when litigating in what may feel like a difficult position from the outset.

A BUSY WEEK FOR CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES CONTINUES

Following on the heels of an earlier blog entry this week addressing "alimony escalators" in the context of proving a change in circumstances meriting a decreased alimony obligation, a new unreported (not precedential) decision from the Appellate Division in the matter of Eick v. Eick, found that the husband had fulfilled his initial "changed circumstances" burden meriting the matter being sent back to the trial court for a plenary hearing on the issue. 

In Eick, the husband was a self-employed bookbinder who was obligated to pay permanent alimony to his former spouse pursuant to a February 2007 property settlement agreement in the amount of $1,500 per month, as well as $2,000 per month in child support for the parties' two younger children (a number agreed upon that went beyond the child support guidelines calculation).  Critically, the PSA established that such figures were based on an income of $117,000 for the husband and $29,000 for the defendant.  As an important aside, it is important in any settlement agreement to note what incomes were utilized to determine support so that a baseline figure exists should the issue arise in the future.

In March 2009, the payor husband filed a motion to reduce his support obligations based on an alleged change in circumstances - a claim that his business had "declined dramatically" due to online research tools utilized by many clients that rendered the need for his services substantially diminished.  He also claimed that his business had suffered due to the growth of imported bond printed material, as well as the general downturn in the economy. 

Interestingly, the former husband supported his application by submitting the report of an employability expert, who concluded that, while he could learn new skills, changing careers was not a realistic possibility after 27 years in the bookbinding business.  The report further concluded that his best option was to stay in his industry, anticipate a continued decrease in business volume, revenue and earnings, and consult with a career counselor or business consultant to determine available options.

In reversing and remanding the trial court's decision denying the husband's modification motion, the Appellate Division noted that not only had his income decreased, but that the wife's income had "significantly increased" - an undisputed fact set forth in the wife's Case Information Statement that the trial court failed to address.  The Appellate Division also concluded that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as to whether the husband's decreased earning situation was of a permanent or temporary nature, since a temporary situation is not enough to merit a changed circumstances finding.  Even though the trial court noted that the bookbinding industry had undergone difficult times when the PSA was entered, the judge also noted that the situation was further "complicated" by the downward economy.  As a result, the trial court's denial of the husband's application was reversed and remanded for a plenary hearing.

CALIFORNIA'S "PROP 8" STRUCK DOWN BY FEDERAL COURT

In what could be the precursor to a long-awaited battle before the United States Supreme Court, a federal court in California today struck down as unconstitutional the controversial, voter-approved "Proposition 8" law banning same sex marriage.  Analysts of the 136-page opinion have suggested that it is so carefully and thoughtfully drafted that the Highest Court in the Land may find itself up against the wall should it seek to overturn its findings and conclusions in the future. 

The federal court judge found that Prop 8 essentially required discrimination in its implementation on the basis of both sex and sexual orientation with an enforced notion that "gays and lesbians are not as good as heterosexuals."  From a constitutional law standpoint, the law did not live up to even the most lenient "rational basis" test (i.e., the law is not rationally related to a legitimate state intertest) to pass muster under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. 

In what can only be described as the sort of monumental rhetoric that will likely be remembered for years to come, the opinion concluded in response to supporters of the law who argued that same-sex marriage violates the fundamental notions of marriage and procreation, "Tradition alone, however, cannot form the rational basis for a law."

Interesting, however, is that the same federal judge immediately stayed his own decision, pending appeals by supporters of the now unconstitutional law.

We will continue to update this blog as details unfold.  For an earlier blog entry on this topic, click here and here.

VETERAN'S DISABILITY PENSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY DEEMED INCOME FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING ALIMONY

In an unreported (non-precedential) decision in the case of Brown v. Brown  released on May 25, 2010, the Appellate Division determined that veterans disability benefits and social security benefits are income for purposes of determining alimony.  In this appeal of an Order that granted some alimony reduction but not as much as the former husband sought, the facts are not particularly interesting.  That said, what was interesting was that the reduction was not as much sought (and in actuality, the ex-husband sought an elimination of alimony, because the court considered the veteran's disability pension and Social Security over his objection.  In fact, he tried to argue that the spendthrift provisions (provisions that prevent creditors from attacking certain assets/benefits) in the relevant federal laws prevent such consideration but the Court noted that a spouse seeking support was not a creditor within the meaning of the law.

The matter was, however, remanded because the trial court did not analyze the statutory factors when reducing the support.  As noted in my blog last week about the Walsh case, when dealing with a motion to modify alimony, once the Court determines ta ht there is a change of circumstances, they have to look at the needs of both parties.  In fact, if the Court makes an initial finding of a change of circumstances, the court must analyze how much the alimony should be in a modification application the same way it would in an initial alimony application.   

STAR LEDGER ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING AND DIVORCE

Following up on my recent blog entry talking about the impact of social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace on the world of divorce, a recent article from the Star Ledger by Sue Epstein (no relation despite our interest in the same topic) discusses how divorcing couples are turning to these websites for evidence to use in their matrimonial proceedings or to simply talk about the divorce itself.  The article states that more than 80% of the nation's top divorce attorneys have seen an increase in cases involving social networking evidence pursuant to a survey by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, with more than 66% of such evidence found on the ever popular and enduring Facebook. 

Evidence found on these sites may be used for any number of purposes.  Examples cited in the article include using evidence found on a child's Facebook page in a custody proceeding, to locate a person to simply serve them with a divorce complaint, to prove adultery where the party lists themselves in their site profile as "single," or even to prove wealth or ownership of assets when the ability to pay support is in dispute. 

Children all too often are dragged into their parents' divorce disputes, and, not uncommonly, encounter postings by their parents on Facebook and other sites discussing the other spouse, the divorce, and the like.  Oftentimes parties do not realize that not only can potentially hundreds, to thousands of people see the postings, but their children can as well.  The emotional impact of such a finding can be dramatic, in addition to impacting the outcome of a custody dispute. 

As I suggested in my prior posting, posting anything about yourself on these social networking sites essentially makes your life an "open book."  To do so in the context of divorce or custody proceeding, however, may ultimately play a part in determining the outcome of your case.     

EDITOR'S NOTE:  Whether it is Facebook, MySpace, emails or text messages, people often tend to be their own worst enemies in divorce, emboldened to put certain things in writing that they would never say at loud.  Once something is in writing and is either posted on the internet or the "send" button is clicked, it is potentially around forever.  All to often, these items create excellent evidence for various purposes in a divorce.  So if you are going through a divorce, a good idea is to get off of Facebook and/or Myspace, or if you wont, at least be very judicious in what you disclose. Consider not posting pictures of your children especially if that will lead to a battle.  Don't disclose you relationship status and post frequent updates about it.  Carefully read and re-read emails to your spouse, ex-spouse and others to make sure that they are not provocative or can otherwise be used against you.  Think "less is more" or "Joe Friday" ("just the facts.")  The case you save can be your own.  Eric S. Solotoff

SHORT SALE FOR CASH? AGGRESSIVE PLAN MAY HELP DIVORCING COUPLES

On April 5th, the struggling housing market will face a new ally in the form of a short sale program being aggressively pushed by the Obama Administration to help millions of home owners escape from mortgage debt by selling their homes for less than the balance of the mortgage while receiving an additional monetary payment to do so.  As the government's attempts to assist homeowners struggling to make their mortgage payments have only slightly helped according to a recent article in the New York Times, the new program will pay $1,500 to the short selling homeowners to "relocate."

The benefits of the plan are hoped to be widespread, as lenders will ideally receive more money than with a foreclosure, the borrowers will experience a softer hit to their credit - including the lender's assurance that they will not later be sued for an unpaid mortgage balance - and fewer homes will be empty on the foreclosure market.  To protect from cases of fraud, lenders will utilize real estate agents, who will determine a home's value and, by correlation, the minimum acceptable sale price.  Adding another layer to this new system, the agent's determined value will not even be shared with the home owner, but the lender is required to accept any offer equal to or higher to such value.  What happens when a home owner has multiple mortgages on a single property, however, remains unclear.

From a family law standpoint, this plan provides the sort of good news that divorcing spouses struggling with what to do with their "under water" marital residence are looking for.  Whether it actually fulfills that glimmer of promise, however, remains unclear.  In the down real estate market, how to equitably distribute the home has proven challenging.  Oftentimes, neither party can afford to continue residing in the marital home, refinancing is unavailable due to the negative equity, neither party wants to face the credit hit of a foreclosure, and there is no money to cover the shortfall debt that might result where the house is sold for a price lower than the outstanding mortgage.

Short sales with a guarantee that the lender will not come after the borrowers such as that in the President's plan are therefore a desirable way out.  Short sales generally tend to be a risky, slow moving process with no guarantees.  With the Obama Administration's new plan to boost the housing market, hopefully such situations will take a turn for the better.

CHILD CUSTODY, ALIMONY & PRO SE LITIGANTS

The old adage is that “He who represents himself has a fool for a client.” Family law by nature is an emotional area of the law - custody, alimony, equitable distribution, visitation, child support – these things impact peoples’ lives. As a result, when a party disagrees with the decision by the trial court, they have the right to appeal. When the Appellate Division issues a published decision, that decision becomes binding on all trial courts in the State. Thus, family law is constantly changing and evolving. 

For instance, in a recent unpublished appellate decision, a pro se litigant appealed a post-judgment order relating to alimony and custody. In R.K.B. v. C.W.B., App. Div., decided February 8, 2010, Docket No. A-1613-08T1, a pro se defendant, CWB, appealed from an order that: 1) denied his request for a hearing on custody of the parties' son; 2) found defendant in violation of litigant's rights and ordered him to pay plaintiff the sum of $5,000 due as reimbursement alimony; 3) restrained him from discussing court proceedings with his son; and 4) directed him to pay $1,750 to plaintiff as attorney's fees. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision, finding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. In addition, the Appellate Court noted that the defendant failed to present sufficient facts to justify a hearing on child custody.

This type of appeal is quite common in family law and like many others, the decision can provide insight and guidance on how to help clients litigate their cases in the future. For instance in R.K.B. v. C.W.B., CWB alleged that there was change of circumstance relating to custody of the parties child. CWB represented, among other things, that because it had been four years since the trial court had determined custody that there was a change of circumstance. The Appellate Division found that mere passage of time and change of the child’s age is not enough to find a change of circumstance or warrant a plenary hearing. (There is other case law out there that says the exact opposite with regard to child support.)

CWB also argued that his child wanted to live with him, as opposed to his mother.  Although this may have been true, the trial judge failed to entertain this argument because it was not something CWB could testify to because it could not be supported by “competent, credible evidence.” While the right to appeal exists for all litigants, knowing how to properly file and argue the legal issues in an appeal is an entirely different story.

Due Process vs. Final Restraining Order

The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, NJSA 2C:25-17 to 35, is the law that governs domestic violence issues in New Jersey, including the issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders (“TROs”) and Final Restraining Orders (“FROs”). The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act was enacted to protect victims of domestic violence. Unfortunately, some individuals abuse the protections offered by the Domestic Violence Act and use it as a weapon in divorce proceedings. While many times the issuance of an FRO is appropriate, there are other times when it is clear that the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act has been abused.     

If a person is a victim of domestic violence, they can obtain a TRO by contacting the local police (at anytime) or going to the county courthouse (during business hours) and explaining the circumstances by which they have been abused. At that time a judge will determine if the facts warrant the issuance of the TRO. If the judge decides that the conduct is sufficient to warrant the TRO, the accused alleged abuser will be served with the TRO, which will order the individual not to contact the victim or anyone else that needs protecting, which may include children, family members, friends, etc. Once the TRO is issued, an FRO hearing is scheduled shortly thereafter.   The FRO hearing is before a Superior Court Judge and will be conducted at the county courthouse. At the FRO hearing, a judge will determine if an FRO is necessary to protect the alleged victim of the domestic violence or if the TRO was incorrectly issued and no FRO is necessary. While the TRO is usually issued ex parte or without any input from the alleged abuser, at the FRO hearing the alleged abuser has the opportunity to testify, call witnesses, present evidence, and most importantly be represented by an attorney.   

In a recent unpublished decision, M.C.B. v. Victoria Vartanian, decided February 5, 2010, Appellate Division, Victoria Vartanian allegedly harassed and threatened her ex-boyfriend M.C.B.     M.C.B. contacted the police and had a judge issue a TRO. The TRO was served upon Ms. Vartanian, but only one day before the FRO hearing. The following day, at the FRO hearing the judge failed to advise Ms. Vartanian that: (1) there were consequences associated with the issuance of the FRO; (2) she had the right to counsel; (3) had the right to seek an adjournment to find counsel; and (4) had the right to subpoena witnesses and generally prepare for the hearing. As a result, notwithstanding the trial judge granted the FRO, the Appellate Division ordered a new hearing because Ms. Vartanian was not afforded the minimum requirements of due process (a right guaranteed by the Constitution).   

Every individual has a right to protect their Constitutional rights, even when they are accused of domestic violence. While I am a staunch opponent of domestic violence, the issuance of an FRO can have long-lasting implications on the alleged abuser. If going to be issued, it should be after due process is granted.

UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE IN SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CONTROLS OUTCOME

Oftentimes parties will sign an agreement settling all issues in their divorce matter only for one party to subsequently try to back away from those terms for any number of reasons.  Is it just that easy for a party to essentially change its mind?  The simple answer is generally no.  New Jersey has a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of fair and equitable agreements entered into on a consensual and voluntary basis.  If the agreement is somehow the product of fraud, unconscionable or otherwise demonstrates one party's effort to take advantage of the other, then the law provides the wronged party with an opportunity to "set aside" or "vacate" the agreement.  

What about those cases where there is no such wrongdoing?  Since marital settlement agreements are contracts and, as a result, generally enforced, Courts in this State will look to the terms of the agreement and apply basic contractual principles when addressing one party's claim as to the agreement's (or that provision's) enforceability.  For instance, where the agreement's language is unambiguous and the Court is called upon to interpret the terms at issue, the Court will not consider external (or "parol") evidence, such as, perhaps, oral discussions had at the time of the agreement's signing.  It will simply apply and interpret the terms before it.

This was the case in Dell'Osa v. Dell'Osa, a recent, unpublished (not precedential) Appellate Division decision where the husband claimed that the trial court improperly divided the parties' retirement accounts because his accounts were comprised of pre-tax funds while the wife's were comprised of after-tax funds.  The husband claimed that, as a result of this account structure, two Orders (known as Qualified Domestic Relations Orders or "QDROs") were needed to fairly divide the accounts, rather than just the Court dividing the accounts without such an Order to his claimed monetary disadvantage.

Affirming the trial court's decision, the Appellate Division found the settlement agreement language unambiguous as to this issue, finding that the agreement merely acknowledged the pre-tax and after-tax retirement contributions of the parties without requiring any equitable distribution to factor in a tax adjustment.  In its affirmance, the Appellate Division emphasized the notion that "A court may not make a better contract for either party than the one the parties drafted."  The Court also looked to other terms of the agreement in concluding that its interpretation of the unambiguous language was consistent with the terms of the agreement as a whole.

GOLDMAN SAGA CONTINUES

One would have hoped that Sean Goldman's return to the United States with father David Goldman would have been the end of this years-long international saga.  Sadly, however, that may not be the case.  News reports yesterday indicated that 9-year old Sean's Brazilian family will fight to regain "custody" of Sean, which is interesting since the family's actions and that of the boy's now deceased ex-wife really constituted an international abduction, thus leading to the boy's ultimate Court-Ordered return. 

After the family previously indicated that the fight was over, lawyers for the family will push to have the Brazilian court hear the boy's wishes after all - indicating as much on the same day that the boy returned home to Tinton Falls, New Jersey, claiming that it was "our home" when seeing the house where he will live once again.  Since the Supreme Court in Brazil does not convene until February, it would not be able to hear the family's arguments before then.

How the Brazilian family's ongoing legal actions will impact their likely future claim for visitation is unclear, as even their decision to publicly parade Sean through the streets in Brazil on the way to the United States consulate on Christmas Eve has been roundly criticized and, according to David Goldman, was a traumatic experience for Sean.  The family, however, has substantial financial resources and will likely fight this losing battle, seemingly at the wishes of Sean's maternal grandmother, until there is no avenue untapped.  For an additional prior blog post on this topic regarding Sean's return, click here as well.  Stay tuned for further details.

EDITOR'S NOTE:  We have previously blogged on grandparent visitation on several occasions.  Grandparent visitation is difficult to obtain in New Jersey following the US Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville and the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Moriarty v. Bradt and the cases that followed it.  Given the constitutional protections of the rights of a parent to parent their child(ren) free from interference from third parties, grandparents now must prove actual harm to the child if they do not receive visitation.  While on one hand, the death of a parent (as was the case in Moriarty) would be a factor in the grandmother's visitation request here on one hand, the abduction and the history in this case may mitigate that factor.  Moreover, one wonders whether, despite the harm that may be able to be proved in this case, given the circumstances surrounding the child's alleged bond with the grandmother and step father, that visiitation with these people who were allegedly part of the ordeal that kept father and son apart for several years, would overcome the harm.  ERIC S. SOLOTOFF

Child Support Guidelines - Attach the Worksheet

One of the most common questions people ask when settling their divorce matter is, how do we figure out what the child support payment is going to be?  Well, as set forth in one of our recent blog posts found here, Child Support Guidelines in New Jersey control where parties combined net after tax income is less than approximately $185,000.  As also set forth in that prior entry, while a custodial parent cannot bargain away their right to child support and there generally cannot be an agreement to pay less than that set forth in the Guidelines, there may be an enforceable agreement to pay more.  Apparently, an agreement to pay more may hold true even where the number agreed upon was inadvertently higher than required.

In resolving child support, it is critical for the settling parties to set forth in the Marital Settlement Agreement the basis for how child support was reached - such as whether support was calculated pursuant to the Guidelines, as well as attach to the Agreement the Child Support Guidelines worksheet itself.  This will clarify whether the child support number set forth in the Agreement was part of an overall settlement of the parties' parenting and financial issues or, by contrast, a unilateral or mutual mistake of the parties.

The perils of not following these basic steps can be costly, as recently addressed by the Appellate Division in Haskoor v. Haskoor.  There, the parties entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement resolving their custody and financial issues.  A weekly child support amount was included, as well as terms addressing the husband's parenting time.  Less than 2 years after following the divorce, the wife sought to reduce the husband's parenting time while increasing his child support obligation.  In responding, the husband indicated that it was at that time that he first realized that the "sole parenting worksheet" rather than the "shared parenting worksheet" had been used to calculate child support in the settlement agreement, thereby obligating him to pay a higher level of child support.  The husband also argued that the sole parenting worksheet applied used the wrong amount of alimony.   

In affirming the trial court's denial of the husband's motion, the Appellate Division relied on principles of finality and equitability associated with settlement agreements negotiated between parties, noting that the husband had agreed to the child support set forth in the PSA as part of the overall settlement.  Notably, the PSA did not state that support had been calculated pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, nor did it refer to any prepared support worksheet.  Interestingly, the Appellate Division noted that, even if there did exist some form of mistake, rescission of the entire agreement, rather than a mere decrease in his child support obligation as sought by the husband, would be the proper remedy. 

The recent blog post referenced above addressed the Appellate Division's decision in Foster v. McGee, which dealt with a related scenario.  There, the husband had researched child support when the parties settled, proposing a number he thought was in line with the Guidelines.  The settlement agreement, unlike that in Haskoor, even indicated that the support level was determined after considering the Guidelines.  Ultimately, however, the husband miscalculated support, obligating himself to a far higher weekly payment number than what the Guidelines called for.  That circumstance was somewhat different from the situation in Haskoor where the husband, who was represented by counsel, allegedly did not realize that the wrong Guidelines worksheet was attached, having left the preparation of calculations to his attorney. 

Ultimately, both cases produced the same result - no relief to the husband despite an argument that a mistake had been made.  As indicated at the beginning of this entry, the lessons to be learned include 1) detailing in the settlement agreement a basis for how child support was reached; and 2) an attachment of the Guidelines worksheet to clear up any claim of mistake.

 

Divorce From Bed and Board - New Jersey's Answer to Legal Separation?

Many times I have been asked whether New Jersey has a form of legal separation.  The answer?  The closest form of legal separation is what is known by statute as divorce from "bed and board," also known as a "limited divorce."  In simple terms, it means that two spouses have obtained a divorce from a financial standpoint, but they are still actually, legally married.  Assets are distributed, support is determined.  Notably, both parties must agree and request to a divorce in this form pursuant to the divorce from bed and board statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-6. 

The statute even says that the grounds upon which the divorce is based are the same available in a standard divorce situation.  As the parties are still legally married, they can then later reconcile, apply for a revocation or suspension of the Judgment of Divorce or, should no reconciliation occur, either may apply to the court for a conversion of the divorce from bed and board to that of a standard divorce "from the bounds of matrimony."  The conversion application must be granted to the requesting party.   A divorce from bed and board allows each party to acquire property free of the rights that the other party would have if there were no divorce in place.  Similarly, such a divorce prevents a spouse from inheriting the other spouse's property at that spouse's death where there existed no Will.

This type of divorce was recently at issue in Pipitone v. Pipitone, an unreported (not precedential) decision from the Appellate Division holding that the bed and board statute does not mandate that an alimony award, entered into years after the bed and board divorce, must be deemed retroactive to the date of the bed and board divorce order.  Simply put, such an award is prospective only.  The Appellate Division reasoned that, in a situation where one spouse attempts to convert a bed and board divorce into an divorce from the bounds of matrimony or "absolute" divorce, there is an opportunity to revisit the support and distribution terms of the prior property settlement agreement.

While the property acquisition freedom associated with a bed and board divorce may be beneficial to some, many people avoid this antiquated concept and prefer to end the bonds of matrimony with an absolute divorce so that the legal attachment to the other that remains with a bed and board divorce no longer exists.